JOSEPH  MCOOHOUGH 


THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


Lft  knero'eHyc  grew  from  more  to  iMoy?t 
£nt  more  of  reverence  in  us  dwell ; 
That  mind  and  soul,  according  well, 

Afav  make  one  music  as  bejoret 

But  vzfier   •    2    *    •    • 

IN  MEMORIAL 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW, 


BY   THE   DUKE   OF   ARGYLL. 


SECOND  AMERICAN  FROM  THE  FIFTH  LONDON  EDITION. 


NEW   YORK: 

GEORGE     ROUTLEDGE     &     SONS, 
416   BROOME   STREET. 


A7 


MORSE 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION. 


T  N  preparing  a  Fifth  Edition  of  this  work, 
I  have  to  acknowledge  the  favour  —  far 
greater  than  I  expected — with  which  it  has  been 
received.  The  argument  which  it  maintains  is 
at  variance  -  with  the  philosophy  of  some  of  the 
most  active  and  popular  thinkers  of  the  time ; 
and  on  a  few  important  points  it  deviates  from 
the  view  commonly  adopted  by  men  with  whom 
I  am  more  generally  agreed.  Some  adverse 
comment  was  therefore  not  only  to  be  expected 
but  desired.  Most  sincerely  do  I  thank  those 
who,  in  numerous  Journals  and  Reviews,  have 
undertaken  this  duty,  for  the  uniformly  courteous 
and  even  kindly  spirit  in  which  their  criticisms 
have  been  expressed. 


VI  PREFACE   TO   THE   FIFTH   EDITION. 

|  In  this  Edition  no  alteration  has  been  made 
involving  any  change  of  principle  or  opinion. 
Here  and  there  words  have  been  added  or  re- 
moved according  as  individual  passages  appear 
to  have  been  misunderstood.  Throughout  some 
of  the  chapters  substantial  additions  have  been 
made  in  reply,  direct  or  indirect,  to  my  principal 
opponents,  whilst  discussions,  more  detailed  than 
were  suitable  for  the  text,  have  been  committed 
to  Notes  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 

These  additions  and  Notes  have  reference  chiefly 
to  the  following  articles  which  appeared  in  review 
of  the  «  Reign  of  Law  :  "— 

I  •  1st.  An  Article,  by  Mr.  Alfred  R.  Wallace,  in 
the  Quarterly  Journal  of  Science,  for  October 
1867.  This  article  is  in  defence  and  illustration 
of  Mr.  Darwin's  "  Theory  on  the  Origin  of  Species." 
The  eminence  of  Mr.  Wallace  as  a  Naturalist,  the 
extent  of  his  researches  in  some  of  the  most  re- 
markable Faunas  of  the  world,  and  the  fact  that, 


PREFACE  TO  THE   FIFTH   EDITION.  Vll 

before  the  publication  of  Mr.  Darwin's  book,  he 
had  come  to  kindred,  if  not  identical  conclusions, — 
all  render  him  peculiarly  competent  to  defend  the 
"  Theory,"  and  to  present  it  in  the  strongest  light. 
I  have  therefore  added  to  the  text  several  passages 
suggested  by  the  challenge  he  makes,  and  by  the 
reasoning  he  employs.  A  further  discussion  of  his 
paper  will  be  found  in  Note  A. 

2d.  An  Article,  by  Mr.  George  H.  Lewes,  in  the 
Fortnightly  Review,  for  July,  1867,  dealing  with 
the  main  argument  and  conclusion  of  this  work 
from  the  well-known  point  of  view  of  the  "  Positive 
Philosophy."  Wherever  in  the  text  there  seemed 
a  fitting  place  for  doing  so,  I  have  inserted  pas- 
sages which  deal  with  the  reasoning  of  his  paper, 
or  with  the  same  reasoning  as  it  appears  in  a  more 
systematic  form  in  the  Prolegomena  to  Mr.  Lewes's 
"  History  of  Philosophy." 

3d.  An  Article  in  the  Dublin  Review,  for  April 
1867,  which  I  am  permitted  to  attribute  to  the 


Vlll  PREFACE   TO   THE    FIFTH    EDITION. 

learned  editor  of  that  periodical,  Dr.  Ward.  The 
more  special  object  of  his  adverse  comment  is  the 
view  I  have  taken  of  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will — 
a  doctrine  which  Dr.  Ward,  with  some  warmth, 
accuses  me  of  having  virtually  abandoned  whilst 
professing  to  defend  it.  A  slight  alteration  in  the 
text  may  perhaps  help  to  remove  some  objections, 
which  rest  entirely  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
sense  in  which  particular  words  are  used.  But 
behind  and  beyond  any  misunderstanding  of  this 
kind,  there  lies  apparently  a  substantial  difference 
in  respect  to  which  my  view  remains  unaltered. 
This  difference  will  be  found  discussed  in  Note  F, 
at  the  end  of  the  volume. 

4th.  An  Article  in  the  Contemporary  Review, 
for  May  1867,  by  Mr.  J.  P.  Mahaffy.  With 
reference  to  his  observations,  as  well  as  to  those 
of  some  other  critics,  I  have  somewhat  expanded 
several  passages  which  deal  with  the  Supernatural, 
and  with  the  various  relations  in  which  miracles 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIFTH    EDITION.  IX 

have  been  conceived  to  stand  towards  the  "  Reign 
of  Law."  I  have  also,  in  a  special  Note  (G),  replied 
to  a  criticism  in  this  paper,  referring  to  the  subject 
of  Necessity  and  Free  Will. 

Other  Notes  have  been  added  in  illustration  or 
support  of  various  passages  in  the  text. 

As  regards  the  intention  I  had  at  one  time 
entertained  of  adding  a  chapter  on  "Law  in 
Christian  Theology,"  further  reflection  has  only 
confirmed  me  in  the  feeling  that  this  is  a  subject 
which  cannot  be  adequately  dealt  with  in  such 
a  form.  I  can  only  again  ask  my  readers  to 
remember  that  although  some  ideas  which  belong 
to  this  subject,  or  touch  it  at  various  points,  cannot 
be,  and  have  not  been,  avoided,  yet  the  desire  and 
intention  to  postpone  it,  in  so  far  as  it  was  possible 
to  do  so,  has  left  blanks  which  every  careful  eye 
must  see. 

INVERARAY,  Jan.  1868. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


OOME  portions  of  this  work  have  already 
appeared  at  various  times  in  the  Edin- 
burgh Review,  in  Good  Words,  and  in  Addresses 
to  the  Royal  Society  of  Edinburgh  during  the 
years  in  which  I  had  the  honour  of  being  Pre- 
sident of  that  Body.  The  deep  interest  of  the 
matter  dealt  with  in  those  Papers  has  induced 
me  to  expand  them,  to  add  new  chapters  on 
other  aspects  of  the  same  subject,  and  to  pub- 
lish the  whole  in  a  connected  form. 

Among  many  other  deficiencies  which  may  be 
observed  in  this  Volume,  there  is  one  which 
demands  explanation,  lest  a  serious  misunder- 
standing should  arise.  I  had  intended  to  con- 


Xll  PREFACE   TO  THE   FIRST   EDITION. 

elude  with  a  chapter  on  "Law  in  Christian 
Theology."  It  was  natural  to  reserve  for  that 
chapter  all  direct  reference  to  some  of  the 
most  fundamental  facts  of  Human  nature. 
Yet  without  such  reference  the  Reign  of  Law, 
especially  in  the  "Realm  of  Mind,"  cannot 
even  be  approached  in  some  of  its  very 
highest  and  most  important  aspects.  For  the 
present,  however,'  I  have  shrunk  from  entering 
upon  questions  so  profound,  of  such  critical  im- 
port, and  so  inseparably  connected  with  religious 
controversy.  In  the  absence  of  any  attempt 
to  deal  with  this  great  branch  of  the  inquiry, 
as  well  as  in  many  other  ways,  I  am  painfully 
conscious  of  the  narrow  range  of  this  work.  I 
can  only  offer  it'  as  a  very  small  contribution 
to  the  discussion  of  a  boundless  subject. 

INVERARAY  October,  i860. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   SUPERNATURAL. 

Paga 

The  term  Supernatural  employed  in  different  and  contradic- 
tory senses    I 

The  Natural  casting  out  the  Supernatural  .  ' 3 

Nature,  in  its  widest  sense,  to  be  understood  as  including  all 
causal  agencies,  especially  Man's  Mind  and  Will  .     .     .     .    5,  6 

Man's  agency  the  most  Natural  of  all  agencies 7 

Man's  Mind  and  Will  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  Super- 
natural             8 

Relation  of  Man's  agency  to  the  physical  laws  of  Nature    .     .       1 1 
"Supernatural"  power — Is  it  Power  independent  of  the  use 

of  means? 14 

Relation  of   God   to  the   rules  of  His   Government  called 

"Laws" 15 

Mansel's  position,  that  a  Miracle  is  a  Superhuman  work     .     .       18 
Gibbon's  attempt  to  account  for  the  spread  of  Christianity  by 

Natural  causes 20 

Preservation   of  the  Jews  by  means   employed   to   effect  a 

Divine  Purpose ib. 

Nothing   in   Religion   incompatible  with  the  belief  that   all 
exercises  of  God's  power,  ordinary  and  extraordinary,  are 

effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  means 22 

Principal  Tulloch's  view  of  Miracles .       23 

Locke's  idea  of  Miracles 24 

The  great  truth  he  misses  •••>....>...      25 


XIV  CONTENTS. 


Page 
Truths  and  Difficulties  of  Religion  —  their  type  in  the  course 

and  constitution  of  Nature 26 

Guizot's  argument,  that  Man  is  the  result  either  of  Material 

forces  or  Supernatural  power 27 

The  Development  hypotheses 29 

No  distinction  in  Scripture  between  Natural  and  Supernatural  30 

"  Silent  Members  "  in  animal  frames 32 

Perception  of  Correspondences  as  much  a  fact  as  the  sight 

or  touch  of  the  things  in  which  they  appear  .  .  .  .  .  33 

Fertilisation  of  Orchids 37 

Intention  the  one  thing  which  Darwin  sees 38,  39 

Orchids  in  all  their  marvellous  forms  developed  out  of  the 

archetypal  arrangements  of  Threes  within  Threes  ...  44 
Ideas  of  Order  based  on  Numerical  Relations  meet  us  at 

every  turn  in  Nature 4*9 

The  distinction  drawn  between  the  Natural  and  the  Super- 
natural a  distinction  artificial,  arbitrary,  and  unreal  ...  50 
Belief  in  the  existence  of  a  Personal  God  essential  to  all  Reli-. 

gion 51 

Decay  of  many  Creeds  and  Confessions  through  dissociating 

the  doctrines  of  Christianity  from  the  analogy  of  Nature     .       52 


CHAPTER  II. 

LAW:   ITS   DEFINITIONS. 

Reign  of  Law  in  the  world  around  us  and  within  us     .     ,     .       55 
Importance  of  looking  sharply  on  Forms  of  Words  professing 

to  represent  scientific  truths •     .     .     .       56 

Religion  and  Science  closely  connected 57 

The  Instinct  which  seeks  for  harmony  in  the  truths  of  Science 
and  the  truths  of  Religion  a  higher  Instinct  than  the  dis- 
position which  pretends  there  is  no  relation  between  them  .       58 
Tie  idea  that  Prayer  to  God  is  only  a  good  way  of  preaching 
to  ourselves  ....„ ,,       60 


CONTENTS.  XV 


Page 

Essence  of  the  belief  in  Prayer,  that  the  Divine  Mind  is  acces- 
sible to  supplication,  and  the  Divine  Will  capable  of  being 
moved  thereby 6 1 

Law,  human  and  Divine,  the  authoritative  expression  of  Will 
enforced  by  Power 64 

The  FIVE  different  Senses  in  which  Law  is  habitually  used  : — 
First,  as  applied  to  an  observed  Order  of  Facts    ....       65 
Secondly,  to  that  Order,  as  involving  the  action  of  some 

Force,  or  Forces,  of  which  nothing  more  may  be  known.       ib. 
Thirdly,  as  applied  to  individual  Forces,  the  measure  of 

whose  operation  has  been  more  or  less  defined  ....       ib. 
Fourthly,  as  applied  to  those  Combinations  of  Force  which 
have  reference  to  the  fulfilment  of  Purpose,  or  the  dis- 
charge of  Function ib. 

Fifthly,  as  applied  to  Abstract  Conceptions  of  the  Mind     .       ib. 

These  great  leading  significations  circle  round  the  Three  great 
questions  Science  asks  of  Nature — the  What,  the  How,  and 
the  Why ib. 

The  Three  Laws  of  Kepler  the  simplest  illustration  of  Law 
applied  in  the  First  Sense 66 

An  observed  Order  of  Facts  can  only  arise  out  of  the  action 
of  some  compelling  Force 68 

Law  of  Gravitation  the  great  example  of  Law  in  the  Third 
Sense 69 

The  "Verifiable  Element" 70 

Laws  in  the  first  three  senses  explain  nothing,  save  that  the 
order  of  subordinate  phenomena  is  due  to  Force  ....  72 

Law  of  Gravitation  the  best  example  of  what  Law  is,  and 
what  it  is  not ib. 

Languages  grow  according  to  rules  of  which  the  men  who 
speak  them  are  unconscious 76 

What  happens  around  us  in  Nature  the  result  jof  different 
and  opposing  Forces  nicely  balanced ib, 

Principle  of  Adjustment  as  the  instrument  and  result  of  Pur- 
pose always  reached  at  last  in  the  course  of  every  physical 
inquiry 78 


XVI  CONTENTS. 


Page 

Law  in  the  highest  Sense  —  Combination  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  Purpose 79 

Some  Philosophers  say  the  question  "  Why?"  should  never  be 

asked #. 

The  facts  of  Adjustment  and  of  Function  constitute  not  Final 

but  Immediate  Purpose 8l 

The  Function  of  an  organ  is  its  Purpose 82 

Doctrine  of  Contrivance  and  Adjustment  not  so  metaphysical 

as  the  doctrine  of  Homologies 83 

Impossible  in  describing  physical  phenomena  to  avoid  phrase- 
ology moulded  on  our  own  conscious  Personality  and  Will .       90 
Ultimate  fact  of  Astronomical  Science  not  the  Law  of  Gravi- 
tation, but  the  Adjustment  between  that  Law  and  others 

less  known   . 92 

Revolution  of  the  Seasons  depend  on  a  multitude  of  Laws, 

Astronomical,  Chemical,  Electrical,  Geological,  &c.  ...       93 
Chemical  Science  rich  in  illustration  of  Forces  in  mutual  Ad- 
justment   94 

"Theine"  and  "  Strychnine "  differ  from  each  other  only  in 

the  proportions  in  which  they  are  combined 95 

How  our  Wills  exercise  a  large  and  increasing  power  over  the 

Material  World 97 

Laws  of  Nature  immutable  only  in  one  Sense ib. 

Laws  of  Nature  employed  in  the  System  of  Nature  in  a 
manner  precisely  analogous  to  that  in  which  we  employ 
them — Examples  furnished  in  the  Shells  of  Barnacles  and 

in  the  Menai  Bridge 99 

Purpose  never  attained  in  Nature  save  by  the  enlistment  of 

Laws  as  instruments loo 

Battery  of  the  Torpedo  compared  with  Man's  Electric  Battery  101 
The  Purpose  what  we  know  in  the  Battery  of  the  Electric  Fish  104 
We  forget  that  Man's  works,  no  less  than  Nature's,  are  done 

through  the  means  of  Law 107 

Fifth  meaning  of  Law — the  designation  of  some  purely  Ab- 
stract Idea,  as,  for  instance,  the  First  Law  of  Motion  in 
Mechanics 108 


CONTENTS.  XV11 


Page 

This  Law  never  operates  in  itself,  but  is  complicated  with 
other  Laws,  producing  a  corresponding  complication  in 

result 109 

Suggestions  of  Materialism  lie  thickest  to  the  eye  on  the  sur- 
face of  things  rather  than  below  it ...  1 13 

Physical  Science  cannot  do  more  than  widen  the  foundation 

of  intelligent  Spiritual  beliefs 114 

The  modern  idea  of  Law  known  instinctively  to  Man  since 
first  he  made  a  Tool  and  used  it  as  the  Instrument  of  Pur- 
pose   ib. 

Two  great  enemies  to  Materialism ;  one  rooted  in  the  Affec- 

tons,  the  other  in  the  Intellect 115 

Transcendental  character  of  the  results  of  Physical  research    .     116 
All  Nature's  realities  are  in  the  region  of  the  Invisible  .     .     .     118 
Life,  according  to  Huxley  and  Carpenter,  the  Cause  of  Organi- 
zation  ib. 

Material  Force,  a  force  which  acts  on  Matter 119 

Our  Conceptions  of  Force  traced  to  their  fountain-head     .     .     I2O 
Force  of  Gravitation  regarded  by  Herschel  as  "the  direct,  or 
indirect,  result  of  a  Consciousness,  or  a  Will,  existing  some- 
where"      122 

The  idea  of  a  Personal  Will  apart  from  the  Forces  which 
work  in  Nature,  is  said  by  some  men  to  be  a  mere  Pro- 
jection of  our  own  Personality  into  the  world  beyond  .  .  123 

A  Watch  the  abode  of  a  "  Watch-force  " 124 

The   greatest   mystery   of  all — the   analogy   between   Man's 

works  and  the  Creator's 125  ' 


CHAPTER  III. 

CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY  ARISING  OUT  OF  THE  REIGN 
OF  LAW. 

Necessity  of  Contrivance  for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose .  126 

Contrivance  in  the  Navigation  of  the  Air    .......  129 

'•The  Way  of  an  Eagle  in  the  Air" ib. 

b 


XV111  CONTENTS. 


Page 

Force  of  Gravitation  the  principal  Force  in  flight     ....  130 

Resisting  Force  of  the  Atmosphere  the  next  Law  appealed  to  131 

Elasticity  and  reacting  Force  of  the  Air  another  Law    .     .     .  132 

Great  Force  of  a  downward  Blow  from  a  Bird's  Wing  .     .     .  134 

Convex  and  Concave  Surfaces  required  in  Wings 136 

The  Feathers  must  underlap  each  other ib. 

How  the  power  of  forward  Motion  is  given  to  Birds      .     .     .  138 

This  theory  of  Flight  may  he  tested  by  the  eye 139 

Experiment  with  a  Heron's  stretched  Wing 140 

Why  no  Bird  can  fly  backwards ib. 

The  heavier  a  Bird  the  greater  its  possible  velocity    ....  144 
Erroneous  notion  of  Birds  having  Air-cells  for  the  inhalation 

and  stowage  of  heated  Air 145 

What  Forces  the  movements  of  flying  animals  are  governed  by  146 

Birds  whose  Wing  is  adapted  for  diving  and  flight    ....  148 
Wings   rather  long  than  broad  in  Birds  of  great  powers  of 

flight 150 

A  long  Wing  nothing  but  a  long  Lever 151 

Description   of   the   Albatross   sailing   or   wheeling  round   a 

ship 15-1 

Sharp-pointed  Wings  also  possessed  by  such  Birds    ....  ib. 

WT hat  sharpness,  or  roundness,  of  Wing  depends  on      ...  156 

On  what  the  propelling  power  of  a  Bird's  Wing  depends    .     .  157 

How  Birds  can  remain  stationary  in  the  Air 159 

Use  of  the  Tail  in  Birds 162 

How  Birds  turn  in  flight 163 

Humming  Birds   the  most  remarkable  examples  of  the  ma- 
chinery of  flight 166 

Adjustments  to  Purpose  in  a  Wing-feather i63 

Why  Man  has  failed  in  Air  Navigation i/o 

CHAPTER  IV. 

APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   SUPREMACY   OF   PURPOSE- 

Structures  of  which  we  cannot  see  the  use I72 

Mr.  Darwin's  curious  mistake  about  Green  Woodpeckers  .     .  176 


CONTENTS.  XIX 


Page 

Adapted  colouring  in  Nature  for  purposes  of  Concealment     .  177 

Only  employed  under  certain  conditions 178 

The  Green  Woodpecker  does  not  come  under  these  conditions  1 79 

Strongly  contrasted  colouring  in  Woodpeckers ib. 

Birds  amongst  whom  the  assimilated  colouring  prevails  .     .     .  181 

Purpose  of  Concealment  in  the  Woodcock's  plumage    .     .     •  1 82 

In  the  Snipe '.     •     •     •  184 

Insects  in  which  imitation,  with  a  view  to  Concealment,  ex- 
tends to  Colour,  Form,  and  Structure ib, 

"Beauty  in  Nature  a  Purpose,  an  Object,  and  an  End    .     .     .  188 
Ornament  as  much  an  End  in  the  Workshop  of  Nature  as  in 

the  Jeweller's  Workshop " 191 

Instance  in  Nature  where  Ornament  takes  the  form  of  Pic- 
torial Representation 192 

In  many  Animal  structures,  perhaps  in  all  save  one,  there  are 

parts  the  presence  of  which  cannot  be  explained  .     .     .  194,  195 

Those  aborted  limbs  parts  of  a  universal  Plan 196 

A  Plan  of  this  kind  itself  a  Purpose 197 

African  Notion  that  the  Ostrich's  toes  correspond  to  Man's 

thumb  and  forefinger 198 

Aborted  Wings  of  the  Ostrich  really  correspond  to  the  Fingers 

in  Man 199 

Homol^gy  in  Structure  and  Analogy  in  Use ib. 

Original  conception  of  the  framework  of  Organic  Life  has  its 

last  development  in  Man 201 

In  Nature,  Use  must  be  interpreted  as  including  Actual  Use, 

Potential  Use,  and  Ornament •     •     .  202 


CHAPTER  V. 

CREATION   BY    LAW. 

Law,  according  to  Physiology,  is  never  absent  as  a  Servant     .     208 
A  like  Order  in  the  existing  World,  and  in  the  past  History 
of  Creation  .•••....... 209 


XX  CONTENTS. 


Page 

Gradual  Modification  of  Type  in  Animals 21 1 

No  knowledge  of  the  Forces  to  which  the  phenomena  of  Life 

can  be  traced 213 

Development  Theory  in  its  earlier  forms 214 

Consequences  of  hiding  our  Ignorance  of  the  causes  of  Phe- 
nomena by  declaring  them  the  result  of  Law    217 

Darwin  does  not  profess  to  trace  the  Origin  of  New  Forms  to 

any  definite  Law ib. 

Darwin's  Theory  not  a.  Theory  on  "  The  Origin  of  Species"  .  219  ' 

His  Theory  incurs  the  risk  of  being  self-condemned      .     .     .  220 

Humming  Birds  as  exhibiting  Mysteries  of  Creation      .     .     .  221 

Absolute  Distinctiveness  from  all  other  Families  of  Birds  .     .  222 

Bond  that  unites  all  the  forms  of  this  Family 223 

"Centres  of  Creation"  as  regards  Humming  Birds  ...»  225 

Differences  generic  and  specific  between  Humming  Birds  .     .  226 

Plan  in  which  mere  Variety  has  been  an  aim 228 

No  connexion  between  the  Humming  Bird's  splendour  and 

any  Function  essential  to  life 229 

"  Coquette"  Humming  Birds 233 

Curious  example  in  Humming  Birds  of  Variety  for  Ornament's 

sake ib. 

Mere  Beauty  and  mere  Variety  for  their  own  sake     ....  235 
"Natural   Selection"  does  not  account   for  the  origin  and 

spread  of  Humming  Birds 236 

Each  new  Variety  must  be  born  Male  and  Female    ....  237 
Possibility  of  new  Births  being  the  means  of  introducing  new 

Species 239 

Principle   of  "Natural   Selection"   has  no  bearing  on  the 

"Origin  of  Species" ••  240 

"Correlation  of  Growth" 241 

Correlation  of  Growth  in  the  Inorganic  world 242 

Correlation  of  GroM'th  having  reference  to  Mental  Purposes  .  245 
Mr.  Darwin   has  not  pointed  out  clearly  the  distinction  be- 
tween these  two  kinds  of  Correlation 246 

Wonders  of  Correlation  revealed  by  Disease  and  Malforma- 
tion, &c. 247 


CONTENTS.  .  '       XXI 


Pago 

Correlation  between  the  internal  Stmcture  of  the  Teeth  in 
Animals  and  the  Structure  of  distant  portions  of  their 
frame 248 

One  Force  directs  the  Form  and  Structure  of  every  Organism    249 

No  conception  of  any  Force  emanating  from  external  things, 
and  moulding  the  Structure  of  an  Organism  in  harmony 
with  themselves 251 

Forces  of  Organic  Growth  worked  under  rules  of  close  Ad- 
justment to  external  conditions.  —  Examples  of  this'  in 
Ducks,  Gulls,  and  Divers 252 

More  correlated  Correlations. — Wing- feathers  and  Auricular- 
feathers  in  Birds 254 

New  Species  can  be  created  only  by  a  Creative  Will  giving  to 
Organic  Forces  a  foreseen  direction 256 

Scientific  men,  in  seeking  expression  for  ultimate  ideas 
arrived  at  by  physical  research,  are  forced  to  borrow  the 
language  of  mechanical  invention ib. 

Mr.  Darwin  presenting  under  one  phase  two  Ideas  radically 
distinct 258 

"  Adherence  to  Type  "  and  "  Correlation  of  Growth  "  not  in 
the  nature  of  Physical  Causes  but  of  Mental  Purposes  .  .  259 

Correlation  of  Growth,  in  the  sense  of  external  adaptations, 
the  most  general  of  Nature's  Laws 260 

The  only  Senses  in  which  we  get  a  glimpse  of  Creation  by 
Law 261 

No  reason  why  Inheritance  should  produce  Organisms  unlike, 
or  only  very  partially  like,  each  other 264 

Affinities  and  Differences  between  Man  and  the  Lower 
Animals ib. 

Theory  of  Creation  by  Birth  clashes  with  the  Theory  ot 
"Natural  Selection" 267 

No  fictions  in  Nature,  and  no  bad  jokes 263 

Some  essential  Resemblances  between  all  forms  of  Life      .     .       ib. 

The  two  Theories  of  Man's  Origin 269 

We  see  the  Purpose,  not  the  Method .271 

All  ultimate  Truth  beyond  the  reach  of  Science 272 


XX11  CONTENTS. 


Page 

The  Reign  of  Law — the  reign  of  Creative  Force,  directed  by 
Creative  Knowledge,  worked  under  the  control  of  Creative 
Power,  and  in  fulfilment  of  Creative  Purpose  .  ,  .  .  ,  273 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  REIGN  OF  LAW  IN  THE  REALM   OF  MIND. 

Phenomena  of  Mind  under  the  Reign  of  Law 274 

One  Force  in  Nature  the  Source  and  Centre  of  all  the  rest, 
and  all   governed   by   Principles  of   Arrangement  purely 
Mental ;  we  know  nothing  directly  of  the  ultimate  Seat  of 
Force  in  any  form  ;  the  nearest  conception  we  can  have  of 
it  is  derived  from  our  consciousness  of  Vital  Power    .     .     .     275 
If  these  conclusions  be  true,  it  need  not  surprise  us  to  see 
that  Law,  in  the  same  Sense,  prevails  in  the  phenomena 
both  of  the  Material  world  and  of  the  world  of  Mind.     .     .       ib. 
The   Mind    not    conscious    of   its    dependence  on   Material 

Organs 276 

No  Series  of  Facts  more  complete  and  conclusive  than  the 
chain  connecting  the  functions  of  the  Brain  with  the  phe- 
nomena of  Mind 279 

Thought  not  to  be  confounded  with  Brain ib. 

Phrenology  mere  Confusion  of  Thought 280 

Physiology  can  never  be  the  basis  of  Psychology 282 

Connexion  between  Mind  and  Brain  a  Law  only  in  the  Sense 

of  Law  as  applied  to  "  an  Observed  Order  of  Facts  "...  283 
Severe  Thinking  attended  with  expenditure  of  Force  .  .  .  284 
Difficulties  from  misconception  of  what  Matter  is  and  the 

Forces  we  call  Material 285 

Large  class  of  phenomena  connected  with  Mind,  of  which 

Consciousness  does  not  inform  us 286 

Men  often  impelled  by  Motives  they  are  unconscious  of      .     .     287 
How  we  can  detect  the  action  of  Forces  which  have  told 

upon  our  Minds 289 

Origin  of  Ideas  ;  how  far  due  to  Experience  or  to  Intuition    .      & 


CONTENTS.  XX111 


Page 
Muscular  Contractions  of  two  kinds  .........     292 

Almost  certain   that   the  Mind   has  automatic  faculties  and 
others  which  work  independently  by  Experience  .     .     .     .     293 

Intuitive  Power  of  mumerical  Computation ib. 

In  discussing  the  Origin  of  Ideas,  there  is  great  want  of  De- 
finition in  the  use  of  terms 295 

An  Idea  is  as  it  were   an  organic  Growth':  —  its  Materials 

from  the  external  world,  its  Structure  from  within     .     .     .     296 
Intuition  in  the  Young  of  the  Lower  Animals,  when  removed 

from  their  Parents ••».     297 

In  Birds,  which  have  comparatively  no  Infancy ib. 

Inheritance  of  Physical  and  Mental  qualities    ..•••.     30x5 
Orderly  progress  of  Events  in  the  history  of  Nations     .     .     .     301 
The  aggregate  of  Motives,  or  Forces,  which  move  the  Mind, 
may  be  called  the  Laws  which  determine  Human  Action 

and  Opinions 303 

The  Lower  Animals  moved  by  fewer  Motives  than  Men,  and 

Savages  by  fewer  Motives  than  civilized  Men 304 

Difficulty  of  predicting  Conduct  proportional  to  the  number 

and  kind  of  Motives 305 

Secret  of  the  boundless  Difference  between   Man   and   the 

highest  Animals  below  him 306 

Man   never  free  from  relations  pre-established   between   the 
Structure  of  his  Mind  and  the  System  of  Things  in  which  it 

is  formed  to  move 307 

Real  Progress  on  the  question   of  Necessity  and  Free  Will     .     308 

Still  clearer  Definitions  needed 309 

Perfect  Knowledge  must  be  perfect  /^-knowledge .     .     .     .     312 

"Spiritual  Antecedents" 313 

Reconcilement  of  Freedom  of  Will  with  the  idea  of  Causa- 
tion  314 

Mr.  Mill's  contradictory  positions   as   to   the  Interference  of 

Will 315 

Comte  on  "  Changeable  Will  " 319 

Stability  of  Character  inseparably  connected  with  a  variable 
Will 320 


XXIV  CONTENTS. 


Page 

An  "Arbitrary"  or  a  "Capricious"  Will 320 

To   operate  on  Human  Character  we  must  place  it  under 
favourable  outward  Conditions •    .    •    •     322 


CHAPTER  VII. 

LAW     IN     POLITICS. 

Direct  appeals  to  the  Reason,  or  the  Feelings,  of  men,  useless 
when  those  faculties  have  not  been  placed  under  favourable 
Conditions 324 

How  far  these  Conditions  are  subject  to  the  Control  of  Will 
through  the  Use  of  Means  . 325 

The  Collective  Will  of  Society  operates  on  the  Conduct  of  its 
members  in  two  Ways — by  Authority,  and  by  altering  Con- 
ditions  326 

True  Conception  of  Natural  Law  founded  on  the  Progress  of 
Physical  Investigation ib. 

Plato's  odious  Conception  of  Human  Society 327 

Aristotle  occasionally  and  almost  unconsciously  resorts  to  true 
methods  of  Scientific  Reasoning 328 

Why  he  missed  the  great  Secret  of  modern  Political  Science  .     330 

Necessity  of  groping  among  little  and  common  things  a  hard 
lesson  for  the  Intellect 331 

Forces  in  Human  Nature  so  constant  that  they  affect  the  great 
majority  of  men 332 

How  these  are  to  be  controlled ib. 

The  word  " Natural" 333 

Laws  founded  on  a  right  exercise  of  Reason  are  Natural  Laws 
in  the  best  and  highest  sense ib. 

The  most  difficult  Problem  in  the  Science  of  Government .     .     334 

Two  great  recent  Discoveries  in  this  country  in  the  Science  of 
Government /3. 

The  one  great  Error  of  Ancient  Systems  of  Political  Philosophy    335 

How  opposite  the  doctrine  of  modern  Politicians      ....       ib. 

Law  of  •  Spain,  prohibiting  Gold  from  leaving  the  country  .    .     336 


CONTENTS.  XXV 


Page 
Essential  idea  of  the  Old  Commercial  Policy  ......     337 

Of  the  New     ..;.... ib. 

Adam  Smith's  Denunciation  of  Laws  restricting  free  Inter- 
change in  the  Products  of  Labour  and  in  the  free  Employ- 
ment of  Labour  itself 338 

Connexion  of  the  work  of  James  Watt  and  Adam  Smith   .     .     339 
Watt's  reduction  to  obedience  of  one  of  the  most  tremendous 

Forces  of  Nature 340 

How  Adam  Smith's  work  was  harder  than  James  Watt's   .     .     341 
Watt's  history  a  signal  illustration  of  the  Follies  of  Restric- 
tion      342 

Order  of  Progress  in  Mankind — Long  Ages  of  comparative 
Silence  and  Inaction  brought  to  an  end  by  shorter  Periods 
of  almost  preternatural  Activity. — Illustrations      ....     343 
Statute  of  Apprenticeship  in  the  time  of  Adam  Smith  .     .     .     3/^4 

Spinning  and  Weaving  in  1 760 345 

How  the  Survivance  of  the  Ancient  domestic  Industries  be- 
came no  longer  possible 346 

Beginning  of  the  Factory  System      .........     347 

System  of  Apprenticeship  in  the  earlier  Mills 348 

Physical  Degeneracy,  Mental  Ignorance,  and  Moral  Corruption 

in  the  Factories ib. 

The  first  Factory  Act,  introduced  by  the  elder  Sir  Robert 

Peel 349 

Abandonment  of  the  Apprenticeship  System 350 

Exhausting  and  demoralising  Labour  in  Factories  by  Children    351 
The  great  Parliamentary  Debate :  How  far  it  is  wise  or  legiti- 
mate to  interfere  for  Moral  ends  with  the  Freedom  of  the 

Individual  Will 352 

In  what  Sense  the  Children's  Labour  was   "free"  and  was 

"w/free" 353 

Arguments,  founded  on  the  Constancy  of  Natural  Laws, 
against  Legislative  Interference  with  the  "freedom"  of 

Individual  Will  354 

The  supporters  of  Restriction  themselves  ignorant  of  the 
fundamental  Principles  at  issue 355 


XXVI  CONTENTS. 


Page 
The  true  doctrine  of  Necessity  exemplified  in  the  conduct  of 

Employers  and  Employed 356 

Antagonism  between  Natural  Law  and  Human  Law     .     .     .       ib. 
Results  to  be  attained  only  by  the  higher  Faculties  of  our 
Nature  imposing  their  Will  in  authoritative  Expressions  of 

Human  Law 358 

The  Factory  Acts  the  first  Legislative  Recognition  of  a  great 

Natural  Law 360 

Double  Movement  in  Legislation  since  the  First  FactoryAct  .  361 
Principle  on  which  the  great  counter-movement  depends  .  .  363 
Progress  in  Political  Science  nowhere  happier  than  in  Factory 

Legislation 364 

Example  how  External  Conditions  and  Mental  Character  can 

be  affected  powerfully  by  positive  Institution 366 

Adjustment  in  the  Realm  of  Mind  by  setting  one  Motive  to 

counieract  another 368 

How  new  Motives  may  be  evoked 369 

The  Spirit  of  Association  —  a  Force  in  the  Realm  of  Mind     .     370 

The  Law  of  Competition 372 

Good  effected  by  Combination  a  higher  Good  than  that  result- 
ing from  Factory  Legislation ib. 

Combination,  an  Appeal  to  the  Law  of  Contrivance ;— the 

Power  of  Adjustment 373 

Sources  of  Error  which  pervert  the  Aims  of  voluntary  Associa- 
tion      374 

History  of  Combination  among  the  Working  Classes  until- 

lately  a  sad  history  of  Misdirected  Effort ib. 

Difficulties  of  our  time  to  be  met  by  unshaken  Faith  in  great 
Natural  Laws  and  in  the  free  Agency  of  Man  to  secure  by 
appropriate  means  the  working  of  those  Laws  for  good       .     376 
The  Law  of  Inequality  not  to  be  violated  with  impunity    .     .     377 
Substantial  economic  Advantage  secured  wherever  the  Hours          .; 
of  Labour  are  reduced  without  a  corresponding  Reduction 

in  Wages 378 

The  very  attempt  of  the  Woiking  Classes  to  govern  through 
Combination  their  own  Affairs  is  an  Education  in  itself  .     .     380 


CONTENTS.  XXV11 


Page 

Nature  a  great  Armoury  of  Weapons  and  Implements  for  the 
service  and  use  of  Will 382 

As  regards  the  great  Science  of  Politics,  men  still,  as  it  were, 
only  at  the  break  of  day 383 

We  look  on  the  Facts  of  Nature  and  Human  Life  through  the 
dulled  eyes  of  Custom  and  Traditional  Opinion  ....  384 

'Natural  Openness  and  Simplicity  of  Mind  characteristics  of 
the  individual  men  who  have  exerted  the  most  powerful  In- 
fluence for  good  on  Society ib. 

Power  of  the  Agencies  which  the  whole  Constitution  and 
Course  of  things  offers  to  Knowledge  and  Contrivance  .  .  385 

Instinct  on  her  own  narrow  path  a  surer  Guide  than  Reason    386 

Some  Causes  no  longer  in  existence  which  produced  the  Over- 
throw of  the  great  historical  Nations  of  Antiquity  ....  387 

Memorable  Examples,  in  the  last  and  present  generations,  of 
the  Reign  of  Law  over  the  Course  of  Political  Events  .  .  ib. 

Modern  Civilization  presents  the  phenomena  of  Development 
and  Growth 388 

The  most  certain  of  all  the  Laws  of  Man's  Nature  .     .     .     .       ib. 

This  the  Law  to  which  Christianity  appeals 389 

An  immense  satisfaction  to  know  that  the  Result  of  Logical 
Analysis  but  confirms  the  Testimony  of  Consciousness,  and 
runs  parallel  with  the  Primaeval  Traditions  of  Belief  .  .  .  390 

Our  Freedom  a  Reality — not  a  Name ib. 

Laws  of  Nature  come  visibly  from  One  pervading  Mind    .     .     391 

Their  Purposes  best  fulfilled  when  made  the  Instruments  of 
intelligent  Will  and  the  Servants  of  enlightened  Conscience  ib. 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

The  Swift facing  147 

Wing.of  Gannet 154 

Wing  of  Golden  Plover 156 

Sparrow-Hawk — Merlin — Kestrel  Hovering  ......  161 


THE  REIGN  OF  LAW. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   SUPERNATURAL. 

THE  Supernatural — what  is  it  ?  What  do  we  mean 
by  it  ?  How  do  we  define  it  ?  M.  Guizot l  tells 
us  that  belief  in  it  is  the  special  difficulty  of  our  time — 
that  denial  of  it  is  the  form  taken  by  all  modern  assaults 
on  Christian  faith  ;  and  again,  that  acceptance  of  it  lies 
at  the  root,  not  only  of  Christianity,  but  of  all  positive 
religion  whatever.  These  questions,  then,  concerning  the 
Supernatural,  are  questions  of  first  importance.  Yet  we 
find  them  seldom  distinctly  put,  and  still  more  seldom 
distinctly  answered.  This  is  a  capital  error  in  dealing 
with  any  question  of  philosophy.  Half  the  perplexities 
of  men  are  traceable  to  obscurity  of  thought  hiding  and 
breeding  under  obscuritv  of  language.  "  The  Super- 

*  "L'Eglise  etla  Societe  Chretienne  en  1861,"  ch.  iv.  p.  19. 

8 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW, 


natural"  is  a  term  employed  often  in  different,  and 
sometimes  in  contradictory,  senses.  It  is  difficult  to 
make  out  whether  M.  Guizot  himself  means  to  identify 
belief  in  the  Supernatural  with  belief  in  the  existence  of 
a  God,  or  with  belief  in  a  particular  mode  of  Divine 
action.  But  these  are  ideas  quite  separaMe  and  distinct. 
There  may  be  some  men  who  disbelieve  in  the  Super- 
natural only  because  they  are  absolute  atheists  ;  but  it  is 
certain  that  there  are  others  who  have  great  difficulty  in 
believing  in  the  Supernatural,  who  are  not  atheists. 
What  they  doubt  or  deny  is,  not  that  God  exists,  but  that 
He  ever  acts,  or  perhaps  can  act,  unless  in  and  through 
what  they  call  the  "Laws  of  Nature."  M.  Guizot, 
indeed,  tells  us  that  "God  is  the  Supernatural  in  a 
Person."  But  this  is  a  rhetorical  figure  rather  than  a 
definition.  He  may,  indeed,  contend  that  it  is  inconsis- 
tent to  believe  in  a  God,  and  yet  to  disbelieve  in  the 
Supernatural ;  but  he  must  admit,  and  indeed  does 
admit,  that  such  inconsistency  is  found  in  fact. 

Theological  and  philosophical  writers  frequently  use 
the  Supernatural  as  synonymous  with  the  Superhuman. 
But  of  course  this  is  not  the  sense  in  which  any  one  can 
have  any  difficulty  in  believing  in  it.  The  powers  and 
works  of  Nature  are  all  superhuman — more  than  Man 
can  account  for  in  their  origin — more  than  he  can  resist 
in  their  energy — more  than  he  can  understand  in  their 


THE    SUPERNATURAL. 


effects.  This,  then,  cannot  be  the  sense  in  which  so 
many  minds  find  it  hard  to  accept  the  Supernatural ;  nor 
can  it  be  the  sense  in  which  others  cling  to  it  as  of  the 
very  essence  of  their  religious  faith.  What,  then,  is  that 
other  sense  in  which  the  difficulty  arises  ?  Perhaps  we 
shall  best  find  it  by  seeking  the  idea  which  is  competing 
with  it,  and  by  which  it  has  been  displaced.  It  is  the 
Natural  which  has  been  casting  out  the  Supernatural — 
the  idea  of  Natural  Law, — the  universal  reign  of  a  fixed 
Order  of  things.  This  idea  is  a  product  of  that  immense 
development  of  the  physical  sciences  which  is  charac- 
teristic of  our  time.  We  cannot  read  a  periodical,  or 
go  into  a  lecture-room,  without  hearing  it  expressed. 
T  -.netimes,  but  rarely,  it  is  stated  with  accuracy,  and 
with  due  recognition  of  the  limits  within  which  Law  can 
be  said  to  comprehend  the  phenomena  of  the  world. 
But  generally  it  is  expressed  in  language  vague  and 
hollow,  covering  inaccurate  conceptions,  and  confounding 
under  common  forms  of  expression  ideas  which  are 
essentially  distinct.  The  mere  ticketing  and  orderly 
assortment  of  external  facts  is  constantly  spoken  of  as  if 
it  were  in  the  nature  of  Explanation,  and  as  if  no  higher 
truth  in  respect  to  natural  phenomena  were  to  be  attained 
or  desired.1  And  herein  we  see  both  the  result  for  which 

1  Those  who  have  followed  the  course  of  recent  speculation  will 
recognise  this  sentence  as  intended  to   describe  the  characteristic 
P  2 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 


Bacon  laboured,  and  the  danger  against  which  Bacon 
prayed.  It  has  been  a  glorious  result  of  a  right  method 
in  the  study  of  Nature,  that  with  the  increase  of  know- 
ledge the  "human  family  has  been  endowed  with  new 
mercies."  But  every  now  and  then,  for  a  time  at  least, 
from  "  the  unlocking  of  the  gates  of  sense,  and  the 
kindling  of  a  greater  natural  light,  incredulity  and  intel 
lectual  night  have  arisen  in  our  minds."1 

But  let  us  observe  exactly  where  and  how  the  difficulty 
arises.  The  Reign  of  Law  in  Nature  is,  indeed,  so  far 
as  we  can  observe  it,  universal.  But  the  common  idea 
of  the  Supernatural  is  that  which  is  at  variance  with 
Natural  Law,  above  it,  or  in  violation  of  it.  Nothing, 
however  wonderful,  which  happens  according  to  Natural 
Law,  would  be  considered  by  any  one  as  Supernatural. 
The  law  in  obedience  to  which  a  wonderful  thing 
happens  may  not  be  known ;  but  this  would  not  give  it  a 
supernatural  character,  so  long  as  we  assuredly  believe 

principle  of  the  Positive  Philosophy.  I  am  glad  to  observe  that  so 
competent  a  judge  as  Mr.  George  H.  Lewes  says  of  it : — "Although 
not,  perhaps,  the  most  dignified  or  explicit  statement  of  the  Positive 
point  of  view,  this  may  be  accepted  as  essentially  correct." — Fort- 
nightly Review,  July  1867. 

i  "  This  also  we  humbly  beg,  that  human  things  may  not  preju- 
dice such  as  are  Divine,  neither  that  from  the  unlocking  of  the  gates 
of  sense,  and  the  kindling  of  a  greater  natural  light,  anything  of 
incredulity  or  intellectual  night  may  arise  in  our  minds  towards 
Divine  mysteries."—  "The  Student's  Prayer."  Bacon's  Works* 


THE   SUPERNATURAL. 


that  it  did  happen  according  to  some  law.  Hence,  it 
would  appear  to  follow  that  a  man  thoroughly  possessed 
of  the  idea  of  Natural  Law  as  universal,  never  could 
admit  anything  to  be  supernatural ;  because  on  seeing 
any  fact,  however  new,  marvellous,  or  incomprehensible, 
he  would  escape  into  the  conclusion  that  it  was  the 
result  of  some  natural  Law  of  which  he  had  before  been 
ignorant.  No  one  will  deny  that,  in  respect  to  the  vast 
majority  of  all  new  and  marvellous  phenomena,  this 
would  be  the  true  and  reasonable  conclusion.  It  is  not 
the  conclusion  of  pride,  but  of  humility  of  mind. 
Seeing  the  boundless  extent  of  our  ignorance  of  the 
natural  laws  which  regulate  so  many  of  the  phenomena 
around  us,  and  still  more  of  so  many  of  the  phenomena 
within  us,  nothing  can  be  more  reasonable  than  to  con- 
clude, when  we  see  something  which  is  to  us  a  wonder, 
that  somehow,  if  we  only  knew  how,  it  is  "  all  right  " — 
all  according  to  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature. 
But  then,  to  justify  this  conclusion,  we  must  understand 
Nature  in  the  largest  sense, — as  including  all  that  is 

"  In  the  round  ocean,  and  the  living  air 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man"  1 

We  must  understand  it  as  including  every  agency  which 
we  see  entering,  or  can  conceive  from  analogy  as  capable 

\  "Tintern  Abbey,"— Wordsworth. 


THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 


of  entering,  into  the  causation  of  the  world.  First  and 
foremost  among  these  is  the  agency  of  our  own  Mind 
and  Will.  Yet,  strange  to  say,  all  reference  to  this 
agency  is  often  tacitly  excluded  when  we  speak  of  the 
laws  of  Nature.  One  of  our  most  distinguished  living 
teachers  of  physical  science1  began,  not  long  ago,  a 
course  of  lectures  on  the  phenomena  of  Heat  by  a  rapid 
statement  of  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  Correlation  of 
Forces — how  the  one  was  convertible  into  the  other — 
how  one  arose  out  of  the  other — how  none  could  be 
evolved  except  from  some  other  as  a  pre-existing  source. 
"Thus,"  said  the  lecturer,  "we  see  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  spontaneousness  in  Nature."  What  ! — not  in  the 
lecturer  himself?  Was  there  no  "  spontaneousness  "  in 
his  choice  of  words — in  his  selection  of  materials — in  his 
orderly  arrangement  of  experiments  with  a  view  to  the 
exhibition  of  particular  results  ?  It  is  not  probable  that 
the  lecturer  was  intending  to  deny  this ;  it  simply  was 
that  he  did  not  think  of  it  as  within  his  field  of  view. 
His  own  Mind  and  Will  were  then  dealing  with  the 
"  laws  of  Nature/'  but  they  did  not  occur  to  him  as  form- 
ing part  of  those  laws,  or,  in  the  same  sense,  as  subject 
to  them. 

Does  Man,  then,  not  belong  to  Nature  ?    Is  he  above 

1  Professor  TyndalL 


THE   SUPERNATURAL. 


it — or  merely  separate  from  it,  or  a  violation  of  it?  Is 
he  supernatural  ?  If  so,  has  he  any  difficulty  in  believing 
in  himself?  Of  course  not.  Self-consciousness  is  the 
one  truth,  in  the  light  of  which  all  other  truths  are 
known.  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  or  volo,  ergo  sum — this  is  the 
one  conclusion  which  we  cannot  doubt,  unless  Reason 
disbelieves  herself.  Why,  then,  are  the  faculties  of  the 
human  mind  and  body  not  habitually  included  among  the 
"  laws  of  Nature  ?  "  Because  a  fallacy  is  getting  hold 
upon  us  from  a  want  of  definition  in  the  use  of  terms. 
"  Nature  "  is  being  used  in  the  narrow  sense  of  physical 
nature.  It  is  conceived  as  containing  nothing  beyond 
the  properties  of  Matter.  Thus  the  whole  mental  world 
in  which  we  ourselves  live,  and  move,  and  have  our 
being,  is  excluded  from  it.  But  these  selves  of  ours  do 
belong  to  Nature.  At  all  events  if  we  are  ever  to 
understand  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  believing  in  the 
Supernatural,  we  must  first  keep  clearly  in  view  what  we 
intend  to  understand  as  included  in  the  Natural.  Let  us 
never  forget,  then,  that  the  agency  of  Man  is  of  all  others 
the  most  natural — the  one  with  which  we  are  most 
familiar — the  only  one,  in  fact,  which  we  can  be  said, 
even  in  any  measure,  to  understand.  When  any  wonder- 
ful event  can  be  referred  to  the  contrivance  or  ingenuity 
of  Man,  it  is  thereby  at  once  removed  from  the  sphere  of 
the  Supernatural,  as  ordinarily  understood. 


8  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  we  are  now 
only  seeking  a  clear  definition  of  terms  ;  and  that  pro- 
vided this  other  meaning  be  clearly  agreed  upon,  the 
Mind  and  Will  of  Man  may  be  considered  as  separate 
from  "  nature,"  and  belonging  to  the  Supernatural.  This 
view  is  taken  in  an  able  treatise  on  "  Nature  and  the 
Supernatural,"  by  Dr.  Bushnell,  an  American  clergyman.1 
Dr.  Bushnell  says  : — "  That  is  supernatural,  whatever  it 
be,  that  is  either  not  in  the  chain  of  natural  cause  and 
effect,  or  which  acts  on  the  chain  of  cause  and  effect  in 
nature,  from  without  the  chain."  Again  : — "  If  the  pro- 
cesses, combinations,  and  results  of  our  system  of  nature 
are  interrupted  or  varied  by  the  action,  whether  of  God, 
or  angels,  or  men,  so  as  to  bring  to  pass  what  would  not 
come  to  pass  in  it  by  its  own  internal  action,  under  the 
laws  of  mtre  cause  and  effect,  such  variations  are  in  like 
manner  supernatural."  There  is  no  other  objection  to 
this  definition  of  the  Supernatural,  than  that  it  rests  upon 
a  limitation  of  the  terms  "  Nature  "  and  "  natural,"  which 
is  very  much  at  variance  with  the  sense  in  which  they 
are  commonly  understood.  There  is,  indeed,  a  distinc- 
tion which  finds  its  expression  in  common  language  be- 
tween the  works  of  Man  and  the  works  of  Nature.  A 
honeycomb,  for  example,  would  be  called  a  work  of 

1  "  Nature  and  the  Supernatural,  as  together  constituting  the  one 
System  of  God."  By  Horace  Bushnell,  D.D.  Edinburgh,  1860. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL. 


Nature,  but  a  steam-engine  would  not.  This  distinction 
is  founded  on  a  true  perception  of  the  fact  that  the 
Mind  and  Will  of  Man  belong  to  an  order  of  existence 
very  different  from  physical  laws,  and  very  different 
also  from  the  fixed  and  narrow  instincts  of  the  lower 
animals.  It  is  a  distinction  bearing  witness  to  the  uni- 
versal consciousness  that  the  Mind  of  Man  has  within 
it  something  of  a  truly  creative  energy  and  force — that 
we  are  in  a  sense  "  fellow-workers  with  God,"  and  have 
been  in  a  measure  "  made  partakers  of  the  Divine 
nature."  Nevertheless,  it  would  be  using  the  word  in  a 
sense  very  different  from  that  in  which  it  is  generally 
accepted,  were  we  to  call  the  steam-engine  a  super- 
natural work.  Yet  it  does  answer  strictly  to  the  de- 
finition of  Dr.  Bushnell  in  being  "the  result  of  natural 
Law  varied  by  the  action  of  men."  It  is  made  by 
"  acting  on  the  chain  of  cause  and  effect  in  nature  from 
without  the  chain."  But  then,  be  it -observed,  that  under 
the  same  definition  all  the  contrivances  of  Nature  become 
Supernatural  the  moment  they  are  conceived  as  the  work 
of  a  Mind  using  what  we  call  the  elements  of  nature  for 
the  accomplishment  of  its  designs.  If,  for  example,  it  is 
open  to  us  to  conceive  that  such  a  creature  as  a  Bee 
cannot  have  been  made  out  of  those  elements  "  by  their 
own  internal  action,"  then  we  must  regard  both  this 
creature  and  the  wonderful  products  of  its  instinct  as 


10  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

belonging  to  the  Supernatural.  The  honeycomb  and  the 
steam-engine  would  thus  come  under  the  same  category — 
with  this  only  difference,  that  the  mind  which  made  the 
steam-engine,  being  connected  with  a  Body,  is  visibly 
known  to  us,  whereas  the  Mind  which  made  the  Bee  is 
withdrawn  from  sight.  But  both  can  be  equally  regarded 
as  the  result  of  Mind  "  acting  on  the  chain  of  cause  and 
effect  from  without  the  chain."  Nor  can  we  stop  here. 
The  same  process  of  analysis  will  carry  us  farther  in  the 
same  direction.  We  often  speak,  as  Dr.  Bushnell  does 
here,  of  the  elementary  forces  of  Nature  as  "  acting  "  by 
themselves.  But  there  is  no  other  meaning  in  these 
words  than  an  expression  of  the  fact  that  we  neither  see 
nor  understand  the  connexion  of  those  elementary  forces 
and  Mind.  But  this  ignorance  of  ours  affords  no  manner 
of  presumption  that  such  connexion  does  not  exist.  On 
the  contrary,  though  the  manner  of  that  connexion  be 
unknown,  it  is  much"  more  conceivable  to  us  that  some 
connexion  does  exist  than  that  it  does  not.  If  therefore 
the  distinction  between  the  Natural  and  the  Supernatural 
be  the  distinction  between  that  which  is  and  that  which 
is  not  the  work  of  Mind,  then  it  becomes  a  purely  arbi- 
trary distinction.  It  assumes  that  we  can  distinguish 
between  cases  in  which  the  properties  of  matter  work 
under  the  direction  of  Mind,  and  other  cases  in  which 
they  work  "  of  themselves."  But  this  is  a  line  which  we 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  II 

draw  for  ourselves.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
it  has  any  reality  in  the  constitution  of  things.  It  is  not 
in  those  things,  but  in  the  point  of  view  from  which  we 
regard  them,  that  the  distinction  lies.  We  have  only  to 
change  that  point  of  view,  and  the  distinction  vanishes. 
All  Nature  becomes  Supernatural,  because  all  her 
elements,  both  in  themselves  and  in  their  combinations, 
are  only  conceivable  as  first  established,  and  then  em- 
ployed by  the  powers  of  Mind. 

But  if  this  definition  of  the  Supernatural  displeases 
us,  as  tending  to  confound  distinctions  which  we  had 
thought  were  clear,  let  us  take  another  definition.  Let 
us  take  the  Natural  in  that  larger  and  wider  sense,  in 
which  it  contains  within  it  the  whole  phenomena  of 
Man's  intellectual  and  spiritual  nature,  as  part,  and 
the  most  familiar  of  all  parts,  of  the  visible  system  of 
things.  This  is  a  definition  more  consonant  with 
common  language.  In  all  ordinary  senses  of  the  term, 
Man  and  his  doings  belong  to  the  .Natural,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Supernatural 

We  are  now  from  another  point  of  view  coming 
nearer  to  some  precise  understanding  of  what  tt 
Supernatural  may  be  supposed  to  mean.  But  before 
we  proceed,  there  is  another  question  which  must  be 
answered — What  is  the  relation  in  which  the  agency  of 
Man  stands  to  the  physical  laws  of  Nature  ?  The 


12  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

answer,  in  part  at  least,  is  plain.  His  power  in  respect 
to  those  laws  extends  only,  first  to  their  discovery  and 
ascertainment,  and  then  to  their  use.  He  can  establish 
none  :  he  can  suspend  none.  All  he  can  do  is  to  guide, 
in  a  limited  degree,  the  mutual  action  and  reaction  of 
the  laws  amongst  each  other.  They  are  the  tools  with 
which  he  works — they  are  the  instruments  of  his  Will. 
In  all  he  does  or  can  do  he  must  employ  them.  His 
ability  to  use  them  is  limited  both  by  his  want  of  know- 
ledge and  by  his  want  of  power.  The  more  he  knows  of 
them,  the  more  largely  he  can  employ  them,  and  make 
them  ministers  of  his  purposes.  This,  as  a  general  rule, 
is  true;  but  it  is  subject  to  the  second  limitation  just 
pointed  out.  Our  power  over  Nature  does  not  neces- 
sarily keep  pace  with  our  knowledge  of  her  Laws.  Man 
already  knows  far  more  than  he  has  power  to  convert  to 
use.  It  is  a  true  observation  of  Sir  George  Lewis,1  that 
Astronomy,  for  example,  in  its  higher  branches,  has  an 
interest  almost  purely  scientific.  It  reveals  to  our  know- 
ledge perhaps  the  grandest  and  most  sublime  of  the 
physical  laws  of  Nature.  But  a  much  smaller  amount  of 
knowledge  would  suffice  for  the  only  practical  appli- 
cations which  we  have  yet  been  able  to  make  of  these 
laws  to  our  own  use.  Still,  that  knowledge  has  a  reflex 

1  "Astronomy  of  the  Ancients,"  p.  254. 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  13 

influence  on  our  knowledge  of  ourselves,  of  our  powers, 
and  of  the  relations  which  subsist  between  the  consti- 
tution of  our  own  minds  and  the  constitution  of  tUe 
universe.  And  in  other  spheres  of  inquiry,  advancing 
knowledge  of  physical  laws  has  been  constantly  accom- 
panied with  advancing  power  over  the  physical  world. 
It  has  enabled  us  to  do  a  thousand  things,  any  one  of 
which,  a  few  generations  ago,  would  have  been  con- 
sidered supernatural.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  this  judg- 
ment of  their  character  would  have  been  erroneous. 
These  things  would  have  been  superhuman  then,  though 
they  are  not  superhuman  now.  The  same  lecturer  who 
told  his  audience  that  there  was  nothing  spontaneous  in 
Nature  proceeded,  by  virtue  of  his  own  knowledge  of 
natural  laws,  and  by  his  selecting  and  combining  power, 
to  present  a  whole  series  of  phenomena — such  as  ice 
frozen  in  contact  with  red-hot  crucibles — which  certainly 
did  not  belong  to  the  "  ordinary  course  of  Nature." 
Such  an  exhibition  a  few  centuries  ago  would,  beyond 
all  doubt,  have  subjected  the  lecturer  on  Heat  to  painful 
experience  of  that  condition  of  matter.  Nevertheless  the 
phenomena  so  exhibited  were  natural  phenomena — in 
this  sense,  that  they  were  the  product  of  natural  laws. 
Only  these  laws  were  combined  in  action  under  extra- 
ordinary conditions,  and  these  conditions  were  governed 
by  the  purpose  and  design  of  the  lecturer,  which  design 


14  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

was  "  spontaneous,"  if  there  is  any  meaning  in  the  word. 
In  like  manner,  if  the  progress  of  discovery  is  as  rapid 
during  the  next  four  hundred  years  as  it  has  been  during 
the  last  period  of  the  same  extent,  men  will  be  able  to 
do  many  things  which  would  now  appear  to  be  "  super- 
natural." There  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  how  a 
complete  knowledge  of  all  natural  laws  would  give,  if 
not  complete  power,  at  least  degrees  of  power,  immensely 
greater  than  those  which  we  now  possess.  Power  of  this 
kind,  then,  however  great  in  degree,  clearly  does  not 
answer  that  idea  of  the  Supernatural  which  so  many 
reject  as  inconceivable.  What,  then,  is  that  idea  ?  Have 
we  not  traced  it  to  its  den  at  last  ?  By  "  supernatural" 
power,  do  we  not  mean  power  independent  of  the  use  of 
means,  as  distinguished  from  power  depending  on  know- 
ledge— even  infinite  knowledge — of  the  means  proper  to 
be  employed? 

This  is  the  sense — probably  the  only  sense — in  which 
the  Supernatural  is,  to  many  minds,  so  difficult  of 
belief.  No  man  can  have  any  difficulty  in  believing 
that  there  are  natural  laws  of  which  he  is  ignorant; 
nor  in  conceiving  that  there  may  be  Beings  who  do 
know  them,  and  can  use  them,  even  as  he  himself 
now  uses  the  few  laws  with  which  he  is  acquainted. 
The  real  difficulty  lies  in  the  idea  of  Will  exercised 
without  the  use  of  means — not  in  the  idea  of  Will 


THE   SUPERNATURAL*  15 

exercised  through  means  which  are  beyond  our  know- 
ledge, or  beyond  our  reach. 

Now,  have  we  any  right  to  say  that  belief  in  this  is 
essential  to  all  Religion?  If  we  have  not,  then,  it  is 
only  putting,  as  so  many  other  hasty  sayings  do  put, 
additional  difficulties  in  the  way  of  Religion.  The  rela- 
tion in  which  God  stands  to  those  rules  of  His  govern- 
ment which  are  called  "  laws,"  is,  of  course,  an  inscrutable 
mystery  to  us.  But  the  very  idea  of  a  Creator  involves 
the  idea  not  merely  of  a  Being  by  whom  the  properties 
of  Matter  are  employed,  but  of  a  Being  from  whose  Will 
the  properties  of  Matter  are  derived.  This,  indeed,  is 
the  proper  work  of  Creation,  as  nearly  as  we  can  form 
a  conception  of  it.  It  is  true  that  in  forming  this 
conception  we  pass  beyond  the  bounds  of  our  own 
experience,  because  "  we  pass  from  that  in  God  of 
fvhich  there  is  an  image  in  Man,  to  that  which  is  dis- 
tinctive of  God  as  God."  But  this  we  must  do  in 
forming  any  idea  of  a  God  at  all.  We  must  conceive 
the  Creator  as  first  giving  existence  to  the  means, 
and  then  using  them  for  the  accomplishment  of  ends. 
"  We  cannot  conceive  of  the  original  relation  of  this 
Universe  to  God  as  that  of  an  infinite  multitude  of  laws 
to  an  infinite  Mind,  having  (only)  perfect  knowledge 
of  them,  and  using  this  knowledge  in  turning  them  to 
account,  in  accomplishing  designs  of  infinite  wisdom. 


1 6  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

We  cannot  conceive  of  infinite  wisdom  thus,  as  it  were, 
finding  infinite  resources  already  existing." l  All  this  is 
true.  But  those  who  believe  that  God's  Will  does  govern 
the  world,  must  believe  that  ordinarily,  at  least,  He  does 
govern  it  by  the  choice  and  use  of  means, — which  means 
were  again  pre-established  by  Himself.  Nor  have  we  any 
certain  reason  to  believe  that  He  ever  acts  otherwise. 
Extraordinary  manifestations  of  Hi?  Will — signs  and 
wonders — maybe  wrought,  for  aught  we  know,  by  similar 
instrumentality — only  by  the  selection  and  use  of  laws 
of  which  Man  knows  and  can  know  nothing,  and  which, 
if  he  did  know,  he  could  not  employ.2 

1  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  quote  these  passages  from  one  of  my 
earliest  and  most  valued  friends,  the  Rev.  J.  McLeod  Campbell. 
They  occur  in  an  Introduction  to  a  new  edition  of  his  work  on  the 
"Nature  of  the  Atonement"  (Macmillan  and  Co.   1867) — an  Intro- 
duction marked  by  characteristic  depth  of  thought  and  feeling. 

2  This  chapter,  originally  published  as  an  article  in  the  Edinburgh 
Revinv  for  Oct.  1862,  has  been  referred  to  in  the  remarkable  work 
of  Mr.   Lecky   on   "The  Rise   and   Influence   of  Rationalism   in 
Europe,"  (vol.  i.  ch.  ii.  p.  195  note,)  as  conveying  "a  notion  of  a 
miracle  which  would  not  differ  generically  from  a  human  act,  though 
it  would  still  be  strictly  available  for  evidential  purposes."     I  am 
quite  satisfied  with  this  definition  of  the  result.     Beyond  the  imme- 
diate purposes  of  benevolence,  which  were  served  by  almost  all  the 
miracles  of  the  New  Testament,  the  only  other  purpose  which  is  ever 
assigned  to  them  is  an   "evidential  purpose  "— that  is,   a  purpose 
that  they  might   serve   as   signs   of  the   presence   of  superhuman 
knowledge,  and  of  the  working  of  superhuman  power.     They  were 
performed — in  short— to  assist  faith,  and  not  to  confound  reason. 


THE  SUPERNATURAL. 


Here,  then,  we  come  upon  the  question  of  miracles — 
how  we  understand  them  ?  what  we  would  define  them 
to  be?  The  common  idea  of  a  miracle  is,  a  suspension 
or  violation  of  the  laws  of  Nature.  This  is  a  definition 
which  places  the  essence  of  a  miracle  in  a  particular 
method  of  operation.  But  there  is  another  definition 
which  passes  over  the  question  of  method  altogether, 
and  dwells  only  on  the  agency  by  which,  and  the  purpose 
for  which,  a  wonderful  work  is  wrought.  "  We  would 
confine  the  word  miracle,"  says  Dr.  M'Cosh,1  "to  those 
events  which  were  wrought  in  our  world  as  a  sign  or 
proof  of  God  making  a  supernatural  interposition,  or  a 
revelation  to  Man."  The  two  most  essential  conditions 
in  this  view  of  a  miracle,  are  that  it  is  a  work  wrought 
by  a  Divine  power  for  a  Divine  purpose,  and  is  of  a 
nature  such  as  could  not  be  wrought  by  merely  human 
contrivance.  This  definition  of  a  miracle  does  not  neces- 
sarily exclude  the  idea  of  God  working  by  the  use  of 
means,  provided  they  are  such  means  as  are  out  of 
human  reach.  Indeed,  in  an  important  note  (p.  149), 
Dr.  M'Cosh  explains  that  miracles  are  not  to  be  con- 
sidered "as  against  Nature"  in  any  other  sense  than 
that  in  which  "one  natural  agent  may  be  against  another 
— as  water  may  counteract  fire."  This  eminent  writer 

1  "The  Supernatural  in  relation  to  the  Natural."     By  the  Rev. 
James  M'Cosh,  LL.D.     Macmillan,  Cambridge,  1861. 

C 


iS  THE   REICN    OF   LAW. 


has  approached  the  subject  by  the  right  method,  because 
he  has  addressed  himself  first  to  the  solution  of  the  one 
question  which  is  an  -essential  preliminary  to  all  sub- 
sequent discussion  : — <!  How  much  is  contained  in  the 
Natural  ?  "  Not  until  this  question  is  answered,  can  the 
Supernatural  be  defined.  Yet  the  answer  given  by  Dr. 
M'Cosh  shows  the  inherent  and  the  insuperable  difficulty 
which  attends  the  giving  of  any  answer  at  all.  "  In  this 
world,"  he  says,  "  there  is  a  set  of  objects  and  agencies 
which  constitute  a  system  or  Cosmos  which  may  have 
relations  to  regions  beyond,  but  is  all  the  while  a  self- 
contained  sphere,  with  a  space  around  it — an  Island  so 
far  separated  from  other  lands.  This  system  we  call 
Nature"  (p.  101).  This  definition  of  the  Natural  is 
perhaps  as  accurate  and  as  full  as  any  that  can  be  given. 
It  assumes,  however,  that  the  boundaries  of  the  Natural 
are  known.'  But  the  essential  difficulty  of  separating 
between  the  Natural  and  the  Supernatural  is  this — 
that  the  boundaries  of  the  Natural  are  not  known — 
that  we  cannot  trace  the  shores  of  this  "island" — that 
even  if  we  could  see  any  distinct  separation  between 
them  and  the  space  around  them,  we  have  not  ex- 
plored the  "  island  "  itself  completely,  and  therefore  we 
cannot  say  of  any  agency  working  therein,  that  it  comes 
from  beyond  the  Sea.  Mr.  Mansel,  in  his  "Essay  on 
Miracles,"  adopts  the  word  "superhuman"  as  the  most 


THE  SUPERNATURAL.  19 

accurate  expression  of  his  meaning.  He  says,  "  A  super- 
human authority  needs  to  be  substantiated  by  super- 
human evidence ;  and  what  is  superhuman  is  miraculous"1 
It  is  important  to  observe  that  this  definition  does  not 
necessarily  involve  the  idea  of  a  "  violation  of  the  laws  of 
Nature."  It  does  not  involve  the  idea  of  the  exercise  of 
Will  apart  from  the  use  of  means.  It  does  not  imply 
any  exception  to  the  great  law  of  causation.  It  does  not 
involve,  therefore,  that  idea  which  appears  to  many  so 
difficult  of  conception.  It  simply  supposes,  without  any 
attempt  to  fathom  the  relation  in  which  God  stands  to 
His  own  "  laws,"  that  out  of  His  infinite  knowledge  of 
these  laws,  or  of  His  infinite  power  of  making  them  the 
instruments  of  His  Will,  He  may  and  He  does  use  them 
for  extraordinary  indications  of  His  presence.2 

The  reluctance  to  admit,  as  belonging  to  the  domain 
of  Nature,  any  special  exertion  of  Divine  power  for 

1  "Aids  to  Faith,"  p.  35.    In  another  passage  (p.  21),  Mr.  Mansel 
eays,  that  in  respect  to  the  great  majority  of  the  miracles  recorded 
in  Scripture,  "  the  supernatural  element  appears  ...  in  the  exer- 
cise of  a  personal  power  transcending  the  limits  of  man's   will 
They  are  not  so  much  supermaterial  as  superhuman" 

2  I  agree  with  Mr.  J.  M.  Campbell  when  he  says,  in  the  Intro- 
duction already  quoted,   "It  appears  to  me  that  we  do  not  know 
enough  to  say,  as  regards  anything  transcending  our  knowledge  of 
Law,  in  which  way  we  should  view  it — whether  as  belonging  to  the 
system  of  Law,  but  to  a  region  of  it  out  of  our  sight,  or  as  outside 
of  that  system,  and  as  having  the  same  immediate  relation  to  God 
which  the  system  of  Law  ultimately  has." — P.  xxxv. 

C  2 


20  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

special  purposes,  stands  really  in  very  close  relation- 
ship to  the  converse  notio.i,  that  where  the  operation 
of  natural  causes  can  be  clearly  traced,  there  the  exer- 
tion of  Divine  power  and  Will  is  rendered  less  certain 
and  less  convincing.  This  is  the  idea  which  lies  at  the 
root  of  Gibbon's  famous  chapters  on  the  spread  of 
Christianity.  He  labours  to  prove  that  it  was  due  to 
natural  causes.  In  proving  this,  he  evidently  thinks  he 
is  disposing  of  the  notion  that  Christianity  spread  by 
Divine  power;  whereas  he  only  succeeds  in  pointing 
out  some  of  the  means  which  were  employed  to  effect 
a  Divine  purpose.  In  like  manner,  the  preservation 
of  the  Jews  as  a  distinct  People  during  so  many  cen- 
turies of  complete  dispersion,  is  a  fact  standing  nearly, 
if  not  absolutely,  alone  in  the  history  of  the  world.  It 
is  at  variance  with  all  other  experience  of  the  laws 
which  govern  the  amalgamation  with  each  other  of  dif- 
ferent families  of  the  human  race.  The  case  of  the 
Gipsies  has  been  referred  to  as  somewhat  parallel.  But 
the  facts  of  this  case  are  doubtful  and  obscure,  and 
such  of  them  as  we  know  involve  conditions  altogether 
dissimilar  in  kind.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that 
the  preservation  of  the  Jews,  partly  from  the  relation 
in  which  it  stands  to  the  apparent  fulfilment  of  Pro- 
phecy, and  partly  from  the  extraordinary  nature  of  the 
fact  itself,  is  tacitly  assumed  by  many  persons  to  come 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  21 

strictly  within  the  category  of  miraculous  events.  Yet 
in  itself  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  striking  illustration 
how  a  departure  from  the  "  ordinary  course  of  nature " 
may  be  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  means 
which  are  natural  and  comprehensible.  An  extraordi- 
nary resisting  power  has  been  given  to  the  Jewish 
People  against  those  dissolving  and  disintegrating  forces 
which  have  caused  the  disappearance  of  every  other 
race  placed  under  similar  conditions.  They  have  been 
torn  from  home  and  country,  and  removed,  not  in  a  body, 
but  in  scattered  fragments,  over  the  world.  Yet  they 
are  as  distinct  from  every  other  people  now  as  they  were 
in  the  days  of  Solomon.  Nevertheless  this  resisting 
power,  wonderful  though  it  be,  is  the  result  of  special 
laws,  overruling  those  in  ordinary  operation.  It  has 
been  effected  by  the  use  of  means.  Those  means 
have  been  superhuman — they  have  been  beyond  human 
contrivance  and  arrangement.  But  they  belong  to 
the  region  of  the  Natural.  They  belong  to  it  not 
the  less,  but  all  the  more,  because  in  their  concatena- 
tion and  arrangement  they  seem  to  indicate  the  purpose 
of  a  living  Will  seeking  and  effecting  the  fulfilment  of 
its  designs.  This  is  the  manner  after  which  our  own 
living  wills  in  their  little  sphere  effect  their  little  objects. 
Is  it  difficult  to  believe  that  after  the  same  manner  also 
the  Divine  Will,  of  which  ours  is  the  image  only,  works 
and  effects  its  purposes? 


22  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

Our  own  experience  shows  that  the  universal  Reign 
of  Law  is  perfectly  consistent  with  a  power  of  making 
those  laws  subservient  to  design — even  when  the  know- 
ledge of  them  is  but  slight,  and  the  power  over  them 
slighter  still.  How  much  more  easy,  how  much  more 
natural,  to  conceive  that  the  same  universality  is  com- 
patible with  the  exercise  of  that  Supreme  Will  before 
which  all  are  known,  and  to  which  all  are  servants  ! 
What  difficulty  in  this  view  remains  in  the  idea  of  the 
Supernatural  ?  Is  it  any  other  than  the  difficulty  in  be- 
lieving in  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Will — in  a  living 
God  ?  If  this  be  the  belief  of  which  M.  Guizot  speaks 
when  he  says  that  it  is  essential  to  religion,  then  his 
proposition  is  unquestionably  true.  In  this  sense  the 
difficulty  of  believing  in  the  Supernatural,  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  believing  in  pure  Theism,  is  one  and  the  same. 
But  if  he  means  that  it  is  necessary  to  religion  to  be- 
lieve in  even  the  occasional  "  violation  of  law," — if  he 
means  that  without  such  belief,  signs  and  wonders  cease 
to  be  evidences  of  Divine  power, — then  he  announces  a 
proposition  which  cannot  be  sustained.  There  is  nothing 
in  Religion  incompatible  with  the  belief  that  all  exer- 
cises of  God's  power,  whether  ordinary  or  extraordi- 
nary, are  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  means 
— that  is  to  say,  by  the  instrumentality  of  natural  laws 
brought  out,  as  it  were,  and  used  for  a  Divine  purpose. 
To  believe  in  <he  existence  of  miracles,  we  must  indeed 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  23 

believe  in  the  Superhuman  and  in  the  Supermaterial. 
But  both  these  are  familiar  facts  in  Nature.  We  must 
believe  also  in  a  Supreme  Will  and  a  Supreme  Intelli- 
gence ;  but  this  our  own  Wills  and  our  -own  Intelligence 
not  only  enable  us  to  conceive  of,  but  compel  us  to 
recognise  in  the  whole  laws  and  economy  of  Nature. 
Her  whole  aspect  "  answers  intelligently  to  our  intelli- 
gence— mind  responding  to  mind  as  in  a  glass."1  Once 
admit  that  there  is  a  Being  who — irrespective  of  any 
theory  as  to  the  relation  in  which  the  laws  of  Nature 
stand  to  His  Will — has  at  least  an  infinite  knowledge  of 
those  laws,  and  an  infinite  power  of  putting  them  to  use — 
then  miracles  lose  every  element  of  inconceivability.  In 
respect  to  the  greatest  and  highest  of  all — that  restora- 
tion of  the  breath  of  life  which  is  not  more  mysterious 
than  its  original  gift — there  is  no  answer  to  the  question 
which  Paul  asks,  "  Why  should  it  be  thought  a  thing 
incredible  by  you  that  God  should  raise  the  dead?" 
.  This  view  of  miracles  is  well  expressed  by  Principal 
Tulloch  :— 

"The  stoutest  advocate  of  interference  can  mean 
nothing  more  than  that  the  Supreme  Will  has  so  moved 
the  hidden  springs  of  nature  that  a  new  issue  arises 

i  "  Beginning  Life :  Chapters  for  Young  Men  on  Religion,  Study, 
and  Business.  Chap,  iii.,  The  Supernatural."  By  John  Tulloch, 
D.D.  Principal  of  St.  Mary's  College,  St,  Andrew's.  Edinburgh, 
1860.  P.  29. 


24  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

on  given  circumstances.  The  ordinary  issue  is  sup- 
planted by  a  higher  issue.  The  essential  facts  before 
us  are  a  certain  set  of  phenomena,  and  a  Higher  Will 
moving  them.  How  moving  them?  is  a  question  for 
human  definition  ;  but  the  answer  to  which  does  not 
and  cannot  affect  the  Divine  meaning  of  the  change. 
Yet  when  we  reflect  that  this  Higher  Will  is  every- 
where reason  and  wisdom,  it  seems  a  juster  as  well  as 
a  more  comprehensive  view  to  regard  it  as  operating 
by  subordination  and  evolution  rather  than  by  'inter- 
ference '  or  '  violation.'  According  to  this  view,  the 
idea  of  Law  is  so  far  from  being  contravened  by  the 
Christian  miracles,  that  it  is  taken  up  by  them  and 
made  their  very  basis.  They  are  the  expression  of  a 
Higher  Law,  working  out  its  wise  ends  among  the 
lower  and  ordinary  sequences  of  life  and  history.  These 
ordinary  sequences  represent  nature — nature,  however, 
not  as  an  immutable  fate,  but  a  plastic  medium 
through  which  a  Higher  Voice  and  Will  are  ever 
addressing  us,  and  «which,  therefore,  may  be  wrought 
into  new  issues  when  the  Voice  has  a  new  message, 
and  the  Will  a  special  purpose  for  .us."  * 

It  is  well  worthy  of  remark,  that  Locke,  who  laid 
great  stress  on  the  Christian  miracles,  as  attesting  the 
authority  of  those  who  wrought  them,  declines,  never- 
theless, to  adopt  the  common  definition  of  that  in 

1  "  .Beginning  Life,"  &c.  pp.  8$,  86.     By  John  Tulloch,  D.D 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  25 

which  miraculous  agency  consists.  "A  miracle  then," 
he  says,1  "I  take  to  be  a  sensible  operation,  which, 
being  above  the  comprehension  of  the  spectator  and, 
in  his  opinion,  contrary  to  the  established  course  of 
nature,  is  taken  by  him  to  be  Divine."  And  in  reply 
to  the  objection,  that  this  makes  a  miracle  depend  on 
the  opinions  or  knowledge  of  the  spectator,  he  points 
out  that  this  objection  cannot  be  avoided  by  any  of 
the  definitions  commonly  adopted  j  because  "  it  being 
agreed  that  a  miracle  must  be  that  which  surpasses  the 
force  of  nature  in  the  established  steady  laws  of  cause 
and  effect,  nothing  can  be  taken  to  be  a  miracle  but 
what  is  judged  to  exceed  those  laws.  Now  every  one 
being  able  to  judge  of  those  laws  only  by  his  own 
acquaintance  with  nature,  and  his  own  notions  of  its 
force,  which  are  different  in  different  men,  it  is  un- 
avoidable that  that  should  be  a  miracle  to  one  man 
which  is  not  so  to  another."  In  this  passage  Locke 
recognises  the  great  truth,  that  we  can  never  know 
what  is  above  Nature  unless  we  know  all  that  is 
within  Nature.  But  he  misses  another  truth,  quite  as 
important, — that  a  miracle  would  still  be  a  miracle  even 
though  we  did  know  the  laws  through  which  it  was 
accomplished,  provided  those  laws,  though  not  beyond 
human  knowledge,  were  beyond  human  control.  We 
might  know  the  conditions  necessaiy  to  the  performance 
*  "A  Discourse  on  Miracles." 


26  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

of  a  miracle,  although  utterly  unable  to  bring  those 
conditions  about.  Yet  a  work  performed  by  the  bring- 
ing about  of  conditions  which  are  out  of  human  reach, 
would  certainly  be  a  work  attesting  superhuman  power. 

Nevertheless  so  deeply  ingrained  in  popular  theology 
is  the  idea  that  miracles,  to  be  miracles  at  all,  must 
be  performed  by  some  violation  or  suspension  of  the 
laws  of  Nature,  that  the  opposite  idea  of  miracles  being 
performed  by  the  use  of  .means  is  regarded  by  many 
with  jealousy  and  suspicion.  Strange  that  it  should  be 
thought  the  safest  course  to  separate  as  sharply  and  as 
widely  as  we  can  between  what  we  are  called  upon  to 
believe  in  Religion,  and  what  we  are  able  to  trace  or 
understand  in  Nature  !  With  what  heart  can  those  who 
cherish  this  frame  of  mind  follow  the  great  argument  of 
Butler  ?  All  the  steps  of  that  argument — the  greatest  in 
the  whole  range  of  Christian  philosophy — are  founded 
on  the  opposite  belief,  that  all  the  truths,  and  not  less  all 
the  difficulties  of  Religion,  have  their  type  and  likeness 
in  the  "constitution  and  course  of  Nature."  As  we 
follow  that  reasoning,  so  simple  and  so  profound,  we 
find  our  eyes  ever  opening  to  some  new  interpretation  of 
familiar  facts,  and  recognising  among  the  curious  things 
of  earth,  one  after  another  of  the  laws  which,  when  told 
us  of  the  spiritual  world,  seem  so  perplexing  and  so  hard 
to  accept  or  understand.  To  ask  how  much  further  this 
argument  of  the  "  Analogy  "  is  capable  of  illustration  and 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  27 

development,  is  to  ask  how  much  more  we  shall  know 
of  Nature.  Like  all  central  truths,  its  ramifications  are 
infinite — as  infinite  as  the  appearance  of  variety,  and  as 
pervading  as  the  sense  of  oneness  in  the  universe  of  God. 
But  what  of  Revelation?  Are  its  history  and  doc- 
trines incompatible  with  the  belief  that  God  uniformly 
acts  through  the  use  of  means  ?  The  narrative  of  Crea- 
tion is  given  to  us  in  abstract  only,  and  is  told  in  two 
different  forms,  both  having  apparently  for  their  main, 
perhaps  their  exclusive  object,  the  presenting  to  our 
conception  the  personal  agency  of  a  living  God.  Yet 
this  narrative  indicates,  however  slightly,  that  room  is 
left  for  the  idea  of  a  material  process.  "  Out  of  the  dust 
of  the  ground ; "  that  is,  out  of  the  ordinary  elements  of 
Nature,  was  that  Body  formed  which  is  still  upheld  and 
perpetuated  by  organic  forces  acting  under  the  rules  of 
Law.  Nothing  which  Science  has  discovered,  or  can 
discover,  is  capable  of  traversing  that  simple  narrative. 
On  this  subject  M.  Guizot  lays  great  stress,  as  many 
others  do,  on  what  he  calls  the  Supernatural  in  Crea- 
tion, as  distinguished  from  the  operations  now  visible  in 
Nature.  "  De  quelle  fa?on  et  par  quelle  puissance  le 
genre  humain  a-t-il  commence  sur  la  terre  ?  "  In  reply  to 
this  question,  he  proceeds  to  argue  that  Man  must  have 
been  the  result  either  of  mere  material  forces,  or  of  a 
supernatural  power  exterior  to,  and  superior  to  Matter. 
Spontaneous  generation,  he  argues,  supposing  it  to  exist 


28  THE  REIGN   OF  LAW. 

at  all,  can  give  birth  only  to  infant  beings — to  the  first 
hours,  and  feeblest  forms  of  nascent  life.  But  Man — the 
human  pair — must  evidently  have  been  complete  from  the 
first ;  created  in  the  full  possession  of  their  powers  and 
faculties.  "  C'est  a  cette  condition  seulement  qu'en  ap- 
paraissant  pour  la  premiere  fois  sur  la  terre  1'homme  aurait 
pu  y  vivre — s'y  perpetuer,  et  y  fonder  le  genre  humain. 
Evidemment  1'autre  origine  du  genre  humain  est  seul  ad- 
missible, seul  possible.  Le  fait  surnaturel  de  la  creation 
explique  seul  la  premiere  apparition  de  1'homme  ici-bas." 
This  is  a  common  but  not  a  very  safe  argument.  If 
the  .Supernatural — that  is  to  say,  the  Superhuman  and 
the  Supermaterial— cannot  be  found  nearer  to  us  than 
this,  it  will  not  be  securely  found  at  all.  It  is  very  diffi- 
cult to  free  ourselves  from  this  notion  that  by  going  far 
enough  back,  we  can  "find  out  God"  in  some  sense  in 
which  we  cannot  find  Him  now.  The  certainty  not 
merely  of  one,  but  of  many  successive  Creations  in  the 
history  of  our  Planet,  and  especially  of  a  time  compara- 
tively recent,  when  Man  did  not  exist,  is  indeed  an 
effectual  answer  to  the  notion,  if  it  be  now  ever  enter- 
tained, of  uall  things  having  continued  as  they  are 
since  the  Beginning."  But  those  who  believe  that  the 
existing  processes  of  Nature  can  be  accounted  for  by 
"  Law,"  may  believe  that  those  processes  were  also 
commenced  by  the  same  vague  and  mysterious  agency, 
To  accept  the  primeval  narrative  of  the  Jewish  Scrip- 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  29 

tures  as  coming  from  authority,  and  as  bringing  before 
us  the  personal  agency  of  the  Creator,  but  without  pur- 
porting to  reveal  the  method  of  His  work, — this  is  one 
thing.  To  argue  that  no  other  origin  for  the  first  parents 
of  the  human  race  is  conceivable  than  that  they  were 
moulded  perfect,  without  the  instrumentality  of  any 
means, — this  is  quite  another  thing.  The  various  hypo- 
theses of  Development,  of  which  Darwin's  theory  is  only 
a  new  and  special  version,  whether  they  are  probable  or 
not,  are  at  least  advanced  as  affording  a  possible  escape 
from  the  puzzle  which  M.  Guizot  puts.  These  hypotheses 
are  indeed  destitute  of  proof;  and  in  the  form  which 
they  have  as  yet  assumed,  it  may  justly  be  said  that 
they  involve  such  violations  of,  or  departures  from, 
all  that  we  know  of  the  existing  order  of  things,  as 
to  deprive  them  of  all  scientific  basis.  But  the  close 
and  mysterious  relations  between  the  mere  animal  frame 
of  Man,  and  that  of  the  lower  animals,  does  render  the 
idea  of  a  common  relationship  by  descent  at  least  con- 
ceivable. Indeed,  in  proportion  as  it  seems  to  approach 
nearer  to  processes  of  which  we  have  some  knowledge,  it 
is,  in  a  degree,  more  conceivable  than  Creation  without 
any  process, — of  which  we  have  no  knowledge  and  can 
have  no  conception. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  method  or  process 
of  Creation,  it  is  Creation  still.  If  it  were  proved 
to-morrow  that  the  first  man  was  "born"  from  some 


3°  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

pre-existing  Form  of  Life,  it  would  still  be  true  that  such 
a  birth  must  have  been,  in  every  sense  of  the  word,  a  new 
Creation.  It  would  still  be  as  true  that  God  formed  him 
"  out  of  the  dust  of  the  earth,"  as  it  is  true  that  He  has 
so  formed  every  child  who  is  now  called  to  answer  the 
first  question  of  all  theologies.  And  we  must  remember 
that  the  language  of  Scripture  nowhere  draws,  or  seems 
even  conscious  of,  the  distinction  which  modern  philo- 
sophy draws  so  sharply  between  the  Natural  and  the 
Supernatural.  All  the  operations  of  Nature  are  spoken 
of  as  operations  of  the  Divine  Mind.  Creation  is  the 
outward  embodiment  of  a  Divine  idea.  It  is  in  this 
sense,  apparently,  that  the  narrative  of  Genesis  speaks  of 
every  plant  being  formed  "before  it  grew."  But  the 
same  language  is  held,  not  less  decidedly,  of  every  ordi- 
nary birth.  "  Thine  eyes  did  see  my  substance,  yet  being 
imperfect.  In  Thy  book  all  my  members  were  written, 
which  in  continuance  were  fashioned,  when  as  yet  there 
were  none  of  them."  And  these  words,  spoken  of  the 
individual  birth,  have  been  applied  not  less  truly  to  the 
modern  idea  of  the  Genesis  of  all  Organic  Life.  What- 
ever may  have  been  the  physical  or  material  relation 
between  its  successive  forms,  the  ideal  relation  has 
been  now  clearly  recognised,  and  reduced  to  scientific 
definition.  .All  the  members  of  that  frame  which  has 
received  its  highest  interpretation  in  Man,  had  existed, 
with  lower  offices  assigned  to  them,  in  the  animals 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  3! 

which  flourished  before  Man  was  born.  All  theories  of 
Development  have  been  simply  attempts  to  suggest  the 
manner  in  which,  or  the  physical  process  by  means  of 
which,  this  ideal  continuity  of  type  and  pattern  has  been 
preserved.  But  whilst  all  these  suggestions  have  been 
in  the  highest  degree  uncertain,  some  of  them  violently 
absurd,  the  one  thing  which  is  certain  is  the  fact  for 
which  they  endeavour  to  account.  And  what  is  that 
fact?  It  is  one  which  belongs  to  the  world  of  Mind, 
not  to  the  world  of  Matter.  When  Professor  Owen  tells 
us,  for  example,  that  certain  jointed  bones  in  the  Whale's 
paddle  are  the  same  bones  which  in  the  Mole  enable  it 
to  burrow,  which  in  the  Bat  enable  it  to  fly,  and  in  Man 
constitute  his  hand  with  all  its  wealth  of  functions,  he 
does  not  mean  that  physically  and  actually  they  are  the 
same  bones,  nor  that  they  have  the  same  uses,  nor  that 
they  ever  have  been,  or  ever  can  be,  transferable  from 
one  kind  of  animal  to  another.  He  means  that  in  a 
purely  ideal  or  mental  conception  of  the  plan  of  all  Ver- 
tebrate skeletons,  these  bones  occupy  the  same  relative 
place— relative,  that  is,  not  to  origin  or  use,  but  to  the 
Plan  or  conception  of  that  skeleton  as  a  whole. 

Here  the  Supermaterial,  and  in  this  sense  the  Super- 
natural, element, — that  is  to  say,  the  ideal  conformity  and 
unity  of  conception,  is  the  one  unquestionable  fact,  in 
which  we  recognise  directly  the  working  of  a  Mind  with 
which  our  own  has  very  near  relations.  Here,  as  else- 


32  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

where,  we  see  the  Natural,  in  the  largest  sense,  including 
and  embodying  the  Supernatural;  the  Material,  including 
*he  Supermaterial.  No  possible  theory,  whether  true  or 
false,  in  respect  to  the  physical  means  employed  to  pre- 
serve the  correspondence  of  parts  which  runs  through  all 
Creation,  can  affect  the  certainty  of  that  mental  plan  and 
purpose  which  alone  makes  such  correspondence  intelli- 
gible to  us,  and  in  which  alone  it  may  be  said  to  exist. 

It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  two  ideas, — 
that  of  a  Physical  Cause  and  that  of  a  Mental  Purpose, — 
are  not  antagonistic  ;  only  the  one  is  larger  and  more 
comprehensive  than  the  other.  Let  us  take  a  case.  In 
many  animal  frames  there  are  what  have  been  called 
"  silent  members  " — members  which  have  no  reference 
to  the  life  or  use  of  the  animal,  but  only  to  the  general 
pattern  on  which  all  vertebrate  skeletons  have  been 
formed.  Mr.  Darwin,  when  he  sees  such  a  member  in 
any  animal,  concludes  with  certainty  that  this  animal  is 
the  lineal  descendant  by  ordinary  generation  of  some 
other  animal  in  which  that  member  was  not  silent  but 
turned  to  use.  Professor  Owen,  taking  a  larger  and 
wider  view,  would  say,  without  pretending  to  explain  how 
its  presence  is  to  be  accounted  for  physically,  that  the 
silent  member  has  relation  to  a  general  purpose  or  plan 
which  can  be  traced  from  the  dawn  of  Life,  but  which 
did  not  receive  its  full  accomplishment  until  Man  was 
h  orn.  This  is  certain :  the  other  is  a  theory.  The 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  33 

assumed  physical  cause  may  be  true  or  false.  But  in  any 
case  the  mental  purpose  and  design — the  conformity  to 
an  abstract  idea — this  is  certain.  The  relation  in  which 
created  Forms  stand  to  our  own  mind  and  to  our  under- 
standing of  their  Purpose,  is  the  one  thing  which  we 
can  surely  know,  because  it  belongs  to  our  own  con- 
sciousness. It  is  entirely  independent  of  any  belief 
we  may  entertain,  or  any  knowledge  we  may  acquire, 
of  the  processes  employed  for  the  fulfilment  of  that 
Purpose. 

And  yet  scientific  men  sometimes  tell  us  that  "we 
must  be  very  cautious  how  we  ascribe  intention  to 
Nature.  Things  do  fit  into  each  other,  no  doubt,  as  if 
they  were  designed  ;  but  all  we  know  about  them  is 
that  these  correspondences  exist,  and  that  they  seem  to 
be  the  result  of  physical  laws  of  development  and 
growth."  Very  likely;  but  how  these  correspondences 
have  arisen,  and  are  daily  arising,  is  not  the  question,  and 
it  is  immaterial  how  that  question  may  be  answered. 
Do  those  correspondences  exist,  or  do  they  not  ?  The 
perception  of  them  by  our  mind  is  as  much  a  fact  as  the 
sight  or  touch  of  the  things  in  which  they  appear.  They 
may  have  been  produced  by  growth — they  may  have  been 
the  result  of  a  process  of  development, — but  it  is  not  the 
less  the  development  of  a  mental  purpose.  It  is  the  end 
subserved  that  we  absolutely  know.  What  alone  is 

D 


34  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

doubtful  and  obscure  is  precisely  that  which  we  are  told 
is  the  only  legitimate  object  of  our  research, — viz.,  the 
means  by  which  that  end  has  been  attained.  Take  one 
instance  out  of  millions.  The  poison  of  a  deadly  snake 
— let  us  for  a  moment  consider  what  this  is.  It  is  a 
secretion  of  definite  chemical  properties  which  have  re- 
ference, not  only — not  even  mainly — to  the  organism  of 
the  animal  in  which  it  is  developed,  but  specially  to  the 
organism  of  another  animal  which  it  is  intended  to  de- 
stroy. Some  naturalists  have  a  vague  sort  of  notion 
that,  as  regards  merely  mechanical  weapons,  or  organs  of 
attack,  they  may  be  developed  by  use, — that  legs  may 
become  longer  by  fast  running,  teeth  sharper  and  longer 
by  much  biting.  Be  it  so :  this  law  of  growth,  if  it 
exist,  is  but  itself  an  instrument  whereby  purpose  is  ful- 
filled. But  how  will  this  law  of  growth  adjust  a  poison 
in  one  animal  with  such  subtle  knowledge  of  the 
organisation  of  another  that  the  deadly  virus  shall  in 
a  few  minutes  curdle  the  blood,  benumb  the  nerves, 
and  rush  in  upon  the  citadel  of  life  ?  There  is  but 
one  explanation — a  Mind,  having  minute  and  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  structure  of  both,  has  designed  the 
one  to  be  capable  of  inflicting  death  upon  the  other. 
This  mental  purpose  and  resolve  is  the  one  thing  which 
our  intelligence  perceives  with  direct  and  intuitive 
recognition.  The  method  of  creation,  by  means  of  which, 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  35 

this   purpose   has   been    carried   into    effect,   is   utterly 
unknown. 

It  is  no  answer  or  objection  to  this  view  that  poisons 
exist  also  in  plants  and  minerals  where  no  similar  adjust- 
ment to  function  is  perceived.1  Even  in  these  cases  there 
are  wonderful  relations  between  our  own  human  frame 
and  many  poisons  of  the  mineral  and  vegetable  world 
which  render  them  invaluable  agents  in  the  mitigation 
of  suffering  and  the  prevention  or  removal  of  disease. 
It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  these  complicated  re- 
lations of  action  and  reaction  between  things  separated 
apparently  from  each  other  by  the  whole  width  of  being, 
have  been  the  result  of  forces  with  which  Mind  and 
Prevision  have  had  no  concern.  But  even  if  the  use 
of  such  poisons  were  absolutely  unknown — even  if  that 
use  lay,  which  it  does  not,  beyond  tr.ie  possibility  of  our 
conception, — this  would  not  deduct  by  the  value  of  a 
fraction  from  the  certainty  of  a  conclusion  which  is 
founded  on  different  conditions.  The  relations  of  ad- 
justment between  a  giv^n  number  of  elements  are  none 
the  less  a  certain  fact  because  similar  elements  may  be 
found  elsewhere  without  any  such  adjustment  being 
visible  to  us.  It  is  the  very  fact  of  their  not  being 

1  "To  what  intention  are  we  to  ascribe  the  poisons  liberally  dis- 
tributed through  plants  and  minerals?"  asks  Mr.  G.  II.  Lewes  in 
his  review  of  this  work.  —  Fortnightly  Review^  July  1867,  p.  loo. 
D  2 


36  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

separate  but  combined  in  the  one  case  which  justifies 
and  compels  a  conclusion  different  from  that  which 
arises  in  the  other  case.  This  is  the  law  of  evidence 
on  which  we  act  and  judge  in  other  matters  with  con- 
viction which  is  both  intuitive,  and  capable  of  being 
confirmed  by  the  rules  of  reason.  And  this  reply  is 
applicable  to  all  objections  of  the  same  kind.  Those 
portions  of  the  system  of  Nature  which  are  wholly  dark 
to  us  do  not  necessarily  cast  any  shadow  on  those 
other  portions  of  that  system  which  are  luminous  with 
inherent  light.  Rather  the  other  way.  The  shining 
tracts  which  thus  reflect  the  light  of  Reason  and  of 
Mind  send  abundant  rays  into  all  the  dark  places  round 
them.  The  new  discoveries  which  Science  is  ever 
making  of  adjustments  and  combinations,  of  which 
we  had  no  previous  conception,  impress  us  with  an 
irresistible  conviction  that  the  same  relations  to  Mind 
prevail  throughout.  It  matters  not  in  what  department 
of  investigation  inquiry  is  conducted,  it  matters  not  what 
may  be  the  Philosophy  or  Theology  of  the  inquirer. 
Every  step  he  takes  he  finds  himself  face  to  face  with 
facts  which  he  cannot  describe  intelligibly  either  to  him- 
self or  others,  except  by  referring  them  to  that  function 
and  power  of  Mind  which  we  know  as  Purpose  and 
Design. 
Perhaps  no  illustration  more  striking  of  this  principle 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  37 

was  ever  presented  than  in  the  curious  volume  published 
by  Mr.  Darwin  on  the  "  Fertilisation  of  Orchids."1  It 
appears  that  the  fertilisation  of  almost  all  Orchids  is  de- 
pendent on  the  transport  of  the  pollen  from  one  flower 
to  another  by  means  of  insects.  It  appears,  further,  that 
the  structure  of  these  flowers  is  elaborately  contrived,  so 
as  to  secure  the  certainty  and  effectiveness  of  this  opera- 
tion. Mr.  Darwin's  work  is  devoted  to  tracing  in  detail 
what  these  contrivances  are.  To  a  large  extent  they  are 
purely  mechanical,  and  can  be  traced  with  as  much 
clearness  and  certainty  as  the  different  parts  of  which 
a  steam-engine  is  composed.  The  complication  and 
ingenuity  of  these  contrivances  almost  exceed  belief. 
"Moth-traps  and  spring-guns  set  on  these  grounds," 
might  be  the  motto  of  the  Orchids.  There  are  baits  to 
tempt  the  nectar-loving  Lepidoptera,  with  rich  odours 
exhaled  at  night,  and  lustrous  colours  to  shine  by  day; 
there  are  channels  of  approach  along  which  they  are 
surely  guided,  so  as  to  compel  them  to  pass  by  certain 
spots ;  there  are  adhesive  plasters  nicely  adjusted  to  fit 
their  probosces,  or  to  catch  their  brows ;  theie  are  hair 
triggers  carefully  set  in  their  necessary  path,  communi- 
cating with  explosive  shells,  which  project  the  pollen- 

i  "On  the  various  Contrivances  by  which  British  and  Foreign 
Orchids  are  fertilised . by  Insects."  By  Charles  Darwin,  F.R  S. 
London,  1862. 


38  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

stalks  with  unerring  aim  upon  their  bodies.  There  are, 
in  short,  an  infinitude  of  adjustments,  for  an  idea  of 
which  I  must  refer  my  readers  to  Mr.  Darwin's  inimi- 
table powers  of  observation  and  description — adjust- 
ments all  contrived  so  as  to  secure  the  accurate  convey- 
ance of  the  pollen  of  the  one  flower  to  its  precise 
destination  in  the  structure  of  another. 

Now  there  are  two  questions  which  present  them- 
selves when  we  examine  such  a  mechanism  as  this. 
The  first  is,  What  is  the  use  of  the  various  parts,  or  their 
relation  to  each  other  with  reference  to  the  purpose  of 
the  whole?  The  second  question  is,  How  were  those 
parts  made,  and  out  of  what  materials  ?  It  is  the  first  of 
these  questions — that  is  to  say,  the  use,  object,  inten- 
tion, or  purpose  of  the  different  parts  of  the  plant — 
which  Darwin  sets  himself  instinctively  to  answer  first ; 
and  it  is  this  which  he  does  answer  with  precision  and 
success.  The  second  question, — that  is  to  say,  how 
those  parts  came  to  be  developed,  and  out  of  what 
"  primordial  elements  "  they  have  been  derived  in  their 
present  shapes,  and  converted  to  their  present  uses — 
this  is  a  question  which  Darwin  does  also  attempt  to 
solve,  but  the  solution  of  which  is  in  the  highest  degree 
difficult  and  uncertain.  It  is  curious  to  observe  the 
language  which  this  most  advanced  disciple  of  pure 
naturalism  instinctively  uses  when  he  has  to  describe  the 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  39 

complicated  structure  of  this  curious  order  of  plants. 
"  Caution  in  ascribing  intentions  to  nature,"  does  not 
seem  to  occur  to  him  as  possible.  Intention  is  the  one 
thing  which  he  does  see,  and  which,  when  he  does  not 
see,  he  seeks  for  diligently  until  he  finds  it.  He  exhausts 
every  form  of  words  and  of  illustration  by  which  intention 
or  mental  purpose  can  be  described.  "  Contrivance  " — 
"  curious  contrivance  " — "  beautiful  contrivance," — these 
are  expressions  which  recur  over  and  over  again.  Here 
is  one  sentence  describing  the  parts  of  a  particular 
species :  "  the  Labellum  is  developed  into  a  long  nec- 
tary, in  order  to  attract  Lepidoptera,  and  we  shall  pre- 
sently give  reasons  for  suspecting  that  the  nectar  is 
purposely  so  lodged  that  it  can  be  sucked  only  slowly,  /// 
order  to  give  time  for  the  curious  chemical  quality  of  the 
viscid  matter  setting  hard  and  dry."1  Nor  are  these 
words  used  in  any  sense  different  from  that  in  which 
they  are  applicable  to  the  works  of  Man's  contrivance—- 
to the  instruments  we  use  or  invent  for  carrying  into 
effect  our  own  preconceived  designs.  On  the  contrary, 
human  instruments  are  often  selected  as  the  aptest  illus- 
trations both  of  the  object  in  view,  and  of  the  means 
taken  to  effect  it.  Of  one  particular  structure,  Mr. 
Darwin  says :  "  This  contrivance  of  the  guiding  ridges 
may  be  compared  to  the  little  instrument  sometimes 
*  P.  29. 


40  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

used  for  guiding  a  thread  into  the  eye  of  a  needle." 
Again,  referring  to  the  precautions  taken  to  compel  the 
insects  to  come  to  the  proper  spot,  in  order  to  have  the 
"  pollinia "  attached  to  their  bodies,  Mr.  Darwin  says  : 
"  Thus  we  have  the  rostellum  partially  closing  the  mouth 
of  the  nectary,  like  a  trap  placed  in  a  run  for  game, — and 
the  trap  so  complex  and  perfect ! " 1  But  this  is  not  all 
The  idea  of  special  use,  as  the  controlling  principle  of 
construction,  is  so  impressed  on  Mr.  Darwin's  mind, 
that,  in  every  detail  of  structure,  however  singular  or 
obscure,  he  has  absolute  faith  that  in  this  lies  the  ulti- 
mate explanation.  If  an  organ  is  largely  developed,  it 
is  because  some  special  purpose  is  to  be  fulfilled.  If  it 
is  aborted  or  rudimentary,  it  is  because  that  purpose  is 
no  longer  to  be  subserved.  In  the  case  of  another 
species  whose  structure  is  very  singular,  Mr.  Darwin  had 
great  difficulty  in  discovering  how  the  mechanism  was 
meant  to  work,  so  as  to  effect  the  purpose.  At  last  he 
made  it  out,  and  of  the  clue  which  led  to  the  discovery 
he  says  :  "  The  strange  position  of  the  Labellum  perched 
on  the  summit  of  the  column,  ought  to  have  shown  me 
that  here  was  the  place  for  experiment.  I  ought  to  have 
scorned  the  notion  that  the  Labellum  was  thus  placed  for 
tio  good  purpose.  I  neglected  this  plain  guide,  and  for  a 
Icng  time  completely  failed  to  understand  the  flower."  a 

f  r,  30.  8  p.  262. 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  4! 

An  attempt  has,  indeed,  been  made  to  explain  away 
Mr.  Darwin's  language  in  such  cases  as  "  metaphorical."  l 
But  this  explanation  is  powerless  to  expel  from  that 
language  the  inference  it  involves.  Indeed,  it  is  an 
explanation  which  only  repeats  the  same  idea  in  another 
form.  The  very  essence  of  a  metaphor  is  that  it  ex- 
presses the  resemblances  of  things.  But  it  is  in  seeing 
the  resemblances,  and  in  seeing  the  correlative  differences 
of  things,  that  all  knowledge  consists.  This  perception 
is  the  raw  material  of  Thought — it  is  the  foundation  of 
all  intellectual  apprehension.  In  proportion  as  resem- 
blances are  complete,  the  language  which  expresses  those 
resemblances  is  the  language  of  truth.  Such  language 
very  often  carries  within  it  the  most  certain  conclusions 
which  are  accessible  to  reason.  One  mind  looking  at 
the  workings  of  another  mind  can  see  likeness  of 
agency  only  by  recognising  likeness  in  the  processes  of 
thought.  That  likeness  can  only  be  expressed  in  words 
which  convey  the  idea  of  it  to  other  minds.  But  in 
this  sense  all  language  is  metaphorical.  The  commonest 
words  we  use  to  indicate  ideas  are  essentially  meta- 
phorical, bringing  home  into  the  world  of  Mind  images 

1  Quarterly  Journal  of  Science,  Oct.  1867.  "  Creation  by  Law," 
by  Alfred  Wallace.  "  Mr.  Darwin  has  laid  himself  open  to  much 
misconception,  and  has  given  to  his  opponents  a  powerful  weapon 
by  his  continual  use  of  metaphor  in  describing  the  wonderful  co- 
adaptations  of  organic  beings." — P.  473. 


42  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

derived  from  material  force,  and  carrying  forth  again 
into  the  outward  world  conceptions  born  of  that  mental 
power  which  alone  is  capable  of  conceiving.  In  one 
aspect,  all  human  speech  is  what  the  Poet  calls  it, 
"  Matter-moulded  forms  of  speech." l  In  another  aspect 
it  is  all  spirit-moulded,  since  we  can  only  think  of 
Matter  in  the  "light  of  those  impressions  which  it  has 
power  to  make  on  Mind.  All  language  is  thus  but  a 
system  of  signs  whereby  we  express  the  analogies — the 
differences  and  resemblances  perceived  by  us  in  those 
two  great  departments  of  Nature  of  which  the  union  and 
the  separation  are  both  imaged  in  ourselves — that  is,  in 
the  union  and  in  the  difference  of  the  Body  and  the 
Mind.  The  most  absolute  certainties  we  can  ever  know 
are  only  known  by  the  translation  of  ideas  or  conceptions 
from  one  of  these  departments  to  the  other,  and  the 
language  in  which  these  certainties  are  expressed  carries, 
and  must  carry,  signs  of  this  origin  in  itself.  The  ques- 
tion, therefore,  in  respect  to  Mr.  Darwin's  language,  is 
not  whether  it  is  "  metaphorical  "—that  is,  whether  it 
applies  to  material  phenomena  conceptions  derived 
from  the  world  of  Mind.  This,  of  course,  it  does,  and 
in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  must  do.  But  the  question 
is,  whether  the  correspondence  it  expresses  between  the 
order  of  these  material  phenomena  and  a  known  order 
*  "In  Memorial)),"  xciv. 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  _  43 

of  Thought  is  or  is  not  a  real  correspondence,  and 
one,  therefore,  indicating  the  known  effects  of  a  known 
originating  cause. 

And  here  it  is  well  worthy  of  observation,  that 
although  Purpose  and  Intention  are,  of  course,  involved 
in  all  mental  operations,  yet  the  conception  of  con- 
trivance is  not  the  only  mental  conception  which,  in 
like  manner,  is  recognised  as  constituting  the  order  of 
natural  phenomena.  Other  conceptions  equally  familiar 
to  the  mind  of  Man  are  instinctively  recognised  by  all 
Naturalists  who  bring  high  intellectual  powers  into  that 
contact  with  Nature  which  consists  in  close  and  thought- 
ful observation  of  her  facts.  Other  mental  conceptions, 
such  as  those  of  Number  and  Proportion,  are  then  found 
to  emerge,  and  make  an  ineffaceable  impression  on  the 
mind  which  sees  them. 

Thus,  when  we  come  to  the  second  part  of  Mr.  Darwin's 
work,  viz.  the  Homology  of  the  Orchids,  we  find  that  the 
inquiry  divides  itself  into  two  separate  questions, — first, 
the  question  what  all  these  complicated  organs  are  in 
their  primitive  relation  to  each  other;  and,  secondly, 
how  these  successive  modifications  have  arisen,  so  as  to 
fit  them  for  new  and  changing  uses.  Now,  it  is  very 
remarkable  that  of  these  two  questions,  that  which  may 
be  called  the  most  abstract  and  transcendental — the 
most  nearly  related  to  the  Supernatural  and  the  Super* 


44  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


material — is  again  precisely  the  one  which  Darwin  is 
able  to  solve  most  clearly.  We  have  already  seen  how 
well  he  solves  the  first  question — What  is  the  use  and 
intention  of  these  various  parts  ?  The  next  question  is, 
What  are  these  parts  in  their  primal  order  and  con- 
ception? The  answer  if,  that  they  are  members  of  a 
numerical  group,  having  a  definite  and  still  traceable 
order  of  symmetrical  arrangement.  They  are  expres- 
sions of  a  numerical  idea,  as  so  many  other  things — 
perhaps  as  all  things — of  beauty  are.  Mr.  Darwin  gives 
a  diagram,  showing  the  primordial  or  archetypal  arrange- 
ment of  Threes  within  Threes,  out  of  which  all  the  strange 
and  marvellous  forms  of  the  Orchids  have  been  deve- 
loped,  and  to  which,  by  careful  counting  and  dissection, 
they  can  still  be  ideally  reduced.  But  when  we  come 
to  the  last  question— By  what  process  of  natural  con- 
sequence have  these  elementary  organs  of  Three  within 
Three  been  developed  into  so  many  various  forms  of 
beauty,  and  made  to  subserve  so  many  curious  and 
ingenious  designs?— we  find  nothing  but  the  vaguest  and 
most  unsatisfactory  conjectures.  Let  us  take  one  in- 
stance as  an  example.  There  is  a  Madagascar  Orchis — 
the  "  Angraecum  sesquipedale  " — with  an  immensely  long 
and  deep  nectary.  How  did  such  an  extraordinary  organ 
come  to  be  developed?  Mr.  Darwin's  explanation  is 
this :  The  pollen  of  tins  flower  can  only  be  removed  by 


TIIU   SUPERNATURAL.  45 

the  proboscis  of  some  very  large  Moth  trying  to  get  at 
the  nectar  at  the  bottom  of  the  vessel.  The  Moths  with 
the  longest  probosces  would  do  this  most  effectually; 
they  would  be  rewarded  for  their  long  noses  by  getting 
the  most  nectar ;  whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  the  flowers 
with  the  deepest  nectaries  would  be  the  best  fertilised  by 
the  largest  Moths  preferring  them.  Consequently,  the 
deepest-nectaried  Orchids,  and  the  longest-nosed  Moths, 
would  each  confer  on  the  other  a  great  advantage  in  the 
"battle  of  life."  This  would  tend  to  their  respective 
perpetuation,  and  to  the  constant  lengthening  of  nec- 
taries and  of  noses.  But  the  passage  is  so  curious  and 
characteristic,  that  it  is  well  to  c;ive  Mr.  Darwin's  own 
words : — • 

"As  certain  Moths  of  Madagascar  became  larger, 
through  natural  selection  in  relation  to  their  general 
conditions  of  life,  either  in  the  larval  or  mature  state, 
or  as  the  proboscis  alone  was  lengthened  to  obtain 
honey  from  the  Angrrecum,  those  individual  plants  of 
the  Angrrecum  which  had  the  longest  nectaries,  (and 
the  nectary  varies  much  in  length  in  some  Orchids.) 
and  which,  consequently,  compelled  the  Moths  to  insert 
their  probosces  up  to  the  very  base,  would  be  the  best 
fertilised.  These  plants  would  yield  most  seed,  and  the 
seedlings  would  generally  inherit  longer  nectaries ;  and 
so  it  would  be  in  successive  generations  of  the  plant  and 


46  THE  REIGN   OF    LAW. 

Moth.  Thus  it  would  appear  that  there  has  been  a  race 
in  gaining  length  between  the  nectary  of  the  Angraecum 
and  the  proboscis  of  certain  Moths  ;  but  the  Angraecum 
has  triumphed,  for  it  flourishes  and  abounds  in  the 
forests  of  Madagascar,  and  still  troubles  each  Moth  to 
insert  its  proboscis  as  far  as  possible  in  order  to  drain 

the  last  drop  of  nectar We  can  thus/'  says  Mr. 

Darwin,  "partially  understand  how  the  astonishing 
length  of  the  nectary  may  have  been  acquired  by  suc- 
cessive modifications." 

It  is  indeed  but  a  "partial"  understanding.1  How 
came  this  Orchis  to  require  any  exact  adjustment  be- 
tween the  length  of  its  nectary  and  the  proboscis  of  an 
insect?  This  is  not  a  general  necessity  even  among  the 
Orchids.  "  In  the  British  species,  such  as  Orchis  Pyra- 
midalis,  it  is  not  necessary  that  any  such  adjustment 
should  exist,  and  thus  a  number  of  insects  of  various 
sizes  are  found  to  carry  away  the  pollinia,  and  aid  in 
the  fertilisation."  2  This  would  obviously  be  the  most 
favourable  condition  for  all  Orchids  in  the  battle  of  life. 
Does  not  the  hypothesis,  then,  begin  by  assuming  the  very 

1  The  passage  which  follows  I  have  added  to  meet  the  objection 
taken  by  Mr.  Wallace,   that  I  have  "  not  shown  what  point  the 
explanation  fails  to  meet."     A  sample  only  of  such  points  can  be 
given  here.     See  also  Note  A. 

2  ''Creation  by  Law."     G.  A.  R.  Wallace,     jotirnal  of  Science, 
October  1867,  p.  475, 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  47 

condition  of  things  for  which  it  professes  to  account? 
We  must  start  with  this  Madagascar  Orchis  already  in 
possession  of  a  larger  nectary  than  other  species,  and 
with  a  structure  already  depending  on  particular  Moths 
also  already  existing,  and  already  provided  with  pro- 
bosces  of  nicely  adjusted  length.  If  the  nectaries  began 
first  to  lengthen,  how  came  the  Moths  not  to  leave 
them  for  other  flowers?  And  if,  on  the  contrary,  they 
began  to  shorten,  how  came  they  not  to  be  favoured 
and  resorted  to  by  other  Moths  of  a  smaller  size  ?  Can 
we  assume  that  somehow  there  were  always  ready  some 
Moths  still  larger  to  favour  the  longer  variety,  and  that 
somehow  also  there  were  no  smaller  Moths  to  favour,  the 
shorter?1  Why  should  the  race  in  this  particular  species 
be  always  in  the  direction  of  nectaries  getting  longer, 
and  not  rather  in  the  direction  of  nectaries  getting 
shorter?  Obviously  the  same  hypothesis  might  be  so 
turned  as  to  account  for  either  result  with  equal  ease, 
and  therefore  it  does  not  account  at  all  for  one  of 
those  results  as  against  the  other.  And  then  there  is 


l  Mr.  Wallace  sees  no  difficulty  whatever  in  making  any  supposi- 
tion of  this  kind  which  the  Theory  may  require.  "Now  let  us 
start,"  he  says,  "from  the  time  when  the  nectary  was  only  half  its 
present  length,  or  about  six  inches,  and  was  chiefly  fertilized  by  a 
species  of  Moth  which,  appeared  at  the  time  of  the  plants  flowering, 
and  w/we  frofoxis  was  of  the  same  faigt/t," — Ibid,  p.  475. 


48  THE  REIGN  OF  LAW. 

a  larger  question  than  any  of  these  which  remains 
behind.  How  came  Orchids  to  be  dependent  at  all 
upon  insects  for  fertilisation?  It  cannot  be  argued 
that  this  is  a  necessity  arising  mechanically  from  the 
nature  of  things,  because,  as  we  are  truly  told  by  an 
eminent  naturalist  who  warmly  supports  the  Darwinian 
hypothesis,  "exactly  the  same  end  is  attained  in  ten 
thousand  other  flowers"  which  do  not  possess  the  same 
structure.1  But  what  is  the  bearing  of  this  fact  upon 
the  theory?  Is  it  not  this — that  the  origin  of  such 
curious  structures,  and  complicated  relations,  cannot  be 
accounted  for  on  any  principle  of  mere  mechanical 
necessity  ?  Elementary  forces  may  indeed  always  be 
detected,  for  they  are  always  present.  But  the  manner 
in  which  they  are  worked  irresistibly  suggests  some 
directing  power,  having  as  one  of  its  aims  mere  increase 
and  variety  in  that  ocean  of  enjoyment  which  con- 
stitutes the  sum  of  Organic  Life.  Some  idea  of  this 
kind,  however  unconsciously,  however  reluctantly  con- 
ceded, lurks  in  every  form  of  words  in  which  the 
facts  of  science  can  be  generalised  to  the  mind.  Thus 
we  find  Mr.  Wallace  himself  saying,  in  the  same  paper 
in  which  he  regrets  the  language  of  Mr.  Darwin,  that  the 
conception  he  prefers  is,  that  the  "  contrivances"  referred 
to  l(  are  some  of  the  results  of  those  general  laws  which 
1  "Creation  by  Law,"  p.  474. 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  49 

were  so  co-ordinated  at  the  first  introduction  of  Life  upon 
the  earth,  as  to  result  necessarily  in  the  utmost  possible 
development  of  varied  forms."  Eliminating  the   word 
"necessarily,"  which,  if  it  has  any  meaning,  does  not 
apply,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  case  of  the  Orchids,  this 
language  presents  an  intelligible  idea.     It  satisfies  the 
mind   precisely  in    proportion   as   it  brings  into  view, 
however  distant,  the  attributes  of  Mind,  and  gives  us  a 
glimpse  of  "  the  reason  why."   The  production  of  variety 
in  beauty  and  in  enjoyment  is  the  purpose  which  those 
words   suggest.      In    like   proportion  is    Mr.    Darwin's 
language   the   truest    and   the    best.     His  explanations 
of    the    mechanical    methods    by    which    a   wonderful 
Orchis  has  come  to  be  are  indeed,  as  he  himself  says, 
with  great  candour,  u  partial"   and   partial  only.     How 
different   from    the    clearness   and    the    certainty    with 
which  Mr.  Darwin  is  able  to  explain  to  its  the  use  and 
intention  of  the  various  organs  !  or  the  primal  idea  of 
numerical  order  and   arrangement  which   governs   the 
whole  structure  of  the  flower !     It  is  the  same  through 
all  Nature.     Purpose  and  intention,  or  ideas  of  order 
based  on  numerical  relations,  are  what  meet  us  at  every 
turn,  and  are  more  or  less  readily  recognised  by  our 
own  intelligence  as  corresponding  to  conceptions  familiar 
to  our  own  minds.     We  know,  too,  that  these  purposes 
and  ideas  are  not  our  own,  but  the  ideas  and  purposes 
«f  Another — of  One  whose   manifestations  are  indeed 

E 


50  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

superhuman  and  supermaterial,  but  are  not  "super- 
natural," in  the  sense  of  being  strange  to  Nature,  or  in 
violation  of  it. 

The  truth  is,  that  there  is  no  such  distinction  be- 
tween what  we  find  in  Nature,  and  what  we  are  called 
upon  to  believe  in  Religion,  as  that  which  men  pretend 
to  draw  between  the  Natural  and  the  Supernatural.  It 
is  a  distinction  purely  artificial,  arbitrary,  unreal.  Nature 
presents  to  our  intelligence,  the  more  clearly  the  more  we 
search  her,  the  designs,  ideas,  and  intentions  of  some 

"  Living  Will  that  shall  endure. 
When  all  that  seems  shall  suffer  shock." 

Religion  presents  to  us  that  same  Will,  not  only  work- 
ing equally  through  the  use  of  means,  but  using  means 
which  are  strictly  analogous — referable  to  the  same 
general  principles — and  which  are  constantly  appealed 
to  as  of  a  sort  which  we  ought  to  be  able  to  appreciate, 
because  we  ourselves  are  already  familiar  with  the  like. 
Religion  makes  no  call  on  us  to  reject  that  idea,  which 
is  the  only  idea  some  men  can  see  in  Nature— the  idea 
of  the  universal  Reign  of  Law — the  necessity  of  con- 
forming to  it — the  limitations  which  in  on,e  aspect  it 
seems  to  place  on  the  exercise  of  Will, — the  essential 
basis,  in  another  aspect,  which  it  supplies  for  all  the 
functions  of  Volition.  On  the  contrary,  the  high  regions 
into  which  this  idea  is  found  extending,  and  the  matters 


THE   SUPERNATURAL.  5! 

over  which  it  is  found  prevailing,  is  one  of  the  deepest 
mysteries  both  of  Religion  and  of  Nature.  We  feel  some- 
times as  if  we  should  like  to  get  afoove  this  rule — into 
some  secret  Presence  where  its  bonds  are  broken.  But 
no  glimpse  is  ever  given  us  of  anything,  but  "  Free- 
dom within  the  bounds  of  Law."  The  Will  revealed 
to  us  in  Religion  is  not — any  more  than  the  Will  re- 
vealed to  us  in  Nature — a  capricious  Will,  but  one  with 
which,  in  this  respect,  "  there  is  no  variableness,  neither 
shadow  of  turning." 

We  return,  then,  to  the  point  from  which  we  started. 
M.  Guizot's  affirmation  that  belief  in  the  Supernatural  is 
essential  to  all  Religion  is  true  only  when  it  is  under- 
stood in  a  special  sense.  Belief  in  the  existence  of  a 
Living  Will — of  a  Personal  God — is  indeed  a  requisite 
condition.  Conviction  "  that  He  is  "  must  precede  the 
conviction  that  "  He  is  the  rewarder  of  those  that  dili- 
gently seek  Him."  But  the  intellectual  yoke  involved 
in  the  common  idea  of  the  Supernatural  is  a  yoke  which 
men  impose  upon  themselves.  Obscure  thought  and 
confused  language  are  the  main  source  of  difficulty. 

Assuredly,  whatever  may  be  the  difficulties  of  Chris- 
tianity, this  is  not  one  of  them, — that  it  calls  on  us  to 
believe  in  any  exception  to  the  universal  prevalence  and 
power  of  Law.  Its  leading  facts  and  doctrines  are 
directly  connected  with  this  belief,  and  directly  sugges- 
tive of  it  The  Divine  mission  of  Christ  on  earth— 

E   9 


52  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW, 

does  not  this  imply  not  only  the  use  of  means  to  an 
end,  but  some  inscrutable  necessity  that  certain  means, 
and  these  only,  should  be  employed  in  resisting  and 
overcoming  evil?  What  else  is  the  import  of  so  many 
passages  of  Scripture  implying  that  certain  conditions 
were  required  to  bring  the  Saviour  of  Man  into  a  given 
relation  with  the  race  He  was  sent  to  save?  "It  be- 
hoved Him  ....  to  make  the  Captain  of  our  Salvation 
perfect  through  suffering."  "It  behoved  Him  in  all 
things  to  be  made  like  unto  His  brethren,  that  He  might 
fa"  &c. — with  the  reason  added  :  " for  in  that  He  Him- 
self hath  suffered  being  tempted,  He  is  able  to  succour 
them  that  are  tempted."  Whatever  more  there  may  be 
in  such  passages,  they  all  imply  the  universal  reign  of 
Law  in  the  moral  and  spiritual,  as  well  as  in  the  mate- 
rial world  :  that  those  laws  had  to  be— behoved  to  be — 
obeyed ;  and  that  the  results  to  be  obtained  are  brought 
about  by  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end,  or,  as  it 
were,  by  way  of  natural  consequence  from  the  instru- 
mentality employed.  This,  however,  is  an  idea  which 
systematic  theology  generally  regards  with  intense  sus- 
picion, though,  in  fact,  all  theologies  involve  it,  and 
build  upon  it.  But  then  they  are  very  apt  to  give 
explanations  of  that  instrumentality  which  have  no  coun- 
terpart in  the  material  or  in  the  moral  world.  Perhaps 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  manifest  decay  which 
so  many  creeds  and  confessions  are  now  suffering,  arises 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  53 

mainly  from  the  degree  in  which  at  least  the  popular 
expositions  of  them  dissociate  the  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tianity from  the  analogy  and  course  of  Nature.  There 
is  no  such  severance  in  Scripture — no  shyness  of  illus- 
trating Divine  things  by  reference  to  the  Natural.  On 
the  contrary,  we  are  perpetually  reminded  that  the  laws 
of  the  spiritual  world  are  in  the  highest  sense  laws  of 
Nature,  whose  obligation,  operation,  and  effect  are  all 
in  the  constitution  and  course  of  things.  Hence  it  is 
that  so  much  was  capable  of  being  conveyed  in  the  form 
of  parable — the  common  actions  and  occurrences  of 
daily  life  being  often  chosen  as  the  best  vehicle  and 
illustration  of  the  highest  spiritual  truth?.  It  is  not 
merely,  as  Jeremy  Taylor  says,  that  "  all  things  are  full 
of  such  resemblances," — it  is  more  than  this — more 
than  resemblance.  It  is  the  perpetual  recurrence,  under 
infinite  varieties  of  application,  of  the  same  rules  and 
principles  of  Divine  government, — of  the  same  Divine 
thoughts,  Divine  purposes,  Divine  affections.  Hence  it 
is  that  no  verbal  definitions  or  logical  forms  can  convey 
religious  truth  with  the  fulness  or  accuracy  which  belongs 
to  narratives  taken  from  Nature — Man's  nature  and  life 
being,  of  course,  included  in  the  term : 

"  And  so,  the  Word  had  breath,  and  wrought 
With  human  hands  the  Creed  of  creeds."  l 

1  Tennyson's  "  In  Memoriam." 


54  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

The  same  idea  is  expressed  in  the  passionate  exclama- 
tion of  Edward  Irving : — "  We  must  speak  in  parables, 
or  we  must  present  a  wry  and  deceptive  form  of  truth ; 
of  which  choice  the  first  is  to  be  preferred,  and  our  Lord 
adopted  it.  Because  parable  is  truth  veiled,  not  truth 
dismembered ;  and  as  the  eye  of  the  understanding 
grows  more  piercing,  the  veil  is  seen  through,  and  the 
truth  stands  revealed."  Nature  is  the  great  Parable; 
and  the  truths  which  she  holds  within  her  are  veiled, 
but  not  dismembered.  The  pretended  separation  be- 
tween that  which  lies  within  Nature  and  that  which  lies 
beyond  Nature  is  a  dismemberment  of  the  truth.  Let 
both  those  who  find  it  difficult  to  believe  in  anything 
which  is  "  above "  the  Natural,  and  those  who  insist  on 
that  belief,  first  determine  how  far  the  Natural  extends. 
Perhaps  in  going  round  these  marches  they  will  find 
themselves  meeting  upon  common  ground.  For,  indeed, 
long  before  we  have  searched  out  all  that  the  Natural 
includes,  there  will  remain  little  in  the  so-called  Super- 
natural which  can  seem  hard  of  acceptance  or  belief — 
nothing  which  is  not  rather  essential  to  our  understand- 
ing of  this  otherwise  "unintelligible  world." 


CHAPTER  II. 

LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS. 

Reign  of  Law — is  this,  then,  the  reign  under 
-*•  which  we  live?  Yes,  in  a  sense  it  is.  There 
is  no  denying  it.  The  whole  world  around  us,  and 
the  whole  world  within  us,  are  ruled  by  Law.  Our 
very  spirits  are  subject  to  it — those  spirits  which  yet 
seem  so  spiritual,  so  subtle,  so  -free.  How  often  in 
the  darkness  do  they  feel  the  restraining  walls — bounds 
within  which  they  move — conditions  out  of  which  they 
cannot  think  !  The  perception  of  this  is  growing  in 
the  consciousness  of  men.  It  grows  with  the  growth 
of  knowledge ;  it  is  the  delight,  the  reward,  the  goal 
of  Science.  From  Science  it  passes  into  every  domain 
of  thought,  and  invades,  amongst  others,  the  Theology 
of  the  Church.  And  so  we  see  the  men  of  Theology 
coming  out  to  parley  with  the  men  of  Science, — a  white 
flag  in  their  hands,  and  saying,  "  If  you  will  let  us  alone 
we  will  do  the  same  by  you.  Keep  to  your  own  pro- 
vince, do  not  enter  ours.  The  Reign  of  Law  which 


56  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

you  proclaim,  we  admit — outside  these  walls,  but  not 
within  them  : — let  there  be  peace  between  us."  But 
this  will  never  do.  "There  can  be  no  such  treaty  divid- 
ing the  domain  of  Truth.  Every  one  Truth  is  con- 
nected with  every  other  Truth  in  this  great  Universe 
of  God.  The  connexion  may  be  one  of  infinite  sub- 
tlety, and  apparent  distance — running,  as  it  were,  under- 
ground for  a  long  way,  but  always  asserting  itself  at 
last,  somewhere,  and  at  some  time.  No  bargaining,  no 
fencing  off  the  ground — no  form  of  process,  will  avail 
to  bar  this  right  of  way.  Blessed  right,  enforced  by 
blessed  power !  Every  truth,  which  is  truth  indeed,  is 
charged  with  its  own  consequences,  its  own  analogies, 
its  own  suggestions.  These  will  not  be  kept  outside 
any  artificial  boundary ;  they  will  range  over  the  whole 
Field  of  Thought,  nor  is  there  -any  corner  of  it  from 
which  they  can  be  warned  away. 

And  therefore  we  must  cast  a  sharp  eye  indeed  on 
every  form  of  words  which  professes  to  represent  a 
scientific  truth.  If  it  be  really  true  in  one  department 
of  thought,  the  chances  are  that  it  will  have  its  bearing 
on  every  other.  And  if  it  be  not  true,  but  erroneous,  its 
effect  will  be  of  a  corresponding  character ;  for  there 
is  a  brotherhood  of  Error  as  close  as  the  brotherhood 
of  Truth.  Therefore,  to  accept  as  a  truth  that  which 
is  not  a  truth,  or  to  fail  in  distinguishing  the  sense  in 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  57 

which  a  proposition  may  be  true,  from  other  senses  in 
which  it  is  not  true,  is  an  evil  having  consequences 
which  are  indeed  incalculable.  There  are  subjects  on 
which  one  mistake  of  this  kind  will  poison  all  the  wells 
of  truth,  and  affect  with  fatal  error  the  whole  circle  of 
our  thoughts. 

It  is  against  this  danger  that  some  men  would  erect 
a  feeble  barrier  by  defending  the  position,  that  Science 
and  Religion  may  be,  and  ought  to  be,  kept  entirely 
separate ; — that  they  belong  to  wholly  different  spheres 
of  thought,  and  that  the  ideas  which  prevail  in  the  one 
province  have  no  relation  to  those  which  prevail  in  the 
other.  This  is  a  doctrine  offering  many  temptations  to 
many  minds.  It  is  grateful  to  scientific  men  who  are 
afraid  of  being  thought  hostile  to  Religion.  It  is  grate- 
ful to  religious  men  who  are  afraid  of  being  thought  to 
be  afraid  of  Science.  To  these,  and  to  all  who  are 
troubled  to  reconcile  what  they  have  been  taught  to 
believe  with  what  they  have  come  to  know,  this  doc- 
trine affords  a  natural  and  convenient  escape.  There 
is  but  one  objection  to  it — but  that  is  the  fatal  objec- 
tion— that  it  is  not  true.  The  spiritual  world  and  the 
'ntellectual  world  are  not  separated  after  this  fashion  : 
and  the  notion  that  they  are  so  separated  does  but 
encourage  men  to  accept  in  each,  ideas  which  will  at 
last  be  found  to  be  false  in  both.  The  truth  is,  that 


58  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

there  is  no  branch  of  human  inquiry,  however  purely 
physical,  which  is  more  than  the  word  "  branch "  im- 
plies ; — none  which  is  not  connected  through  endless 
ramifications  with  every  other, — and  especially  that 
which  is  the  root  and  centre  of  them  all.  If  He  who 
formed  the  mind  be  one  with  Him  who  is  the  Orderer 
of  all  things  concerning  which  that  mind  is  occupied, 
there  can  be  no  end  to  the  points  of  contact  between 
our  different  conceptions  of  them,  of  Him,  and  of 
ourselves. 

The  instinct  which  impels  us  to  seek  for  harmony 
in  the  truths  of  Science  and  the  truths  of  Religion,  is 
a  higher  instinct  and  a  truer  one  than  the  disposition 
which  leads  us  to  evade  the  difficulty  by  pretending 
that  there  is  no  relation  between  them.  For,  after  all, 
it  is  a  pretence  and  nothing  more.  No  man  who 
thoroughly  accepts  a  principle  in  the  philosophy  of 
Nature  which  he  feels  to  be  inconsistent  with  a  doc- 
trine of  Religion,  can  help  having  his  belief  in  that 
doctrine  shaken  and  undermined.  We  may  believe, 
and  we  must  believe,  both  in  Nature  and  Religion, 
many  things  which  we  cannot  understand ;  but  we  can- 
not really  believe  two  propositions  which  are  felt  to  be 
contradictory.  It  helps  us  nothing  in  such  a  difficulty, 
to  say  that  the  one  proposition  belongs  to  Reason  and 
the  other  proposition  belongs  to  Faith.  The  endeavour 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  59 

to  reconcile  them  is  a  necessity  of  the  mind.  We  are 
right  in  thinking  that,  if  they  are  both  indeed  true,  they 
can  be  reconciled,  and  if  they  really  are  fundamentally 
opposed,  they  cannot  both  be  true.  That  is  to  say, 
there  must  be  come  error  in  our  manner  of  conception 
in  one  or  in  the  other,  or  in  both.  At  the  very  best, 
each  can  represent  only  some  partial  and  imperfect 
aspect  of  the  truth.  The  error  may  lie  in  our  Theo- 
logy, or  it  may  lie  in  what  we  are  pleased  to  call  our 
Science.  It  may  be  that  some  dogma,  derived  by 
tradition  from  our  fathers,  is  having  it3  hollowness  be- 
trayed by  that  light  which  sometimes  shines  upon  the 
ways  of  God  out  of  a  better  knowledge  of  His  works. 
It  may  be  that  some  proud  and  rash  generalisation  of 
the  schools  is  having  its  falsehood  proved  by  the  vio- 
lence it  does  to  the  deepest  instincts  of  our  spiritual 
nature, — to 

"  Truths  which  wake  to  perish  never  ! 
Which  neither  man  nor  boy, 
Nor  all  that  is  at  enmity  with  joy, 
Can  utterly  abolish  or  destroy." 1 

Such,  for  example,  is  the  conclusion  to  which  the 
language  of  some  scientific  men  is  evidently  pointing, 
that  great  general  Laws  inexorable  in  their  operation, 

l  "Ode  to  Immortality,  from  the  Recollections  of  early  Child- 
hood. " — Wordsworth. 


60  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

and  Causes  in  endless  chain  of  invariable  sequence, 
are  the  governing  powers  in  Nature,  and  that  they  leave 
no  room  for  any  special  direction  or  providential  order- 
ing of  events.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  vain  to  deny  its 
bearing  on  Religion.  What  then  can  be  the  use  of 
prayer?  Can  La\vs  hear  us  ?  Can  they  change,  or  can 
they  suspend  themselves  ?  These  questions  cannot  but 
arise,  and  they  require  an  answer.  It  is  said  of  a 
late  eminent  Professor  and  clergyman  of  the  English 
Church,  who  was  deeply  imbued  with  these  opinions 
on  the  place  occupied  by  Law  in  the  economy  of 
Nature,  that  he  went  on,  nevertheless,  preaching  high 
doctrinal  sermons  from  the  pulpit  until  his  death.  He 
did  so  on  the  ground  that  propositions  which  were  con- 
trary to  his  reason  were  not  necessarily  beyond  his  faith. 
The  inconsistencies  of  the  human  mind  are  indeed  un- 
fathomable ;  and  there  are  men  so  constituted  as  honestly 
to  suppose  that  they  can  divide  themselves  into  two 
spiritual  beings,  one  of  whom  is  sceptical,  and  the 
other  is  believing.  But  such  men  are  rare — happily 
for  Religion,  and  not  less  happily  for  Science.  No 
healthy  intellect,  no  earnest  spirit,  can  rest  in  such  self- 
betrayal.  Accordingly  we  find  many  men  now  facing 
the  consequences  to  which  they  have  given  their  intellec- 
tual assent,  and  taking  their  stand  upon  the  ground  that 
prayer  to  God  has  no  other  value  or  effect  than  so  far 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  6 1 

as  it  may  be  a  good  way  of  preaching  to  ourselves.  It 
is  a  useful  and  helpful  exercise  for  our  own  spirits,  but 
it  is  nothing  more.  But  how  can  they  pray  who  have 
come  to  this  ?  Can  it  ever  be  useful  or  helpful  to  be- 
lieve a  lie?  That  which  has  been  threatened  as  the 
worst  of  all  spiritual  evils,  would  then  become  the  con- 
scious attitude  of  our  "  religion,"  the  habitual  condition 
of  our  worship.  This  must  be  as  bad  science,  as  it 
is  bad  religion.  It  is  in  violation  of  a  Law  the  highest 
known  to  Man — the  Law  which  inseparably  "connects 
earnest  conviction  of  the  truth  in  what  we  do  or  say, 
with  the  very  fountains  of  all  intellectual  and  moral 
strength.  No  accession  of  force  can  come  to  us  from 
doing  anything  in  which  we  disbelieve.  Such  a  doc- 
trine will  be  indeed 

"  The  little  rift  within  the  lute 
That  by  and  by  will  make  the  music  mute, 
And  ever  widening  slowly  silence  all. "  1 

If  there  is  any  helpfulness  in  Prayer  even  to  the 
Mind  itself,  that  helpfulness  can  only  be  preserved  by 
showing  that  the  belief  on  which  this  virtue  depends  is 
a  rational  belief.  The  very  essence  of  that  belief  is 
this — that  the  Divine  Mind  is  accessible  to  supplication, 
and  that  the  Divine  Will  is  capable  of  being  moved 

1  "Idylls  of  the  King — Vivien." — Tennyson. 


62  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

thereby.  No  question  is,  or  indeed  can  be,  raised  as 
to  the  powerful  effect  exerted  by  this  belief  on  Man's 
nature.  That  effect  is  recognised  as  a  fact  Its  value 
is  admitted ;  and  in  order  that  it  may  not  be  lost,  the 
compromise  now  offered  by  some  philosophers  is  this — 
that  although  the  course  of  external  nature  is  unaltera- 
ble, yet  possibly  the  phenomena  of  Mind  and  character 
may  be  changed  by  the  Divine  Agency.  But  will  this 
reasoning  bear  analysis  ?  Can  the  distinction  it  assumes 
be  maintained?  Whatever  difficulties  there  may  be  in 
reconciling  the  ideas  of  Law  and  of  Volition,  they  are 
difficulties  which  apply  equally  to  the  Worlds  of  Matter 
and  of  Mind.  The  Mind  is  as  much  subiect  to  Law 
as  the  Body  is.  The  Reign  of  Law  is  over  all ;  and  if 
its  dominion  be  really  incompatible  with  the  agency  of 
Volition,  Human  or  Divine,  then  the  Mind  is  as  inacces- 
sible to  that  agency  as  material  things.  It  would  indeed 
be  absurd  to  affirm  that  all  Prayers  are  equally  rational 
or  equally  legitimate.  Most  true  it  is  that  "we  know 
not  what  we  should  pray  for  as  we  ought."  Prayer 
does  not  require  us  to  believe  that  anything  can  be  done 
without  the  use  of  means ;  neither  does  it  require  us 
to  believe  that  anything  will  be  done  in  violation  of 
the  Universal  Order.  "  If  it  be  possible,"  was  the 
qualification  used  in  the  most  solemn  Prayer  ever 
uttered  upon  Earth.  What  are  and  what  are  not  legi- 


LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  63 


timate  objects  of  supplication,  is  a  question  which  may 
well  be  open.  But  the  question  now  raised  is  a  wider 
one  than  this — even  the  question  whether  the  very  idea 
of  Prayer  be  not  in  itself  absurd — whether  the  Reign 
of  Law  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  Will  affect- 
ing the  successive  phenomena  either  of  Matter  or  of 
Mind.  This  is  a  question  lying  at  the  root  of  our 
whole  conceptions  of  the  Universe,  and  of  all  our  own 
powers,  both  of  thinking  and  of  acting.  The  freedom 
which  is  denied  to  God  is  not  likely  to  be  left  to  Man. 
We  shall  see,  accordingly,  that  precisely  the  same  denials 
are  applied  to  both. 

The  conception  of  Natural  Laws — of  their  place,  of 
their  nature,  and  of  their  office — which  involves  us  in 
such  questions,  and  which  points  to  such  conclusions, 
demands  surely  a  very  careful  examination  at  our 
hands. 

What,  then,  is  this  Reign  of  Law?  What  is  Law,  and 
in  what  sense  can  it  be  said  to  reign  ? 

Words,  which  should  be  the  servants  of  Thought,  are 
too  often  its  masters ;  and  there  are  very  few  words 
which  are  used  more  ambiguously,  and  therefore  more 
injuriously,  than  the  word  "Law."  It  may  indeed  be 
legitimately  used  in  several  different  senses,  because  in 
all  cases  as  applied  in  Science  it  is  a  metaphor,  and  one 
which  has  relation  to  many  different  kinds  and  degrees 


64  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

of  likeness  in  the  ideas  which  are  compared.  It  matters 
little  in  which  of  these  senses  it  is  used,  provided  the 
distinctions  between  them  are  kept  clearly  in  view,  and 
provided  we  watch  against  the  fallacies  which  must  arise 
when  we  pass  insensibly  from  one  meaning  to  another. 
And  here  it  may  be  observed,  in  passing,  that  the  meta- 
phors which  are  employed  in  Language  are  generally 
founded  on  analogies  instinctively,  and  often  uncon- 
sciously, perceived,  and  which  would  not  be  so  perceived 
if  they  were  not  both  deep  and  true.  In  this  case  the 
idea  which  lies  at  the  root  of  Law  in  all  its  applications 
is  evident  enough.  In  its  primary  signification,  a  "  law  " 
is  the  authoritative  expression  of  human  Will  enforced  by 
Power.  The  instincts  of  mankind  finding  utterance  in 
their  language,  have  not  failed  to  see  that  the  phenomena 
of  Nature  are  only  really  conceivable  to  us  as  in  like 
manner  the  expressions  of  a  Will  enforcing  itself  with 
Power.  But,  as  in  many  other  cases,  the  secondary  or 
derivative  senses  of  the  word  have  supplanted  the 
primary  signification ;  and  Law  is  now  habitually  used 
by  men  who  deny  the  analogy  on  which  that  use  is 
founded,  and  to  the  truth  of  which  it  is  an  abiding  wit- 
ness. It  becomes  therefore  all  the  more  necessary  to 
define  the  secondary  senses  with  precision.  There  are 
at  least  Five  different  senses  in  which  Law  is  habitually 
used,  and  these  must  be  carefully  distinguished  :— 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  65 

First,  We  have  Law  as  applied  simply  to  an  observed 
Order  of  facts. 

Secondly,  To  that  Order  as  involving  the  action  of 
some  Force  or  Forces  of  which  nothing  more  may  be 
known. 

Thirdly,  As  applied  to  individual  Forces  the  measure 
of  whose  operation  has  been  more  or  less  denned  or 
ascertained. 

Fourthly,  As  applied  to  those  combinations  of  Force 
which  have  reference  to  the  fulfilment  of  Purpose,  or  the 
discharge  of  Function. 

Fifthly,  As  applied  to  Abstract  Conceptions  of  the 
mind — not  .corresponding  with  any  actual  phenomena, 
but  deduced  therefrom  as  axioms  of  thought  necessary 
to  our  understanding  of  them.  Law,  in  this  sense,  is  a 
reduction  of  the  phenomena,  not  merely  to  an  Order 
of  facts,  but  to  an  Order  of  Thought. 

These  great  leading  significations  of  the  word  Law  all 
circle  round  the  three  great  questions  which  Science  asks 
of  Nature,  the  What,  the  How,  and  the  Why  : — 

(1)  What  are  the  facts  in  their  established  Order? 

(2)  How — that  is,  from  what  physical  causes,— Adoes 
that  Order  come  to  be  ? 

(3)  Why  have  these  causes  been  so  combined?     What 
relation  do  they  bear  to  Purpose,  to  the  fulfilment  of 
intention,  to  the  discharge  of  Function  ? 

F 


66  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

It  is  so  important  that  these  different  senses  of  the 
word  Law  should  be  clearly  distinguished,  that  each  of 
them  must  be  more  fully  considered  by  itself. 

The  First  and,  so  to  speak,  the  lowest  sense  in  which 
Law  is  applied  to  natural  phenomena  is  that  in  which  it 
is  used  to  express  simply  "  an  observed  Order  of  facts  " — 
that  is  to  say,  facts  which  under  the  same  conditions 
always  follow  each  other  in  the  same  order.  In  this 
sense  the  laws  of  Nature  are  simply  those  facts  of 
Nature  which  recur  according  to  a  rule.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  the  legitimate  application  of  Law  in  this 
sense,  that  the  cause  of  any  observed  Order  of  facts 
should  be  at  all  known,  or  even  guessed  at.  The  Force 
or  Forces  to  which  that  Order  is  due  may  be  hid  in  total 
darkness.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  Order  or  sequence  of 
phenomena  be  uniform  and  constant.  The  neatest  and 
simplest  illustration  of  this,  as  well  as  of  the  other  senses 
in  which  Law  is  used,  is  to  be  found  in  the  exact 
sciences,  and  especially  in  the  history  of  Astronomy.  It 
is  nearly  250  years  since  Kepler  discovered,  in  respect  to 
the  distances,  velocities,  and  orbits  of  the  Planets,  three 
facts,  or  rather  three  series  of  facts,  which,  during  many 
years1  of  intense  application  to  physical  inquiry,  re- 
mained the  highest  truths  known  to  Man  on  the  pheno- 

i  The  "Third  Law"  of  Kepler  was  made  known  to  the  world 
Jin  1619.  Newton's  'Trincipia"  appeared  in  1687, 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS  6"j 

mena  of  the  Solar  System.  They  were  known  as  the 
Three  Laws  of  Kepler.  It  is  not  necessary  to  describe 
in  detail  here  what  these  laws  were.  Suffice  it  to  say, 
that  the  most  remarkable  among  them  were  facts  of 
constant  numerical  relation  between  the  distances  of  the 
different  Planets  from  the  Sun,  and  the  length  of  their 
periodic  times  ;  and  again,  between  the  velocity  of  their 
motion  and  the  space  enclosed  within  certain  corre- 
sponding sections  of  their  orbit.  These  Laws  were 
simply  and  purely  an  "  Order  of  facts "  established  by 
observation,  and  not  connected  with  any  known  cause. 
The  Force  of  which  that  Order  is  a  necessary  result  had 
not  then  been  ascertained.  A  very  large  proportion  of 
the  laws  of  every  science  are  laws  of  this  kind  and  in 
this  sense.  For  example,  in  Chemistry  the  behaviour  of 
different  substances  towards  each  other,  in  respect  to 
combination  and  affinity,  is  reduced  to  system  under  laws 
of  this  kind,  and  of  this  kind  only.  Because,  although 
there  is  a  probability  that  Electric  or  Galvanic  Force  is 
the  cause,  or  one  of  the  causes,  of  the  series  of  facts 
exhibited  in  chemical  phenomena,  this  is  as  yet  no  better 
than  a  probability,  and  the  laws  of  Chemistry  stand  no 
higher  than  facts  which  by  observation  and  experiment 
are  found  to  follow  certain  rules. 

But  the   ascertainment   of  a  law  in   this   First  and 
lower  sense  leads  immediately  and  instinctively  to  the 
F  2 


63  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


search  after  Law  in  another  sense  which  is  higher.  An 
observed  Order  of  facts,  to  be  entitled  to  the  rank  of 
a  Law,  must  be  an  Order  so  constant  and  uniform  as 
to  indicate  necessity,  and  necessity  can  only  arise  out 
of  the  action  of  some  compelling  Force.  Law,  there- 
fore, comes  to  indicate  not  merely  an  observed  Order  of 
facts,  but  that  Order  as  involving  the  action  of  some 
Force  or  Forces,  of  which  nothing  more  may  be  known 
than  these  visible  effects.  Every  observed  Order  in 
physical  phenomena  suggests  irresistibly  to  the  mind 
the  operation  of  some  physical  cause.  We  say  of  an 
observed  Order  of  facts  that  it  must  be  due  to  some 
"law,"  meaning  simply  that  all  Order  involves  tn~  idea 
of  some  arranging  cause,  the  working  of  some  Force  or 
Forces  (whether  they  be  such  as  we  can  further  trace 
and  define  or  not)  of  which  that  Order  is  the  index  and 
the  result.  This  is  the  Second  of  the  five  senses  speci- 
fied above. 

And  so  we  pass  on,  by  an  easy  and  natural  transi- 
tion, to  the  Third  sense  in  which  the  word  Law  is  used. 
This  is  the  most  exact  and  definite  of  all.  The  mere 
general  idea  that  some  Force  is  at  the  bottom  of  all 
phenomena,  which  are  invariably  consecutive,  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  knowing  what  that  Force  is  in  respect 
to  the  rule  or  measure  of  its  operation.  Of  Law  in 
this  sense  the  one  great  example,  before  and  above  all 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  69 

others,  is  the  Law  of  Gravitation,  for  this  is  a  Law  in 
the  sense  not  merely  of  a  rule,  but  of  a  cause — that  is, 
of  a  Force  accurately  defined  and  ascertained  accord- 
ing to  the  measure  of  its  operation,  from  which  Force 
other  phenomena  arise  by  way  of  necessary  conse- 
quence. Force  is  the  root-idea  of  Law  in  its  scientific 
sense.  And  so  the  Law  of  Gravitation  is  not  merely 
the  "observed  order"  in  which  the  heavenly  bodies 
move ;  neither  is  it  only  the  abstract  idea  of  some 
Force  to  which  such  movements  must  be  due,  but  it 
is  that  Force  the  exact  measure  of  whose  operation  was 
numerically  ascertained  or  denned  by  Newton  —  the 
Force  which  compels  those  movements  and  (in  a  sense) 
explains  them.  Now  the  difference  between  Law  in 
the  narrower  and  Law  in  the  larger  sense  cannot  be 
better  illustrated  than  in  the  difference  between  the 
Three  special  Laws  discovered  by  Kepler,  and  the  One 
universal  Law  discovered  by  Newton.  The  Three  Laws 
of  Kepler  were,  as  we  have  seen,  simply  and  purely 
an  observed  Order  of  facts.  They  stood  by  themselves 
— disconnected, — their  cause  unknown.  The  higher 
Law,  discovered  by  Newton,  revealed  their  connexion 
and  their  cause.  The  '*  observed  Order  "  which  Kepler 
had  discovered,  was  simply  a  necessary  consequence  of 
the  Force  of  Gravitation.  In  the  light  of  this  great  Law 
the  "  Three  Laws  of  Kepler"  have  been  merged  and  lost. 


7O  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

When  the  operations  of  any  material  Force  can  be 
reduced  to  rules  so  definite  as  those  which  have  been  dis- 
covered in  respect  to  the  Force  of  Gravitation,  and  when 
these  rules  are  capable  of  mathematical  expression  and 
of  mathematical  proof,  they  are,  so  far  as  they  go,  in 
the  nature  of  pure  truth.  Mr.  Lewes,  in  his  very 
curious  and  interesting  work  on  the  "  Philosophy  of  Aris- 
totle," has  maintained  that  the  knowledge  of  Measure 
— or  what  he  calls  the  "verifiable  element"  in  our 
knowledge — is  the  element  which  determines  whether 
any  theory  belongs  to  Science,  strictly  so  called,  or  to 
Metaphysics;  and  that  any  theory  may  be  transferred 
from  Metaphysics  to  Science,  or  from  Science  to  Meta- 
physics, simply  by  the  addition  or  withdrawal  of  its 
"  verifiable  element."  In  illustration  of  this,  he  says 
that  if  we  withdraw,  from  the  Law  of  Universal  Attrac- 
tion, the  formula,  "  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  dis- 
tance, and  directly  as  the  mass,"  it  becomes  pure  Meta- 
physics. If  this  means  that,  apart  from  ascertained 
numerical  relations,  our  conception  of  Law,  or  our 
knowledge  of  natural  phenomena,  loses  all  reality  and 
distinctness,  I  do  not  agree  in  the  position.  The  idea 
of  natural  Forces  is  quite  separate  from  any  ascertained 
measure  of  their  energy.  The  knowledge,  for  example, 
that  all  the  particles  of  matter  exert  an  attractive  force 
upon  each  other,  is,  so  far  as  it  goes,  true  physical 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  7 1 

knowledge,  even  though  we  did  not  know  the  further 
truth,  that  this  force  acts  according  to  the  numerical 
rule  ascertained  by  Newton.  To  banish  from  phy- 
sical Science,  properly  so  called,  and  to  relegate  to 
Metaphysics,  all  knowledge  which  cannot  be  reduced 
to  numerical  expression,  is  a  dangerous  abuse  of  lan- 
guage. 

Force,  ascertained  according  to  some  measure  of  its 
operation — this  is  indeed  one  of  the  definitions,  but 
only  one,  of  a  scientific  Law.  The  discovery  of  laws 
in  this  sense  is  the  great  quest  of  Science,  and  the 
finding  of  them  is  one  of  her  great  rewards.  Such 
laws  yield  to  the  human  mind  a  peculiar  delight,  from 
the  satisfaction  they  afford  to  those  special  faculties 
whose  function  it  is  to  recognise  the  beauty  of  numerical 
relations.  This  satisfaction  is  so  great,  and  in  its  own 
measure  is  so  complete,  that  the  mind  reposes  on  an 
ascertained  law  of  this  kind  as  on  an  ultimate  truth. 
And  ultimate  it  is  as  regards  the  particular  faculties 
which  are  concerned  in  this  kind  of  search.  When  we 
have  observed  our  facts,  and  when  we  have  summed 
up  our  figures,  when  we  have  recognised  the  constant 
numbers, — then  our  eyes,  our  ears,  and  our  calculating 
faculties  have  done  their  work.  But  other  faculties  are 
called  into  simultaneous  operation,  and  these  have  other 
work  to  do.  For  let  it  be  observed  that  laws,  in  the 


72  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

first  three  senses  we  have  now  examined,  cannot  be  said 
to  explain  anything  except  the  Order  of  subordinate 
phenomena.  They  set  forth  that  order  as  due  to  Force. 
They  do  nothing  more.  Least  of  all  do  laws,  in  any 
of  these  three  senses,  explain  themselves.  They  sug- 
gest a  thousand  questions  much  more  curious  than  the 
questions  which  they  solve.  The  very  beauty  and  sim- 
plicity of  some  laws  is  their  deepest  mystery.  What 
can  their  source  be  ?  How  is  their  uniformity  main- 
tained? Every  law  implies  a  Force,  and  all  that  we 
ever  know  is  some  numerical  rule  or  measure  accord- 
ing to  which  some  unknown  Forces  operate.  But 
whence  come  those  measures — those  exact  relations  to 
number,  which  never  vary  ?  Or,  if  there  are  variations, 
how  comes  it  that  these  are  always  found  to  follow 
some  other  rules  as  exact  and  as  invariable  as  the  first? 

And  as  there  can  be  no  better  example  of  what  Law 
is,  so  also  there  can  be  no  better  example  of  what  it  is 
not — than  the  Law  of  Gravitation.  The  discovery  of 
it  was  probably  the  highest  exercise  of  pure  intellect 
through  which  the  human  mind  has  found  its  way.  It 
is  the  most  universal  physical  law  which  is  known  to 
us,  for  it  prevails,  apparently,  through  all  Space.  Yet 
of  the  Force  of  Gravitation  all  we  know  is,  that  it  is 
a  force  of  attraction  operating  between  all  the  particles 
of  matter  in  the  exact  measure  which  was  ascertained  by 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  73 

Newton, — that  is — "  directly  as  the  mass,  and  inversely 
as  the  square  of  the  distance."  This  is  the  Law.  But 
it  affords  no  sort  of  explanation  of  itself.  What  is  the 
cause  of  this  Force — what  is  its  source — what  are  the 
media  of  its  operation — how  is  the  exact  uniformity  of 
its  proportions  maintained  ? — these  are  questions  which 
it  is  impossible  not  to  ask,  but  which  it  is  quite  as  impos- 
sible to  answer.  Sir  John  Herschel,  in  speaking  of  this 
Force,  has  indicated  in  a  passing  sentence  a  few  ques- 
tions out  of  the  many  which  arise  : — "  No  matter,"  he 
says,  "  from  what  ultimate  causes  the  power  called  gravi- 
tation originates — be  it  a  virtue  lodged  in  the  sun  as  its 
receptacle,  or  be  it  pressure  from  without,  or  the  resultant 
of  many  pressures,  or  solicitations  of  unknown  kinds, 
magnetic  or  electric,  ethers  or  impulses," l  &c.  &c. 
How  little  we  have  ascertained  in  this  Law,  after  all ! 
Yet  there  is  an  immense  and  an  instinctive  pleasure  in 
the  contemplation  of  it.  To  analyse  this  pleasure  is  as 
difficult  as  to  analyse  the  pleasure  which  the  eye  takes 
in  beauty  of  form,  or  the  pleasure  which  the  ear  takes  in 
the  harmonies  of  sound.  And  this  pleasure  is  inex- 
haustible, for  these  laws  of  number  and  proportion 
pervade  all  Nature,  and  the  intellectual  organs  which 
:iave  been  fitted  to  the  knowledge  of  them  have  eyes 

J  Herschel's  "  Outlines  of  Astronomy,"  fifth  edition,  p.  323, 


74  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

which  are  never  satisfied  with  seeing,  and  ears  which  are 
never  full  of  hearing.  The  agitation  which  overpowered 
Sir  Isaac  Newton  as  the  Law  of  Gravitation  was  rising 
to  his  view  in  the  light  of  rigorous  demonstration,  was 
the  homage  rendered  by  the  great  faculties  of  his  nature 
to  a  harmony  which  was  as  new  as  it  was  immense  and 
wonderful.  The  same  pleasure  in  its  own  degree  is  felt 
by  every  man  of  science  who,  in  any  branch  of  physical 
inquiry,  traces  and  detects  any  lesser  law.  And  it  is 
perfectly  true  that  such  laws  are  being  detected  every- 
where. Forces  which  are  in  their  essence  and  their 
source  utterly  mysterious,  are  always  being  found  to 
operate  under  rules  which  have  strict  reference  to 
measures  of  number, — to  relations  of  Space  and  Time. 
The  Forces  which  determine  chemical  combination  all 
work  under  rules  as  sharp  and  definite  as  the  Force  of 
Gravitation.  So  do  the  Forces  which  operate  in  Light, 
and  Heat,  and  Sound.  So  do  those  which  exert  their 
energies  in  Magnetism  and  Electricity.  All  the  opera- 
tions of  Nature — the  smallest  and  the  greatest— are  per- 
formed under  similar  measures  and  restraints.  Not  even 
a  drop  of  water  can  be  formed  except  under  rules  which 
determine  its  weight,  its  volume,  and  its  shape,  with 
exact  reference  to  the  density  of  the  fluid,  to  the  struc- 
ture of  the  surface  on  which  it  may  be  formed,  and  to 
the  pressure  of  the  surrounding  atmosphere.  Then  that 


75 


pressure  is  itself  exercised  under  rigorous  rules  again. 
Not  one  of  the  countless  varieties  of  form  which  prevail 
in  clouds,  and  which  give  to  the  face  of  heaven  such 
infinite  expression,  not  one  of  them  but  is  ruled  by 
Law, — woven,  or  braided,  or  torn,  or  scattered,  or 
gathered  up  again  and  folded, — by  Forces  which  are  free 
only  "  within  the  bounds  of  Law." 

And  equally  in  those  subjects  of  inquiry  in  which 
rules  of  number  and  of  proportion  are  not  applicable, 
rules  are  discernible  which  belong  to  another  class,  but 
which  are  as  certain  and  as  prevailing.  All  events, 
however  casual  or  disconnected  they  may  at  first  appear 
to  be,  are  found  in  the  course  of  time  to  arrange  them- 
selves in  some  certain  Order,  the  index  and  exponent  of 
Forces,  of  which  we  know  nothing  except  their  existence 
as  evidenced  in  these  effects.  It  is  indeed  wonderful  to 
find  that  in  such  a  matter,  for  example,  as  the  develop-  - 
ment  of  our  Human  Speech,  the  unconscious  changes 
which  arise  from  time  to  time  among  the  rudest  utter- 
ances of  the  rudest  tribes  and  races  of  Mankind,  are  all 
found  to  follow  rules  of  progress  as  regular  as  those 
which  preside  over  any  of  the  material  growths  of 
Nature.  Yet  so  it  is ;  and  it  is  upon  this  fact  alone  that 
the  science  of  Language  rests — a  science  in  which  all 
the  facts  are  not  yet  observed,  and  many  of  those  which 
have  been  observed  are  not  yet  reduced  to  order ;  but 


76  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

in  which  enough  has  been  ascertained  to  show  that 
languages  grow,  and  change  from  generation  to  gene- 
ration, according  to  rules  of  which  the  men  who  speak 
them  are  wholly  unconscious.  It  is  the  same  with  all 
other  things.  And  as  it  is  now,  so  apparently  has  it 
been  in  all  past  time  of  which  we  have  any  record. 
Even  the  work  of  Creation  has  been  and  is  being  car- 
ried on  under  rules  of  adherence  to  Typical  Forms,  and 
under  limits  of  variation  from  them,  which  can  be  dimly 
seen  and  traced,  although  they  cannot  be  denned  or 
understood.  The  universal  prevalence  of  laws  of  this 
kind  cannot  therefore  be  denied.  The  discovery  of 
them  is  one  of  the  first  results  of  all  physical  inquiry. 
In  this  sense  it  is  true  that  we,  and  the  world  around  us, 
are  under  the  Reign  of  Law. 

It  is  true,  but  only  a  bit  and  fragment  of  the  truth. 
For  there  is  another  fact  quite  as  prominent  as  the 
universal  presence  and  prevalence  of  laws — and  that  is, 
the  number  of  them  which  are  concerned  in  each  single 
operation  in  Nature.  No  one  Law — that  is  to  say,  no 
one  Force — determines  anything  that  we  see  happening 
or  done  around  us.  It  is  always  the  result  of  different 
and  opposing  Forces  nicely  balanced  against  each  other. 
The  least  disturbance  of  the  proportion  in  which  any 
one  of  them  is  allowed  to  tell,  produces  a  total  change 
in  the  effect.  The  more  we  know  of  Nature,  the  more 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  77 

intricate  do  such  combinations  appear  to  be.  They  can 
be  traced  very  near  to  the  fountains  of  Life  itself,  even 
close  up  to  the  confines  of  the  last  secret  of  all — how 
the  Will  acts  upon  its  organs  in  the  Body.  Recent 
investigations  in  Physiology  seem  to  favour  the  hypo- 
thesis that  our  muscles  are  the  seat  of  two  opposing 
Forces,  each  so  adjusted  as  to  counteract  the  other ;  and 
that  this  antagonism  is  itself  so  arranged  as  to  enable 
us  by  acting  on  one  of  these  Forces,  to  regulate  the 
action  of  the  other.  One  Force — an  elastic  or  con- 
tractile Force — is  supposed  to  be  inherent  in  the  mus- 
cular fibre :  another  Force — that  of  Animal  Electricity 
in  statical  condition — holds  the  contractile  Force  in 
check ;  and  the  relaxed,  or  rather  the  restful,  condition 
of  the  muscle  when  not  in  use,  is  due  to  the  balance  so 
maintained.  When,  through  the  motor  nerves  the  Will 
orders  the  muscles  into  action,  that  order  is  enforced 
by  a  discharge  of  the  Electrical  Force,  and  upon  this 
discharge  the  contractile  Force  is  set  free  to  act,  and 
does  accordingly  produce  the  contraction  which  is 
desired.1 

Such  is,  at  least,  one  suggestion  as  to  the  means 
employed  to  place  human  action  under  the  control  of 

1  This  theory  of  muscular  and  nervous  action  is  set  forth  with 
much  ingenuity  and  force  of  illustration  in  "Lectures  on  Epilepsy," 
&c.,  by  Charles  Bland  Radcliffe,  M.D. 


1 8  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

human  Will,  in  that  material  frame  which  is  so  wonder- 
fully and  fearfully  made.  And  whether  this  hypothesis 
be  accurate  or  not,  it  is  certain  that  some  such  adjust- 
ment of  Force  to  Mechanism  is  involved  in  every  bodily 
movement  which  is  subject  to  the  Will.  Even  in  this 
high  region,  therefore,  we  see  that  the  existence  of 
individual  laws  is  not  the  end  of  our  physical  know- 
ledge. What  we  always  reach  at  last  in  the  course  of 
every  physical  inquiry,  is  the  recognition,  not  of  indi- 
vidual laws,  but  of  some  definite  relation  to  each  other, 
in  which  different  laws  are  placed,  so  as  to  bring  about 
a  particular  result.  But  this  is,  in  other  words,  the 
principle  of  Adjustment,  and  adjustment  has  no  meaning 
except  as  the  instrument  and  the  result  of  Purpose. 
Force  so  combined  with  Force  as  to  produce  certain 
definite  and  orderly  results, — this  is  the  ultimate  fact  of 
all  discovery. 

And  so  we  come  upon  another  sense — the  Fourth 
sense,  in  which  Law  is  habitually  used  in  Science,  and 
this  is  perhaps  the  commonest  and  most  important  of 
all.  It  is  used  to  designate  not  merely  an  observed 
Order  of  facts — not  merely  the  bare  abstract  idea  of 
Force — not  merely  individual  Forces  according  to  ascer- 
tained measures  of  operation — but  a  number  of  Forces  in 
the  condition  of  mutual  adjustment,  that  is  to  say,  as  com- 
bined with  each  other,  and  fitted  to  each  other  for  the 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  79 

attainment  of  special  ends.  The  whole  science  of  Animal 
Mechanics,  for  example,  deals  with  Law  in  this  sense — 
with  natural  Forces  as  related  to  Purpose  and  subservient 
to  the  discharge  of  Function.  And  this  is  the  highest 
sense  of  all — Law  in  this  sense  being  more  perfectly 
intelligible  to  us  than  in  any  other;  because,  although 
we  know  nothing  of  the  real  nature  of  Force,  even  of 
that  Force  which  is  resident  in  ourselves,  we  do  know 
for  what  ends  we  exert  it,  and  the  principle  that  governs 
our  devices  for  its  use.  That  principle  is,  Combination 
for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose. 

Accordingly  it  is,  when  natural  phenomena  can  be 
reduced  to  Law,  in  this  last  sense,  that  we  reach  some- 
thing which  alone  is  really  in  the  nature  of  an  explana- 
tion. For  what  do  we  mean  by  an  explanation  ?  It  is 
an  unfolding  or  a  "  making  plain."  But  as  the  human 
mind  has  many  faculties,  so  each  of  these  seeks  a  satis- 
faction of  its  own.  That  which  is  made  plain  to  one 
faculty  is  not  necessarily  made  plain  to  another.  That 
which  is  a  complete  answer  to  the  question  What,  or  to 
the  question  How,  is  no  answer  at  all  to  the  question 
Why.  There  are  some  philosophers  who  tell  us  that 
this  last  is  a  question  which  had  better  never  be  asked, 
because  it  is  one  to  which  Nature  gives  no  reply.  If 
this  be  so,  it  is  strange  that  Nature  should  have  given  us 
the  faculties  which  impel  us  to  ask  this  question — ay, 


8O  THE    REIGN   OF    LAW. 


and  to  ask  it  more  eagerly  than  any  other.  It  is,  indeed, 
true  that  there  is  a  point  beyond  which  we  need  not  ask 
it,  because  the  answer  is  inaccessible.  But  this  is  equally 
true  of  the  questions  What,  and  How.  We  cannot  reach 
Final  Causes  any  more  than  Final  Purposes.  For  every 
cause  which  we  can  detect,  there  is  another  cause  which 
lies  behind;  and  for  every  purpose  which  we  can  see, 
there  are  other  purposes  which  lie  beyond. 

And  so  it  is  true  that  all  things  in  Nature  may  either 
be  regarded  as  means  or  as  ends — for  they  are  always 
both — only  that  Final  Ends  we  can  never  see.  For,  as 
Bishop  Butler  truly  says  in  his  "  Analogy,"  l  "  We  know 
what  we  ourselves  aim  at  as  final  ends,  and  what  courses 
we  take  merely  as  means  conducing  to  these  ends.  But 
we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are  considered  by 
the  Author  of  Nature  under  the  simple  notion  of  means 
and  ends, — so  as  that  it  may  be  said  this  is  merely  an 
end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  His  regard.  And  whether 
there  be  not  some  peculiar  absurdity  in  our  very  manner 
of  conception  concerning  this  matter,  somewhat  con- 
tradictory, arising  from  an  extremely  imperfect  view  of 
things,  it  is  impossible  to  say."  This  is  indeed  a  wise 
caution,  and  one  which  has  been  much  needed  to  check 
the  abuse  of  that  method  of  reasoning  which  has  been 

I  Butler's  "Analogy,"  chap,  iv. 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  8 1 

called  the  doctrine  of  Final  Causes.  When  Man  makes 
an  implement,  he  knows  the  purpose  for  which  he  makes 
it — he  knows  the  function  assigned  to  it  in  his  own  inten- 
tion. But  as  in  making  it  there  are  a  thousand  chips 
and  fragments  of  material  which  he  casts  aside,  so  in  its 
final  use  it  often  produces  consequences  and  results 
which  he  did  not  contemplate  or  foresee.  But  in  Nature 
all  this  is  different.  Nature  has  no  chips  or  fragments 
which  she  does  not  put  to  use ;  and  as  on  the  way  to 
her  apparent  ends  there  are  no  incidents  which  she  did 
not  foresee,  so  beyond  those  ends  there  are  no  ulterior 
results  which  do  not  open  out  into  new  firmaments  of 
Design.  Of  nothing,  therefore,  can  we  say  with  even 
the  probability  of  truth  that  we  see  its  Final  Cause ;  that 
is  to  say,  its  ultimate  purpose.  All  that  we  can  ever  see 
are  the  facts  of  Adjustment  and  of  Function,  and  these 
constitute  not  Final,  but  Immediate  Purpose.  But  a 
purpose  is  not  less  a  purpose,  because  other  purposes 
may  lie  beyond  it.  And  not  only  can  we  detect  Purpose 
in  natural  phenomena,  but,  as  we  have  already  seen,  it  is 
very  often  the  only  thing  about  them  which  is  intelligible 
to  us.  The  How  is  very  often  incomprehensible,  where 
the  Why  is  apparent  at  a  glance.  And  be  this  observed, 
that  when  Purpose  is  perceived,  it  is  a  "making  plain" 
to  a  higher  faculty  of  the  mind  than  the  mere  sense  of 
Order.  It  is  a  making  plain  to  Reason.  It  is  the  reduc- 
G 


82  THE  REIGN   OF   LAW. 

tion  of  phenomena  to  that  Order  of  Thought  which  is 
the  basis  of  all  other  Order  in  the  works  of  Man,  and 
which,  he  instinctively  concludes,  is  the  basis  also  of  all 
Order  in  the  works  of  Nature. 

And  here  it  is  important  to  observe,  that  although 
this  general  conclusion,  like  all  other  general  conclu- 
sions, belongs  to  the  category  of  mental  inferences,  and 
not  to  the  category  of  physical  facts,  yet  each  particu- 
lar instance  of  Purpose  on  which  the  general  inference 
is  founded,  is  not  an  inference  merely,  but  a  fact.  The 
function  of  an  organ,  for  example,  is  a  matter  of  purely 
physical  investigation.  But  the  function  of  an  organ 
is  not  merely  that  which  it  does,  but  it  is  that  which 
some  special  construction  enables  it  to  do.  It  is,  not 
merely  its  work,  but  it  is  the  work  assigned  to  it  as  an 
Apparatus,  and  as  fitted  to  other  organs  having  othei 
functions  related  to  its  own.  The  nature  of  that  Appa- 
ratus, as  being  in  itself  an  adjustment  for  a  particular 
purpose,  is  not  an  inference  from  the  facts,  but  it  is 
part  of  the  facts  themselves.  The  very  idea  of  Func- 
tion is  inseparable  from  the  idea  of  Purpose.  The 
Function  of  an  organ  is  its  Purpose  ;  and  the  relation 
of  its  parts,  and  of  the  whole  to  that  Purpose,  is  as 
much  and  as  definitely  a  scientific  fact  as  the  relation 
of  any  other  phenomenon  to  Space,  or  Time,  or 
Number. 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS,  83 

This  distinction  between  Purpose  as  a  general  in- 
ference and  Purpose  as  a  particular  fact,  has  not  been 
sufficiently  observed.  The  just  condemnation  pro- 
nounced by  Bacon  on  the  pursuit  of  Final  Causes  as 
distorting  the  true  Method  of  Physical  Investigation, 
has  been  applied  without  discrimination  to  two  very 
different  conceptions.  Even  Philosophers  who  believe 
in  the  Supremacy  of  Purpose  in  Nature  have  been  will- 
ing to  banish  this  conception  from  the  Domain  of 
Science,  and  to  classify  it  as  belonging  altogether  to 
Metaphysics  or  Theology.  Thus  in  the  very  able  Har- 
veian  Oration  for  1865  by  Dr.  H.  W.  Acland,  he  says, 
— "Whether  there  be  any  Purpose,  is  the  object  of 
Theological  and  Metaphysical,  but  not  of  Physical  in- 
quiry."1 And  again,  "The  evidence  of  intention  is 
metaphysical,  and  depends  on  probabilities.  It  is  not 
positive.  It  is  inferential  from  many  considerations."2 
I  venture  to  dissent  from  these  conclusions.  They 
involve,  I  think,  a  confounding  of  two  separate  ques- 
tions. The  nature  and  character  of  the  intending 
Mind — this  is  indeed  a  question  of  Theology ;  but  not 
the  existence  of  intention.  Neither  in  any  restrictive 
sense  of  the  word  can  it  be  called  Metaphysical.  Even 
as  a  general  doctrine,  the  doctrine  of  Contrivance  and 

»  P.  61.  a  P.  63. 

G2 


84  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

Adjustment  is  not  so  metaphysical  as  the  Doctrine  of 
Homologies ;  and  when  we  come  to  particular  cases 
there  can  be  no  question  whatever  that  the  relation  of 
a  given  Structure  to  its  Purpose  and  Function  comes 
more  unequivocally  under  the  class  of  physical  facts 
than  the  relation  of  that  same  Structure  to  some  cor- 
responding part  in  another  animal.  It  is  less  .ideal, 
for  example,— less  theoretical — less  metaphysical — to 
assert  of  the  little  hooked  claw  which  is  attached  to 
the  (apparent)  elbow  of  a  Bat's  wing,  that  it  was  placed 
there  to  enable  the  Bat  to  climb  and  crawl,  than  to 
affirm  of  that  same  claw  that  it  is  the  "homologue"  of 
the  human  thumb.  Yet  who  can  deny  that  this  doc- 
trine of  Homologies  has  been  established  as  a  strictly 
scientific  truth  ?  There  is  a  sense,  of  course,  in  which 
all  Knowledge  and  all  Science  belongs  to  Metaphysics. 
Mere  classification,  which  is  the  basis  of  all  Science, 
what  is  it  but  the  marshalling  of  physical  facts  in  an 
Ideal  Order — an  arrangement  of  them  according  to  the 
relation  which  they  bear  to  the  laws  of  Thought  ?  But 
this  does  not  constitute  as  a  branch  of  Metaphysics, 
the  division  of  animals  into  Genera,  and  Families,  and 
Orders.  And  what  relation  can  physical  facts  ever  have 
to  Thought  so  directly  cognisable  or  so  susceptible  of 
Demonstration  as  the  relation  of  an  animal  organ  to 
its  purpose  and  function  in  the  animal  economy? 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  85 

Whether  Purpose  be  the  basis  of  all  natural  Order  or 
not  is  a  separate  question.  It  is  at  least  one  of  the 
facts  of  that  Order.  Combination  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  Purpose  therefore  in  particular  cases,  such  as 
the  relation  between  the  structure  of  an  Organ  and  its 
function,  is  not  merely  a  safe  conclusion  of  Philosophy, 
but  an  ascertained  fact  of  Science.1 

This  question  has  acquired  additional  importance 
since  the  revival  in  our  own  day,  and  with  new  re- 
sources, of  that  old  philosophy  which  assumes  to  banish 
from  the  domain  of  Knowledge  no  small  part  of  the 
richest  and  surest  acquisitions  of  Reason.  That  Phi- 
losophy must-  be  tested  by  a  rigid  analysis  of  thought 
and  language.  This  is  the  weapon  with  which  the  assault 
is  made,  and  it  is  by  the  same  weapon  better  handled 
that  it  can  alone  be  met.  An  arbitrary  limitation  of 
the  word  "  knowledge,"  to  a  particular  kind  of  know- 
ledge, can  only  be  tolerated  on  condition  that  the 
arbitrary  nature  of  the  limitation  be  constantly  kept  in 
view.  In  like  manner  the  word  "  verification  "  may  be 
confined  to  a  particular  kind  of  proof  applicable  only 
to  a  particular  class  of  truths.  So  again,  in  regard 
to  "  Metaphysics,"  it  may  be  considered  with  reference 
to  its  subject-matter  as  denoting  a  particular  branch  of 

i  See  Note  B. 


86  THE   REIGN   OF  LAW. 

inquiry — such  as  Psychology — or  as  a  method  of  in- 
vestigation which  may  be  applied  equally  to  all  subjects 
which  furnish  the  mind  with  the  materials  of  thought. 
But  we  must  watch  against  the  substitution  of  one  of 
these  meanings  for  another ;  and  against  the  jugglery  by 
which  men  first  use  Metaphysical  Analysis  to  pull  down 
conceptions  which  they  dislike,  and  then  denounce 
Metaphysics  as  incapable  of  establishing  any  conclu- 
sions on  which  we  can  rely.  The  fact  to  which  I  have 
previously  referred,1  is  a  fact  of  immense  significance, 
that  one  of  the  most  able  supporters  of  the  Positive 
Philosophy  in  England  relegates  to  Metaphysics  the  great 
scientific  fact  of  Physical  Attraction,  when  it  is  considered 
apart  from  its  numerical  relations.  But  if  this  be  con- 
sidered Metaphysics,  then  let  it  be  remembered  that 
many  of  the  most  certain  truths  we  know  belong  to  the 
same  category.  From  a  similar  point  of  view,  it  might 
be  argued,  and  it  has  actually  been  argued,  that  Number 
and  all  numerical  relations  are  purely  abstract  con- 
ceptions of  the  mind,  having  no  other  reality  than  as 
there  conceived.2  The  same  reasoning  may  be  applied 
to  all  our  most  fundamental  conceptions — without  which 
Science  could  not  even  begin  her  work.  The  existence 
of  Force  under  any  form,  of  which  the  existence  of  Matter 

i  P.  7a  •  See  Note  C. 


LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  87 

is  only  a  special  case,  may  be  regarded  as  a  purely 
metaphysical  conception.  It  is  surely  a  comfort  to 
find  that,  if  all  ideas  of  Plan  and  of  Design  in  the 
Adjustments  of  Organic  Life  are  to  be  condemned  as 
Metaphysical,  they  stand  at  least  in  goodly  company 
among  the  necessities  of  Thought.  Mr.  Lewes,  indeed, 
himself  confesses  that  "  Science  finds  it  indispensable 
to  co-ordinate  all  the  facts  in  a  general  concept,  such 
as  a  Plan." 1  But  he  pronounces  it  one  of  the  "  Infirmi- 
ties of  Thought"  to  "realize  the  concept."  But  no 
accurate  thinker  ever  "  realized "  such  an  idea  as  a 
"Plan" — that  is  to  say,  no  one  ever  conceived  it  as 
existing  by  itself,  separate  from  an  intending  Mind. 
Mr.  Lewes  complains  that  "  Matter  and  Force  are 
mysterious  enough"  without  a  "new  mystery  of  Archi- 
tectural Plan,  shaping  Matter  and  directing  Force." 2 
But,  substituting  here  "  Mind  "  for  Plan,  it  may  surely 
be  argued  that,  if  Science  finds  it  "  indispensable "  to 
co-ordinate  all  the  facts  in  some  such  general  concept, 
this  is  of  itself  a  proof  that  the  element  so  introduced 
does  not  add  to  the  mystery,  but  helps  to  remove  it. 
Even  if  it  be  an  "artifice  of  thought,"  it  can  only  be 
resorted  to  as  rendering  the  facts  not  less  but  more 
conceivable.  And  this  it  plainly  does  by  appealing  to 

l  "History  of  Philosophy,"  Prologue,  p.  Ixxxvi.  a  Ibid 


83  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

an  agency  having  known  power  in  the  production  of 
analogous  phenomena.  The  instinctive  wisdom  which 
lies  in  this  "  infirmity "  of  the  mind  becomes  more 
apparent  when  we  turn  to  the  efforts  of  an  acute  in- 
tellect to  cast  such  infirmities  away.  The  most  abstract 
metaphysical  conceptions  are  substituted  for  those  which 
are  denounced  :  the  only  difference  being  that,  whilst 
the  old  conceptions  are  intelligible  as  connecting  the 
Phenomena  by  a  link  of  thought  which  the  mind  can 
feel  and  follow,  the  new  conceptions  are  unintelligible 
because  they  try  to  describe  facts  without  any  reference 
to  the  ideas  they  involve.  No  new  light — nothing  but 
denser  darkness — is  cast  on  the  phenomena  of  Organic 
Life  by  calling  "  Life  the  connexus  of  the  organic 
activities."  x  Yet  meaningless  words  are  heaped  on  each 
other  in  the  desperate  effort  to  dispense  with  those  con- 
ceptions which  can  alone  render  the  order  of  Nature 
intelligible  to  us.  Thus  we  are  told  again,  that  "  The 
Organism  is  the  synthesis  of  diverse  parts,  and  Life  is 
the  synthesis  of  their  properties;"2 — and  again,  that 
"  Vitality  is  the  abstract  designation  of  certain  special 
properties  manifested  by  Matter  under  certain  special 
conditions."3  Surely  there  is  more  light  in  the  old 
reading  : — "  Finding,"  says  Mr.  Lewes,  "  in  an  organism 

1  *'  History  of  Philosophy,"  p.  Ixxx.  2  Ibid.  p.  IxxxiiL 

8  Ibid.  p.  Ixxxiv, 


LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  89 

a  certain  adjustment  of  parts,  which  may  be  reduced  to 
a  plan,  we  are  easily  led  to  conceive  that  this  plan  was 
made  before  the  parts,  and  that  the  adjustment  was 
determined  by  the  plan."  No  doubt !  This  is  the 
easiest  conception,  and  it  is  the  easiest  because  it  is 
most  conformable  to  the  laws  of  Thought;  and  that 
which  is  the  most  conformable  to  the  laws  of  Thought 
is  that  which  makes  the  nearest  approach  to  absolute 
Truth  attainable  by  the  Mind. 

The  universal  prevalence  of  this  idea  of  Purpose  in 
Nature  is  indicated  by  the  irresistible  tendency  which 
we  observe  in  the  language  of  Science  to  personify  the 
Forces,  and  the  combinations  of  Force  by  which  all 
natural  phenomena  are  produced.  It  is  a  great  injustice 
to  scientific  men — too  often  committed — to  suspect  them 
of  unwillingness  to  accept  the  idea  of  a  Personal  Creator 
merely  because  they  try  to  keep  separate  the  language 
of  Science  from  the  language  of  Theology.1  But  it  is 

l  A  remarkable  instance  of  this  injustice  has  been  lately  brought 
to  light.  Professor  Huxley,  in  an  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review, 
had  used  one  of  those  vague  phrases,  so  common  with  scientific  men, 
about  the  "unknown  and  the  unknowable"  being  the  goal  of  all 
scientific  thought,  which  not  unnaturally  suggest  the  notion  that  all 
idea  of  a  God  is  unattainable.  A  writer  in  the  Spectator  accord- 
ingly dealt  with  Professor  Huxley  as  avowing  Atheism,  and  was 
rebuked  by  the  Professor  in  a  letter  published  in  the  Spectator  of 
Feb.  10,  1866.  Professor  Huxley  says:  "I  do  not  know  that  I 
care  very  much  about  popular  odium,  so  that  there  is  no  great  merit 


90  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

curious  to  observe  how  this  endeavour  constantly  breaks 
down — how  impossible  it  is  in  describing  physical 
phenomena  to  avoid  the  phraseology  which  identifies 
them  with  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  and  is  moulded 
on  our  own  conscious  Personality  and  Will.  It  is 
impossible  to  avoid  this  language  simply  because  no 
other  language  conveys  the  impression  which  innumer- 
able structures  leave  upon  the  mind.  Take,  for  ex- 
ample, the  word  "  contrivance."  How  could  Science 
do  without  it?  How  could  the  great  subject  of  Animal 
Mechanics  be  dealt  with  scientifically  without  continual 
reference  to  Law  as  that  by  which,  and  through  which, 
special  organs  are  formed  for  the  doing  of  special 
work?  What  is  the  very  definition  of  a  machine? 
Machines  do  not  increase  Force,  they  only  adjust  it. 
The  very  idea  and  essence  of  a  machine  is  that  it  is 
a  contrivance  for  the  distribution  of  Force  with  a  view 

in  saying  that  if  I  really  saw  fit  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  God, 
I  should  certainly  do  so,  for  the  sake  of  my  own  intellectual  free- 
dom, and  be  the  honest  Atheist  you  are  pleased  to  say  I  am.  As 
it  happens,  however,  I  cannot  take  this  position  with  honesty,  in- 
asmuch as  it  is,  and  always  has  been,  a  favourite  tenet  of  mine, 
that  Atheism  is  as  absurd,  logically  speaking,  as  Polytheism."  On 
the  subject  of  miracles,  in  the  same  letter,  Professor  Huxley  says, 
that  "  denying  the  possibility  of  miracles  seems  to  me  quite  as 
unjustifiable  as  speculative  Atheism."  The  question  of  miracles 
seems  now  to  be  admitted  on  all  hands  to  be  simply  a  questioa 
of  evidence. 


LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  9! 

to  its  bearing  on  special  purposes.  A  man's  arm  is  a 
machine  in  which  the  law  of  leverage  is  supplied  to 
the  vital  force  for  the  purposes  of  prehension.  We 
shall  see  presently  that  a  bird's  wing  is  a  machine  in 
which  the  same  law  is  applied,  under  the  most  com- 
plicated conditions,  for  the  purpose  of  flight.  Anatomy 
supplies  an  infinite  number  of  similar  examples.  It  is 
impossible  to  describe  or  explain  the  facts  we  meet 
with  in  this  or  in  any  other  branch  of  Science  without 
investing  the  "  laws  "  of  Nature  with  something  of  that 
Personality  which  they  do  actually  reflect,  or  without 
conceiving  of  them  as  partaking  of  those  attributes  of 
Mind  which  we  everywhere  recognise  in  their  working 
and  results. 

We  may,  again,  take  the  Forces  which  determine  the 
Planetary  motions  as  the  grandest  and  the  simplest  illus- 
trations of  this  truth  of  Science.  Gravitation,  as  already 
said,  is  a  Force  which  prevails  apparently  through  all 
Space.  But  it  does  not  prevail  alone.  It  is  a  Force 
whose  function  it  is  to  balance  other  Forces,  of  which 
we  know  nothing,  except  this, — that  these,  again,  are 
needed  to  balance  the  Force  of  Gravitation.  Each 
Force,  if  left  to  itself,  would  be  destructive  of  the 
Universe.  Were  it  not  for  the  Force  of  Gravitation,  the 
centrifugal  Forces  which  impel  the  Planets  would  fling 
them  off  into  Space.  Were  it  not  for  these  centrifugal 
Forces,  the  Force  of  Gravitation  would  dash  them 


92  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

against  the  Sun.  The  orbits,  therefore,  of  the  Planets, 
with  all  that  depends  upon  them,  are  determined  by  the 
nice  and  perfect  balance  which  is  maintained  between 
these  two  Forces ;  and  the  ultimate  fact  of  astronomical 
science  is  not  the  Law  of  Gravitation,  but  the  Adjust- 
ment between  this  law  and  others  which  are  less  known, 
so  as  to  produce  and  maintain  the  existing  Solar  System. 
This  is  one  example  of  the  principle  of  Adjustment ; 
but  no  one  example,  however  grand  the  scale  may  be  on 
which  it  is  exhibited,  can  give  any  idea  of  the  extent  to 
which  the  principle  of  Adjustment  is  required,  and  is 
adopted  in  the  works  of  Nature.  The  revolution  of  the 
seasons,  for  example — seed-time  and  harvest — depend  on 
the  Law  of  Gravitation  in  this  sense,  that  if  that  law 
were  disturbed,  or  if  it  were  inconstant,  they  would  be 
disturbed  and  inconstant  also.  But  the  seasons  equally 
depend  on  a  multitude  of  other  laws, — laws  of  heat,  laws 
of  light,  laws  relating  to  fluids,  and  to  solids,  and  to 
gases,  and  to  magnetic  attractions  and  repulsions,  each 
one  of  which  laws  is  invariable  in  itself,  but  each  of 
which  would  produce  utter  confusion  if  it  were  allowed 
to  operate  alone,  or  if  it  were  not  balanced  against 
others  in.  the  right  proportion.  It  is  very  difficult  to  form 
any  adequate  idea  of  the  vast  number  of  laws  which  are 
concerned  in  producing  the  most  ordinary  operations  of 
Nature.  Looking  only  at  the  combinations  with  which 
Astronomy  is  concerned,  the -adjustments  are  almost 


LAW; — ITS  DEFINITIONS.  93 

infinite.  Each  minutest  circumstance  in  the  position, 
or  size,  or  shape  of  the  Earth,  the  direction  of  its  axis, 
the  velocity  of  its  motion  and  of  its  rotation,  has  its 
own  definite  effect,  and  the  slightest  change  in  any  one 
of  these  relations  would  wholly  alter  the  world  we  live  in. 
And  then  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  seasons,  as  they 
are  now  fitted  to  us,  and  as  we  are  fitted  to  them,  do  not 
depend  only  on  the  facts  or  the  laws  which  Astronomy 
reveals.  They  depend  quite  as  much  on  other  sets  of 
facts,  and  other  sets  of  laws,  revealed  by  other  sciences, 
— such,  for  example,  as  Chemistry,  Electricity,  and 
Geology.  The  motion  of  the  Earth  might  be  exactly 
what  it  is,  every  fact  in  respect  to  our  Planetary  position 
might  remain  unchanged,  yet  the  seasons  would  return 
in  vain  if  our"  own  atmosphere  were  altered  in  any  one 
of  the  elements  of  its  composition,  or  if  any  one  of  the 
laws  regulating  the  action  were  other  than  it  is.  Under 
a  thinner  air  even  the  torrid  zone  might  be  wrapped  in 
eternal  snow.  Under  a  denser  air,  and  one  with  dif- 
ferent refracting  powers,  the  Earth  and  all  that  is  therein 
might  be  burnt  up.  And  so  it  is  through  the  whole 
of  Nature:  laws  everywhere — laws  in  themselves  in- 
variable, but  so  worked  as  to  produce  effects  of 
inexhaustible  variety  by  being  pitched  against  each 
other,  and  made  to  hold  each  other  in  restraint 

I  have  already  referred  to  Chemistry  as  a  science  full 
of  illustrations  of  Law  in  the  First  and  simplest  sense — 


94  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

that  is,  of  facts  in  observed  orders  of  recurrence.  But 
Chemistry  is  a  science  not  less  rich  in  illustration  of  Law 
in  the  Fourth  sense — that  is,  of  Forces  in  mutual  adjust- 
ment. Indeed,  in  Chemistry,  this  system  of  adjustment 
among  the  different  properties  of  matter  is  especially  in- 
tricate and  observable.  Some  of  the  laws  which  regulate 
Chemical  Combination  were  discovered  in  our  own 
time,  and  are  amongst  the  most  wonderful  and  the  most 
beautiful  which  have  been  revealed  by  any  science. 
They  are  laws  of  great  exactness,  having  invariable  re- 
lations to  number  and  proportion.  Each  elementary 
substance  has  its  own  combining  proportions  with  other 
elements,  so  that,  except  in  these  proportions,  no 
chemical  union  can  take  place  at  all.  And  when 
chemical  union  does  take  place,  the  compounds  which 
result  have  different  and  even  opposite  powers,  according 
to  the  different  proportions  employed.  Then,  the  rela- 
tions in  which  those  inorganic  compounds  stand  to  the 
chemistry  of  Life,  constitute  another  vast  series  in  which 
the  principle  of  adjustment  has  applications,  infinite  in 
number,  and  as  infinite  in  beauty.  How  delicate  these 
relations  are,  and  how  tremendous  are  the  issues  de- 
pending on  their  management,  may  be  conceived  from 
this  single  fact, — that  the  same  elements  combined  in  one 
proportion  are  sometimes  a  nutritious  food  or  a  grateful 
stimulant,  soothing  and  sustaining  the  powers  of  life ; 
whilst,  combined  in  another  proportion,  they  may  be  a 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  9$ 


deadly  poison,  paralysing  the  heart  and  carrying  agony 
along  every  nerve  and  fibre  of  the  animal  frame.  This  is 
no  mere  theoretical  possibility.  It  is  actually  the  re- 
lation, for  example,  in  which  two  well-known  substances 
stand  to  each  other — Tea  and  Strychnia.  The  active 
principles  of  these  two  substances,  "  Theine "  and 
"  Strychnine,"  are  identical  so  far  as  their  elements  are 
concerned,  and  differ  from  each  other  only  in  the  pro- 
portions in  which  they  are  combined.  Such  is  the  power 
of  numbers  in  the  Laboratory  of  Nature !  What  havoc 
in  this  world,  so  full  of  Life,  would  be  made  by  blind 
chance  gambling  with  such  powers  as  these !  What 
confusion,  unless  they  were  governed  by  laws  whose 
certainty  makes  them  capable  of  fine  adjustment,  and 
therefore  subject  to  accurate  control !  How  fine  these 
adjustments  are,  and  how  absolute  is  that  control,  is 
indicated  in  another  fact — and  that  is  the  few  elements 
out  of  which  all  things  are  made.  The  number  of 
substances  deemed  elementary  has  varied  with  the 
advance  of  Science  ;  but  as  compared  with  the  variety 
of  their  products,  that  number  may  be  considered  as  in- 
fmitesimally  small ;  whilst  the  progress  of  analysis,  with 
glimpses  of  laws  as  yet  unknown,  renders  it  almost 
certain  that  this  number  will  be  found  to  be  smaller  still. 
Yet  out  of  that  small  number  of  elementary  substances, 
having  fixed  rules,  too,  limiting  their  combination,  all  the 
infinite  varieties  of  organic  and  inorganic  matter  are  built 


96  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

up  by  means  of  nice  adjustment.  As  all  the  faculties  of 
a  powerful  mind  can  utter  their  voice  in  language  whose 
elements  are  reducible  to  twenty-four  letters,  so  all  the 
forms  of  Nature,  with  all  the  ideas  they  express,  are 
worked  out  from  a  few  simple  elements  having  a  few 
simple  properties. 

Simple !  can  we  call  them  so  ?  Yes,  simple  by  com- 
parison with  the  exceeding  complication  of  the  uses  they 
are  made  to  serve :  simple  also,  in  this  sense,  that  they 
follow  some  simple  rule  of  numbers.  But  in  themselves 
these  laws,  these  forces  are  incomprehensible.  That 
which  is  most  remarkable  about  them  is  their  unchange- 
ableness.  The  whole  mind  and  imagination  of  scientific 
men  is  often  so  impressed  with  this  character  of  material 
laws,  that  no  room  is  left  for  the  perception  of  other 
aspects  of  their  nature  and  of  their  work.  We  hear  of 
rigid  and  universal  sequence — necessary — invariable; — 
of  unbroken  chains  of  cause  and  effect,  no  link  of  which 
can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  ever  broken.  And  this 
idea  grows  upon  the  mind,  until  in  some  confused 
manner  it  is  held  as  casting  out  the  idea  of  Purpose 
in  creation,  and  inconsistent  with  the  element  of  Will. 
If  it  be  so,  the  difficulty  cannot  be  evaded  by  denying 
the  uniformity,  any  more  than  the  universality,  of  Law. 
It  is  perfectly  true  that  every  law  is,  in  its  own  nature, 
invariable,  producing  always  precisely  and  necessarily 
the  same  effects, — that  is,  provided  it  is  worked  under 


LAW  ; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  97 

the  same  conditions.  But  then,  if  the  conditions  are  not 
the  same,  the  invariableness  of  effect  gives  place  to 
capacities  of  change  which  are  almost  infinite.  It  is  by 
altering  the  conditions  under  which  any  given  law  is 
brought  to  bear,  and  by  bringing  other  laws  to  operate 
upon  the  same  subject,  that  our  own  Wills  exercise  a 
large  and  increasing  power  over  the  material  world. 
And  be  it  observed — to  this  end  the  uniformity  of  laws 
is  no  impediment,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  an  indis- 
pensable condition.  Laws  are  in  themselves — if  not . 
unchangeable — at  least  unchanging,  and  if  they  were  not 
unchanging,  they  could  not  be  used  as  the  instruments 
of  Will.  If  they  were  less  rigorous  they  would  be  less 
certain,  and  the  least  uncertainty  would  render  them 
incapable  of  any  service.  No  adjustment,  however  nice, 
could  secure  its  purpose  if  the  implements  employed  were 
of  uncertain  temper. 

The  notion  therefore  that  the  uniformity  or  invariable- 
ness  of  the  Laws  of  Nature  cannot  be  reconciled  with 
their  subordination  to  the  exercise  of  Will,  is  a  notion 
contrary  to  our  own  experience.  It  is  a  confusion  of 
thought  arising  very  much  out  of  the  ambiguity  of  lan- 
guage. For  let  it  be  observed  that,  of  all  the  senses  in 
which  the  word  Law  is  used,  there  is  only  one  in  which 
it  is  true  that  laws  are  immutable  or  invariable;  and 
that  is  the  sense  in  which  Law  is  used  to  designate  an 

H 


98  THE  REIGN   OF  LAW. 

individual  Force.  Gravitation,  for  example,  is  immu- 
table in  this  respect — that  (so  far  as  we  know)  it  never 
operates  according  to  any  other  measure  than  "  directly 
as  the  mass,  and  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance." 
But  in  all  the  other  senses  in  which  the  word  Law  is 
used,  laws  are  not  immutable ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  they 
are  the  great  instruments,  the  unceasing  agencies,  of 
change.  When,  therefore,  scientific  men  speak,  as  they 
often  do,  of  all  phenomena  being  governed  by  invariable 
laws,  they  use  language  which  is  ambiguous,  and  in  most 
cases  they  use  it  in  a  sense  which  covers  an  erroneous 
idea  of  the  facts.  There  are  no  phenomena  visible  to 
Man  of  which  it  is  true  to  say  that  they  are  governed  by 
any  invariable  Force.  That  which  does  govern  them  is 
always  some  variable  combinations  of  invariable  forces. 
But  this  makes  all  the  difference  in  reasoning  on  the 
relation  of  Will  to  Law, — this  is  the  one  essential  dis- 
tinction to  be  admitted  and  observed.  There  is  no 
observed  Order  of  facts  which  is  not  due  to  a  com- 
bination of  Forces ;  and  there  is  no  combination  of 
Forces  which  is  invariable — none  which  are  not  capable 
of  change  in  infinite  degrees.  In  these  senses — and 
these  are  the  common  senses  in  which  Law  is  used  to 
express  the  phenomena  of  Nature — Law  is  not  rigid,  it 
is  not  immutable,  it  is  not  invariable,  but  it  is,  on  the 
contrary,  pliable^  subtle,  various.  In  the  only  sense  in 


LAW;— ITS    DEFINITIONS.  99 

which  laws  are  immutable,  this  immutability  is  the  very 
characteristic  which  makes  them  subject  to  guidance 
through  endless  cycles  of  design.  We  know  this  in  our 
own  case.  It  is  the  very  certainty  and  in  variableness  of 
the  laws  of  Nature  which  alone  enables  us  to  use  them, 
and  to  yoke  them  to  our  service. 

Now,  the  laws  of  Nature  appear  to  be  employed  in 
the  system  of  Nature  in  a  manner  precisely  analogous 
to  that  in  which  we  ourselves  employ  them.  The 
difficulties  and  obstructions  which  are  presented  by  one 
law  in  the  way  of  accomplishing  a  given  purpose,  are 
met  and  overcome  exactly  on  the  same  principle  on 
which  they  are  met  and  overcome  by  Man — viz.,  by 
knowledge  of  other  laws,  and  by  resource  in  applying 
them, — that  is,  by  ingenuity  in  mechanical  contrivance. 
It  cannot  be  too  much  insisted  on,  that  this  is  a  con- 
clusion of  pure  Science.  The  relation  which  an  organic 
structure  bears  to  its  purpose  in  Nature  can  be  recog- 
nised as  certainly  as  the  same  relation  between  a  ma- 
chine and  its  purpose  in  human  art.  It  is  absurd  to 
maintain,  for  example,  that  the  purpose  of  the  cellular 
arrangement  of  material  in  combining  lightness  with 
strength,  is  a  purpose  legitimately  cognisable  by  Science 
in  the  Menai  Bridge,  but  is  not  as  legitimately  cognisable 
when  it  is  seen  in  Nature,  actually  serving  the  same  use. 
The  little  Barnacles  which  crust  the  rocks  at  low  tide, 

H  2 


100  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

and  which  to  live  there  at  all  must  be  able  to  resist  the 
surf,  have  the  building  of  their  shells  constructed  strictly 
with  reference  to  this  necessity.  It  is  a  structure  all 
hollowed  and  chambered  on  the  plan  which  engineers 
have  so  lately  discovered  as  an  arrangement  of  material 
by  which  the  power  of  resisting  strain  or  pressure  is 
multiplied  in  an  extraordinary  degree.  That  shell  is  as 
pure  a  bit  of  mechanics  as  the  bridge,  both  being  struc- 
tures in  which  the  same  arrangement  is  adapted  to  the 
same  end. 

"  Small,  but  a  work  divine  j 
Frail,  but  of  force  to  withstand, 
Year  upon  year,  the  shock 
Of  cataract  seas  that  snap 
The  three-decker's  oaken  spine."  * 

This  is  but  one  instance  out  of  a  number  which  no 
man  can  count.  So  far  as  we  know,  no  Law — that  is, 
no  elementary  Force — of  Nature  is  liable  to  change. 
But  every  Law  of  Nature  is  liable  to  counteraction ;  and 
the  rule  is,  that  laws  are  habitually  made  to  counteract 
each  other  in-  precisely  the  manner  and  degree  which 
some  definite  result  requires. 

Nor  is  it  less  remarkable  that  the  converse  of  this  is 
true  :  no  Purpose  is  ever  attained  in  Nature,  except  by 
the  enlistment  of  Laws  as  the  means  and  instruments  of 

i  "Maud." 


LAW;  —  ITS    DEFINITIONS. 


attainment.  When  an  extraordinary  result  is  aimed  at, 
it  often  happens  that  some  common  law  is  yoked  to 
extraordinary  conditions,  and  its  action  is  intensified  by 
some  special  machinery.  For  example,  the  Forces  of 
Electricity  are  in  action,  probably,  in  all  living  Orga- 
nisms, but  certainly  in  the  muscular  and  nervous  system 
of  the  higher  animals.  In  a  veiy  few  (so  far  as  yet 
known,  in  only  a  very  few  animals  among  the  millions 
which  exist,  and  these  all  belonging  to  the  Class  of 
Fishes),  the  electrical  action  has  been  so  stored  and 
concentrated  as  to  render  it  serviceable  as  a  weapon  of 
offence.  Creatures  which  grovel  at  the  bottom  of  the 
sea,  or  in  the  slime  of  rivers,  have  been  gifted  with  the 
astonishing  faculty  of  wielding  at  their  will  the  most 
subtle  of  all  the  powers  of  Nature.  They  have  the 
faculty  of"  shooting  out  lightning  "  against  their  enemies 
or  their  prey.  But  this  gift  has  not  been  given  without 
an  exact  fulfilment  of  all  the  laws  which  govern  Elec- 
tricity, and  which  especially  govern  its  concentration  and 
destructive  force.  The  Electric  Ray,  or  Torpedo,  has 
been  provided  with  a  Battery  closely  resembling,  but 
greatly  exceeding  in  the  beauty  and  compactness  of  its 
structure,  the  Batteries  whereby  Man  has  now  learned 
to  make  the  laws  of  Electricity  subservient  to  his  will. 
There  are  no  less  than  940  hexagonal  columns  in  this 
Battery  like  those  of  a  bees'  comb,  and  each  of  these  13 


102  THE  REIGN   OF   LAW. 

subdivided  by  a  series  of  horizontal  plates,  which  appear 
to  be  analogous  to  the  plates  of  the  Voltaic  Pile.  The 
whole  is  supplied  with  an  enormous  amount  of  nervous 
matter,  four  great  branches  of  which  are  as  large  as  the 
animal's  spinal  cord,  and  these  spread  out  in  a  multitude 
of  thread-like  filaments  round  the  prismatic  columns, 
and  finally  pass  into  all  the  cells.1  This,  again,  seems 
to  suggest  an  analogy  with  the  arrangement  by  which 
an  electric  current,  passing  through  a  coil  and  round  a 
magnet,  is  used  to  intensify  the  magnetic  force.  A  com 
plete  knowledge  of  all  the  mysteries  which  have  been 
gradually  unfolded  from  the  days  of  Galvani  to  those  of 
Faraday,  and  of  many  others  which  are  still  inscrutable 
to  us,  is  exhibited  in  this  structure.  The  laws  which  are 
appealed  to  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  purpose  are 
many  and  very  complicated ;  because  the  conditions  to 
be  satisfied  refer  not  merely  to  the  generation  of  Electric 
force  in  the  animal  to  which  it  is  given,  but  to  its  effect 
on  the  nervous  system  of  the  animals  against  which  it  is 
to  be  employed,  and  to  the  conducting  medium  in  which 
both  are  moving. 

When  we  contemplate  such  a  structure  as  this,  the 
idea  is  borne  in  with  force  upon  the  mind,  that  the  need 
of  conforming  to  definite  conditions  seems  as  absolute  a 

1  Owen's  "Lectures  on  Comp.  Anat."  vol.  ii.  (Fishes). 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  103 

necessity  in  making  an  Electric  Fish  as  in  making  an 
Electric  Telegraph.  But  the  fact  of  these  conditions 
existing,  and  requiring  to  be  satisfied, — or,  in  other 
words,  the  fact  of  so  many  natural  laws  demanding  a 
first  obedience, — is  not  the  ultimate  fact,  it  is  not  even 
the  main  fact,  which  Science  apprehends  in  such  pheno- 
mena as  these.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  is  most 
observable  and  most  certain,  is  the  manner  in  which 
these  conditions  are  met,  complied  with,  and,  by  being 
complied  with,  are  overcome.  But  this  is,  in  other 
words,  the  subordination  of  many  laws  to  a  difficult  and 
curious  Purpose, — a  subordination  which  is  effected 
through  the  instrumentality  of  a  purely  mechanical  con- 
trivance. 

It  is  no  objection  to  this  universal  truth,  that  the 
machines  thus  employed  in  Nature  are  themselves  con- 
structed through  the  agency  of  Law.  .They  grow — or,  in 
modern  phraseology,  they  are  developed.  But  this  makes 
no  difference  in  the  case — or,  rather,  it  only  carries  us 
farther  back  to  other  and  yet  other  illustrations  of  the 
same  truth.  This  is  precisely  one  of  those  cases  already 
referred  to,  in  which  Causes  are  unknown,  whilst  Pur- 
poses are  clear  and  certain.  The  Battery  of  an  Electric 
Pish  is  both  a  means  and  an  end.  As  respects  the 
electric  laws  which  it  puts  in  motion — that  is,  as  respects 
the  Force  which  it  concentrates — it  must  be  regarded 


104  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

as  a  means.     As  respects  the  organic  laws  by  which  it  is 
itself  developed,  it  is  an  end. 

What  we  do  know  in  this  case  is  why  the  apparatus  was 
made ;  that  is  to  say,  what  we  do  know  is  the  Purpose. 
What  we  do  not  know,  and  have  no  idea  of,  is  how  it 
was  made ;  that  is  to  say,  what  we  do  not  know  is  the 
Law,  the  Force  or  Forces,  which  have  been  used  as  the 
instrument  of  that  Purpose.  When  Man  makes  a  voltaic 
Battery,  he  selects  materials  which  have  properties  and 
relations  with  each  other  previously  ascertained — metals 
worked  out  of  natural  ores,  acids  distilled  out  of  other 
natural  substances ;  and  he  puts  these  together  in  such 
fashion  as  he  knows  will  generate  the  mysterious  Force 
which  he  desires  to  evoke  and  to  employ.  But  how  can 
such  a  machine  be  made  out  of  the  tissues  of  a  fish  ? 
Well  may  Mr.  Darwin  say,  "  It  is  impossible  to  conceive 
by  what  steps  these  wondrous  organs  have  been  pro- 
duced."1 We  see  the  Purpose — that  a  special  appara- 
tus should  be  prepared,  and  we  see  that  it  is  effected 
by  the  production  of  the  machine  required ;  but  we  have 
not  the  remotest  notion  of  the  means  employed.  Yet  we 
can  see  so  much  as  this,  that  here  again  other  laws, 
belonging  altogether  to  another  department  of  Nature — 
laws  of  organic  growth — are  made  subservient  to  a  very 
definite  and  very  peculiar  Purpose.  The  paramount  facts 
a  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p.  192,  ist  edition. 


LAW  j— ITS    DEFINITIONS.  10$ 

disclosed  by  Science,  however,  in  this  case,  are  these : — 
first,  the  adaptation  of  the  animal  tissues  to  form  a 
battery;  and,  secondly,  the  Purpose  or  function  of  the 
apparatus,  when  made,  to  discharge  electric  shocks. 

There  is  indeed  one  objection  to  this  method  of 
conception,  which  would  be  a  fatal  objection  if  it 
could  be  consistently  maintained.  But  all  the  strength 
of  this  objection  lies  in  the  obscure  terrors  which  a  very 
long  word  is  sometimes  capable  of  inspiring.  This 
word  is  "Anthropomorphism."  Purpose  and  Design,  it 
is  said,  is  a  human  conception.  Unquestionably  it  is, 
and  so  is  all  knowledge  in  every  form.  We  can  never 
stand  outside  ourselves.  We  can  never  get  behind  or 
above  our  own  methods  of  conception.  The  human 
mind  can  know  nothing,  and  can  think  of  nothing  ex- 
cept in  terms  of  its  own  capacities  of  thought.  But 
if  this  be  fatal  to  our  knowledge  of  any  of  the  mean- 
ings in  creation,  it  must  be  equally  fatal  to  our  having 
any  knowledge  of  the  very  existence  of  a  Creator.  Once 
grant  it  to  be  true,  "  that  if  we  are  to  apply  our  human 
standard  to  the  Creator  in  one  direction,  we  must  apply 
it  in  all," 1 — then  it  will  follow  that  we  cannot  conceive 
any  Creator  unless  it  be  one  as  weak,  and  as  corrupt, 
and  as  ignorant  as  ourselves.  If  this  be  not  bad  logic, 
as  on  the  face  of  it  it  clearly  is,  then  it  is  not  "  Theo- 
logy" alone  which  goes  by  the  board.  The  purest  and 
1  Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes,  Fortnightly  Review^  July  1867,  p.  109. 


106  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

most  naked  Theism  is  equally  destroyed.  If  it  can  be 
said  with  truth  that  "  the  Universal  Mind  is  essentially 
other  than  the  Human  Mind," 1  so  that  no  recognisable 
relations  can  exist  between  them,  then  that  Universal 
Mind  is  to  us  as  if  it  were  not.  But  those  who  take 
objection  to  Anthropomorphism,  are  not  generally  pre- 
pared to  follow  it  to  this  extreme  conclusion.  Mr. 
Lewes  speaks  of  the  sceptical  philosophy  he  supports  as 
"rejecting  Atheism  " — of  Atheism  being  "  an  error  which 
it  has  not  maintained," — of  Atheism  being  not  only 
rash,  but  "contradictory."2  But  every  conception  of  a 
"  Mind,"  even  though  it  be  described  as  "  Universal," 
must  be  in  some  degree  Anthropomorphic.  Our  minds 
can  think  of  another  mind  only  as  having  some  powers 
and  properties  which  in  kind  are  common  with  our  own. 
Nor  is  this  objection  avoided  by  any  of  the  othei 
methods  of  conception  which  are  devised  to  eliminate 
from  the  Order  of  Nature  one  of  the  most  patent  of  its 
facts.  The  idea  of  natinal  forces  working  "by  them- 
selves "  is  pre-eminently  Anthropomorphic.  This  is  un- 
doubtedly the  way  in  which  they  seem  to  us  to  work  when 
we  employ  them.  The  idea  of  those  forces  having  been 
so  co-ordinated  at  the  first  as  to  produce  "  necessarily" 
and  "by  themselves"  all  the  phenomena  of  Nature — 
this  is  an  idea  essentially  formed  on  those  higher  efforts 

i  Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes,  Fortnightly  Review,  July  1867,  p.  109. 
8  T!.!;l.  p.  107. 


LAW;  —  ITS    DEFINITIONS. 


of  human  ingenuity  in  virtue  of  which  "self-acting" 
machines  are  made.  It  is  quite  true,  no  doubt,  that 
this  is  one  aspect  in  which  the  adjustments  and  con- 
trivances in  Nature  present  themselves  to  us.  But  it 
does  not  render  this  idea  more  Anthropomorphic,  but 
rather  less  when  we  add  to  it  other  conceptions—  such 
as  the  idea  of  a  Mind  which  is  the  source  of  all  power, 
and  a  Will  which  is  present  in  all  effects.  There  may 
be  other  difficulties  in  the  way  of  this  conception,  but 
not  the  difficulty  of  Anthropomorphism.  From  neither 
of  these  conceptions,  however,  can  we  eliminate  the 
idea  of  Purpose  and  Design. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  divest  ourselves  of  the  notion, 
that  whatever  happens  by  way  of  natural  consequence 
is  thereby  removed,  at  least  by  one  degree,  from  being 
the  expression  of  Will  and  the  effect  of  Purpose.  We 
forget  that  all  our  own  works,  not  less  than  the  works  of 
Nature,  are.  works  done  through  the  means  and  instru- 
mentality of  Law.  All  that  we  can  effect  is  brought 
about  by  way  of  natural  consequence.  All  our  machine^ 
are  simply  contrivances  for  bringing  natural  Forces  intq 
operation;  and  these  machines  themselves  we  are  able 
to  construct  only  out  of  the  materials  and  by  appli- 
cation of  the  laws  of  Nature.  The  Steam-engine  works 
by  way  of  natural  consequence  ;  so  does  Mr.  Babbage's 
Calculating  Machine  ;  so  does  the  Electric  Telegraph  ; 


I08  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

so  does  the  Solar  System.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  in 
all  human  machinery  we  know  by  the  evidence  of  sight 
the  ultimate  agency  to  which  the  machinery  is  due, 
whei'eas  in  the  machinery  of  Nature  the  ultimate  agency 
is  concealed  from  sight.  But  it  is  the  very  business 
and  work  of  Science  to  rise  from  the  Visible  to  the 
Invisible — from  what  we  observe  by  Sense  to  what  we 
know  by  Reason. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  Fifth  meaning  in  which  the 
word  Law  is  habitually  used  in  Science, — a  meaning 
which  is  indeed  well  deserving  of  attention.  In  this 
sense,  Law  is  used  to  designate,  not  any  observed  Order 
of  facts, — not  any  Force  tu  which  such  Order  may  be 
due, — neither  yet  any  combination  of  Force  adjusted 
to  the  discharge  of  function,  but — some  purely  Abstract 
Idea,  which  carries  up  to  a  higher  point  our  conception 
of  what  the  phenomena  are  and  of  what  they  do.  There 
may  be  no  phenomena  actually  corresponding  to  such 
Idea,  and  yet  a  clear  conception  of  it  may  be  essential 
to  a  right  understanding  of  all  the  phenomena  around 
us.  A  good  example  of  Law  in  this  sense  is  to  be  found 
in  the  law  which,  in  the  Science  of  Mechanics,  is  called 
the  First  Law  of  Motion.  The  law  is,  that  all  Motion  is 
in  itself  (that  is  to  say,  except  as  affected  by  extraneous 
Forces)  uniform  in  velocity,  and  rectilinear  in  direction. 
Thus  according  to  this  law  a  body  moving,  and  not 


LAW; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  1 09 

subject  to  any  extraneous  Force,  would  go  on  moving 
for  ever  at  the  same  rate  of  velocity,  and  in  an  exactly 
straight  line. 

Now,  there  is  no  such  motion  as  this  existing  on  the 
earth  or  in  the  heavens.  It  is  an  Abstract  Idea  of 
Motion  which  no  man  has  ever,  or  can  ever,  see  exem- 
plified. Yet  a  clear  apprehension  of  this  Abstract  Idea 
was  necessary  to  a  right  understanding  and  to  the  true 
explanation  of  all  the  motions  which  are  actually  seen. 
It  was  long  before  this  idea  was  arrived  at ;  and  for  want 
of  it,  the  efforts  of  Science  to  explain  the  visible  pheno- 
mena of  Motion  were  always  taking  a  wrong  direction. 
There  was  a  real  difficulty  in  conceiving  it,  because 
not  only  is  there  no  such  motion  in  Nature,  but  there 
is  no  possibility  by  artificial  means  of  producing  it. 
It  is  impossible  to  release  any  moving  body  from  the 
impulses  of  extraneous  Force.  The  First  Law  of  Motion 
is  therefore  a  purely  Abstract  Idea.  It  represents  a 
Rule  which  never  operates  as  we  conceive  it,  by  itself, 
but  is  always  complicated  with  other  Rules  which  pro- 
duce a  corresponding  complication  in  result.  Like  many 
other  laws  of  the  same  class,  it  was  discovered,  not  by 
looking  outwards,  but  by  looking  inwards;  not  by 
observing,  but  by  thinking.  The  human  mind,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  own  faculties  and  powers,  sometimes  by 
careful  reasoning,  sometimes  by  the  intuitions  of  genius 


IIO  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

unconscious  of  any  process,  is  able,  from  time  to  time, 
to  reach  now  one,  now  another,  of  those  purely  Intel- 
lectual Conceptions  which  are  the  basis  of  all  that  is  in- 
telligible to  us  in  the  Order  of  the  Material  World.  We 
look  for  an  ideal  order  or  simplicity  in  material  Law ;  and 
the  very  possibility  of  exact  Science  depends  upon  the 
fact  that  such  ideal  order  does  actually  prevail,  and  is 
related  to  the  abstract  conceptions  of  our  own  intellectual 
nature.  It  is  in  this  way  that  many  of  the  greatest  dis- 
coveries of  Science  have  been  made.  Especially  have 
the  great  pioneers  in  new  paths  of  discovery  been  led  to 
the  opening  of  those  paths  by  that  fine  sense  for  abstract 
truths  which  is  the  noblest  gift  of  genius.  Copernicus, 
Kepler,  and  Galileo  were  all  guided  in  their  profound 
interpretations  of  visible  phenomena  by  those  intuitions 
which  arise  in  minds  finely  organised,  brought  into  close 
relations  with  the  mind  of  Nature,  and  highly  trained  in 
the  exercise  of  speculative  thought.  They  guessed  the 
truth  before  they  proved  it  to  be  true ;  and  those  guesses 
had  their  origin  in  Abstract  Ideas  of  the  mind  which 
turned  out  to  be  ideas  really  embodied  in  the  Order  of 
the  Universe.  So  constantly  has  this  recurred  in  the 
history  of  Science,  that,  as  Dr.  Whewell  says,  it  is  not 
to  be  considered  as  an  exception,  but  as  the  rule.1 

i  Whewell's  "History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,"  2nd  edition, 
vol  i.  p.  434.     Speaking  of  Copernicus,   Dr.   Whewell   says,   in 


Ill 


Here  again  it  is  very  instructive  to  observe  how  "Law" 
in  this  last  sense  is  dealt  with  by  the  Positive  Philosophy. 
Scientific  men  are  accustomed  to  reckon  such  Laws  as 
the  First  Law  of  Motion  among  the  surest  possessions  of 
pure  Intellect,  and  the  faculty  by  which  they  are  con- 
ceived among  the  noblest  proofs  of  its  energy  and  power. 
Positivism,  on  the  contrary,  regards  such  laws  as  mere 
"  artifices  "  of  thought,  and  the  Power  by  which  they  are 
conceived  not  as  a  Strength,  but  as  an  "  Infirmity "  of 
Mind.1  I  do  not  deny  that  the  process  by  which  these 
Abstractions  are  attained  is  a  metaphysical  process, — that 
is  to  say,  they  are  purely  mental  conceptions.  But  the 
process  which  denies  "reality  "to  these  conceptions  is 
also  purely  a  metaphysical  process,  with  this  only  differ- 
ence, that  it  is  bad  metaphysics  instead  of  good.  The 
analysis  which  evolves  these  abstract  Laws  out  of  the 
phenomena  of  Nature  is  an  analysis  which  truly  co- 
ordinates the  order  of  those  phenomena  with  an  Order 

another  place :  "It  is  manifest  that  in  this,  as  in  other  cases  of 
discovery,  a  clear  and  steady  possession  of  abstract  Ideas,  and  an 
aptitude,  in  comprehending  real  Facts  under  these  general  concep- 
tions, must  have  been  leading  characters  in  the  Discoverer's  mind." 
—Vol.  i.  p.  389. 

i  "  Science  is  distinguished  from  common  knowledge  by  its  con- 
scious employment  of  artifices  which  our  infirmity  renders  indispen- 
sable." Again,  "  Abstraction  is  one  of  the  necessary  (from  infirmity) 
artifices  of  research." — Lewes'  "Prologue,"  p.  Ixxxix. 


TT2  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

of  Thought.  The  counter  Analysis  which  'pronounces 
them  to  be  mere  artifices  of  Thought,  and  "  preliminary 
falsifications  of  fact,"  is  an  attempt  to  make  Reason 
disbelieve  herself,  and  immerses  us  at  once  in  the  worst 
kind  of  Metaphysics — that  which  has  made  the  name 
almost  opprobrious — even  the  old  Scholastic  subtleties 
of  the  Nominali stic  and  the  Realistic  controversy. 

And  now  having  traced  the  various  senses  in  which 
Law  is  used,  we  can  form  some  estimate  on  the  value  of 
those  conclusions  of  which  some  men  are  so  boastful  and 
of  which  other  men  are  so  much  afraid.  We  can  see 
how  much  and  how  little  is  really  meant  when  it  is  said 
that  Law  can  be  traced  in  all  things,  and  all  things  can  be 
traced  to  Law.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that,  in 
establishing  this  conclusion,  the  progress  of 'modern  in- 
vestigation is  in  a  direction  tending  to  Materialism.  This 
may  be  and  always  has  been  the  tendency  of  individual 
minds.  There  are  men  who  would  stare  into  the  very 
Burning  Bush  without  a  thought  that  the  ground  on 
which  they  stand  must  be  Holy  Ground.  It  is  not  now 
of  wood  or  stone  that  men  make  their  Idols,  but  of  their 
own  abstract  conceptions.  Before  these,  borrowing  for 
them  the  attributes  of  Personality,  they  bow  down  and 
worship.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  to  find  men 
who  may  be  trusted  thoroughly  on  the  facts  of  their  own 
Science,  who  cannot  be  trusted  for  a  moment  on  the 


LAW;  —  ITS    DEFINITIONS. 


place  which  those  facts  assume  in  the  general  system  of 
truth.  Philosophy  must  include  Science  ;  but  Science 
does  not  necessarily  include  Philosophy.  There  are,  and 
there  always  have  been,  some  special  misconceptions 
connected  with  the  prosecution  of  physical  research.  It 
is,  however,  on  the  surface  of  things,  rather  than  below 
it,  that  the  suggestions  of  Materialism  lie  thickest  to  the 
eye.  They  abound  among  the  commonest  facts  which 
obtrude  themselves  on  our  attention  in  Nature  and  in 
human  life.  When  the  bursting  of  some  small  duct  of 
blood  upon  the  Brain  is  seen  to  destroy  in  a  moment  the 
Mind  of  Man,  and  to  break  down  all  the  powers  of  his 
Intellect  and  his  Will,  we  are  in  presence  of  a  fact  whose 
significance  cannot  be  increased  by  a  million  of  other 
facts  analogous  in  kind. 

Yet  on  every  fresh  discovery  of  a  few  more  such  facts, 
there  is  generally  some  fresh  outbreak  of  old  delusions 
respecting  the  forms  and  the  Laws  of  Matter  as  the 
supreme  realities  of  the  world.  But  when  the  new  facts 
have  been  looked  at  a  little  longer,  it  is  always  seen  that 
they  take  their  place  with  others  which  have  been  long 
familiar,  and  the  eternal  problems  which  lie  behind  all 
natural  phenomena  are  seen  to  be  unaffected  and  un- 
changed. Like  the  most  distant  of  the  Fixed  Stars,  they 
have  no  parallax.  The  whole  orbit  of  human  knowledge 
shows  in  them  no  apparent  change  of  place.  No 

I 


114  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

amount  of  knowledge  of  the  kind  which  alone  physical 
Science  can  impart  can  do  more  than  widen  the  founda- 
tion of  intelligent  spiritual  beliefs.  We  think  that 
Astronomy  and  Geology  have  given  to  us  in  these  latter 
days  ideas  wholly  new  in  respect  to  Space  and  Time. 
Yet,  after  all,  can  we  express  those  ideas,  or  can  we  in- 
dicate the  questions  they  suggest,  in  any  language  which 
approaches  in  power  to  the  majestic  utterances  of  David 
and  of  Job  ?  We  know  more  than  they  knew  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  Heavenly  Bodies  ;  but  what  more  can 
we  say  than  they  said  of  the  wonder  of  them, — of 
Orion,  of  Arcturus,  and  the  Pleiades  P1  We  know  that 
the  earth  moves,  which  they  did  not  know ;  and  we  know 
that  the  rapid  rotation  of  a  globe  on  its  own  axis  is  a 
means  of  maintaining  the  steadiness  of  that  axis  in  its 
course  through  Space.  But  what  effect,  except  that  of 
increasing  its  significance,  has  this  knowledge  upon  the 
praise  which  David  ascribes  to  that  ultimate  Agency 
which  has  made  the  round  world  so  sure  "  that  it  cannot 
be  moved?"2 

And  so  of  other  departments  of  Science.  Even  the 
modern  idea  of  Law,  of  the  constancy  and  therefore  the 
trustworthiness  of  Natural  Forces,  has  been  known,  not 
indeed  scientifically  but  instinctively,  to  Man  since  first 

1  Job  ix.  9.  *  Ps.  xciii.  I. 


LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  1 15 

he  made  a  Tool,  and  used  it  as  the  instrument  of  Pur- 
pose. What  has  Science  added  to  this  idea,  except  that 
the  same  rule  prevails  as  widely  as  the  Universe,  and  is 
made  subservient  in  a  like  manner  to  Knowledge  and  to 
Will  ?  In  the  enthusiasm  awakened  by  the  discovery  of 
some  new  facts,  or  of  some  new  forces,  and  in  the 
freshness  with  which  they  impress  the  idea  of  such 
agencies  on  our  minds,  we  sometimes  very  naturally 
exaggerate  the  length  of  way  along  which  they  carry  us 
towards  the  great  ultimate  objects  of  intellectual  desire. 
We  forget  altogether  that  the  knowledge  they  convey  is 
in  quality  and  in  kind  identical  with  knowledge  already 
long  in  our  possession,  and  places  us  in  no  new  relation 
whatever  to  the  vast  background  of  the  Eternal  and 
the  Unseen.  Thus  it  is  that  the  notions  of  Materialism 
are  perpetually  reviving,  and  are  again  being  perpetually 
swept  away — swept  away  partly  before  the  Intuitions  of 
the  Mind,  partly  before  the  Conclusions  of  the  Reason. 
For  there  are  two  great  enemies  to  Materialism,— one 
rooted  in  the  Affections,  the  other  in  the  Intellect.  One 
is  the  power  of  THINGS  HOPED  FOR — a  power  which 
never  dies :  the  other  is  the  evidence  of  THINGS  NOT 
SEEN — and  this  evidence  abounds  in  all  we  see.  In 
reinforcing  this  evidence,  and  in  adding  to  it,  Science  is 
doing  boundless  work  in  the  present  day.  It  is  not  the 
extent  of  our  knowledge,  but  rather  the  limits  of  it,  that 
1  a 


Il6  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

physical  research  teaches  us  to  see  and  feel  the  most. 
Of  course,  in  so  far  as  its  discoveries  are  really  true,  its 
influence  must  be  for  good.  To  doubt  this  were  to  doubt 
that  all  truth  is  true,  and  that  all  truth  is  God's. 

There  are  eddies  in  every  stream — eddies  where  rub- 
bish will  collect,  and  circle  for  a  time.  But  the  ultimate 
bearing  of  scientific  truth  cannot  be  mistaken.  Nothing 
is  more  remarkable  "in  the  present  state  of  physical 
research,  than  what  may  be  called  the  transcendental 
character  of  its  results.  And  what  is  transcendentalism 
but  the  tendency  to  trace  up  all  things  to  the  relation  in 
which  they  stand  to  abstract  Ideas  ?  And  what  is  this 
but  to  bring  all  physical  phenomena  nearer  and  nearer 
into  relation  with  the  phenomena  of  Mind?  The  old 
speculations  of  Philosophy  which  cut  the  ground  from 
Materialism  by  showing  how  little  we  know  of  Matter, 
are  now  being  daily  reinforced  by  the  subtle  analysis 
of  the  Physiologist,  the  Chemist,  and  the  Electrician. 
Under  that  analysis  Matter  dissolves  and  disappears, 
surviving  only  as  the  phenomena  of  Force ;  which  again 
is  seen  converging  along  all  its  line's  to  some  common 
centre — "sloping  through  darkness  up  to  God."1 

Even  the  writers  who  have  incurred  most  reasonable 
suspicion  as  to  the  drift  of  their  teaching,  give  neverthe- 

*  Tennyson's  "In  Memoriam." 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  117 

less  constant  witness  to  what  may  be  called  the  purely 
mental  quality  of  the  ultimate  results  of  physical  inquiry. 
It  has  been  said  with  perfect  truth  that  "  the  fundamental 
ideas  of  modern  Science  are  as  transcendental  as  any  of 
the  axioms  in  ancient  philosophy.1  We  have  seen  that 
one  of  the  senses  in  which  Law  is  habitually  used  is  to 
designate  abstract  ideas  and  doctrines  of  this  kind.  So 
far  from  these  doctrines  and  ideas  Having  a  tendency  to 
Materialism,  they  serve  rather  to  bring  inside  the  strict 
domain  of  Science  ideas  which  in  the  earlier  stages  of 
human  knowledge  lay  wholly  within  the  region  of  Faith 
or  of  Belief.  For  example,  the  writer  of  the  Epistle  to 
the  Hebrews  specially  declares  that  it  is  by  Faith  that 
we  understand  "  that  the  things  which  are  seen  were  not 
made  of  the  things  which  do  appear."  Yet  this  is  now 
one  of  the  most  assured  doctrines  of  Science, — that 
invisible  Forces  are  behind  and  above  all  visible  pheno- 
mena, moulding  them  in  forms  of  infinite  variety,  of  all 
which  forms  the  only  real  knowledge  we  possess  lies  in 
our  perception  of  the  Ideas  they  express — of  their  beauty, 
or  of  their  fitness, — in  short,  of  their  being  all  the  work 
of  "  Toil  co-operant  to  an  End." 

Every  natural  Force  which  we   call  a  law  is  itself 
invisible — the  idea  of  it  in  the  mind  arising  by  way  of 

l  Lewes  s  "  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,"  p.  66. 


Il8  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

necessary  inference  out  of  an  observed  Order  of  facts. 
And  very  often,  if  not  always,  in  our  conception  of  these 
Forces,  we  are  investing  them  with  the  attributes  of 
Intelligence  and  of  Will  at  the  very  moment,  perhaps, 
when  we  are  stumbling  over  the  difficulty  of  seeing  in 
them  the  exponents  of  a  Mind  which  is  intelligent  and 
of  a  Will  which  is  Supreme.  The  deeper  we  go  in 
Science,  the  more  certain  it  becomes  that  all  the  realities 
of  Nature  are  in  the  region  of  the  Invisible,  so  that  the 
saying  is  literally,  and  not  merely  figuratively  true,  that 
the  things  which  are  seen  are  temporal,  and  it  is  only 
the  things  which  are  not  seen  that  are  eternal.  For 
example,  we  never  see  the  phenomena  of  Life  dis- 
sociated from  Organisation.  Yet  the  profoundest  physi- 
ologists have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Organisation 
is  not  the  cause  of  Life,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  Life 
is  the  cause  of  Organisation, — Life  being  something — a 
Force  of  some  kind,  by  whatever  name  we  may  call 
it — which  precedes  Organisation,  and  fashions  it,  and 
builds  it  up.  This  was  the  conclusion  come  to  by  the 
great  anatomist  Hunter,  and  it  is  the  conclusion  en- 
dorsed in  our  own  day  by  such  men  as  Dr.  Carpenter 
and  Professor  Huxley, — men  neither  of  whom  have 
exhibited  in  their  philosophy  any  undue  bias  towards 
either  theological  or  metaphysical  explanations.  One 
illustration  referred  to  by  these  writers  is  derived  from 


LAW; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  1 19 


the  shells — the  beautiful  shells — of  the  animals  called 
the  "  Foraminifera."  x  No  Forms  in  Nature  are  more 
exquisite.  Yet  they  are  the  work  and  the  abode  of 
animals  which  are  mere  blobs  of  jelly — without  parts, 
without  organs — absolutely  without  visible  structure  of 
any  kind.  In  this  jelly,  nevertheless,  there  works  a 
"  vital  Force "  capable  of  building  up  an  Organism  of 
most  complicated  and  perfect  symmetry. 

But  what  is  a  vital  Force  ?  It  is  something  which  we 
cannot  see,  but  of  whose  existence  we  are  as  certain 
as  we  are  of  its  visible  effects — nay,  which  our  reason 
tells  us  precedes  and  is  superior  to  these.  We  often 
speak  of  Material  Forces  as  if  we  could  identify  any 
kind  of  Force  with  Matter.  But  this  is  only  one  of 
the  many  ambiguities  of  language.  All  that  we  mean 
by  a  Material  Force  is  a  force  which  acts  upon  Matter, 
and  produces  in  Matter  its  own  appropriate  effects.  We 
must  go  a  step  further  therefore  and  ask  ourselves,  What 
is  Force  ?  What  is  our  conception  of  it  ?  What  idea 
can  we  form,  for  example,  of  the  real  nature  of  that 
Force,  the  measure  of  whose  operation  has  been  so 
exactly  ascertained — the  Force  of  Gravitation?  It  is 
.  invisible — imponderable — all  our  words  for  it  are  but 
circumlocutions  to  express  its  phenomena  or  effects. 

1  "The   Elements   of   Comparative  Anatomy,"   (Huxley,)   pp. 

JO,    II. 


I2O  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

There  are  many  kinds  of  force  in  Nature— which 
we  distinguish  after  the  same  fashion — according  to 
their  effects  or  according  to  the  forms  of  Matter  in 
which  they  become  cognisable  to  us.  But  if  we  trace 
all  our  conceptions  on  the  nature  of  Force  to  their 
fountain-head,  we  shall  find  that  they  are  formed  on 
our  own  consciousness  of  Living  Effort — of  that  force 
which  has  its  seat  in  our  own  vitality,  and  especially 
on  that  kind  of  it  which  can  be  called  forth  at  the 
bidding  of  the  Will.  In  saying  this  I  do  not  mean  to 
borrow  from  that  false  philosophy  which  pretends  by  the 
exercise  of  reason  to  get  behind  all  the  intuitive  convic- 
tions on  which  reason  rests.  It  is  in  this  way  that  men 
have  come  to  argue  on  what  they  call  the  "  reality  of 
an  external  world."  Even  if  there  were  no  process  of 
reasoning  capable  of  defending  that  reality,  this  would 
not  lend  a  reasonable  character  to  doubts  regarding  it. 
Reason  must  start  from  some  postulate — some  primary 
truths  which  cannot  be  denied.  But  we  need  not  assume 
the  reality  of  an  external  world  to  be  one  of  these. 
Yet  if  it  be  not  a  first  step,  it  is  a  second  step  hardly 
distinguishable  from  the  first.  Self-existence  is  of  course 
the  truth  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  first  of  all,  but 
in  the  very  idea  of  Self  the  existence  of  that  which  is 
Not-Self  is  necessarily  involved.  In  connecting,  how- 
ever, our  conceptions  of  Force  with  the  consciousness 


LAW; — ITS   DEFINITIONS-  121 

of  Living  Effort  in  ourselves,  we  must  guard  against  mis- 
taking analogy  for  identity,  and  against  confounding 
together  two  items  of  knowledge  which  are  quite  distinct. 
Correlative  with  the  consciousness  of  Living  Effort  in 
ourselves,  and  inseparable  from  it,  there  is  the  con- 
sciousness of  Force  acting  on  us,  as  well  as  acting 
in  us.  And  this  argument  applies  equally  whether 
Self  be  regarded  as  a  perceiving  Mind,  or  as  a  physical 
Organism  through  which  Mind  perceives.  %  Thus  the 
knowledge  of  an  external  world — that  is  to  say,  the 
knowledge  of  external  Force— stands  side  by  side  with 
the  knowledge  of  Self.  Nothing  can  be  known  except 
as  distinguished  from  other  things ;  and  all  things  which 
are  distinguishable  from  each  other,  are,  in  a  sense,  and 
in  the  measure  of  that  distinction,  known.  And  so  we 
know  the  existence  both  of  internal  and  of  external 
Force.  But  if  we  come  to  ask  ourselves  farther  ques- 
tions, as  to  the  nature  and  seat  of  Material  Force,  we  can 
only  think  of  it  in  the  terms  of  the  Vital  Force  exerted 
by  ourselves.  If  we  can  ever  know  anything  of  the 
nature  of  any  Force,  it  ought  to  be  of  this  one.  And 
yet  the  fact  is  that  we  know  nothing.  If,  then,  we 
know  nothing  of  that  kind  of  Force  which  is  so  near 
to  us,  and  with  which  our  own  Intelligence  is  in  such 
close  alliance,  much  less  can  we  know  the  ultimate 
nature  of  Force  in  its  other  forms. 


122  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW, 

It  is  important  to  dwell  on  this,  because  both  the 
aversion  with  which  some  men  regard  the  idea  of  the 
Reign  of  Law,  and  the  triumph  with  which  some  others 
hail  it,  are  founded  on  a  notion  that,  when  we  have 
traced  any  given  phenomena  to  what  are  called  Natural 
Forces,  we  have  traced  them  farther  than  we  really  have. 
We  know  nothing  of  the  ultimate  nature,  or  of  the  ulti- 
mate seat  of  Force.  Science,  in  the  modern  doctrine  of 
the  Conservation  of  Energy,  and  the  Convertibility  of 
Forces,  is  already  getting  something  like  a  firm  hold  of 
the  idea  that  all  kinds  of  Force  are  but  forms  or  mani- 
festations of  some  one  Central  Force  issuing  from  some 
one  Fountain-head  of  Power.  Sir  John  Herschel  has 
not  hesitated  to  say,  that  "  it  is  but  reasonable  to  regard 
the  Force  of  Gravitation  as  the  direct  or  indirect  result 
of  a  Consciousness  or  a  Will  existing  somewhere." l 
And  even  if  we  cannot  certainly  identify  Force  in  all  its 
forms  with  the  direct  energies  of  One  Omnipresent  and 
all  pervading  Will,  it  is  at  least  in  the  highest  degree 
unphilosophical  to  assume  the  contrary— to  speak  or  to 
think  as  if  the  Forces  of  Nature  were  either  independent 
of,  or  even  separate  from,  the  Creator's  Power. 

It  follows,  then,  from  these  considerations,  that  what- 
ever difficulty  there  may  be  in  conceiving  of  a  Will 
not  exercised  by  a  visible  Person,  it  is  a  difficulty  which 
l  «'  Outlines  of  Astronomy,"  5th  edition,  p.  291. 


LAW  j — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  1 23 

cannot  be  evaded  by  arresting  our  conceptions  at  the 
point  at  which  they  have  arrived  in  forming  the  idea 
of  Laws  or  Forces.  That  idea  is  itself  made  up  out 
of  elements  derived  from  our  own  consciousness  of 
Personality.  This  fact  is  seen  by  men  who  do  not 
see  the  interpretation  of  it.  They  denounce  as  a  super- 
stition the  idea  of  any  Personal  Will  separable  from 
the  Forces  which  work  in  Nature.  They  say  that  this 
idea  is  a  mere  projection  of  our  own  Personality  into 
the  world  beyond — the  shadow  of  our  own  Form  cast 
upon  the  ground  on  which  we  look.  And  indeed  this, 
in  a  sense,  is  true.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  Mind 
does  recognise  in  Nature  a  reflection  of  itself.  But  if 
this  be  a  deception,  it  is  a  deception  which  is  not 
avoided  by  transferring  the  idea  of  Personality  to  the 
abstract  Idea  of  Force,  or  by  investing  combinations  of 
Force  with  the  attributes  of  Mind. 

We  need  not  be  jealous,  then,  when  new  domains 
are  claimed  as  under  the  Reign  of  Law — an  agency 
through  which  we  see  working  everywhere  some  Pur- 
pose of  the  Everlasting  Will.  There  are  many  things 
in  Nature  of  which  we  do  not  see  the  reason  ;  and 
many  other  things  of  which  we  cannot  find  out  the 
cause;  but  there  are  none  from  which  we  exclude  the 
idea  of  Purpose  by  success  in  discovering  the  cause.  It 
has  been  said,  with  perfect  truth,  by  a  living  naturalist 


124  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

who  is  of  all  others  most  opposed  to  what  he  calls 
Theological  explanations  in  Science,  that  we  may  just 
as  well  speak  of  a  watch  as  the  abode  of  a  "  watch- 
force,"  as  speak  of  the  organisation  of  an  animal  as 
the  abode  of  a  "vital  Force."1  The  analogy  is  precise 
and  accurate.  The  Forces  by  which  a  watch  moves  are 
natural  Forces.  It  is  the  relation  of  interdependence 
in  which  those  Forces  are  placed  to  each  other,  or, 
in  other  words,  the  adjustment  of  them  to  a  par- 
ticular Purpose,  which  constitutes  the  "  watch-force ;" 
and  the  seat  of  this  Force — which  is  in  fact  no  one 
Force,  but  a  combination  of  many  Forces — is  in  the 
Intelligence  which  conceived  that  combination,  and  in 
the  Will  which  gave  it  effect.  The  mechanisms  devised 
by  Man  are  in  this  respect  only  an  image  of  the  more 
perfect  mechanism  of  Nature,  in  which  the  same  prin 
ciple  of  Adjustment  is  always  the  highest  result  which 
Science  can  ascertain  or  recognise.  There  is  this  differ- 
ence, indeed, — that  in  regard  to  our  works  we  see  that 
our  knowledge  of  natural  laws  is  very  imperfect,  and 
our  control  over  them  is  very  feeble  ;  whereas  in  the 
machinery  of  Nature  there  is  evidence  of  complete 
knowledge  and  of  absolute  control.  The  universal  rule 
is,  that  everything  is  brought  about  by  way  of  Na.ural 

X  Lewes's  "  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,"  p.  87. 


j  -  ITS    DEFINITIONS. 


Consequence.  But  another  rule  is,  that  all  natural 
consequences  meet  and  fit  into  each  other  in  endless 
circles  of  Harmony  and  of  Purpose.  And  this  can  only 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  what  we  call  Natural 
Consequence  is  always  the  conjoint  effect  of  an  infinite 
number  of  elementary  Forces,  whose  action  and  re- 
action are  under  direction  of  the  Will  which  we  see 
obeyed,  and  of  the  Purposes  which  we  see  actually 
attained. 

It  is,  indeed,  the  completeness  of  the  analogy  between 
our  own  works  on  a  small  scale,  and  the  works  of  the 
Creator  on  an  infinitely  large  scale,  which  is  the  greatest 
mystery  of  all.  Man  is  under  constraint  to  adopt  the 
principle  of  Adjustment,  because  the  Forces  of  Nature 
are  external  to  and  independent  of  his  Will.  They 
may  be  managed,  but  they  cannot  be  disobeyed.  It 
is  impossible  to  suppose  that  they  stand  in  the  same 
relation  to  the  Will  of  the  Supreme  ;  yet  it  seems  as 
if  He  took  the  same  method  of  dealing  with  them 
—  never  violating  them,  never  breaking  them,  but 
always  ruling  them  by  that  which  we  call  Adjustment 
or  Contrivance.  Nothing  gives  us  such  an  idea  of 
the  immutability  of  Laws  as  this  !  nor  does  anything 
give  us  such  an  idea  of  their  pliability  to  use.  How 
imperious  they  are,  yet  how  submissive  J  How  they 
reign,  yet  how  they  serve  ! 


CHAPTER  IIL 

CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY  ARISING    OUT   OF  THE    REIGN 
OF   LAW — EXAMPLE   IN   THE   MACHINERY  OF   FLIGHT. 

'"  I  ^HE  necessity  of  Contrivance  for  the  accomplish- 
-*-  ment  of  Purpose  arises  out  of  the  immutability 
of  Natural  Forces.  They  must  be  conformed  to,  and 
obeyed.  Therefore,  where  they  do  not  serve  our  purpose 
directly,  they  can  only  be  made  to  serve  it  by  ingenuity 
and  contrivance.  This  necessity,  then,  may  be  said  to 
be  the  index  and  the,  measure  of  the  power  of  Law. 
And  so,  on  the  other  hand,  the  certainty  with  which 
Purpose  can  be  accomplished  by  Contrivance,  is  the 
index  and  the  measure  of  mental  knowledge  and  re- 
source. It  is  by  wisdom  and  knowledge  that  the  Forces 
of  Nature — even  those  which  may  seem  most  adverse — 
are  yoked  to  service.  This  idea  of  the  relation  in  which 
Law  stands  to  Will,  and  in  which  Will  stands  to  Law,  is 
familiar  to  us  in  the  works  of  Man  :  but  it  is  less  familiar 
to  us  as  equally  holding  good  in  the  works  of  Nature. 
We  feel,  sometimes,  as  if  it  were  an  unworthy  notion  of 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  1 27 

the  Will  which  works  in  Nature,  to  suppose  that  it 
should  never  act  except  through  the  use  of  means.  But 
our  notions  of  unworthiness  are  themselves  often  the 
un worthiest  of  all.  They  must  be  ruled  and  disciplined 
by  observation  of  that  which  is, — not  founded  on  d 
priori  conceptions  of  what  ought  to  be.  Nothing  is 
more  certain  than  that  the  whole  Order  of  Nature  is  one 
vast  system  of  Contrivance.  And  what  is  Contrivance 
but  that  kind  of  arrangement  by  which  the  unchangeable 
demands  of  Law  are  met  and  satisfied  ?  It  may  be  that 
all  natural  Forces  are  resolvable  into  some  One  Force ; 
and  indeed  in  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  Correlation  of 
Forces,  an  idea  which  is  a  near  approach  to  this,  has 
already  entered  the  domain  of  Science.  It  may  also  be 
that  this  One  Force,  into  which  all  others  return  again,  is 
itself  but  a  mode  of  action  of  the  Divine  Will.  But  we 
have  no  instrjments  whereby  to  reach  this  last  analysis. 
Whatever  the  ultimate  relation  may  be  between  mental 
and  material  Force,  we  can  at  least  see  clearly  this, — that 
in  Nature  there  is  the  most  elaborate  machinery  to 
accomplish  Purpose  through  the  instrumentality  of 
means.  It  seems  as  if  all  that  is  done  in  Nature  as  well 
as  all  that  is  done  in  art,  were  done  by  knowing  how  to 
do  it.  It  is  curious  how  the  language  of  the  great  Seerg 
of  the  Old  Testament  corresponds  with  this  idea.  They 
uniformly  ascribe  all  the  operations  of  Nature— the 


128  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

greatest  and  the  smallest — to  the  working  of  Divine 
Power.  But  they  never  revolt — as  so  many  do  in  these 
weaker  days — from  the  idea  of  this  Power  working  by 
wisdom  and  knowledge  in  the  use  of  means ;  nor,  in  this 
point  of  view,  do  they  ever  separate  between  the  work 
of  first  Creation,  and  the  work  which  is  going  on  daily  in 
the  existing  world.  Exactly  the  same  language  is  applied 
to  the  rarest  exertions  of  power,  and  to  the  gentlest  and 
most  constant  of  all  natural  operations.  Thus  the  saying 
that  "  The  Lord  by  wisdom  hath  founded  the  Earth  ;  by 
understanding  hath  He  established  the  Heavens," — is 
coupled  in  the  same  breath  with  this  other  saying,  "  By 
His  knowledge  the  depths  are  broken  up,  and  the  clouds 
drop  down  the  dew."1 

Every  instance  of  Contrivance  which  we  can  thoroughly 
follow  and  understand,  has  an  intense  interest — as  cast- 
ing light  upon  this  method  of  the  Divine  government, 
and  upon  the  analogy  between  the  operations  of  our 
own  minds  and  the  operations  of  the  Creator.  Some 
instances  will  strike  us  more  than  others — and  those 
will  strike  us  most  which  stand  in  some  near  comparison 
with  our  own  human  efforts  of  ingenuity  and  contrivance. 
There  is  one  such  instance  which  I  propose  to  consider 
in  this  chapter — the  machinery  by  which  a  great  pur- 

*  Frov.  iii.  19,  20. 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  I2g 

pose  has  been  accomplished  in  Nature — a.  purpose 
which  Man  has  never  been  able  to  accomplish  in  art, 
and  that  is  the  Navigation  of  the  Air.  No  more  beau- 
tiful example  can  be  found,  even  in  the  wide  and  rich 
domain  of  Animal  Mechanics — none  in  which  we  can 
trace  more  clearly,  too,  the  mode  and  method  in  which 
laws  the  most  rigorous  and  exact  are  used  as  the  supple 
instruments  of  Purpose. 

"The  way  of  an  Eagle  in  the  air"  was  one  of  the 
things  of  which  Solomon  said,  that  "he  knew  it  not." 
No  wonder  that  the  Wise  King  reckoned  it  among  the 
great  mysteries  of  Nature !  The  Force  of  Gravitation, 
though  its  exact  measure  was  not  ascertained  till  the 
days  of  Newton,  has  been  the  most  familiar  of  all  Forces 
in  all  ages  of  Mankind.  How,  then,  in  violation  of  its 
known  effects,  could  heavy  bodies  be  supported  upon 
the  thin  air — and  be  gifted  with  the  power  of  sustaining 
and  directing  movements  more  easy,  more  rapid,  and 
more  certain  than  the  movements  of  other  animals  upon 
the  firm  and  solid  earth  ?  No  animal  motion  in  Nature 
is  so  striking  or  so  beautiful  as  the 

"  Scythe-like  sweep  of  wings,  that  dare 
The  headlong  plunge  through  eddying  gulfs  of  air." l 

Nor  will    the   wonder    cease   when,   so   far   as    the 

1  Longfellow's  "  Wayside  Inn — Ser  Federigo," 
K 


130  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

mechanical  problem  is  concerned,  the  mystery  of  flight 
is  solved.  If  we  wish  to  see  how  material  laws  can 
be  bent  to  purpose,  we  shall  study  this  problem. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  remarkable  that  the  Force  which 
seems  so  adverse — the  Force  of  Gravitation  drawing 
down  all  bodies  to  the  earth — is  the  very  Force  which 
is  the  principal  one  concerned  in  flight,  and  without 
which  flight  would  be  impossible.  It  is  curious  how 
completely  this  has  been  forgotten  in  almost  all  human 
attempts  to  navigate  the  air.  Birds  are  not  lighter  than 
the  air,  but  immensely  heavier.  If  they  were  lighter 
than  the  air  they  might  float,  but  they  could  not  fly. 
This  is  the  difference  between  a  Bird  and  a  Balloon.  A 
Balloon  rises  because  it  is  lighter  than  the  air,  and  floats 
upon  it.  Consequently,  it  is  incapable  of  being  directed, 
because  it  possesses  in  itself  no  active  Force  enabling 
it  to  resist  the  currents  of  the  air  in  which  it  is  im- 
mersed, and  because,  if  it  had  such  a  force,  it  would  have 
no  fulcrum,  or  resisting  medium  against  which  to  exert 
it  It  becomes,  as  it  were,  part  of  the  atmosphere,  and 
must  go  with  it  where  it  goes.  No  Bird  is  ever  for  an 
instant  of  time  lighter  than  the  air  in  which  it  flies  :  but 
being,  on  the  contrary,  always  greatly  heavier,  it  keeps 
possession  of  a  Force  capable  of  supplying  momentum, 
and  therefore  capable  of  overcoming  any  lesser  Force, 
such  as  the  ordinary  resistance  of  the  atmosphere,  arid 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY. 


even  of  heavy  gales  of  wind.  The  Law  of  Gravitation, 
therefore,  is  used  in  the  flight  of  Birds  as  one  of  the 
most  essential  of  the  Forces  which  are  available  for  the 
accomplishment  of  the  end  in  view. 

The  next  law  appealed  to,  and  pressed  into  the  ser- 
vice, is  again  a  law  which  would  seem  an  impediment  in 
the  way.  This  is  the  resisting  force  of  the  atmosphere 
in  opposing  any  body  moving  through  it.  In  this 
force  an  agent  is  sought  and  found  for  supplying  the 
requisite  balance  to  the  Force  of  Gravity.  But  in  order 
that  the  resisting  force  of  air  should  be  effectual  for  this 
purpose,  it  must  be  used  under  very  peculiar  conditions. 
The  resisting  force  of  fluids,  and  of  airs  or  gases,  is  a 
force  acting  equally  in  all  directions,  unless  special 
means  are  taken  to  give  it  predominant  action  in  some 
special  direction.  If  it  is  a  force  strong  enough  to  pre- 
vent a  body  from  falling,  it  is  also  a  force  strong  enough 
to  prevent  it  from  advancing.  In  order,  therefore,  to 
solve  the  problem  of  flight,  the  resisting  power  of  the 
air  must  be  called  into  action  as  strongly  as  possible 
in  the  direction  opposite  to  the  Force  of  Gravity,  and 
as  little  as  possible  in  any  other.  Consequently  a  body 
capable  of  flight  must  present  its  maximum  of  surface  to 
the  resistance  of  the  air  in  the  perpendicular  direction, 
and  its  minimum  of  surface  in  the  horizontal  direction. 
Now,  both  these  conditions  are  satisfied  (i)  by  the  great 

K  2 


132  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

breadth  or  length  of  surface  presented  to  the  air  perpen- 
dicularly in  a  Bird's  expanded  wings,  and  by  (2)  the 
narrow  lines  presented  in  its  shape  horizontally,  when 
in  the  act  of  forward  motion  through  the  air.  But  some- 
thing more  yet  is  required  for  flight.  Great  as  the  resist- 
ing force  of  air  is,  it  is  not  strong  enough  to  balance 
the  Force  of  Gravity  by  its  mere  pressure  on  an  ex- 
panded wing — unless  that  pressure  is  increased  by  an 
appeal  to  yet  other  laws — and  other  properties  of  its 
nature.  Every  sportsman  must  have  seen  cases  in  which 
a  flying  Bird  has  been  so  wounded  as  to  produce  a  rigid 
expansion  of  the  wings.  This  does  not  prevent  the  Bird 
from  falling,  although  it  breaks  the  fall,  and  makes  it 
come  more  or  less  gently  to  the  ground. 

Yet  further,  therefore,  to  accomplish  flight,  another 
law  must  be  appealed  to,  and  that  is  the  immense  elas- 
ticity of  the  air,  and  the  reacting  force  it  exerts  against 
compression.  To  enable  an  animal  heavier  than  the  air 
to  support  itself  against  the  Force  of  Gravity,  it  must  be 
enabled  to  strike  the  air  downwards  with  such  force  as 
to  occasion  a  rebound  upwards  of  corresponding  power. 
The  wing  of  a  flying  animal  must,  therefore,  do  some- 
thing more  than  barely  balance  Gravity.  It  must  be  able 
to  strike  the  air  with  such  violence  as  to  call  forth  a 
reaction  equally  violent,  and  in  the  opposite  direction. 
This  is  the  function  assigned  to  the  powerful  muscles  by 


CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY.  133 

which  the  wings  of  Birds  are  flapped  with  such  velocity 
and  strength.  We  need  not  follow  this  part  of  the  pro- 
blem further,  because  it  does  not  differ  in  kind  from  the 
muscular  action  of  other  animals.  The  connexion,  in- 
deed, between  the  Wills  of  animals  and  the  mechanism 
of  their  frame,  is  the  last  and  highest  problem  of  all  in 
the  mechanics  of  Nature ;  but  it  is  merged  and  hid  for 
ever  in  the  one  great  mystery  of  Life.  But  so  far  as  this 
difficulty  is  concerned,  the  action  of  an  Eagle's  wing  is 
not  more  mysterious  than  the  action  of  a  Man's  arm. 
There  is  a  greater  concentration  of  muscular  power  in 
the  organism  of  Birds  than  in  most  other  animal  frames  ; 
because  it  is  an  essential  part  of  the  problem  to  be 
solved  in  flight,  that  the  engine  which  works  the  wings 
should  be  very  strong,  very  compact,  of  a  special  form, 
and  that,  though  heavier  than  the  air,  it  should  not  have 
an  excessive  weight.  These  conditions  are  all  met  in 
the  power,  in  the  outline,  and  in  the  bulk  of  the  pectoral 
muscles  which  move  the  wings  of  Birds.  Few  persons 
have  any  idea  of  the  force  expended  in  the  action  of 
ordinary  flight.  The  pulsations  of  the  wing  in  most  Birds 
are  so  rapid  that  they  cannot  be  counted.  Even  the 
Heron  seldom  flaps  its  wings  at  a  rate  of  less  than  from 
120  to  150  strokes  in  a  minute.  This  is  counting  only 
the  downward  strokes,  preparatory  to  each  one  of  which 
there  must  be  an  upward  stroke  also  j  so  that  there  are 


134  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

from  240  to  300  separate  movements  per  minute.  Yet 
the  Heron  is  remarkable  for  its  slow  and  heavy  flight, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  believe,  until  one  has  timed  the 
pulsations  with  a  watch,  that  they  have  a  rapidity  ap- 
proaching to  two  in  a  second.  But  this  difficulty  is  an 
index  to  the  enormous  comparative  rapidity  of  the  faster- 
flying  Birds.  Let  any  one  try  to  count  the  pulsations  of 
the  wing  in  ordinary  flight  of  a  Pigeon,  or  of  a  Blackcock, 
or  of  a  Partridge,  or,  still  more,  of  any  of  the  diving  sea- 
fowl.  He  will  find  that  though,  in  the  case  of  most  of 
these  Birds,  the  quickness  of  sight  enables  him  to  see  the 
strokes  separate  from  each  other,  it  is  utterly  impossible 
to  count  them ;  whilst  in  some  Birds,  especially  in  the 
Divers,  as  well  as  in  the  Pheasant  and  Partridge  tribe, 
the  velocity  is  so  great  that  the  eye  cannot  follow  it  at 
all.  and  the  vibration  of  the  wings  leaves  only  a  blurred 
impression  on  the  eye. 

Oui  subject  here,  however,  is  not  so  much  the  amount 
of  vital  force  bestowed  on  Birds,  as  the  mechanical  laws 
which,  are  appealed  to  in  order  to  make  that  force  effec- 
tive in  the  accomplishment  of  flight.  The  elasticity  of 
the  air  is  the  law  which  offers  itself  for  the  counteraction 
of  gravity.  But,  in  order  to  make  it  available  for  this 
purpose,  there  must  be  some  great  force  of  downward 
blow  in  order  to  evoke  a  corresponding  rebound  in  the 
opposite,  or  upward  direction.  Now,  what  is  the  nature 


CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY.  135 

of  the  implement  required  for  striking  this  downward 
blow  ?  There  are  many  conditions  it  must  fulfil.  First, 
it  must  be  large  enough  in  area  to  compress  an  adequate 
volume  of  air;  next,  it  must  be  light  enough  in  sub- 
stance not  to  add  an  excess  of  weight  to  the  already 
heavy  body  of  the  Bird ;  next,  it  must  be  strong  enough 
in  frame  to  withstand  the  pressure  which  its  own  action 
on  the  air  creates.  The  first  of  these  conditions  is  met 
by  an  exact  adjustment  of  the  size  or  area  of  the  wing  to 
the  size  and  weight  of  the  Bird  which  it  is  to  lift.  The 
second  and  the  third  conditions  are  both  met  by  the 
provision  of  a  peculiar  substance,  feathers,  which  are 
very  light  and  very  strong;  whilst  the  only. heavy  parts  of 
the  framework,  namely,  the  bones  in  which  the  feathers 
are  inserted,  are  limited  to  a  very  small  part  of  the  area 
required. 

But  there  is  another  difficulty  to  be  overcome — a 
difficulty  opposed  by  natural  laws,  and  which  can  only 
be  met  by  another  adjustment,  if  possible  more  inge- 
nious and  beautiful  than  the  rest.  It  is  obvious  that  if 
a  Bird  is  to  support  itself  by  the  downward  blow  of  its 
wings  upon  the  air,  it  must  at  the  end  of  each  downward 
stroke  lift  the  wing  upwards  again,  so  as  to  be  ready  for 
the  next.  But  each  upward  stroke  is  in  danger  of  neu- 
tralising the  effect  of  the  downward  stroke.  It  must  be 
made  with  equal  velocity,  and  if  it  required  equal  force, 


136  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

it  must  produce  equal  resistance, — an  equal  rebound 
from  the  elasticity  of  the  air.  If  this  difficulty  were  not 
evaded  somehow,  flight  would  be  impossible.  But  it 
is  evaded  by  two  mechanical  contrivances,  which,  as  it 
were,  triumph  over  the  laws  of  aerial  resistance  by  con- 
forming to  them.  One  of  these  contrivances  is,  that 
the  upper  surface  of  the  wing  is  made  convex,  whilst 
the  under  surface  is  concave.  The  enormous  difference 
which  this  makes  in  atmospheric  resistance  is  familiarly 
known  to  us  by  the  difference  between  the  effect  of  the 
wind  on  an  umbrella  which  is  exposed  to  it  on  the 
under  or  the  upper  side.  The  air  which  is  struck  by  a 
concave  or  hollow  surface  is  gathered  up,  and  prevented 
from  escaping ;  whereas  the  air  struck  by  a  convex  or 
bulging  surface  escapes  readily  on  all  sides,  and  com- 
paratively little  pressure  or  resistance  is  produced.  And 
so,  from  the  convexity  of  the  upper  surface  of  a  Bird's 
wing,  the  upward  stroke  may  be  made  with  compara- 
tively trifling  injury  to  the  force  gained  in  the  downward 
blow. 

But  this  is  only  half  of  the  provision  made  against 
a  consequence  which  would  be  so  fatal  to  the  end  in 
view.  The  other  half  consists  in  this — that  the  feathers 
of  a  Bird's  wing  are  made  to  underlap  each  other,  so  that 
in  the  downward  stroke  the  pressure  of  the  air  closes 
them  upwards  against  each  other,  and  converts  the 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  137 

whole  series  of  them  into  one  connected  membrane, 
through  which  there  is  no  escape ;  whilst  in  the  upward 
stroke  the  same  pressure  has  precisely  the  reverse  effect 
— it  opens  the  feathers,  separates  them  from  each  other, 
and  converts  each  pair  of  feathers  into  a  self-acting 
valve,  through  which  the  air  rushes  at  every  point. 
Thus  the  same  implement  is  changed  in  the  fraction 
of  a  second  from  a  close  and  continuous  membrane 
which  is  impervious  to  the  air,  into  a  series  of  discon- 
nected joints  through  which  the  air  passes  without  the 
least  resistance — the  machine  being  so  adjusted  that 
when  pressure  is  required  the  maximum  of  pressure  is 
produced,  and,  when  pressure  is  to  be  avoided,  it  is 
avoided  in  spite  of  rapid  and  violent  action. 

This,  however,  exhausts  but  a  small  part  of  the  means 
by  which  Law  is  made  to  do  the  work  of  Will  in  the 
machinery  of  flight.  It  might  easily  be  that  violent  and 
rapid  blows,  struck  downwards  against  the  elastic  air, 
might  enable  animals  possessed  of  such  power  to  lift 
themselves  from  the  ground  and  nothing  more.  There 
is  a  common  toy  which  lifts  itself  in  this  manner  from 
the  force  exerted  by  the  air  in  resisting,  and  reacting 
upon  little  vanes  which  are  set  spinning  by  the  hand. 
But  the  toy  mounts  straight  up,  and  is  incapable  of 
horizontal  motion.  So,  there  are  many  structures  of 
wing  which  might  enable  animals  to  mount  into  the  air, 


138  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

but  which  would  not  enable  them  to  advance  or  to 
direct  their  flight.  How,  then,  is  this  essential  purpose 
gained?  Again  we  find  an  appeal  made  to  natural 
laws,  and  advantage  taken  of  their  certainty  and 
unchangeableness. 

The  power  of  forward  motion  is  given  to  Birds,  first 
by  the  direction  in  which  the  whole  wing  feathers  are 
set,  and  next  by  the  structure  given  to  each  feather  in 
itself.  The  wing  feathers  are  all  set  backwards, — that 
is,  in  the  direction  opposite  to  that  in  which  the  Bird 
moves;  whilst  each  feather  is  at  the  same  time  so  con- 
structed as  to  be  strong  and  rigid  toward  its  base,  and 
extremely  flexible  and  elastic  towards  its  end.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  front  of  the  wing,  along  the  greater  part 
of  its  length,  is  a  stiff  hard  edge,  wholly  unelastic  and 
unyielding  to  the  air.  The  anterior  and  posterior  webs 
of  each  feather  are  adjusted  on  the  same  principle.  The 
consequence  of  this  disposition  of  the  parts  as  a  whole, 
and  of  this  construction  of  each  of  the  parts,  is,  that  the 
air  which  is  struck  and  compressed  in  the  hollow  of  the 
wing,  being  unable  to  escape  through  the  wing,  owing  to 
the  closing  upwards  of  the  feathers  against  each  other, 
and  being  also  unable  to  escape  forwards  owing  to  the 
rigidity  of  the  bones  and  of  the  quills  in  that  direction, 
finds  its  easiest  escape  backwards.  In  passing  back- 
wards it  lifts  by  its  force  the  elastic  ends  of  the  feathers ; 


CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY.  139 

and  thus  whilst  effecting  this  escape,  in  obedience  to  the 
'law  of  action  and  reaction,  it  communicates,  in  its  pas- 
sage along  the  whole  line  of  both  wings,  a  corresponding 
push  forwards  to  the  body  of  the  Bird.  By  this  elaborate 
mechanical  contrivance  the  same  volume  of  air  is  made 
to  perform  the  double  duty  of  yielding  pressure  enough 
to  sustain  the  Bird's  weight  against  the  Force  of  Gravity, 
and  also  of  communicating  to  it  a  forward  impulse. 
The  Bird,  therefore,  has  nothing  to  do  but  to  repeat  with 
the  requisite  velocity  and  strength  its  perpendicular 
blows  upon  the  air,  and  by  virtue  of  the  structure  of  its 
wings  the  same  blow  both  sustains  and  propels  it.1 

The  truth  of  this  explanation  of  the  mechanical  theory 
of  flight  may  be  tested  in  various  ways.  In  the  first 
place  it  is  quite  visible  to  the  eye.  In  many  birds  flying 
straight  to  us,  or  straight  from  us,  the  effect  of  aerial 
resistance  in  bending  upwards  the  ends  of  the  quill 
feathers  is  very  conspicuous.  The  flight  of  the  common 
Rook  affords  an  excellent  example — where  the  Bird  is 
seen  foreshortened.  In  Eagles  the  same  effect  is  very 

1  The  upward  stroke  has  no  sustaining  power,  but  has  con? 
siderable  propelling  power ;  because  some  air,  failing  to  escape 
between  the  feathers,  must  always  pass  along  the  convex  surface  of 
the  wing,  and,  escaping  backwards,  must  exert  upon  the  ends  of  the 
quills  a  similar  reactive  force  to  that  which  is  exerted  in  the  down* 
ward  stroke. 


140  THE    REIGN   OF  LAW. 

marked — the  wing  tips  forming  a  sharp  upward  curve. 
I  have  seen  it  equally  obvious  in  that  splendid  Bird  the 
Gannet,  or  Solan  Goose ;  and  when  we  recollect  the 
great  weight  which  those  few  quill  feathers  are  thus  seen 
sustaining,  we  begin  to  appreciate  the  degree  in  which 
lightness,  strength,  and  imperviousness  to  the  passage  of 
air  are  combined  in  this  wonderful  implement  of  flight. 

But  perhaps  the  simplest  test  of  the  action  and  re- 
action of  the  air  and  the  wing  feathers  in  producing 
forward  motion  is  an  actual  experiment.  If  we  take 
in  the  hand  the  stretched  wing  of  a  Heron,  which  has 
been  dried  in  that  position,  and  strike  it  quickly  down- 
wards in  the  air,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  very  difficult 
indeed  to  maintain  the  perpendicular  direction  of  the 
stroke,  requiring,  in  fact,  much  force  to  do  so;  and 
that  if  we  do  not  apply  this  force,  the  hand  is  carried 
irresistibly  forward,  from  the  impetus  in  that  direction 
which  the  air  communicates  to  the  wing  in  its  escape 
backwards  from  the  blow. 

Another  test  is  one  of  reasoning  and  observation.  If 
the  explanation  now  given  be  correct,  it  must  follow 
that  since  no  Bird  can  flap  its  wings  in  any  other 
direction  than  the  vertical — i.e.  perpendicular  to  its 
own  axis  (which  is  ordinarily  horizontal) — and  as  this 
motion  has  been  shown  to  produce  necessarily  a  forward 
motion,  no  Bird  can  ever  fty  backwards.  Accordingly  no 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  14! 

Bird  ever  does  so — no  man  ever  saw  a  Bird,  even  for  an 
instant,  fly  tail  foremost.  A  Bird  can,  of  course,  allow 
itself  to  fall  backwards  by  merely  slowing  the  action 
of  its  wings  so  as  to  allow  its  weight  to  overcome 
their  sustaining  power;  and  this  motion  may  some- 
times give  the  appearance  of  flying  backwards, — as 
when  a  Swift  drops  backwards  from  the  eaves  of  a 
house,  or  when  a  Humming  Bird  allows  itself  to  drop 
in  like  manner  from  out  of  the  large  tubular  petals  of 
a  flower.  But  this  backward  motion  is  due  to  the  action 
of  gravity,  and  not  to  the  action  of  the  Bird's  wing. 
In  short,  it  is  falling  downwards,  not  flying  backwards. 
Nay,  more,  if  the  theory  of  flight  here  given  be  correct, 
it  must  equally  follow  that  even  standing  still,  which 
is  the  easiest  of  all  things  to  other  animals,  must  be 
very  difficult,  if  not  altogether  impossible,  to  a  Bird 
when  flying.  This  also  is  true  in  fact.  To  stand  still 
in  the  air  is  not  indeed  impossible  to  a  flying  Bird, 
for  reasons  to  be  presently  explained,  but  it  is  one  of 
the  most  difficult  feats  of  wingmanship, — a  feat  which 
many  Birds,  not  otherwise  clumsy,  can  never  perform 
at  all,  and  which  is  performed  only  by  special  exertion, 
and  generally  for  a  very  short  time,  by  those  Birds 
whose  structure  enables  tnem  to  be  adepts  in  their 
glorious  art. 

It  cannot   be   too  often  repeated — because  miscon* 


142  THE   kEION    OF   LAW. 

ception  on  this  point  has  been  the  cardinal  error  in 
human  attempts  to  navigate  the  air — that  in  all  the 
beautiful  evolutions  of  birds  upon  the  wing,  it  is  weight, 
and  not  buoyancy,  which  makes  those  evolutions  pos- 
sible. It  supplies  them,  so  to  speak,  with  a  store  of 
Force  which  is  constant,  inexhaustible,  inherent  in  the 
very  substance  of  themselves,  and  entirely  independent 
of  any  muscular  exertion.  All  they  have  to  do  is  to 
give  direction  to  that  internal  Force,  by  acting  on  the 
external  Force  of  aerial  currents,  through  the  contrac- 
tion and  expansion  of  the  implements  which  have  been 
given  them  for  that  purpose.  Those  who  have  watched 
the  flight  of  Birds  with  any  care,  must  have  observed 
that  when  once  they  have  attained  a  certain  initial 
velocity  and  a  certain  elevation,  by  rapid  and  repeated 
strokes  upon  the  air,  they  are  then  able  to  fly  with 
comparatively  little  exertion,  and  very  often  to  pursue 
their  course  for  long  distances  without  any  flapping 
whatever  of  the  wings.  The  contrast  between  the 
violent  efforts  required  for  the  first  acquisition  of  the 
initial  velocity,  and  the  perfect  ease  with  which  flight  is 
performed  after  it  has  been  acquired,  is  a  contrast 
described  by  Virgil  in  lines  of  incomparable  beauty  :— 

'*  Qunlis  spelunca  subito  commota  columba, 
Cui  domus  et  dulces  latebroso  in  pumice  nidi, 
Fertur  in  arva  volans,  plausumque  exterrita  pennis 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  143 

Dat  tecto  ingentem  ;  mox,  ae're  lapsa  quieto, 
Radit  iter  liquidum,  celeres  neque  commovet  alas." 

jEn.  lib.  v.  213-17. 

Still  more  remarkable,  as  showing  the  power  and  the 
value  of  weight  in  flight,  is  the  fact  that  Birds  are  able 
to  resume  rapid  and  easy  motion  not  only  as  the  result 
of  a  previously- acquired  momentum,  but  after  "  soaring" 
in  an  almost  perfectly  stationary  position.  Nothing,  for 
example,  is  more  common  than  to  see  Sea  Gulls,  and  some 
large  species  of  Hawks,  "  soaring  "  one  moment  (that  is, 
all  the  forces  bearing  on  the  Bird  brought  to  an  equi- 
librium, and  all  motion  brought  consequently  to  nearly 
a  perfect  standstill),  and  the  next  moment  sailing 
onwards  in  rapid  and  apparently  effortless  progression. 
Now,  how  is  this  effect  produced  ?  If  we  only  think 
of  it,  the  question  ought  rather  to  be,  How  is  it 
ever  prevented?  The  soaring  is  a  much  more  diffi- 
cult thing  to  do  than  the  going  onwards.  It  cannot 
be  done  at  all  in  a  perfectly  still  atmosphere.  It  can 
only  be  done  when  there  is  a  breeze  of  sufficient 
strength.  Gravity  is  ceaselessly  acting  on  the  Bird  to 
pull  it  downwards  :  and  downwards  it  must  go,  unless 
there  is  a  countervailing  Force  to  keep  it  up.  This 
force  is  the  force  of  the  breeze  striking  against  the 
vanes  of  the  wings.  But  in  order  to  bring  these  two 
forces  to  nearly  a  perfect  balance,  and  so  to  "soar," 


144  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

the  Bird  must  expand  or  contract  its  wings  exactly 
to  the  right  size,  and  hold  them  exactly  at  the  right 
angle.  The  slightest  alteration  in  either  of  these 
adjustments  produces  instantly  an  upsetting  of  the 
balance,  and  of  course  a  resulting  motion.  The  exact 
direction  of  that  motion  will  depend  on  the  degree  in 
which  the  wing  is  contracted,  and  the  degree  in  which 
its  angle  to  the  wind  is  changed.  If  the  wing  is  very 
much  contracted,  and  at  the  same  time  held  off  from 
the  wind,  that  motion  will  be  steeply  downwards.  Ac- 
cordingly this  is  the  action  of  a  Hawk  when  it 
swoops  upon  its  prey  from  a  great  height  above  it.  I 
have  seen  a  Merlin  dash  down  from  a  great  distance 
with  its  wings  so  closed  as  to  seem  almost  wholly 
folded.  The  Gannet  in  diving  for  fish  does  not  close 
its  wings  at  all,  but  turning  them  and  the  whole  axis 
of  its  body  into  the  perpendicular,  and  thus  allowing 
its  great  weight  to  act  without  any  counteraction,  dashes 
itself  into  the  sea  with  foam.  But  every  variety  of 
forward  motion  is  attained  by  different  degrees  of  con- 
traction and  exposure,  according  to  the  strength  of  the 
breeze  with  which  the  Bird  has  to  deal.  The  limit  of 
its  velocity  is  the  limit  of  its  momentum,  and  the  limit 
of  its  momentum  is  the  limit  of  its  weight  The  light- 
ness of  a  Bird  is  therefore  a  limit  to  its  velocity.  The 
heavier  a  Bird  is,  the  greater  is  its  possible  velocity 


CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY.  145 

of  flight — because  the  greater  is  the  store  of  Force — or 
to  use  the  language  of  modern  physics,  the  greater  is 
the  quantity  of  "  potential  energy  "  which,  with  proper 
implements  to  act  upon  aerial  resistance,  it  can  always 
convert  into  upward,  or  horizontal,  or  downward  motion, 
according  to  its  own  management  and  desires. 

It  will  be  at  once  seen  from  this  view  of  the  forces 
concerned  in  flight,  that  the  common  explanation  of 
Birds  being  assisted  by  air-cells  for  the  inhalation  and 
storage  of  heated  air,  must  not  only  be  erroneous,  but 
founded  on  wholly  false  conceptions  of  the  fundamental 
mechanical  principles  on  which  flight  depends.  If  a 
Bird  could  inhale  enough  warm  air  to  make  it  buoyant, 
its  power  of  flight  would  be  effectually  destroyed.  It 
would  become  as  light  as  a  Balloon,  and  consequently 
as  helpless.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  were  merely  to 
inflate  itself  with  a  small  quantity  of  hot  air  insufficient 
to  produce  buoyancy,  but  sufficient  to  increase  its  bulk, 
the  only  effect  would  be  to  expose  it  to  increased  resist- 
ance in  cleaving  the  air.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the 
bones  of  Birds  are  made  more  hollow  and  lighter  than 
the  bones  of  Mammals,  because  Birds,  though  requinng 
weight,  must  not  have  too  much  of  it.  It  is  true,  also, 
that  the  air  must  have  access  to  these  hollows,  else  they 
would  be  unable  to  resist  atmospheric  pressure.  But  it  is 
no  part  whatever  of  the  plan  or  intention  of  the  structure 

L 


146  THE  REIGN   OF   LAW. 

f  Birds,  or  of  any  part  of  that  structure,  to  afford  balloon- 
-;>ace  for  heated  air  with  a  view  to  buoyancy. 

And  here,  indeed,  we  open  up  a  new  branch  of  the 
same  inquiry,  showing,  in  new  aspects,  how  the  univer- 
sality and  unchangeableness  of  all  natural  laws  are 
essential  to  the  use  of  them  as  the  instruments  of  Will ; 
and  how  by  being  played  off  against  each  other  they  are 
made  to  express  every  shade  of  thought,  and  the  nicest 
change  of  purpose.  The  movement  of  all  flying  animals 
in  the  air  is  governed  and  determined  by  Forces  of  mus- 
cular power,  and  of  aerial  resistance  and  elasticity,  being 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  Force  of  Gravity,  whereby, 
according  to  the  universal  laws  of  motion,  a  direction  is 
given  to  the  animal  which  is  the  resultant,  or  compromise, 
between  all  the  Forces  so  employed.  Weight,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  one  of  these  Forces — absolutely  essential  to 
that  result,  and  no  flying  animal  can  ever  for  a  moment 
of  time  be  buoyant,  or  lighter  than  the  air  in  which  it  is 
designed  to  move.  But  it  is  obvious  that,  within  certain 
limits,  the  proportion  in  which  these  different  Forces  are 
balanced  against  each  other  admits  of  immense  variety. 
The  limits  of  variation  can  easily  be  specified.  Every 
flying  animal  must  have  muscular  power  great  enough  to 
work  its  own  size  of  wing  :  that  size  of  wing  must  be 
large  enough  to  act  upon  a  volume  of  air  sufficient  to  lift 
the  animal's  whole  weight :  lastly,  and  consequently,  the 


THE    SWIFT. 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  147 

weight  must  not  be  too  great,  or  dispersed  over  too  large 
a  bulk.  But  within  these  limits  there  is  room  for  great 
varieties  of  adjustments,  having  reference  to  correspond- 
ing varieties  of  purpose.  To  some  Birds  the  air  is  almost 
their  perpetual  home — the  only  region  in  which  they  find 
their  food — a  region  which  they  never  leave,  whether  in 
storm  or  sunshine,  except  during  the  hours  of  darkness, 
and  the  yearly  days  which  are  devoted  to  their  nests. 
Other  Birds  are  mainly  terrestrial,  and  never  betake 
themselves  to  flight  except  to  escape  an  enemy,  or  to 
follow  the  seasons  and  the  sun.  Between  these  ex- 
tremes there  is  every  possible  variety  of  habit.  And  all 
these  have  corresponding  varieties  of  structure.  The 
Birds  which  seek  their  food  in  the  air  have  long  and 
powerful  wings,  and  so  nice  an  adjustment  of  their 
weight  to  that  power  and  to  that  length,  that  the  faculty 
of  self-command  in  them  is  perfect,  and  their  power  of 
direction  so  accurate  that  they  can  pick  up  a  flying  gnat 
whilst  they  are  passing  through  the  air  at  the  rate  of 
more  than  a  hundred  miles  an  hour.  Such  especially  are 
the  powers  of  some  species  of  the  Swallow  tribe,  one  of 
which,  the  common  Swift,  is  a  creature  whose  wonderful 
and  unceasing  evolutions  seem  part  of  the  happiness 
of  summer  and  of  serene  and  lofty  skies.1 

1  For  the  form  of  the  wing  in  this  remarkable  bird,  see  the  beau- 
tiful  drawing  here  engraved  from  the  pencil  of  Mr.  Wolf. 

L  2 


148  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

There  are  other  Birds  in  which  the  wing  has  to  be 
adapted  to  the  double  purpose  of  swimming,  or  rather  of 
diving,  and  of  flight.  In  this  case,  a  large  area  of  wing 
must  be  dispensed  with,  because  it  would  be  incapable 
of  being  worked  under  water.  Consequently  in  all 
diving  Birds  the  wings  are  reduced  to  the  smallest  pos- 
sible size  which  is  consistent  with  retaining  the  power 
of  flight  at  all ;  and  in  a  few  extreme  Forms,  the  power 
of  flight  is  sacrificed  altogether,  and  the  wing  is  reduced 
to  the  size,  and  adapted  to  the  function,  of  a  powerful 
fin.  This  is  the  condition  of  the  Penguins.  But  in  most 
genera  of  swimming  Birds,  both  purposes  are  combined, 
and  the  wing  is  just  so  far  reduced  in  size  and  stiffened  in 
texture  as  to  make  it  workable  as  a  fin  under  water, 
whilst  it  is  still  just  large  enough  to  sustain  the  weight  of 
the  Bird  in  flight.  And  here  again  we  have  a  wonderful 
example  of  the  skill  with  which  inexorable  mechanical 
laws  are  subordinated  to  special  purpose.  It  is  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  area  of  the  wing  being  so  re- 
duced, in  proportion  to  the  size  of  the  Bird,  that  great 
muscular  power  must  be  used  in  working  it,  otherwise 
the  Force  of  Gravity  could  not  be  overcome  at  all.  It 
is  a  farther  consequence  of  this  proportion  of  weight  to 
working  power,  that  there  must  be  great  momentum  and 
therefore  great  velocity  of  flight.  Accordingly  this  is  the 
fact  with  all  the  oceanic  diving  Birds.  They  have  vast 


CONTRIVANCE    A   NECESSITY.  149 

distances  to  go,  following  shoals  of  fish,  and  moving 
from  their  summer  to  their  winter  haunts.  They  all  fly 
with  immense  velocity,  and  the  wing-strokes  are  ex- 
tremely rapid.  But  there  is  one  quality  which  their 
flight  does  not  possess — because  it  is  incompatible  with 
their  structure,  and  because  it  is  not  required  by  their 
habits — they  have  no  facility  in  evolutions,  no  delicate 
power  of  steering ;  they  cannot  stop  with  ease,  nor  can 
they  resume  their  onward  motion  in  a  moment.  They 
do  not  want  it  :  the  trackless  fields  of  ocean  over  which 
they  roam  are  broad,  and  there  are  no  obstructions  in 
the  way.  They  fly  in  straight  lines,  changing  their  direc- 
tion only  in  long  curves,  and  lighting  in  the  sea  almost 
with  a  tumble  and  a  splash.  Their  rising  again  is  a  work 
of  great  effort,  and  generally  they  have  to  eke  out  the 
resisting  power  of  their  small  wings,  not  only  by  the 
most  violent  exertion,  but  by  rising  against  the  wind, 
so  as  to  collect  its  force  as  a  help  and  addition  to 
their  own. 

And  now,  again,  we  may  see  all  these  conditions 
changed  where  there  is  a  change  in  the  purpose  to  be 
served.  There  is  another  large  class  of  oceanic  Birds 
whose  feeding  ground  is  not  under  water,  but  on  the 
surface  of  the  sea.  In  this  class  all  those  powers  of 
flight  which  would  be  useless  to  the  Divers  are  abso- 
lutely required,  and  are  given  in  the  highest  perfection,  by 


150  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

the  enlistment  of  the  same  mechanical  laws  under  dif- 
ferent conditions.  In  the  Gulls,  the  Terns,  the  Petrels, 
and  in  the  Fulmars,  with  the  Albatross  as  their  typical 
Form,  the  mechanism  of  flight  is  carried  through  an 
ascending  scale,  to  the  highest  degrees  of  power,  both  as 
respects  endurance  and  facility  of  evolution. 

The  mechanical  laws  which  are  appealed  to  in  all 
these  modifications  of  structure  require  adjustments  of 
the  finest  kind; 'and  some  of  them  are  so  curious  and 
so  beautiful  that  it  is  well  worth  following  them  a  little 
further  in  detail. 

There  are  two  facts  observable  in  all  Birds  of  great 
and  long-sustained  powers  of  flight : — the  first  is,  that 
they  are  always  provided  with  wings  which  are  rather 
long  than  broad,  sometimes  extremely  narrow  in  pro- 
portion to  their  length ;  the  second  is,  that  the  wings  are 
always  sharply  pointed  at  the  ends.  Let  us  look  at  the 
mechanical  laws  which  absolutely  require  this  structure 
for  the  purpose  of  powerful  flight,  and  to  meet  -which 
it  has  accordingly  been  devised  and  provided. 

One  law  appealed  to  in  making  wings  rather  long 
than  broad  is  simply  the  law  of  leverage.  But  this 
law  has  to  be  applied  under  conditions  of  difficulty 
and  complexity,  which  are  not  apparent  at  first  sight. 
The  body  to  be  lifted  is  the  very  body  that  must 
exert  the  lifting  power.  The  Force  of  Gravity,  which 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  151 

has  to  be  resisted,  may  be  said  to  be  sitting  side 
by  side,  occupying  the  same  particles  of  matter,  with 
the  Vital  Force  which  is  to  give  it  battle.  Nay,  more, 
the  one  is  connected  with  the  other  in  some  mysterious 
manner  which  we  cannot  trace  or  understand.  A  dead 
Bird  weighs  as  much  as  a  living  one.  Nothing  which 
our  scales  can  measure  is  lost  when  the  Vital  Force 
is  gone.  It  is  The  Great  Imponderable.  Nevertheless, 
vital  forces  of  unusual  power  are  always  coupled  with 
unusual  mass  and  volume  in  the  matter  through  which 
they  work.  And  so  it  is  that  a  powerful  Bird  must 
always  also  be.  comparatively  a  heavy  Bird.  And  then 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  action  of  gravity  is 
constant  and  untiring.  The  Vital  Force,  on  the  contrary, 
however  intense  it  may  be,  is  intermitting  and  capable 
of  exhaustion.  If,  then,  this  Force  is  to  be  set  against 
the  Force  of  Gravity,  it  has  much  need  of  some  imple- 
ment through  which  it  may  exert  itself  with  mechanical 
advantage  as  regards  the  particular  purpose  to  be  at- 
tained. Such  an  implement  is  the  lever — and  a  long 
wing  is  nothing  but  a  long  lever.  The  mechanical  prin- 
ciple, or  law,  as  is  well  known,  is  this, — that  a  veiy  small 
amount  of  motion,  or  motion  through  a  very  small  space, 
at  the  short  end  of  a  lever,  produces  a  great  amount  of 
motion,  or  motion  through  a  long  space,  at  the  opposite 
or  longer  end.  This  action  requires  indeed  a  very  intense 


152  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

force  to  be  applied  at  the  shorter  end,  but  it  applies  that 
force  with  immense  advantage  for  the  purpose  in  view  : 
because  the  motion  which  is  transmitted  to  the  end 
of  a  long  wing  is  a  motion  acting  at  that  point  through 
a  long  space,  and  is  therefore  equivalent  to  a  very  heavy 
weight  lifted  through  a  short  space  at  the  end  which  is 
attached  to  the  body  of  the  Bird.  Now  this  is  precisely 
what  is  required  for  the  purpose  of  flight.  The  body  of 
a  Bird  does  not  require  to  be  much  lifted  by  each  stroke 
of  the  wing.  It  only  requires  to  be  sustained  ;  and  when 
more  than  this  is  needed — as  when  a  Bird  first  rises 
from  the  ground,  or  from  the  sea,  or  when  it  ascends 
rapidly  in  the  air — greatly  increased  exertion — in  many 
cases,  very  violent  exertion — is  required.1  And  then 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  long  wings  economise  the 
vital  force  in  another  way.  When  a  strong  current 
of  air  strikes  against  the  wings  of  a  Bird,  the  same 
sustaining  effect  is  produced  as  when  the  wing  strikes 

1  The  Albatross,  when  rising  from  tne  sea,  is  described  ("  Ibis," 
July  1865)  as  "stretching  out  his  neck,  and  with  great  exertion  of 
his  wings,  running  along  the  top  of  the  water  for  seventy  or  eighty 
yards,  until  at  last  having  got  sufficient  impetus,  he  tucks  up  his 
legs,  and  is  once  more  fairly  launched  into  the  air."  The  contrast 
here  described  between  the  violent  exertion  required  in  first  rising, 
and  the  perfect  ease  of  flight  after  this  first  momentum  has  beep, 
acquired,  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  true  mechanical  principles 
of  flight. 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  153 

against  the  air.  Consequently  Birds  with  very  long 
wings  have  this  great  advantage,  that  with  pre-acquired 
momentum,  they  can  often  for  a  long  time  fly  without 
flapping  their  wings  at  all.  Under  these  circumstances, 
a  Bird  is  sustained  very  much  as  a  boy's  kite  is  sustained 
in  the  air.  The  string  which  the  boy  holds,  and  by 
which  he  pulls  the  kite  downwards  with  a  certain  force, 
performs  for -the  kite  the  same  offices  which  its  own 
weight  and  balance  and  momentum  perform  for  the 
Bird.  The  great  long-winged  oceanic  Birds  often  appear 
to  float  rather  than  to  fly.  The  stronger  is  the  gale, 
their  flight,  though  less  rapid,  is  all  the  more  easy — so 
easy  indeed  as  to  appear  buoyant;  because  the  blasts 
which  strike  against  their  wings  are  enough  to  sustain 
the  bird  with  comparatively  little  exertion  of  its  own, 
except  that  of  holding  the  wing  vanes  stretched  and 
exposed  at  proper  angles  to  the  wind.  And  whenever 
the  onward  force  previously  acquired  by  flapping  be- 
comes at  length  exhausted,  and  the  ceaseless  inexorable 
Force  of  Gravity  is  beginning  to  overcome  it,  the  Bird 
again  rises  by  a  few  easy  and  gentle  half-strokes  of  the 
wing.  Very  often  the  same  effect  is  produced  by  allow- 
ing the  Force  of  Gravity  to  act,  and  when  the  downward 
momentum  has  brought  the  Bird  close  to  the  ground 
or  to  the  sea,  that  force  is  again  converted  into  an 
ascending  impetus  by  a  change  in  the  angle  at  which 


154  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

the  wing  is  exposed  to  the  wind.  This  is  a  constant 
action  with  all  the  oceanic  Birds.  Those  who  have  seen 
the  Albatross  have  described  themselves  as  never  tired 
of  watching  its  glorious  and  triumphant  motion  : — 

"  Tranquil  its  spirit  seemed,  and  floated  slow  ; 
Even  in  its  very  motion  there  was  rest." l 

Rest — where  there  is  nothing  else  at  rest  in  the  tre- 
mendous turmoil  of  its  own  stormy  seas  !  Sometimes 
for  a  whole  hour  together  this  splendid  Bird  will  sail  or 
wheel  round  a  ship  in  every  possible  variety  of  direction 
without  requiring  to  give  a  single  stroke  to  its  pinions. 
Now,  the  Albatross  has  the  extreme  form  of  this  kind  of 
wing.  Its  wings  are  immensely  long — about  fourteen  or 
fifteen  feet  from  tip  to  tip — and  almost  as  narrow  in  pro- 
portion as  a  riband.2  Our  common  Gannet  is  an  excel- 

1  Professor  Wilson's  Sonnet,   "  A  Cloud,"  &c. 

2  The  mechanical  principle  involved  in  the  sufficiency  of  very 
narrow  wings  has,  I  believe,  been  adequately  explained  in  a  very 
ingenious  paper  read  before  the  Aeronautical  Society,  by  Mr.  F.  H. 
Wenham,  C.E.    It  is  the  same  mechanical  principle  which  accounts 
for  the  narrow  blades  of  a  Screw  Propeller  having  a  resisting  force 

.  as  great  as  would  be  exerted  upon  the  whole  area  of  rotation  by  a 
solid  Disc.  In  the  case  of  a  flat  body,  such  as  the  wing  of  a  bird, 
being  propelled  edgeways  through  the  air,  nearly  the  whole  re- 
sisting and  sustaining  force  is  exerted  upon  the  first  few  inches 
of  the  advancing  surface. 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  155 

lent,  though  a  more  modified,  example  of  the  same  kind 
of  structure.  On  the  other  hand,  Birds  of  short  wings, 
though  their  flight  is  sometimes  very  fast,  are  never  able 
to  sustain  it  very  long.  The  muscular  exertion  they 
require  is  greater,  because  it  does  not  work  to  the  same 
advantage.  Most  of  the  Gallinaceous  Birds  (such  as  the 
common  Fowl,  Pheasants,  Partridges,  &c.)  have  wings  of 
this  kind ;  and  some  of  them  never  fly  except  to  escape 
an  enemy,  or  to  change  their  feeding-ground. 

The  second  fact  observable  in  reference  to  Birds  of 
easy  and  powerful  flight — namely,  that  their  wings  are 
all  sharply  pointed  at  the  end — will  lead  us  still  further 
into  the  niceties  of  adjustment  which  are  so  signally  dis- 
played in  the  machinery  of  flight. 

The  feathers  of  a  Bird's  wing  have  a  natural  threefold 
division,  according  to  the  different  wing-bones  to  which 
they  are  attached.  The  quills  which  form  the  end  of  the 
wing  are  called  the  Primaries ;  those  which  form  the 
middle  of  the  vane  are  called  the  Secondaries  ;  and 
those  which  are  next  the  body  of  the  Bird  are  called  the 
Tertiaries.  The  motion  of  a  Bird's  wing  increases  from 
its  minimum  at  the  shoulder-joint  to  its  maximum  at  the 
tip.  The  primary  quills  which  form  the  termination  of 
the  wing  are  those  on  which  the  chief  burden  of  flight  is 
cast.  Each  feather  has  less  and  less  weight  to  bear,  and 
less  and  less  force  to  exert,  in  proportion  as  it  lies  nearer 


THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 


the  body  of  the  Bird  ;  and  there  is  nothing  more  beau- 
tiful in  the  structure  of  a  wing  than  the  perfect  gradation 
in  strength  and  stiffness,  as  well  as  in  modification  of 
form,  which  marks  the  series  from  the  first  of  the  Primary 
quills  to  the  last  and  feeblest  of  the  Tertiaries.1  Now,  the 
sharpness  or  roundness  of  a  wing  at  the  tip  depends  on 
the  position  which  is  given  to  the  longest  Primary  quill. 
If  the  first,  or  even  the  second,  primary  is  the  longest, 
and  all  that  follow  are  considerably  shorter,  the  wing  is 
necessarily  a  pointed  wing,  because  the  tip  of  a  single 
quill  forms  the  end  ;  but  if  the  third  or  fourth  Primary 
quills  are  the  longest,  and  the  next  again  on  both  sides 
are  only  a  little  shorter,  the  wing  becomes  a  round-ended 
wing.  Round-ended  wings  are  also  almost  always  open- 
ended  —  that  is  to  say,  the  tips  of  the  quills  do  not  touch 
each  other,  but  leave  interspaces  at  the  end  of  the  wing, 
through  which,  of  course,  a  good  deal  of  air  escapes. 
Since  each  single  quill  is  formed  on  the  same  principle 
as  the  whole  wing  —  th~t  is,  with  the  anterior  margin  stiff 
and  the  posterior  margin  yielding  —  this  escape  is  not 


*  I  owe  to  the  accurate  pencil  of  Mr.  J.  Wolf  the  accompanying 
engraving  of  the  wing  of  the  Golden  Plover,  a  Bird  of  powerful  flight. 
In  this  wing  the  gradation  of  the  feathers  is  very  perfect.  It  will  be 
observed  that  the  first  of  the  Secondaries,  the  eleventh  feather  from 
the  tip  of  the  wing,  is  marked  by  a  slight  variation  in  the  form 
of  the  margin. 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  1  :,  7 

useless  for  progression ;  but  the  air  acts  less  favourably 
for  this  purpose  than  when  struck  by  a  more  com- 
pact set  of  feathers.  The  common  Rook  and  all  the 
Crows  are  examples  of  this.  The  Peregrine  Falcon, 
the  common  Swallow,  and  all  Birds  of  very  powerful 
flight,  have  been  provided  with  the  sharp-pointed 
structure.1 

The  object  of  this  structure,  and  the  mechanical  laws 
to  which  it  appeals,  will  be  apparent  when  we  recollect 
what  it  is  on  which  the  propelling  power,  as  distinct 
from  the  sustaining  power,  of  a  Bird's  wing  depends.  It 
depends  on  the  reaction  of  the  air  escaping  backwards — 
that  is,  in  the  direction  exactly  opposite  to  that  of  the 
intended  motion  of  the  Bird.  Any  air  which  escapes 
from  under  the  wing,  in  any  other  direction,  will  of 
course  react  with  less  advantage  upon  that  motion.  But 
from  under  a  round  wing  a  good  deal  of  air  must  neces- 
sarily escape  along  the  rounded  end — that  is,  in  a  direction 
at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  intended  flight.  All  the 
reaction  produced  by  this  escape  is  a  reaction  which  is 
useless  for  propulsion.  Accordingly,  in  all  Birds  to 
which  great  velocity  of  flight  is  essential,  this  structure, 
which  is  common  in  other  Birds,  is  carefully  avoided. 

1  The  illustrations  of  Mr.  Wolf  will  here  again  be  the  best  ex- 
planation to  the  reader  of  the  difference  between  the  sharp  and  the 
round  structure,  p.  156. 


158  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

The  Hawks  have  been  classified  as  "noble"  or  "ig- 
noble," according  to  the  length  and  sharpness  of  their 
wings  :  those  which  catch  their  prey  by  velocity  of  flight 
having  been  uniformly  provided  with  the  long-pointed 
structure.      The  Sparrow-Hawk  and    the    Merlin    are 
excellent   examples   of  the   difference.     The  Sparrow- 
Hawk,  with   its   comparatively  short  and   blunt  wings, 
steals  along  the  hedgerows  and  pounces  on  its  prey  by 
surprise ;  seldom  chasing  it,  except  for  a  short  distance, 
and  when  the  victim  is  at  a  disadvantage.     And  well  do 
the  smaller  Birds  know  this  habit,  and  the  limit  of  his 
powers.     Many  of  them  chase  and  "  chaff"  the  Sparrow- 
Hawk,  when  he  is  seen  flying  in  the   open,   perfectly 
aware  that  he  cannot  catch  them  by  fast  flying.      But 
they  never  play  these  tricks  with  the  Merlin.     This  beau- 
tiful little  Falcon   hunts  the   open  ground,  giving  fair 
chase  to  its  quarry  By  power  and  speed  of  flight.     The 
Merlin  delights  in  flying  at  some  of  the  fastest  Birds,  such 
as  the  Snipe.     The  longest  and  most  beautiful  trial  of 
wingmanship  I  have  ever  seen  was  the  chase  of  a  Merlin 
after  a  Snipe  in  one  of  the  Hebrides.     It  lasted  as  far 
as  the  eye  could  reach,  and  seemed  to  continue  far  out 
to  sea.    In  the  Merlin,  as  in  all  the  fastest  Falcons,  the 
second   quill   feather  is   the  longest  in  the  wing;   the 
others  rapidly  diminish ;  and  the  point  of  the  wing  looks 
as  sharp  as  a  needle  in  the  air. 


CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY.  159 

There  is  yet  one  other  power  which  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  some  Birds  that  their  wings  should  enable 
them  to  exert :  and  that  is,  the  power  of  standing  still, 
or  remaining  suspended  in  the  air  without  any  forward 
motion.  One  familiar  example  of  this  is  the  common 
Kestrel,  which,  from  the  frequent  exercise  of  this  power, 
is  called  in  some  counties  the  "Windhover."  The 
mechanical  principles  on  which  the  machinery  of  flight 
is  adapted  to  this  purpose,  are  very  simple.  No  Bird 
can  exercise  this  power  which  is  not  provided  with  wings 
large  enough,  long  enough,  and  powerful  enough  to  sus- 
tain its  weight  with  ease,  and  without  violent  exertion. 
Large  wings  can  always  be  diminished  at  the  pleasure  of 
the  Bird,  by  being  partially  folded  inwards ;  and  this 
contraction  of  the  area  is  constantly  resorted  to.  But  a 
Bird  which  has  wings  so  small  and  scanty  as  to  compel 
it  to  strike  them  always -at  full  stretch,  and  with  great 
velocity  in  order  to. fly  at  all,  is  incapable  of  standing 
still  in  the  air.  No  man  ever  saw  a  Diver  or  a  Duck 
performing  the  evolution  which  the  Kestrel  may  be  seen 
performing  every  hour  over  so  many  English  fields.  The 
cause  of  this  is  obvious,  if  we  refer  to  the  principles 
which  have  already  been  explained.  We  have  seen  that 
the  perpendicular  stroke  of  a  Bird's  wing  has  the  double 
effect  of  both  propelling  and  sustaining.  The  reaction 
from  such  a  stroke  brings  two  different  forces  to  bear 


l6o  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

upon  the  Bird — one  whose  direction  is  upwards,  and 
another  whose  direction  is  forwards.  How  can  these 
two  effects  be  separated  from  each  other?  How  can 
the  wing  be  so  moved  as  to  keep  up  just  enough  of  the 
sustaining  force  without  allowing  the  propelling  force  to 
come  into  play  ?  The  answer  to  this,  although  it  involves 
some  very  complicated  laws  connected  with  what  mecha- 
nicians call  the  "  parallelogram  of  forces,"  is  practically 
a  simple  one.  It  can  only  be  done  by  shortening  the 
stroke,  and  altering  the  perpendicularity  of  its  direction. 
Of  course,  if  a  Bird,  by  altering  the  axis  of  its  own  body, 
can  direct  its  wing-stroke  in  some  degree  forwards,  it 
will  have  the  effect  of  stopping  instead  of  promoting 
progression.  But  in  order  to  do  this,  it  must  have  a 
superabundance  of  sustaining  force,  because  some  of  this 
force  is  sacrificed  when  the  stroke'  is  off  the  perpen- 
dicular. Hence  it  follows  that  Birds  so  heavy  as  to 
require  the  whole  action  of  their  wings  to  sustain  them 
at  all,  can  never  afford  this  sacrifice  of  the  sustaining 
force,  and,  except  for  the  purpose  of  arresting  their  flight, 
can  never  strike  except  directly  downwards, — that  is, 
directly  against  the  opposing  force  of  gravity.  But  Birds 
with  superabundant  sustaining  power,  and  long  sharp 
wings,  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  diminish  the  length  of 
stroke,  and  direct  it  off  the  perpendicular  at  such  an 
angle  as  will  bring  all  the  forces  bearing  upon  their  body 


C.       SPARROW    HAWK  —  ROUNIJ 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  l6l 

to  an  exact  balance,  and  they  will  then  remain  stationary 
at  a  fixed  point  in  the  air.1 

They  are  greatly  assisted  in  this  beautiful  evolution 
by  an  adverse  current  of  air;  and  it  will  always  be 
observed  that  the  Kestrel,  when  hovering,  turns  his  head 
to  wind,  and  hangs  his  whole  body  at  a  -greater  or  less 
angle  to  the  plane  of  the  horizon.  When  there  is  no 
wind,  or  very  little,  the  sustaining  force  is  kept  up  by 
a  short  rapid  action  of  the  pinions,  and  the  long  tail 
is  spread  out  like  a  fan  to  assist  in  stopping  any  ten- 
dency to  onward  motion.  When  there  is  a  strong 
breeze,  no  flapping  is  required  at  all — the  force  of  the 
wind  supplying  the  whole  force  necessary  to  counteract 
the  force  of  gravity ;  and  in  proportion  to  the  increasing 
strength  of  the  wind,  the  amount  of  vane  which  must  be 
exposed  to  it  becomes  less  and  less.  I  have  seen  a 
Kestrel  stand  suspended  in  a  half  gale  with  the  wings 
folded  close  to  the  body,  and  with  no  visible  muscular 
motion  whatever.  And  so  nice  is  the  adjustment  of 
position  which  is  requisite  to  produce  this  exact  balance 
of  all  the  forces  bearing  on  the  Bird,  that  the  change 
in  that  position  which  again  instantly  results  in  a  for- 
ward motion  is  very  often  almost  insensible  to  the  eye. 

l  Mr.  Wolf's  illustration  of  a  Kestrel  hovering  shows  accurately 
the  position  of  the  bird  when  the  action  is  performed  in  still  air. 
M 


1 62  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

It  is  generally  a  slight  expansion  of  the  wings,  and  a 
very  slight  change  in  the  axis  of  the  body. 

And  here  it  may  be  observed  that  the  tails  of  Birds 
have  not,  as  is  often  supposed,  any  function  analogous 
to  the  rudder  of  a  ship.  Birds  which  have  lost  the  tail 
are  not  thereby  rendered  incapable  of  turning.  If  the 
steering  function  had  been  assigned  to  Birds'  tails,  the 
vane  of  the  tail  must  have  been  set,  not,  as  it  is,  hori- 
zontally, but  perpendicularly  to  the  line  of  flight.  But 
a  Bird's  tail  has  in  flight  no  lateral  motion  whatever. 
It  does,  indeed,  materially  assist  the  Bird  in  turning, 
because  it  serves  to  stop  the  way  of  a  Bird  when  it 
rises  or  turns  in  the  air  to  take  a  new  direction.  The 
feathers  of  the  tail  are  also  capable  of  being  depressed 
unequally, — that  is,  more  at  one  side  than  at  the  other ; 
and  when  the  whole  are  spread  out  like  the  leaves  of 
a  fan,  this  depression  at  one  side  is  a  means,  whereby 
the  Bird  can  exert  against  the  air  which  is  passing  under 
it  greater  muscular  pressure  upon  one  side  than  upon  the 
other,  and  can  thus  help  the  turning  action  of  the  wings. 
With  a  telescope  I  have  seen  this  action  of  the  tail  very 
marked  in  the  soaring  flight  of  the  Buzzard,  when  the 
Bird  is  wheeling  round  in  spiral  circles.  The  tail  con- 
tributes also  largely  to  the  general  balance  of  the  body, 
which  in  itself  is  an  important  element  in  the  facility 
of  flight.  Accordingly,  almost  all  Birds  which  depend 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  163 

on  great  ease  of  evolution  in  flight — or  on  the  power 
of  stopping  suddenly,  have  largely  developed  tails. 
This  is  the  case  with  all  the  Birds  of  prey— with  the 
Kestrel  in  a  conspicuous  degree.  But  there  are  some 
exceptions  which  show  that  great  powers  of  flight  are 
not  always  dependent  on  the  possession  of  a  large  tail 
— as,  for  example,  the  Swift. 

Another  explanation  has  been  given  of  the  means 
by  which  Birds  are  able  to  turn  in  flight,  which  is  a 
curious  example  how  preconceived  theories  founded 
on  false  analogies  will  vitiate  our  observation  of  the 
commonest  facts  in  nature.  I  do  not  know  of  any 
modern  work  that  gives  any  account  of  the  theory  of 
flight,  which  is  even  tolerably  correct.  But  in  most 
points  an  admirable  account  is  to  be  found  in  the  cele- 
brated work  of  Borelli,  "  De  Motu  Animalium."  On 
the  question,  however,  of  steerage  in  flight,  he  gives  a 
solution  which  the  most  ordinary  observation  is  sufficient 
to  contradict.  Borelli  is  quite  aware  that  the  tail  in  Birds 
has  no  such  function  as  that  which  is  usually  assigned  to 
it,  and  he  points  out  the  true  theoretical  objection  to 
the  possibility  of  its  having  any  guiding  power — viz., 
its  horizontal  position,  and  its  immobility  in  the  lateral 
direction.  But  the  theory  which  he  himself  propounds 
is  equally  erroneous.  It  is  this, — that  Birds  deflect  their 
course  to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  as  rowers  turn  a  row- 
M  2 


164  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

boat — by  striking  more  quickly  and  more  strongly 
with  one  wing  than  with  the  other.1  To  this  theory 
there  are  two  objections — first,  that  as  matter  of  fact 
Birds  can  turn,  and  do  turn,  even  to  the  extent  of 
describing  complete  circles  in  the  air,  without  any  flap- 
ping either  of  one  wing  or  the  other :  and  secondly, 
that  when  Birds  do  flap  and  turn  at  the  same  time,  not 
the  slightest  difference  in  time  between  the  two  wing- 
strokes  can  ever  be  detected.  The  beats  of  a  Bird's 
two  wings  are  always  exactly  synchronous.  But  the 
first  of  these  two  objections  is  of  itself  quite  sufficient 
to  disprove  the  theory.  No  man  can  have  watched 
even  for  a  moment  the  flight  of  the  common  Swallow, 
and  especially  the  flight  of  the  Swift,  without  seeing  it 
perform  complete  gyrations  in  the  air  without  any 
strokes  of  either  wing.  The  only  change  which  can  ever 
be  detected  by  the  eye  is  a  slight  elevation  on  one  side 


i  Referring  to  a  boat,  he  says  : — "Si  remi  dexteri lateris  celerixis 
quam  sinistri  aquam  retrorsum  impellant — semper  prora  revolvetur 
versus  sinistrum  latus  ;  ergo  eodem  modo  dum  avis  in  medio  fluido 
aevis  innatat,  volando  sequilibrata  in  centro  gravitatis  ejus,  si  sola 
dextra  ala  deorsum  sed  oblique  flectatur,  aerem  subjectum  impel- 
lando  versus  caudam  necessario  ad  instar  navis  mox  memoratse,  per- 
movetur  latus  ejus  dextrum,  quiescente  aut  tardius  moto  sinistro 
latera.  Ex  quo  fit,  ut  avis  pars  anterior  circa  centrum  gravitatis 
ejus  revoluta,  flectatur  versum  sinistrum  latus."  —  Borellus,  "De 
Motu  Animalium,"  Pars  Prima.  Propositio  cxcix. 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  165 

of  the  whole  body,  and  a  slight  depression  of  the  other. 
The  depression  is  always  on  that  side  towards  which  the 
bird  is  turning.  On  the  opposite  side,  that  from  which 
the  Bird  is  turning,  there  is  of  course  a  corresponding  ele- 
vation. Sometimes  this  is  very  obvious ;  but  in  general 
it  is  so  slight  as  to  require  close  observation  to  detect  it. 
In  the  Albatross,  when  sweeping  round,  the  wings  are 
often  pointed  in  a  direction  nearly  perpendicular  to 
the  sea.1  The  effect  of  this,  of  course,  is  to  expose  the 
two  vanes  at  different  angles  to  the  aerial  currents — 
and  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  flight  the  balance 
of  all  the  forces  employed  is  so  extremely  fine  that  the 
most  minute  alteration  in  the  degree  in  which  they 
bear  upon  each  other  will  produce  an  immense  change 
in  the  result.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the 
muscular  movements  which  serve  to  turn  the  axis  of 
a  flying  Bhd'from  one  direction  to  another,  are  very 


l  See  a  very  interesting  account  of  the  flight  of  the  Albatross  by 
Captain  T.  W.  Hutton,  in  the  "Ibis"  for  July  1864.  Captain 
Hutton  says  :  "If  he  wishes  to  turn  to  the  right,  he  bends  his  head 
and  tail  slightly  upwards,  at  the  same  time  raising  his  left  side  and 
lowering  the  right,  in  proportion  to  the  sharpness  of  the  curve  he 
wishes  to  make,  the  wings  being  kept  rigid  the  whole  time."  This 
is  the  only  paper  I  have  seen  on  the  flight  of  birds  in  which  obser- 
vation of  the  facts  is  not  vitiated  by  some  false  preconceived  theory 
on  their  cause.  Captain  Hutton  has  thoroughly  seized  the  true 
mechanical  principles  of  flight. 


1 66  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

often  so  extremely  minute  as  generally  altogether  to 
elude  the  sight.  But  in  general  terms,  it  may  be  said 
that  a  Bird  turns  in  flying  essentially  on  the  same  prin- 
ciple as  that  on  which  a  Man  turns  in  walking.  It  is 
done  in  both  cases  by  change  in  the  direction  of  mus- 
cular pressure  upon  a  resisting  medium.  By  an  ex- 
quisite combination  of  different  laws,  and  by  mecha- 
nical contrivance  in  the  adjustment  of  them,  it  has  been 
given  to  a  Bird  to  find  in  the  thin  and  yielding  air  a 
medium  of  resistance  against  which  its  own  muscular 
force  may  act,  as  firm  and  as  effective  as  that  which 
Man  finds  in  the  solid  earth. 

The  Humming  Birds  are  perhaps  the  most  remark- 
able examples  in  the  world  of  the  machinery  of  flight. 
The  power  of  poising  themselves  in  the  air, — remain- 
ing absolutely  stationary  whilst  they  search  the  blossoms 
for  insects, — is  a  power  essential  to  their  life.  It  is 
a  power  accordingly  which  is  enjoyed  by  them  in  the 
highest  perfection.  When  they  intend  progressive  flight, 
it  is  effected  with  such  velocity  as  to  elude  the  eye. 
The  action  of  the  wing  in  all  these  cases  is  far  too 
rapid  to  enable  the  observer  to  detect  the  exact  differ- 
ence between  that  kind  of  motion  which  keeps  the  Bird 
at  absolute  rest  in  the  air,  and  that  which  carries  it 
along  with  such  immense  velocity.  But  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  change  is  one  from  a  short  quick 


CONTRIVANCE    A    NECESSITY.  167 

stroke  delivered  obliquely  forward,  to  a  full  stroke, 
more  slow,  but  delivered  perpendicularly  This  corre- 
sponds with  the  account  given  by  that  most  accurate 
ornithological  observer,  Mr.  Gould.  He  says :  "  When 
poised  before  any  object,  this  action  of  the  wing  is 
so  rapidly  performed  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  eye 
to  follow  each  stroke,  and  a  hazy  semicircle  of  indis- 
tinctness on  each  side  of  the  Bird  is  all  that  is  per- 
ceptible." There  is  another  fact  mentioned  by  those 
who  have  watched  their  movements  most  closely  which 
corresponds  with  the  explanation  already  given — viz., 
the  fact  that  the  axis  of  the  Humming  Bird's  body 
when  hovering  is  always  highly  inclined,  so  much  so  as 
to  appear  almost  perpendicular  in  the  air.  In  other 
words  the  wing-stroke,  instead  of  being  delivered  per- 
pendicularly downwards,  which  would  infallibly  carry 
the  body  onwards,  is  delivered  at  such  an  angle  for- 
wards as  to  bring  to  an  exact  balance  the  upward,  the 
downward,  and  the  forward  forces  which  bear  upon  the 
body  of  the  Bird.  Mr.  Darwin  says,  "  When  hovering 
by  a  flower,  the  tail  is  constantly  shut  and  expanded  like 
a  fan,  the  body  being  kept  in  a  nearly  vertical  position" 
Mr.  Wallace,  another  accurate  observer,  describes  the 
Humming  Birds  as  "  balancing  themselves  vertically 
in  the  air." 

These  are  a  few,  and  a  few  only,  of  the  adjustments 


1 63  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 


required  in  order  to  the  giving  of  the  power  of  flight ; — • 
adjustments  of  organic  growth  to  intensity  of  vital  force 
— of  external  structure  to  external  work — of  shape  in 
each  separate  feather  to  definite  shape  in  the  series  as  a 
whole — of  material  to  resistance — of  mass  and  form  to 
required- velocities ;  adjustments,  in  short,  of  law  to  law, 
of  force  to  force,  and  of  all  to  Purpose.  So  many  are 
these  contrivances,  so  various,  so  fine,  so  intricate,  that  a 
volume  might  be  written  without  exhausting  the  beauty 
of  the  method  in  which  this  one  mechanical  problem  has 
been  solved.  It  is  by  knowledge  of  unchanging  laws 
that  these  victories  over  them  seem  to  be  achieved  :  yet 
not  by  knowledge  only,  except  as  the  guide  of  Power. 
For  here  as  everywhere  else  in  Nature,  we  see  the  same 
mysterious  need  of  conforming  to  imperative  conditions, 
side  by  side  with  absolute  control  over  the  forces  through 
which  this  conformity  is  secured.  When  any  given  pur- 
pose cannot  be  attained  without  the  violation  of  some 
law,  unless  by  some  new  power,  and  some  new  ma- 
chinery— the  requisite  power  and  mechanism  are  evolved 
generally  out  of  old  materials,  and  by  modifications  of 
pre-existing  forms.  There  can  be  no  better  example  of 
this  than  a  wing-feather.  It  is  a  production  wholly 
unlike  any  other  animal  growth — an  implement  specially 
formed  to  combine  strength  with  lightness,  elasticity,  and 
imperviousness  to  air.  Again,  the  bones  of  a  Bird's  wing 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  169 

are  the  bones  of  the  Mammalian  arm  and  hand,  specially 
modified  to  support  the  feathers.  The  same  purpose  is 
effected  by  other  means  in  connexion  with  precisely  the 
same  bones  in  the  flying  Mammalia — the  Bats.  In  these 
animals  the  finger-bones  instead  of  being  compressed  or 
soldered  together  to  support  feathers,  are  separated, 
attenuated,  and  greatly  lengthened  to  afford  attachment 
to  a  web  or  flying  membrane  which  is  stretched  between 
them.  In  other  ages  of  the  world  there  were  also  flying 
Lizards.  But  in  all  these  cases  the  mechanical  principle 
is  the  same,  and  there  has  been  the  same  ingenious 
adaptation  of  material  and  of  force  to  the  universal  laws 
of  motion. 

On  the  earth  and  on  the  sea  Man  has  attained  to 
powers  of  locomotion  with  which,  in  strength,  endur- 
ance, and  in  velocity,  no  animal  movement  can  compare. 
But  the  air  is  an  element  on  which  he  cannot  travel — an 
ocean  which  he  cannot  navigate.  The  Birds  of  heaven 
are  still  his  envy,  and  on  the  paths  they  tread  he  cannot 
follow.  As  yet !  for  it  is  not  certain  that  this  exclusion  is 
to  be  perpetual.  His  failure  has  resulted  quite  as  much 
from  his  ignorance  of  natural  laws,  as  from  his  inability 
to  meet  the  conditions  which  they  demand.  All  at- 
tempts to  guide  bodies  buoyant  in  the  air  must  be  fruit- 
less. Balloons  are  mere  toys.  No  flying  animal  has 
ever  been  formed  on  the  principle  of  buoyancy.  Birds 


170  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

and  Bats,  and  Dragons,  have  been  all  immensely  heavier 
than  the  air,  and  their  weight  is  one  of  the  forces  most 
essential  to  their  flight.  Yet  there  is  a  real  impediment 
in  the  way  of  Man  navigating  the  air — and  thai:  is  the 
excessive  Weight  of  the  only  great  mechanical  moving 
powers  hitherto  placed  at  his  disposal.  When  Science 
shall  have  discovered  some  moving  power  greatly  lighter 
than  any  we  yet  know,  in  all  probability  the  problem  will 
be  solved.1  But  of  one  thing  we  may  be  sure — that  if 
Man  is  ever  destined  to  navigate  the  air,  it  will  be  in 
machines  formed  in  strict  obedience  to  the  mechanical 
laws  which  have  been  emploved  by  the  Creator  for  the 
same  purpose  in  flying  animals.2 

1  The  men  of  Science  in  France  are  ahead  of  the  men  of  Science 
in  England  upon  this  subject.     There  is  a   society  established  in 
Paris  which  announces  in  its  very  title  the  true  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of   flight — "  Societe  d'Encouragement  pour  la   Locomotion 
aerienne  au  moyen   d'Appareils  PLUS  LOURDS   que  1'Air."      The 
false  principle  of  Buoyancy  is  thus  eliminated  and  banished  from 
the  question. 

2  I  owe  to  my  father  (John,  7th  Duke  of  Argyll)  my  knowledge 
of  the  Theory  of  Flight  which  is  expounded  in  this  chapter.     The 
retired  life  he  led,  and  the  dislike  he  had  of  the  work  of  literary 
composition,  confined  the  knowledge  of  his  views  within  a  com- 
paratively narrow  circle.     But  his  love  of  mechanical  science,  and 
his  study  of  the  problem  during  many  years  of  investigation  and 
experiment,  made  him  thoroughly  master  of  the  subject.     In  his 
devices  for  testing  and  illustrating  the  truth  of  his  Theory,  he  was 
chiefly  assisted  by  two  very  ingenious  men,  the  late  Mr.  John  Hart, 


CONTRIVANCE  A   NECESSITY. 


of  Glasgow,  and  the  late  Mr.  Robert  Bryson,  of  Edinburgh.  The 
result  of  his  investigations  led  him  to  the  opinion  that  until  a  lighter 
moving  power  than  steam  is  discovered,  it  will  be  impossible  to 
construct  successfully  machines  for  the  navigation  of  the  air.  I 
shall  only  add,  that  having  made  ornithology  a  favourite  pursuit, 
I  have  been  led  during  many  years  to  test  this  theory  by  close 
observation  of  the  flight  of  Birds  ;  and  that  from  the  manner  in 
which  it  fits  into,  and  explains  all  the  facts,  I  have  been  aiwayj 
more  and  more  satisfied  of  its  trulh. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

APPARENT    EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   SUPREMACY   OF 
PURPOSE. 

"X^ET,  as  we  look  .at  Nature,  the  fact  will  force  itself 
-*•  upon  us  that  there  are  structures  in  which  we 
cannot  recognise  any  use;  that  there  are  contrivances 
which  often  fail  of  their  effect ;  and  that  there  are  others 
which  appear  to  be  separated  from  the  conditions  they 
were  intended  to  meet,  and  under  which  alone  their 
usefulness  could  arise.  Such  instances  occur  in  many 
branches  of  inquiry ;  and  although  in  the  great  mass  of 
natural  phenomena  the  supremacy  of  Purpose  is  evident 
enough,  such  cases  do  frequently  come  across  our  path 
as  cases  of  exception — cases  in  which  Law  does  not 
seem  to  be  subservient  to  Will,  but  to  be  asserting  a 
power  and  an  endurance  of  its  own. 

The  degree  of  importance  which  may  be  attached  to 
such  cases  as  a  source  of  real  difficulty,  will  vary  with 
the  character  of  the  individual  mind,  and  its  capacity  of 
holding  by  the  great  lines  of  evidence  which  run  through 
the  whole  Order  of  Nature.  It  is  with  these  cases  as 


APPARENT    EXCEPTIONS.  173 

with  the  local  currents  which  sometimes  obscure  the 
rising  and  falling  of  the  tides.  When  watched  from 
hour  to  hour,  the  greater  law  is  clearly  discernible  by 
well-marked  effects  :  but  when  watched  from  minute  to 
minute,  that  law  is  not  distinct,  and  there  are  waves 
which  seem  like  a  rebellion  of  the  sea  against  the  force 
which  is  dragging  it  from  the  land.  The  Order  of 
Nature  is  very  complicated,  and  very  partially  understood. 
It  is  to  be  expected  therefore  that  there  should  be  a  vast 
variety  of  subordinate  facts,  whose  relation  to  each  other 
and  to  the  whole  must  be  a  matter  of  perplexity  to  us. 
It  is  so  with  the  relation  in  which  different  known  laws 
of  Nature  stand  to  each  other;  much  more  must  it  be  so 
with  the  far  deeper  subject  of  the  relation  which  these 
laws  bear  to  the  Will  and  the  intentions  of  the  Supreme. 
But  as  cases  of  intention  frustrated,  of  structure  without 
apparent  purpose,  of  organs  dissociated  from  function 
and  from  the  opportunities  of  use,  are  sometimes  sources 
of  difficulty,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  this  subject  a 
little  nearer.  Let  us  look  at  it  both  in  the  light  of 
abstract  reasoning,  and  also  in  the  light  of  particular 
illustration. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  we  must  remember  that  results 
which  may  appear  as  exceptions  to  the  attainment  of  one 
Purpose  may  be  nothing  more  than  fulfilments  of  an- 
other. This  follows  from  the  truth  which  has  been  dealt 


174  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

with  in  a  former  page,1  that  we  are  "  greatly  ignorant," 
as  Bishop  Butler  says,  how  far  anything  in  Nature  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  means  or  as  an  end,  and  that  ultimate 
or  final  purposes  we  can  never  see.  The  difficulty  hence 
arising  has  often  been  represented  as  a  fundamental  ob- 
jection to  the  whole  doctrine  of  Intention.  But  this  view 
is  founded  on  a  very  great,  although  a  very  natural  con- 
fusion of  thought.  The  perception  of  Purpose  and  In- 
tention is  inseparable  from  the  perception  of  Adjustment 
and  Function  as  these  are  exhibited  in  Nature.  As  such 
it  belongs  to  Knowledge.  It  is  the  perception  of  a  re- 
lation between  those  phenomena  and  certain  well  known 
phenomena  of  Mind.  But  to  perceive  a  relation  is  not 
necessarily  to  perceive  all  that  this  relation  involves.  To 
perceive  intention  is  a  very  different  thing  from  per- 
ceiving all  that  is  intended.  Our  own  human  experience 
should  make  this  distinction  familiar  to  us.  Many  things 
we  do  and  many  things  we  contrive  are  done  and  con- 
trived with  more  than  one  intention.  In  the  light  of  this 
experience  it  is  altogether  irrational  to  regard  as  an  ex- 
ception to  the  attainment  of  Purpose  in  Nature  the  fact, 
for  example,  "  that  of  fifty  seeds  she  often  brings  but  one 
to  bear."  It  throws  no  doubt  or  difficulty  in  the  way  of 
our  conviction,  for  example,  that  one  purpose  of  seed- 

*  Ante,  p.  80. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  175 

bearing  in  Plants  is  the  reproduction  of  their  kind, 
because  it  appears  that  another  purpose  to  which  that 
seed-bearing  is  applied  is  the  support  of  animal  life. 
The  intention  with  which  a  grain  of  wheat  is  so  con- 
stituted as  to  be  capable  of  producing  another  wheat 
plant,  is  not  the  less  in  the  nature  of  Purpose  because 
it  co-exists  with  another  intention,  that  the  same  grain 
should  be  capable  of  sustaining  the  powers  and  the  en- 
joyments of  Life  in  the  Body  and  in  the  Mind  of  Man. 
On  the  contrary,  the  power  possessed  by  most  plants, 
and  by  this  plant  especially,  of  producing  seed  in  a 
ratio  far  beyond  that  which  would  be  required  for 
one  purpose,  is  the  sure  indication  and  the  proof  that 
another  purpose  larger  and  wider  was  in  view.  Yet  the 
seeds  of  corn  which,  as  seeds,  are  destroyed  when  they 
are  converted  into  bread,  may  in  that  aspect  be  re- 
presented and  regarded  as  "  failures."  In  reference  to 
this  kind  of  failure,  it  has  been  actually  argued  that  in 
Nature  "the  prodigality  of  waste  is  far  more  con- 
spicuous than  the  wise  economy  of  which  so  much  is 
said." x  When  applied  to  the  case  of  the  wheat  plant 
the  fallacy  is  apparent,  and  would  probably  be  admitted. 
But  this  is  only  one  example  of  a  class  to  which  an 
infinite  number  of  other  examples  in  Nature  may  be 

*  Mr.  G.  Ii.  Lewes,  Fortnightly  Review^  July  1867,  p.  100. 


176  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

referred.  There  may  be,  indeed,  and  there  are,  in- 
numerable examples  where  the  meaning  of  like  *'  failures  " 
is  not  equally  evident  to  us— some  which  may  be 
involved  in  utter  and  hopeless  darkness — some  which 
may  run  up  into  the  great  master  difficulty — that  which 
we  are  accustomed  to  call  the  "  Origin  of  Evil."  But 
the  same  argument  applies  to  all.  It  is  not  that  Purpose 
and  Intention  solve  all  difficulties.  But  it  is  that  no 
difficulty  in  perceiving  what  may  be  the  purpose  and 
intention  of  a  particular  fact  can  affect  the  reality  and 
truth  of  that  perception  in  other  cases  where  no  such 
difficulty  exists.  Let  us  now  look  at  the  same  subject 
in  the  light  of  particular  examples. 

There  is  one  explanation  which,  it  cannot  be  doubted, 
applies  to  many  cases ;  and  this  is,  the  simple  explana- 
tion that  we  often  mistake  the  purpose  of  particular 
structures  in  Nature,  and  connect  them  with  intentions 
which  are  not,  and  never  were,  the  intentions  really  in 
view.  The  best  naturalists  are  liable  to  such  mistakes.  A 
very  curious  illustration  is  afforded  by  an  observation  of 
Mr.  Darwin,  in  his  "  Origin  of  Species."  He  says  that 
"  if  green  Woodpeckers  alone  had  existed,  and  we  did 
not  know  that  there  were  any  black  and  pied  kinds, 
I  daresay  we  should  have  thought  that  the  green  colour 
was  a  beautiful  adaptation  to  hide  this  tree-frequenting 
bird  from  its  enemies."  Now,  this  introduces  us  to  a 


APPARENT    EXCEPTIONS.  177 

very  curious  subject,  and  one  as  well  adapted  as  any 
other  to  illustrate  the  relation  in  which  Law  stands  to 
Purpose  in  the  economy  of  Nature. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  principle  of  adapted 
colouring  with  the  effect  and  for  the  purpose  of  conceal- 
ment, prevails  extensively  in  various  branches  of  the 
Animal  Kingdom.  It  arises,  probably,  like  all  other 
phenomena,  by  way  of  Natural  Consequence,  out  of 
some  combination  of  forces  which  are  the  instruments 
employed.  We  have  no  knowledge  what  these  forces 
are ;  but  we  can  imagine  them  to  be  worked  into  a  law 
of  assimilation,  founded  on  some  such  principle  as  that 
which  photography  has  revealed.  It  is  true  that  Man 
has  not  yet  discovered  any  process  by  which  the  tints  of 
Nature  can  be  transferred,  as  the  most  delicate  shades 
of  light  can  be  transferred,  to  surfaces  artificially  pre- 
pared to  receive  them.  Such  a  process  is,  however,  very 
probably  within  the  reach  even  of  human  chemistry,  and 
it  is  one  which  is  certainly  known  in  the  laboratory  of 
Nature.  The  Chameleon  is  the  extreme  case  in  which 
the  effect  .of  such  a  process  is  proverbially  known. 
Many  Fish  exhibit  it  in  a  remarkable  degree,  changing 
colour  rapidly  in  harmony  with  the  colour  of  the  water  in 
which  they  swim,  or  of  the  bottom  on  which  they  lie.  The 
law  on  which  such  changes  depend  is  very  obscure :  but 
it  appears  to  be  a  natural  process,  as  constant  as  all  other 

N 


178  THE   RFIGN   OF  LAW. 

laws  are — that  is,  constant  whenever  given  conditions 
are  brought  together.  It  is  possible  that  the  effect  may 
be  due  to  a  cause  which  is  well  known  to  be  capable  of 
producing  somewhat  analogous  results.  Even  before  the 
days  of  Jacob  and  of  Laban,  it  seems  to  have  been 
•known  that  through  the  eyes  of  the  female  parent  colour 
can  be  determined  in  her  young ;  and  although  this  is 
certainly  not  the  law  which  commonly  determines  colour 
— operating  as  it  does,  so  far  as  we  know,  seldom,  and 
only  in  a  small  degree — it  is  quite  conceivable  that, 
under  special  conditions,  it  is  capable  of  being  worked 
as  a  great  power  in  Nature.  But,  then,  these  condition*? 
are  not  brought  together  except  with  a  view  to  purpose. 
For  now  let  us  see  how  this  law,  whatever  it  may  be,  is 
regulated  and  applied. 

One  thing  is  certain :  assimilated  colouring  is  not 
applied  universally;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  applied  very 
partially.  Is  it,  therefore,  applied  arbitrarily — at  hap- 
hazard, or  without  reference  to  conditions  in  which  we 
can  trace  a  reason  and  a  rule  ?  Far  from  it.  The  rule 
appears  to  be  this : — adaptive  colouring,  as  a  means  of 
concealment,  is  never  applied  (i)  to  any  animal  whose 
habits  do  not  expose  it  to  special  danger,  or  (2)  to  any 
animal  which  is  sufficiently  endowed  with  other  more 
effective  means  of  escape. 

This  is  the  higher  Law  of  Purpose  which  governs  the 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  179 

lesser  law,  whatever  it  may  be,  by  which  assimilative 
colouring  is  produced.  Now,  no  man  who  had  observed 
this  higher  law  could  ever  fall  into  the  error  of  supposing 
that  the  colour  of  the  Green  Woodpecker  was  given  to  it 
as  a  means  of  concealment.  Few  Birds  are  so  invisible 
as  Woodpeckers,  because  their  structure  and  habits  give 
them  other  methods  of  escaping  observation,  which  are 
most  curious  and  effective.  They  have  few  natural 
enemies  but  Man ;  and  when  in  danger  of  being  seen  by 
him,  they  slip  and  glide  round  the  bole  of  a  tree  or 
bough  on  which  they  may  be  climbing,  with  a  swift, 
silent,  and  cunning  motion,  and  from  behind  that  shelter, 
with  nothing  visible  but  their  head,  they  keep  a  close 
watch  upon  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  With  such 
sleight  of  feet,  there  is  no  need  of  lazier  methods  of 
concealment. 

Accordingly,  in  this  family  of  Birds,  the  law  of  assimi- 
lation is  withheld  from  application,  and  the  most  violent 
and  strongly  contrasted  colouring  prevails.  Jet  black, 
side  by  side  with  pure  white,  and  the  most  brilliant 
crimsons,  are  common  in  the  plumage  of  the  Wood- 
peckers. No  birds  are  more  conspicuous  in  colouring, 
yet  none  are  more  seldom  seen.  The  Green  Woodpecker 
itself,  with  its  yellow  tints  and  crimson  hood,  contrasts 
strongly  with  the  bark  on  which  it  climbs.  The  purpose 
of  concealment  being  effected  by  other  means,  gives 

N  9 


l8o  THE    REIGN   OF    LAW. 

way  to  the  purpose  of  beauty  or  of  adornment  in  the  dis- 
position of  colours.  And  in  general  the  same  rule  ap- 
plies to  all  Birds  whose  life  is  led  among  woods  and 
forests.  Comparatively  inaccessible  to  Birds  of  prey,  they 
exhibit  every  variety  of  tint,  and  the  principle  of  invisi- 
bility from  assimilated  colouring  is  almost  unknown. 

It  must  always  be  remembered,  that  animals  of  prey 
are  as  much  intended  to  capture  their  food,  as  their 
victims  are  intended  to  have  some  chances  and  facilities 
of  escape.  The  purpose  here  is  a  double  purpose — a 
purpose  not  in  all  cases  to  preserve  life,  but  to  maintain 
its  balance  and  due  proportion.  In  order  to  effect  this 
purpose,  the  means  of  aggression,  and  of  defence,  or  of 
escape,  must  bear  a  definite  relation  to  each  other  both 
in  kind  and  in  degree.  When  arboreal  Birds  leave  their 
sheltering  trees,  they  are  exposed  to  the  attacks  of 
Hawks,  but  they  have  fair  opportunities  of  retreating 
to  their  coverts  again;  and  the  upward  spring  of  the 
disappointed  Falcon  in  the  air,  when  his  quarry  reaches 
the  shelter  of  trees,  tells  how  effective  such  a  retreat  is, 
and  how  completely  it  ends  the  chase.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  a  great  variety  of  Birds  whose  habitat 
is  the  open  plain — the  desert — the  unprotected  shore — 
the  treeless  moor — the  stony  mountain-top.  These  are 
the  favourite  hunting-grounds  of  the  Eagles,  and  the 
Falcons,  and  the  Hawks.  There  they  have  free  scope 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  l8l 

for  their  great  powers  of  wing,  and  uninterrupted  range 
for  their  piercing  powers  of  sight.  And  it  must  be  re- 
membered, that  even  the  slowest  of  the  Hawks  can 
on  such  ground  capture  with  ease  Birds  which,  when 
once  on  the  wing,  could  distance  their  pursuer  by  supe- 
rior speed,  because  the  Hawk,  sweeping  over  the  ground, 
takes  the  prey  at  a  disadvantage,  pouncing  on  it  before 
it  can  get  fairly  into  the  air.  Birds  whose  habitat  is  thus 
exposed  could  not  maintain  their  existence  at  all  without 
special  means  of  concealment  or  escape.  Accordingly  it 
is  among  such  Birds  almost  exclusively  that  the  law  of 
assimilative  colouring  prevails.  And  among  them  it  is 
carried  to  a  perfection  which  is  wonderful  indeed. 
Every  ornithologist  will  recognise  the  truth  of  the 
observation,  that  this  law  prevails  chiefly  among  the 
Grouse,  the  Partridges,  the  Plovers,  the  Snipes,  Wood- 
cocks, Sandpipers,  and  other  kindred  families,  all  of 
which  inhabit  open  ground.  There  can  be  no  better 
examples  than  the  Grouse  and  the  Ptarmigan  of  our 
Scottish  mountains.  The  close  imitation  in  the  plumage 
of  these  Birds  of  the  general  tinting  and  mottling  of  the 
ground  on  which  they  lie  and  feed  is  apparent  at  a 
glance,  and  is  best  known  to  those  who  have  tried  to 
see  Grouse  or  Ptarmigan  when  sitting,  and  when  their 
position  is  indicated  within  a  few  feet  or  a  few  inches 
by  the  trembling  nostrils  and  dilated  eyeballs  of  a  steady 


1 82  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

Pointer-Dog.  In  the  case  of  the  common  Grouse,  as 
the  ground  is  nearly  uniform  in  colour  throughout  the 
year,  the  colouring  of  the  Bird  is  constant  also.  But 
in  the  case  of  the  Ptarmigan,  it  changes  with  the  chang- 
ing seasons.  The  pearly  grays  which  in  summer  match 
so  exactly  with  the  lichens  of  the  mountain  peaks,  give 
place  in  winter  to  the  pure  white  which  matches  not 
less  perfectly  with  the  wreaths  of  snow. 

This  is  indeed  a  change  which  requires  for  its  pro- 
duction the  agency  of  other  laws  than  those  merely 
of  reflected  light,  because  the  substitution  of  one  entire 
set  of  feathers  for  another  of  a  different  colour,  twice 
in  every  year,  implies  arrangements  which  lie  deep  in 
the  organic  chemistry  of  the  Bird.  The  various  genera 
of  Sand-Grouse  and  Sand-Partridges  which  frequent  the 
deserts  and  naked  plains  of  the  Asiatic  continent,  are 
coloured  in  exquisite  harmony  with  the  ground.  Our 
common  Woodcock  is  another  excellent  example,  and 
is  all  the  more  remarkable  as  there  is  one  very  peculiar 
colour  introduced  into  the  plumage  of  this  Bird  which 
exactly  corresponds  with  a  particular  stage  in  the  decay 
of  fallen  leaves — I  mean  that  in  which  the  browns  and 
yellows  of  the  Autumn  rot  away  into  the  pale  ashy 
skeletons  which  lie  in  thousands  under  every  wood  in 
winter.  This  colour  is  exactly  reproduced  in  the  feathers 
of  the  Woodcock,  and  so  mingled  with  the  dark  browns 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  183 

and  warm  yellows  of  fresher  leaves,  that  the  general 
imitation  of  effect  is  perfect.  And  so  curiously  is  the 
purpose  of  concealment  worked  out  in  the  plumage 
of  the  Woodcock,  that  one  conspicuous  ornament  of 
the  bird  is  covered  by  a  special  provision  from  the 
too  curious  gaze  of  those  for  whose  admiration  it  was 
not  intended.  The  tail-feathers  of  the  Woodcock  can 
be  erected  and  spread  out  at  pleasure  like  a  fan, 
and,  being  tipped  on  their  under  surface  with  white 
of  a  brilliant  and  silvery  lustre,  set  off  by  contrast  with 
an  adjacent  patch  of  velvety  black,  they  then  produce  a 
most  conspicuous  effect.  But  the  same  web  which  on  its 
under  surface  bears  this  beautiful  but  dangerous  orna- 
ment, is  on  its  upper  surface  dulled  down  to  a  sombre 
ashy-gray,  and  becomes  as  invisible  as  the  rest  of  the 
plumage.  These  are  all  provisions  of  Nature,  which 
stand  in  clear  and  intelligible  relation  to  the  habits  of 
the  Bird.  It  rests  all  day  upon  the  ground,  under  trees ; 
and  were  it  not  for  its  ingeniously  adapted  colouring,  it 
would  be  peculiarly  exposed  to  destruction.  Man  is 
an  enemy  whose  cunning  inventions  overcome  all  such 
methods  of  protection,  and  the  Woodcock,  when  in  his 
most  rapid  flight,  is  now  an  easier  prey  than  in  older 
times  when  sitting  on  the  ground.  But  before  fire-arms 
had  reached  the  perfection  which  has  enabled  us  to 
shoot  flying  Birds,  the  colouring  of  the  Woodcock  served 


1 84  THE    RF.IGN    OF   LAW. 

it  in  good  stead,  even  against  the  Lords  of  the  Creation. 
In  old  times  it  required  special  skill  and  practice  to  see 
Woodcocks  on  the  ground,  and  the  large  lustrous  black 
eye  which  is  adapted  for  night-vision  was  the  one  spot 
of  colour  which  enabled  the  fowler  of  a  century  and 
a  half  years  ago  to  detect  the  bird.  Thus  Hudibras 
has  it : — 

"  For  fools  are  known  by  looking  wise, 
As  men  find  woodcocks  by  their  eyes."1 

In  Snipes,  again,  there  is  a  remarkable  series  of  straw- 
coloured  feathers  introduced  along  the  back  and  shoul- 
ders, which  perfectly  imitate  the  general  effect  of  the 
bleached  vegetable  stalks  common  on  the  ground  which 
the  Bird  frequents. 

There  are  other  animals  in  which  the  principle  of 
imitation  with  a  view  to  concealment  is  carried  very 
much  farther  than  the  mere  imitation  of1  colour,  and 
extends  also  to  form  and  structure.  There  are  some 
examples  of  this 'in  the  Class  of  Insects,  so  remarkable 
that  it  is  impossible  to  look  at  them  without  ever  fresh 
astonishment.  I  refer  to  some  families  of  the  Orthop- 
terous  order,  and  especially  to  some  genera  of  the 
Mantida  and  Phasmidce.  Many  species  of  the  genus 
Mantis  are  wholly  modelled  in  the  form  of  vegetable 

*  "  Hudibras  to  Sidrophel,"  79,  80. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  185 

growths.  The  legs  are  made  to  imitate  leaf- stalks,  the 
body  is  elongated  and  notched  so  as  to  simulate  a  twig  ; 
the  segment  of  the  shoulders  is  spread  out  and  flattened 
in  the  likeness  of  a  seed-vessel ;  and  the  large  wings  are 
exact  imitations  of  a  full-blown  leaf,  with  all  its  veins  and 
skeleton  complete,  and  all  its  colour  and  apparent  tex- 
ture. There  is  something  startling  and  almost  horrible 
in  the  completeness  of  the  deception — very  horrible  it 
must  be  to  its  hapless  victims.  For  in  this  case  the 
purpose  of  the  imitation  is  a  purpose  of  destruction,  the 
Mantis  being  a  predacious  insect,  armed  with  the  most 
terrible  weapons,  hid  under  the  peaceful  forms  of  the 
vegetable  world.  It  is  the  habit  of  these  creatures  to 
sit  upon  the  leaves  which  they  so  closely  resemble,  ap- 
parently motionless,  but  really  advancing  on  their  prey 
with  a  slow  and  insensible  approach.  Their  structure 
disarms  suspicion.  Wonderful  as  this  structure  is,  it 
would  be  none  the  less,  but  all  the  more  wonderful,  if 
it  should  arise  by  way  of  Natural  Consequence  from 
some  law  of  development  or  of  growth.  It  must  be  a 
law  of  which  at  present  we  have  no  knowledge,  and 
can  hardly  form  any  conception.  But  certain  it  is  that 
here,  as  in  all  other  cases,  the  purpose  which  is  actually 
attained,  is  attained  by  a  special  adaptation  of  ordinary 
structure  to  a  special  and  extraordinary  purpose.  No 
new  members  are  given  to  the  Mantis;  there  is  no 


1 86  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

departure  from  the  plan  on  which  all  other  Insects  of 
the  same  Order  are  designed.  The  body  has  the  same 
number  of  segments,  the  legs  are  the  same  in  number, 
and  are  composed  of  the  same  joints ;  every  part  of  this 
strange  creature  which  seems  like  a  bit  of  foliage  ani- 
mated with  insect  life,  can  be  referred  to  its  correspond- 
ing part  in  the  ordinary  anatomy  of  its  Class.  The 
whole  effect  is  produced  by  a  little  elongation  here,  a 
little  swelling  there,  a  little  dwarfing  of  one  part,  a  little 
development  of  another.  The  most  striking  part  of  the 
whole  imitation — that  of  the  "  nervation  "  of  the  leaf — 
is  produced  by  a  modification,  not  very  violent,  of  a 
structure  which  belongs  to  all  flying  Insects.  Their 
wings  are  constructed  of  a  thin  filmy  material  stretched 
upon  a  framework  of  stronger  substance,  as  the  sails  of 
a  windmill  are  stretched  upon  a  trellis-work  of  spars. 
This  framework  is  designed  in  a  great  variety  of  patterns 
— more  elaborate  and  more  beautiful  than  the  tracery 
of  Gothic  windows.  In  the  Mantis  this  tracery,  instead 
of  being  drawn  in  a  mere  pattern,  is  drawn  in  imitation 
of  the  nervature  of  a  leaf.  And  imitative  colouring  is 
added  to  imitative  structure — so  that  nothing  should  be 
wanting  to  its  completeness  and  success. 

It  must  always  be  remembered,  however,  that  Con- 
trivance in  Nature  can  never  be  reduced  to  a  single 
purpose,  and  to  that  alone.  Almost  every  example  of 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  187 

it  is  connected  with  a  number  of  effects  which  fit  into 
each  other  in  endless  ramifications  of  adjustment.  For 
example,  this  imitative  structure  of  the  Mantidtz  serves 
as  well  for  their  own  protection  from  insectivorous  birds 
as  for  the  procuring  of  their  food  in  the  capture  of  other 
.Insects.  And  this,  which  is  perhaps  the  subordinate 
purpose  in  the  case  of  the  Mantida,  emerges  as  the 
main  purpose  in  another  family  of  imitative  Insects,  the 
Phasmidcz.  These  last  are  vegetable  feeders,  and  their 
imitative  structure  is,  if  possible,  even  more  wonderful, 
as  it  certainly  is  more  beautiful.  In  some  species  the 
wings  are  not  only  made  like  leaves  in  form,  in  struc- 
ture, and  in  general  colour,  but  they  are  tinted  at 
different  seasons  of  the  year  with  the  varying  colours 
of  spring,  of  summer,  or  of  autumn.  The  fundamental 
green  is  shaded  off  into  browns,  and  reds,  and  yellows, 
with  a  few  of  those  crimson  touches  which  are  so  com- 
mon in  the  "  Pageant  of  the  year."  There  is  one  speci- 
men in  the  British  Museum  where  the  imitative  effect  is 
pursued,  as  it  were,  into  a  region  of  still  more  minute 
and  curious  observation.  The  general  aspect  of  sum- 
mer vegetation  is  much  affected  by  the  ravages  of  insect 
life.  Minute  larvae  eat  into  the  cuticle  of  leaves,  and 
mark  them  with  various  spots  of  bleached  or  faded 
colour.  Now  the  specimen  of  Phasma  I  refer  to  has 
its  wing  covered  with  spots  which  exactly  imitate  this 


1 88  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

appearance  of  a  larva-eaten  leaf.  Can  it  be  that  this 
effect  is  itself  produced  by  a  really  similar  cause — the 
eating  of  some  larval  parasite  into  the  tissue  of  the 
wing?  If  so,  the  combination  of  means  to  the  pro- 
duction of  so  wonderful  an  effect  becomes  only  the 
more  bewildering  in  the  endless  vistas  of  adjustment 
which  are  opened  out.  And  there  is  another  fact  con- 
nected with  these  Insects  which  is  as  astonishing  as  any 
other.  It  is  this — that  the  idea  and  purpose  of  imitation 
is  carried  into  effect  consistently  and  perseveringly 
through  all  the  stages  of  the  creature's  metamorphoses. 
The  eggs  are  as  perfect  imitations  of  vegetable  seeds  as 
the  adult  insect  is  of  the  expanded  leaf.  In  the  larval 
form  they  are  like  bits  of  stalk,  or  chips  or  cuttings  of 
leaves. 

But  although  the  laws  which  determine  both  form 
and  colouring  are  here  seen  to  be  subservient  to  use, 
we  shall  never  understand  the  phenomena  of  Nature 
unless  we  admit  that  mere  ornament  or  beauty  is  in 
itself  a  purpose,  an  object,  and  an  end.  Mr.  Darwin 
denies  this ;  but  he  denies  it  under  the  strange  impres- 
sion, that  to  admit  it  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to  his 
own  theory  on  the  Origin  of  Species.  So  much  the 
worse  for  his  theory,  if  this  incompatibility  be  true. 
There  is  indeed  a  difference,  at  least  in  words,  between 
the  doctrine  now  asserted  and  the  doctrine  which  Mr. 


APPARENT    EXCEPTIONS.  189 

Darwin  denies.  What  he  denies  as  a  purpose  in  nature 
is  beauty  "  in  the  eyes  of  Man."  But  this  evades  the 
real  point  at  issue.  The  relation  in  which  natural 
beauty  stands  to  Man's  appreciation  of  it,  is  quite  a 
separate  question.  It  is  certain  enough  that  the  gift 
of  ornament  in  natural  things  has  not  been  lavished, 
as  it  is  lavished,  for  the  mere  admiration  of  mankind. 
Ornament  was  as  universal — applied  upon  a  scale  at 
once  as  grand  and  as  minute  as  now — during  the  long 
ages  before  Man  was  born.  Some  of  the  most  beau- 
tiful forms  in  Nature  are  the  shells  of  the  marine  Mol- 
lusca,  and  many  of  them  are  the  richest,  too,  in  surface 
ornament.  But,  prodigal  of  beauty  as  the  Ocean  now 
is  in  the  creatures  which  it  holds,  its  wealth  was  even 
greater  and  more  abounding  in  times  when  there  was  no 
man  to  gather  them.  The  shells  and  corals  of  the  old 
Silurian  Sea  were  as  elaborate  and  as  richly  carved  as 
those  which  we  now  admire  :  and  the  noble  Ammonites 
of  the  Secondary  ages  must  have  been  glorious  things 
indeed.  Even  now  there  is  abundant  evidence  that 
although  Man  was  intended  to  admire  beauty,  beauty 
was  not  intended  only  for  Man's  admiration.  Nowhere 
is  ornament  more  richly  given,  nowhere  is  it  seen  more 
separate  from  use,  than  in  those  organisms  of  whose 
countless  millions  the  microscope  alone  enables  a  few 
men  for  a  few  moments  to  see  s  few  examples.  There 


THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


is  no  better  illustration  of  this  than  a  class  of  forms 
belonging  to  the  border-land  of  animal  and  vegetable  life 
called  the  Diatomacea,  which,  though  invisible  to  the 
naked  eye,  play  an  important  part  in  the  economy  of 
Nature.  They  exist  almost  everywhere,  and  of  their 
remains  whole  strata,  and  even  mountains,  are  in  great  part 
composed.  They  have  shells  of  pure  silex,  and  these, 
each  after  its  own  kind,  are  all  covered  with  the  most 
elaborate  ornament  —  striated,  or  fluted,  or  punctured,  or 
dotted  in  patterns  which  are  mere  patterns,  but  patterns 
of  perfect,  and  sometimes  of  most  complex,  beauty. 
No  graving  done  with  the  graver's  tool  can  equal  that 
work  in  gracefulness  of  design,  or  in  delicacy  and 
strength  of  touch.  Yet  it  is  impossible  to  look  at 
these  forms  —  in  all  the  variety  which  is  often  crowded 
under  a  single  lens—  without  recognising  instinctively 
that  the  work  of  the  graver  is  work  strictly  analogous, 
—  addressed  to  the  same  perceptions,  —  founded  on  the 
same  idea,  —  having  for  its  object  the  same  end  and  aim. 
And  as  the  work  of  the  graver  varies  for  the  mere  sake 
of  varying,  so  does  the  work  on  these  microscopic 
shells.  In  the  same  drop  of  moisture  there  may  be 
some  dozen  or  twenty  forms,  each  with  its  own  dis- 
tinctive pattern,  all  as  constant  as  they  are  distinctive, 
yet  having  all  apparently  the  same  habits,  and  without 
any  perceptible  difference  of  function, 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS. 


It  would  be  to  doubt  the  evidence  of  our  senses 
and  of  our  reason,  or  else  to  assume  hypotheses  of 
which  there  is  no  proof  whatever,  if  we  were  to  doubt 
that  mere  ornament,  mere  variety,  are  as  much  an  end 
and  aim  in  the  workshop  of  Nature  as  they  are  known 
to  be  in  the  workshop  of  the  goldsmith  and  the  jeweller. 
Why  should  they  not?  The  love  and  desire  of  these 
is  universal  in^the  mind  of  Man.  It  is  seen  not  more 
distinctly  in  the  highest  forms  of  civilized  art  than 
in  the  habits  of  the  rudest  savage,  who  covers  with 
elaborate  carving  the  handle  of  his  war-club,  or  the 
prow  of  his  canoe.  Is  it  likely  that  this  universal  aim 
and  purpose  of  the  mind  of  Man  should  be  wholly 
without  relation  to  the  aims  and  purposes  of  his  Creator? 
He  that  formed  the  eye  to  see  beauty,  shall  He  not  see 
it  ?  He  that  gave  the  human  hand  its  cunning  to  work 
for  beauty,  shall  His  hand  never  work  for  it?  How, 
then,  shall  we  account  for  all  the  beauty  of  the  world  —  for 
the  careful  provision  made  for  it  where  it  is  only  the 
secondary  object,  not  the  first?  Even  in  those  cases, 
for  example,  where  concealment  is  the  main  object  in 
view,  ornament  is  never  forgotten,  but  lies  as  it  were 
underneath,  carried  into  effect  under  the  conditions 
and  limitations  imposed  by  the  higher  law  and  the 
more  special  purpose.  Thus  the  feathers  of  the  Ptar- 
migan, though  confined  by  the  law  of  assimilative 


192  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

colouring  to  a  mixture  of  black  and  white  or  gray, 
have  those  simple  colours  disposed  in  crescent  bars 
and  mottlings  of  beautiful  form,  even  as  the  lichens 
which  they  imitate  spread  in  radiating  lines  and  semi- 
circular ripples  over  the  weather-beaten  stones.  It  is 
the  same  with  all  other  Birds  whose  colour  is  the  colour 
of  their  home.  For  the  purpose  of  concealment,  their 
colouring  would  be  equally  effective  if  it  were  laid  on 
without  order  or  regularity  of  form.  But  this  is  never 
done.  The  required  tints  are  always  disposed  in  pat- 
terns, each  varying  with  the  genus  and  the  species; 
varying  for  the  mere  sake  of  variation,  and  for  the 
beauty  which  belongs  to  ornament.  And  where  this 
purpose  is  not  under  the  restraint  of  any  other  purpose 
controlling  it  and  keeping  it  down  as  it  were  within  com- 
paratively narrow  limits,  how  gorgeous  are  the  results 
attained  !  What  shall  we  say  of  flowers — those  banners 
of  the  vegetable  world,  which  march  in  such  various 
and  splendid  triumph  before  the  coming  of  its  fruits  ? 
What  shall  we  say  of  the  Humming  Birds — whose 
feathers  are  made  to  return  the  light  which  falls  upon 
them,  as  if  rekindled  from  intenser  fires,  and  coloured 
with  more  than  all  the  colours  of  all  the  gems  ? 

There  is  one  instance  in  Nature  (and,  as  far  as  I 
know,  only  one)  in  which  ornament  takes  the  form  of 
pictorial  representation.  The  secondary  feathers  in  the 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  1 93 

wing  of  the  Argus  Pheasant  are  developed  into  long 
plumes,  which  the  bird  can  erect  and  spread  out  like  a 
fan,  as  a  Peacock  spreads  his  train.  These  feathers 
are  decorated  with  a  series  of  conspicuous  spots  or 
"  eyes,"  which  are  so  coloured  as  to  imitate  the  effect  of 
balls.  The  shadows  and  the  "high  light"  are  placed 
exactly  where  an  artist  would  place  them  in  order  to 
represent  a  sphere.1  The  "  eyes "  of  the  Peacock's 
train  are  wonderful  examples  of  ornament ;  but  they 
do  not  represent  anything  except  their  own  harmonies 
of  colour.  The  "  eyes  "  of  the  Argus  Pheasant  are  like 
the  "ball  and  socket"  ornament  which  is  common  in 
the  decorations  of  human  art.  It  is  no  answer  to  this 
argument  in  respect  to  beauty,  that  we  are  constantly 
discovering  the  use  of  beautiful  structures  in  which  the 
beauty  only,  and  not  the  usefulness,  had  been  hitherto 
perceived.  The  harmonies  on  which  all  beauty  pro- 
bably depends  are  so  minutely  connected  in  Nature  that 
"use"  and  ornament  may  often  both  arise  out  of  the 
same  conditions.  Thus,  some  of  the  most  beautiful 
lines  on  the  surface  of  shells  are  simply  the  lines  oi 
their  annual  growth,  which  growth  has  followed  definite 
curves,  and  it  is  the  "  law "  of  these  curves  that  is  beau- 

1  I  owe  the  observation  of  thir  curious  fact  to  my  friend  Mr. 
James  Nasmyth,  so  well  known  as  the  inventor  of  the  Steam 
Hammer,  and  as  a  distinguished  astronomer. 

0 


194  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW, 

tiful  in  our  eyes.  Again,  the  forms  of  many  Fish  which 
are  so  beautiful,  are  also  forms  founded  on  the  lines 
of  least  resistance.  The  same  observation  applies  to 
the  form  of  the  bodies  and  of  the  wings  of  Birds. 
Throughout  Nature,  ornament  is  perpetually  the  result 
of  conditions  and  arrangements  fitted  to  use  and  con- 
trived for  the  discharge  of  function.  But  the  same 
principle  applies  to  human  art,  and  few  persons  are 
probably  aware  how  many  of  the  mere  ornaments  of 
architecture  are  the  traditional  representation  of  parts 
which  had  their  origin  in  essential  structure.  Yet  who 
would  argue  from  this  fact  that  ornament  is  not  a  special 
aim  in  the  works  of  Man  ?  When  the  savage  carves  the 
handle  of  his  war-club,  the  immediate  purpose  of  his 
carving  is  to  give  his  own  hand  a  firmer  hold.  But  any 
shapeless  scratches  would  be  enough  for  this.  When  he 
carves  it  in  an  elaborate  pattern,  he  does  so  for  the  love 
of  ornament,  and  to  satisfy  the  sense  of  beauty. 

There  is,  however,  another  department  of  natural 
phenomena  which,  much  more  than  the  one  we  have 
been  now  considering,  does  at  first  sight  suggest  to  the 
mind  the  subordination  of  Purpose  and  the  supremacy 
of  Law.  It  is  the  department  of  Comparative  Anatomy. 
It  is  a  fact  now  well  known  and  universally  accepted, 
that  in  many  animal  structures,  perhaps  in  all  except 
one,  there  are  parts  the  presence  of  which  cannot  be 


APPARENT    EXCEPTIONS.  1 95 

explained,  from  their  serving  any  immediate  use,  or 
discharging  any  actual  function.  For  example,  the  limbs 
of  all  the  Mammalia,  and  even  of  all  the  Lizards,  termi- 
nate in  five  jointed  bones  or  fingers.  But  in  many 
animals  the  whole  five  are  not  needed,  but  only  some  one, 
or  two,  or  three.  In  such  cases  the  remainder  are  indeed 
dwarfed,  sometimes  almost  extinguished ;  but  the  curious 
fact  is  that  rudimentally  the  whole  number  are  always  to 
be  traced.  Even  in  the  Horse,  where  one  only  of  the 
five  is  directly  used,  and  where  this  one  is  enlarged  and 
developed  into  a  hoof,,  parts  corresponding  to  the  remain- 
ing four  fingers  can  be  detected  in  the  anatomy  of  the 
limb.  Other  examples  of  the  same  principle  might  be 
given  without  number.  Thus  there  are  Monkeys  which 
have  no  thumbs  for  use,  but  only  thumb-bones  hid 
beneath  the  skin  :  the  wingless  Bird  of  New  Zealand,  the 
"  Apteryx,"  has  useless  wing-bones  similarly  placed :  snakes 
destined  always  to  creep  "  upon  their  belly"  have  never- 
theless rudiments  of  legs,  and  the  common  "  Slowworm  " 
has  even  the  "  blade  bone  "  and  ' '  collar  bone  "  of  rudi- 
mentary or  aborted  limbs  :  the  Narwhal  has  only  one 
tusk,  on  the  left  side,  developed  for  use,  like  the  horn  of 
an  heraldic  Unicorn,  but  the  other  tusk,  on  the  right 
side,  is  present  as  a  useless  germ :  the  female  Narwhal 
has  both  tusks  reduced  to  the  same  unserviceable  con- 
dition: young  whalebone  Whales  are  born  with  teeth 
o  2 


196  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

which   never   cut   the  gum,   and  which   are  afterwards 
absorbed  as  entirely  useless  to  the  creature's  life. 

At  first  sight  it  may  appear  as  if  these  were  facts  not 
to  be  reconciled  with  the  supremacy  of  Purpose  : — at 
first  sight,  but  at  first  sight  only.  For  as  we  look  at 
them  and  wonder  at  them,  and  set  ourselves  to  discover 
how  many  of  a  like  nature  can  be  found,  our  eye  catches 
sight  of  an  Order  which  had  not  been  at  first  perceived. 
Exceptions  to  one  narrow  rule  such  as  we  might  have 
laid  down  and  followed  for  ourselves,  they  are  now  seen 
to  be  in  strict  subordination  to  a  larger  rule  which  it 
would  never  have  entered  into  our  imagination  to  con- 
ceive. These  useless  members,  these  rudimentary  or 
aborted  limbs  which  puzzled  us  so  much,  are  parts  of  an 
universal  Plan.  On  this  plan  the  bony  skeletons  of 
all  living  animals  have  been  put  together.  The  forces 
which  have  been  combined  for  the  moulding  of  Or- 
ganic Forms  have  been  so  combined  as  to  mould  them 
after  certain  types  or  patterns.  And  when  Comparative 
Anatomy  has  revealed  this  fact  as  affecting  all  the 
animals  of  the  existing  world,  another  branch  of  the 
same  science  comes  in  to  conform  the  generalisation, 
and  extend  it  over  the  innumerable  creatures  which 
have  existed  and  have  passed  away.  This  one  Plan  of 
Organic  Life  has  never  been  departed  from  since  Time 
began. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  1 97 

When  we  have  grasped  this  great  fact,  all  the  lesser 
facts  which  are  subordinate  to  it  assume  a-  new  signi- 
ficance. In  the  first  place  a  Plan  of  this  kind  is  in 
itself  a  Purpose.  An  Order  so  vast  as  this,  including 
within  itself  such  variety  of  detail,  and  maintained 
through  such  periods  of  Time,  implies  combination 
and  adjustment  founded  upon,  and  carrying  into  effect, 
one  vast  conception.  It  is  only  as  an  Order  of  Thought 
that  the  doctrine  of  Animal  Homologies  is  intelligible 
at  all.  It  is  a  Mental  Order,  and  can  only  be  mentally 
perceived.  For  what  do  we  mean  when  we  say  that 
this  bone  in  one  kind  of  animal  corresponds  to  such 
another  bone  in  another  kind  of  animal?  Corresponds 
— in  what  sense?  Not  in  the  method  of  using  it — for 
very  often  limbs  which  are  homologically  the  same  are 
put  to  the  most  diverse  and  opposite  uses.  To  what 
standard,  then,  are  we  referring  when  we  say  that  such 
and  such  two  limbs  are  homologically  the  same  ?  It  is 
to  the  standard  of  an  Ideal  Order — a  Plan — a  Type — a 
Pattern  mentally  conceived.  This  sounds  very  recon- 
dite and  metaphysical ;  and  yet  the  habit  of  referring 
physical  facts  to  some  ideal  standard  and  order  of 
thought  is  a  universal  instinct  in  the  human  mind.  It 
is  one  of  the  earliest  of  our  efforts  in  endeavouring  to 
understand  the  phenomena  around  us.  The  science  of 
Homologies,  as  developed  by  Cuvier  and  Hunter  and 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 


Owen  and  Huxley,  is  indeed  an  intricate,  almost  a 
transcendental  science.  Yet  Dr.  Livingstone  found  the 
natives  of  Africa  debating  a  question  which  belongs 
essentially  to  that  science  and  involves  the  whole  prin- 
ciple of  the  mental  process  by  which  it  is  pursued. 
The  debate  was  on  the  question  "  whether  the  two  toes 
of  the  Ostrich  represent  the  thumb  and  forefinger  in 
Man,  or  the  little  and  ring-finger."  l  This  is  purely  a 
question  of  Comparative  Anatomy.  It  is  founded  on 
the  instinctive  perception  that  even  between  two  frames 
so  widely  separated  as  those  of  an  Ostrich  and  a  Man, 
there  is  a  common  Plan  of  structure,  with  reference  to 
which  plan,  parts  wholly  dissimilar  in  appearance  and  in 
use,  can  nevertheless  be  identified  as  "representative" 
of  each  other  :  —  that  is,  as  holding  the  same  relative 
place  in  one  Ideal  Order  of  arrangement. 

The  recognition  of  this  idea  in  minds  so  rude  is  not 
the  less  remarkable  from  the  fact  that  both  sides  in  this 
African  debate  were  wrong  in  their  practical  application 
of  the  idea  to  the  particular  case  before  them.  Unity 
of  design  amidst  variety  of  form  is  so  conspicuous  and 
universal  in  the  works  of  Nature  that  the  perception 
of  it  could  not  possibly  escape  recognition  even  by  the 
rudest  human  mind,  formed  as  that  Mind  is  to  see 

1  "The  Zambesi  and  its  Tributaries,"  p.  424. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  1 99 

Order,  and  to  work  for  it,  and  to  admire  it.  But  though 
instinct  is  enough  to  give  us  the  general  idea,  and  to 
trace  it  in  a  thousand  instances  where  it  can  hardly  be 
overlooked,  yet  it  needs  close  and  laborious  study,  and 
high  powers  of  analysis  and  of  thought,  to  trace  cor- 
rectly the  true  Order  and  Plan  through  the  fine  and 
subtle  passages  of  Nature.  It  would  have  astonished 
those  poor  natives  of  Africa  to  be  told,  as  is  the  truth, 
that  if  they  wished  to  find  in  the  Ostrich  the  parts 
corresponding  to  their  own  middle  finger,  or  ring-finger, 
or  any  other  finger,  they  must  look,  not  to  the  toes  of 
the  Ostrich,  but  to  her  little  aborted  wings,  which,  though 
useless  for  the  purposes  of  flight,  are  still  retained  as 
representing  the  wings  of  other  Birds,  and  the  forearms 
of  all  the  Mammals. 

For  here  we  come  upon  the  interchange  and  crossing 
as  it  were  of  two  distinct  ideas,  which  seem  to  stand  the 
one  as  the  warp  and  the  other  as  the  woof  in  the  fabrics 
of  Organic  Life.  There  is  the  idea  of  Homology  in 
Structure  and  the  idea  of  Analogy  in  Use.  The  one 
represents  the  Unity  of  Design,  the  other  represents 
Variety  of  Function.  It  might  have  been  supposed  that 
these  could  not  easily  be  reconciled — that  where  great 
differences  in  use  and  application  are  essential,  rigid 
adherence  to  one  pattern  of  structure  would  be  an  im- 
pediment in  the  way.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  same 


200  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

bones  in  different  animals  are  made  subservient  to  the 
widest  possible  diversity  of  function.  The  same  limbs 
are  converted  into  paddles,  and  wings,  and  legs,  and 
arms.  And  so  it  is  with  every  other  part  of  the  skeleton 
and  every  other  organ  of  the  body.  Indeed  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  say  whether  the  law  of  unity  in  design,  or  the 
law  of  variety  in  adaptation,  is  pushed  to  the  greatest 
length.  There  are  some  cases  in  which  the  adaptation 
of  form  to  special  function  is  carried  so  far  that  all 
appearance  of  common  structure  is  entirely  lost.  It 
is  very  difficult,  for  example,  to  persuade  persons  igno- 
rant of  the  principles  of  anatomy  that  the  Whale  and 
the  Porpoise  are  not  Fish,  that  they  breathe  with  lungs 
as  Man  breathes,  that  they  would  be  drowned  if  kept 
long  under  water,  and  that,  as  they  suckle  their  young, 
they  belong  to  the  same  great  Class,  Mammalia.  Living 
in  the  same  element  as  Fish,  and  feeding  very  much  as 
fishes  feed,  a  similar  outward  form  has  been  given  to 
them,  because  that  form  is  the  best  adapted  for  pro- 
gression through  the  water.  But  that  form  has  been, 
so  to  speak,  put  on  round  the  Mammalian  skeleton,  and 
covers  all  the  organs  proper  to  the  Mammalian  Class. 
Whales  and  Porpoises,  notwithstanding  their  form,  and 
their  habitat,  and  their  food,  are  as  separate  from 
Fishes  as  the  Elephant,  or  the  Hippopotamus,  or  the 
Giraffe. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  2OI 

And  when  we   remember   that  the  immense  variety 
of  Organic  Forms  in  the  existing  world  does  not  exhaust 
the  adaptability  of  their  Plan,  but  that  the  still  vaster 
varieties  of  all  the  extinct  creations  have  circled  round 
the  same  central  Types,  it  becomes  evident  that  these 
Types  have  had  from  the  first  a  Purpose  which  has  been 
well  and  wonderfully  fulfilled.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
see   that   the  original  conception  of  the  framework  of 
Organic  Life  has  included  in  itself  provisions  for  apply- 
ing the  principle  of  adaptation  in  infinite  degrees.     Its 
last  development  is  in  Man.      In  his  frame  there  is  no 
aborted  member.     Every  part  is  put  to  its  highest  use  : — 
highest,  that  is,  in  reference  to  the  supremacy  of  Mind.1 
There  are  stronger  arms,  there  are  swifter  limbs,  there 
are  more  powerful  teeth,  there  are  finer  ears,  there  are 
sharper  eyes.     There  are  creatures  which  go  where  he 
cannot  go,  and  can  live  where  he  would  die.     But  all 
his    members   are    co-ordinated  with    one  power — the 
power  of  Thought.     Through  this  he  has  the  dominion 
over  all  other  created  things — whilst  yet  as  regards  the 
type  and  pattern  of  his  frame  he  has  not  a  single  bone 
or  joint  or  organ  which  he  does  not  share  with  some  one 
or  other  of  the  Beasts  that  perish.     It  is  not  in  any  of 

1  "Quid  reliqua  descriptione  omnium  corporis  partium,  in  qua 
nihil  inane,  nihil  sine  causa,  nihil  supervacaneum  est?" — Cicero^ 
"De  Nat.  Deor.,"  lib.  i.  cap.  33. 


2O2  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

the  parts  of  his  structure,  but  in  their  combination  and 
adjustment,  that  he  stands  alone. 

All  these  facts  must  convince  us  that  we  must  enlarge 
our  ideas  as  to  what  is  meant  by  Use  in  the  Economy  of 
Nature.  In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  so  interpreted  as  to 
include  ornament ;  and  in  the  second  place,  it  must  in- 
clude also  not  merely  Actual  Use,  but  Potential  Use,  or 
the  capacity  of  being  turned  to  use  in  new  creations. 
Of  course  this  is  one  of  the  ideas  which  Philosophers  of 
the  Positive  School  denounce  as  "Metaphysical."  But 
here  again  their  opposition  is  itself  based  upon  meta- 
physics, only  upon  metaphysics  which  are  bad.  "  Po- 
tential existence,"  says  Mr.  Lewes,1  "  is  ideal  not  real." 
"  A  fact  is  not  a  fact  until  it  is  accomplished.  Nothing 
exists  before  it  exists.  This  truism  is  disregarded  by  those 
who  talk  of  potential  existence."  So  it  is,  and  it  ought  to 
be  disregarded,  because  it  has  no  bearing  on  the  question. 
May  not  the  formation  of  a  plan  or  conspiracy  to  murder 
be  "a  fact"  although  the  murder  is  not  "accomplished?" 
Is  not  the  capacity  in  the  different  pieces  of  a  puzzle 
of  being  fitted  together,  a  fact — even  when  the  pieces 
are  all  huddled  confusedly  in  a  box  ?  Is  there  no  poten- 
tial use  in  the  udder  of  a  cow-calf  before  it  can  have 
had  any  calves  of  its  own?  Is  the  idea  of  Potential 

1  "History  of  Philosophy,"  Prologue,  p.  Ixxxviii. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  203 

use  in  all  these  cases  an  idea  which  has  no  "reality?" 
Are  they  mere  "artifices  of  thought,"  or  "preliminary 
falsifications  of  fact  ?  "  If  the  metaphysics  of  Positivism 
are  available  to  establish  this  conclusion,  they  must  be 
equally  available  to  condemn  knowledge  in  all  its  forms 
as  "Ideal"  and  not  "real."  Bad  metaphysics  of  this 
kind  are  indeed,  what  Dr.  Newman  dreads  the  human 
mind  may  be,  a  "universal  solvent,"  casting  doubt  on 
the  most  certain  of  its  own  conclusions,  and  landing 
itself  in  universal  scepticism. 

We  have  not  far  to  go  to  find  the  same  kind  of  reason- 
ing, and  the  same  methods  of  analysis,  employed  to 
establish  the  converse  proposition,  that  so  far  from 
Potentiality  having  no  existence,  it  is  the  only  form 
under  which  the  existence  of  anything  beyond  ourselves 
can  be  known  to  us.  No  less  eminent  a  thinker  than 
Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  reduces  Matter  itself,  and  the  very  idea 
of  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  to  a  "  Permanent 
Possibility  of  Sensation." 1  Nay,  he  is  not  sure — he  only 
sees  some  "  intrinsic  difficulties  "  in  the  way — whether 
our  knowledge  of  Self-existence  may  not  be  brought  under 
the  same  "  Potential "  category — as  a  mere  "  Possibility 
of  Sensation."2  In  regard  to  Matter,  Mr.  Mill  distinctly 
says  that  so  far  from  a  mere  Possibility  having  no  real 

*  "  Mill  on  Hamilton,"  chap.  xi.  8  Ibid.  chap.  xii. 


204  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

existence,  it  is  the  only  reality — the  one  thing  which  is 
constant  and  abiding  behind  the  flux  and  uncertainty 
of  actual  sensations.  My  own  opinion  is  that  the  meta- 
physical process  by  which  these  opposite  paradoxes  are 
arrived  at  is  nearly  as  worthless  in  the  one  case  as  in 
the  other.  Of  the  two  I  prefer  the  paradox  of  Mr.  Mill 
to  the  paradox  of  Mr.  Lewes — so  far  at  least  as  the 
reality  of  Potential  Existences  is  concerned.  But  I  prefer 
it  only  in  the  very  case  to  which  Mr.  Mill  shrinks  from 
applying  it.  I  can  think  of  my  own  mind  or  existence 
as  a  "  Possibility  of  Sensation  "  (whether  "  permanent " 
or  not).  It  is  a  method  of  conception  indeed  which 
casts  no  light  on  anything,  and  it  is  highly  artificial ;  but 
at  least  it  is  not  false.  It  involves  no  confounding  of 
two  different  elements  of  thought.  But  I  cannot  transfer 
the  word  or  the  idea  of  sensation  from  myself  to  the 
external  things  which  cause  sensation  in  me.  This 
transfer  involves  a  fundamental  confusion  of  thought 
and  of  language  as  the  instrument  of  thought.1  But 
such  paradoxes  are  the  natural  result  of  one  great  error 
— the  endeavour  to  get  rid  of,  or  to  explain  away,  or  to 
dissolve  by  analysis,  such  simple  and  elementary  con- 
ceptions of  the  Mind  as  the  idea  of  External  Force  and 
of  Causation,  or  the  idea  of  Purpose  and  Intention. 

i  See  Note  D. 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  205 

Matter  may  very  well  be  conceived  as  "  That  which 
produces,  or  has  a  Possibility  of  producing,  Sensation  in 
Sentient  beings."  But  this  is  a  definition  which  involves 
the  idea  of  Causation.  And  if  this  be  rejected  as  an 
elementary  conception,  (or  as  a  distinct  conception, 
whether  elementary  or  not,)  then  the  paradox  of  Mr.  Mill 
is  the  natural  result.  In  like  manner,  if  the  idea  of 
Purpose  and  Intention  be  repudiated,  as  representing  no 
"  reality "  in  Nature,  then  the  opposite  paradox  of  Mr. 
Lewes  is  reached  along  the  same  slippery  and  deceptive 
ways.  We  know  at  least,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  that 
we  are  capable  of  forming  plans  which  exist  as  such 
before  they  are  carried  into  effect.  We  know  too  that 
one  plan  may  be  large  enough  to  include  another,  and 
that  even  within  the  fractional  limits  of  our  foresight 
we  can  provide  for  contingent  as  well  as  for  actual 
use.  We  can  therefore  easily  conceive  the  existence  of 
the  same  kind  of  prevision  in  the  Mind  which  works 
in  Nature,  and  we  can  easily  understand  how  the 
apparent  difference  between  actual  and  contingent  use 
should  be  greater  in  proportion  as  the  Plan  is  larger, 
and  is  designed  to  operate  during  vaster  periods  of 
Time. 

In  this  point  of  view  rudimentary  or  aborted  organs 
need  no  longer  puzzle  us,  for  in  respect  to  Purpose  they 
may  be  read  either  in  the  light  of  History,  or  in  the  light 


206  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

of  Prophecy.  They  may  be  regarded  as  indicating  always 
either  what  had  already  been,  or  what  was  yet  to  be. 
Why  new  creations  should  never  have  been  made  wholly 
new ; — why  they  should  have  been  always  moulded 
on  some  pre-existing  Forms  ;-*-why  one  fundamental 
ground-plan  should  have  been  adhered  to  for  all  Verte- 
brate Animals,  we  cannot  understand.  But  as  a  matter 
of  fact  it  is  so.  For  it  appears  that  Creative  Purpose 
has  been  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  Forces 
so  combined  as  to  arrange  the  particles  of  organic  matter 
in  definite  forms  :  which  forms  include  many  separate 
parts  having  a  constant  relation  to  each  other  and  to 
the  whole,  but  capable  of  arrestment  or  development 
according  as  special  organs  are  required  for  the  discharge 
of  special  functions.  Each  new  creation  seems  to  have 
been  a  new  application  of  these  old  materials.  Each 
new  House  of  Life  has  been  built  on  these  old  founda- 
tions. Among  the  many  wonders  of  Nature  there  is 
nothing  more  wonderful  than  this— the  adaptability  of 
the  one  Vertebrate  Type  to  the  infinite  variety  of  Life  to 
which  it  serves  as  an  organ  and  a  home.  Its  basement 
has  been  so  laid  that  every  possible  change  or  addition 
of  superstructure  could  be  built  upon  it.  Creatures 
destined  to  live  on  the  earth  or  in  the  earth,  on  the  sea 
or  in  the  sea,  under  every  variety  of  condition  of  exist- 
ence, have  all  been  made  after  that  one  pattern;  and 


APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS.  2 07 

each  of  them  with  as  close  an  adaptation  to  special 
function  as  if  the  pattern  had  been  designed  for  itself 
alone.  It  is  true  that  there  are  particular  parts  of  it 
which  are  of  no  use  to  particular  animals.  But  there  is 
no  part  of  it  which  is  not  of  indispensable  use  to  some 
member  of  the  group ;  and  there  is  one  Supreme  Form 
in  which  all  its  elements  receive  their  highest  interpreta- 
tion and  fulfilment.  It  is  indeed  wonderful  to  think  that 
the  feeble  and  sprawling  paddles  of  a  Newt,  the  ungainly 
flippers  of  a  Seal,  and  the  long  leathery  wings  of  a  Bat, 
have  all  the  same  elements,  bone  for  bone,  with  that 
human  hand  which  is  the  supple  instrument  of  Man's  con- 
trivance, and  is  alive,  even  to  the  finger-tips,  with  the 
power  of  expressing  his  Intellect  and  his  Will.  Here 
again  the  Laws  of  Nature  are  seen  to  be  nothing  but 
combinations  of  Force  with  a  view  to  Purpose  :  com- 
binations which  indicate  complete  knowledge,  not  only 
of  what  is,  but  of  what  is  to  be,  and  which  foresees  the 
bind  from  the  .Beginning. 


CHAPTER  V. 

CREATION    BY    LAW. 

WE  see,  then,  how  the  existence  of  Organs  sepa- 
rated from  Function,  and  of  structures  without 
immediate  use,  find  their  natural  place  among  all  the 
other  phenomena  of  the  world.  They  do  not  show  that 
"Law"  is  ever  superior  to  Will,  or  can  ever  assert,  even  for 
a  moment,  an  independence  of  its  own.  On  the  contrary, 
they  show,  as  nothing  else  can  show,  the  patient  move- 
ments, and  the  incalculable  years,  through  which  material 
laws  have  been  made  to  follow  the  steps  of  Purpose. 

But,  then,  let  us  remember  this  :  these  discoveries  in 
Physiology,  though  they  are  helpless  to  prove  that  Law 
has  ever  been  present  as  a  Master,  are  eminently  sug- 
gestive of  the  idea  that  Law  has  never  been  absent  as  a 
Servant  j — that  as,  in  governing  the  world,  so  in  forming 
it,  Material  Forces  have  been  always  used  as  the  instru- 
ments of  Will. 

It  is  no  mere  theory,  but  a  fact  as  certain  as  any  other 
fact  of  Science,  that  Creation  has  had  a  History.  It  has 
not  been  a  single  act,  done  and  finished  once  for  all, 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  2OQ 

but  a  long  series  of  acts — a  work  continuously  pursued 
through  an  inconceivable  lapse  of  time.  It  is  another 
fact,  equally  certain,  respecting  this  work,  that  as  it 
has  been  pursued  in  Time,  so  also  it  has  been  pursued 
by  Method.  There  is  an  "  observed  Order  of  facts " 
in  the  history  of  Creation,  both  in  the  organic  and 
in  the  inorganic  world.  I  speak  here,  however,  of  the 
organic  world  alone,  and  chiefly  of  those  higher  Forms 
which  are  the  seat  of  Animal  Life.  In  these,  there  is 
an  observed  Order  in  the  most  rigid  scientific  sense — 
that  is,  phenomena  in  uniform  connexion,  and  mutual 
relations  which  can  be  made,  and  are  made,  the  basis  of 
systematic  classification.  These  classifications  are  imper- 
fect, not  because  they  are  founded  on  ideal  connexions 
where  none  exist,  but  only  because  they  fail  in  repre- 
senting adequately  the  subtle  and  pervading  Order  which 
binds  together  all  living  things.  But  the  Order  which 
prevails  in  the  existing  world  is  not  the  only  Order 
which  has  been  recognised  by  science.  A  like -Order  has 
prevailed  through  all  the  past  history  of  Creation.  Nay, 
more  ;  it  has,  I  think,  been  clearly  ascertained,  not  only 
that  relations  similar  to  those  which  now  exist  have 
existed  always  among  all  the  animals  of  each  contem- 
porary Creation,  but  that  Order  of  a  like  kind  has  con- 
nected with  each  other  all  the  different  Creations  which 
were  successively  introduced.  In  almost  all  the  leading 

p 


210  THE   REIGN   OF  LAW. 


Types  of  Life  which  have  existed  in  the  different  geolo- 
gical ages,  there  is  an  orderly  gradation  connecting  the 
Forms  which  were  becoming  extinct  with  the  Forms 
which  were  for  the  first  time  appearing  in  the  world.  It 
is  still  disputed  by  some  geologists,  whether  we  have 
certain  evidence  that  this  gradation  has  been  the  grada- 
tion of  a  rising  scale — of  progressive  Creations  from 
lower  to  higher  Types.  But  this  dispute  is  maintained 
only  on  the  ground  that  we  cannot  safely  trust  to  nega- 
tive evidence.  It  is  an  unquestionable  fact,  that  so  far 
as  this  kind  of  evidence  can  go,  it  does  testify  to  the 
successive  introduction  of  higher  and  higher  Forms  of 
Life.  Very  recently  a  discovery  has  been  made,  to  which 
Mr.  Darwin  only  a  few  years  ago  referred  as  "a  dis- 
covery of  which  the  chance  is  very  small " — viz.  of  fossil 
Organisms  in  beds  far  beneath  the  lowest  Silurian  strata. 
This  discovery  has  been  made  in  Canada — in  beds  far 
down,  near  the  bottom  even,  of  the  rocks  hitherto  termed 
"  Azoic."  But  what  are  the  Forms  of  Life  which  have 
been  found  here?  They  belong  to  the  very  lowest  of 
living  types — to  the  "  Rhizopods."  So  far  as  this  dis- 
covery goes,  therefore,  it  is  in  strict  accordance  with  all 
the  facts  previously  known — that,  as  we  go  back  in  time, 
we  lose,  one  after  another,  the  higher  and  more  complex 
organisms:  first,  the  Mammalia;  then  the  Vertebrata; 
and  now,  lastly,  even  the  Mollusca.  It  is  in  accordance, 


CREATION   BY    LAW.  211 

too,  with  another  fact  which  has  been  observed  before, 
viz.  that  particular  Forms  of  Life  have  attained,  at  par- 
ticular epochs,  a  maximum  development,  both  in  respect 
to  size  and  distribution — the  favourites,  as  it  were,  of 
Creation  for  a  time.  These  earliest  Rhizopods  seem  to 
have  been  of  enormous  size,  and  developed  on  an  enor- 
mous scale;  since  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that 
beds  of  immense  thickness  are  composed  of  their  re- 
mains. All  that  is  new  in  this  discovery  is  the  vast 
extension  which  it  gives  in  Time  to  the  same  rules  which 
had  been  already  traced  through  ages  which  we  cannot 
number. 

Then,  there  is  another  observed  Order.  For  each 
Class  of  animal  some  definite  Type  or  pattern  has  been 
adhered  to ;  and  the  modifications  of  that  Type  have 
been  gradual  and  successive.  In  many  cases  the  science 
of  fossil  remains  enables  us  to  trace  the  intermediate 
Forms  through  which  existing  animals  can  be  connected 
with  animals  long  since  extinct.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  fact  of  this  connexion  is  quite  a  separate 
thing  from  any  theory  as  to  its  physical  cause.  Professor 
Owen  pointed  out  some  years  before  the  publication  of 
Mr.  Darwin's  theory,  the  existence  of  fossil  animals 
which  showed  an  increasing  approximation  to  the  forms 
of  the  Horse  and  of  the  Ox  :  and  he  showed  that  this 
approximation  was  related  in  Time,  as  it  seemed  to  be 

P  9 


212  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

in  Purpose,  with  the  coming  need  of  them  for  the  service 
and  use  of  Man.  These  are  the  facts  on  which  the  idea 
of  "  Creation  by  Law  "  is  founded.  Let  us  look  a  little 
nearer  what  this  idea  is,  and  what  it  involves.  It  is 
an  idea  much  vaunted  by  some  men,  much  feared  by 
others.  Perhaps  it  may  be  found,  on  closer  investi- 
gation, that  they  are  fearing  or  worshipping,  as  the  case 
may  be,  an  idol  of  the  imagination. 

It  being  certain  that  Creation  exhibits  an  Order  of 
facts  which  can  be  so  clearly  denned  and  traced,  it 
follows,  that  at  least  in  this  first  sense  of  the  word, 
Creation  has  been  by  Law.  We  are,  therefore,  led  on 
to  the  farther  question,  whether  Law  in  any  other  sense 
can  be  traced  or  detected  in  the  work  of  Creation  ?  Is 
the  observed  Order  which  prevails  in  the  organic  world 
an  Order  of  which  we  can  even  guess  the  physical 
cause  ?  Is  it  an  Order  which  contains  within  itself  any 
indications  of  the  Force  or  combination  of  Forces  which 
have  been  concerned  in  producing  it  ? 

In  considering  this  question,  there  is  one  thing  to 
be  observed  at  the  outset.  It  is  certain  that  nothing 
is  known,  or  has  been  even  guessed  at,  in  respect  to 
the  history  and  Origin  of  Life,  which  corresponds  with 
Law  in  its  strictest  and  most  definite  sense.  We  have 
no  knowledge  of  any  one  or  more  Forces — such  as  the 
Force  of  Gravitation,  or  of  magnetic  attraction  and 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  213 

repulsion — to  which  any  one  of  the  phenomena  of  Life 
can  be  traced.  Far  less  have  we  any  knowledge  of  any 
laws  of  the  like  kind  which  can  be  connected  with  the 
successive  creation  or  development  of  new  Organisms. 
Professor  Huxley,  in  a  recent  work,1  has  indeed  spoken  of 
"  that  combination  of  natural  forces  which  we  term  Life." 
But  this  language  is  purely  rhetorical.  I  do  not  mean  to 
say  that  Life  may  not  be  defined  to  be  a  kind  of  Force, 
or  a  combination  of  Forces.  All  I  mean  is,  that  we 
know  nothing  of  any  of  these  Forces  in  the  same  sense 
in  which  we  do  know  something  of  the  Force  of  Gravity, 
or  of  Magnetism,  or  of  Electricity,  or  of  Chemical 
Affinity.  These  are  all  more  or  less  known,  not,  in- 
deed, in  respect  to  iheir  ultimate  nature,  but  in  respect 
to  certain  methods  and  measures  of  their  operation. 
No  such  knowledge  exists  in  respect  to  any  of  the 
Forces  which  have  been  concerned  in  the  development 
of  Life.  No  man  has  ever  pretended  to  get  such  a  view 
of  any  of  these  as  to  enable  him  to  apply  to  them 
the  instruments  of  his  analysis,  or  to  trace  in  their 
working  any  definite  relations  to  Space,  or  Time,  or 
Number. 

Since,  then,  laws,  in  this  most  definite  sense  of  the 
word,  have  not  been  discovered  in  the  existing  pheno- 

1  *'  Elements  of  Comparative  Anatomy,"  p.  2. 


214  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

mena,  or  in  the  past  history  of  Organic  Life,  let  us  look 
a  little  closer  at  the  ideas  which  these  phenomena  have 
suggested  to  the  mind  of  those  who  have  speculated 
on  the  Origin  and  Development  of  Species. 

There  is  one  idea  which  has  been  common  to  all 
theories  of  Development,  and  that  is,  the  idea  that  ordi- 
nary generation  has  somehow  been  producing,  from  time 
to  time,  extraordinary  effects,  and  that  a  new  Species  is, 
in  fact,  simply  an  unusual  birth.  It  is  worthy  of  ob- 
servation, that  the  earlier  forms  in  which  the  theory 
of  Development  appeared,  did  suggest  something  more 
nearly  approaching  to  a  Law  of  Creation  than  is  con- 
tained in  the  later  form  which  that  theory  has  assumed 
in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Darwin.  The  essential  idea  of  the 
theory  of  Development,  in  its  earlier  forms,  was,  that 
modifications  of  structure  arose  somehow  by  way  of 
natural  consequence  from  the  outward  circumstances 
or  physical  conditions  which  required  them,  and  from 
the  living  effort  of  Organism  sensible  in  some  degree  of 
that  requirement  Now,  inadequate  and  even  grotesque 
though  this  idea  may  be  as  explaining  the  Origin  of  new 
Species,  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  it  makes  its  appeal  to  a 
process  which,  at  least  to  a  limited  extent,  does  operate 
in  producing  modifications  of  organic  structure.  For 
example,  the  same  species  of  Mollusc  has  often  a  shell 
comparatively  weak  and  thin,  or  a  shell  comparatively 


CREATION    BY   LAW. 


robust  and  strong,  according  as  it  lies  in  tranquil  or 
in  stormy  water.  The  shell  which  is  much  exposed 
needs  to  be  stronger  than  the  shell  which  is  less  ex- 
posed. But  it  is  obvious  that  the  mere  fact  of  the  need 
cannot  supply  the  thing  needed,  unless  by  the  adjust- 
ment of  some  machinery  for  the  purpose.  How  the 
vital  forces  of  the  Mollusc  can  thus  be  made  to  work 
to  order,  under  a  change  of  external  conditions,  we  do 
not  know.  But  we  do  know,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that 
the  shell  is  thickened  and  strengthened,  according  as 
it  needs  resisting  power.  This  result  does  not  appear 
to  arise  from  any  difference  in  the  amount  of  lime  held 
in  solution  in  the  water,  but  from  some  power  in  the 
secreting  organs  of  the  animal  to  appropriate  more  or 
less  of  it,  according  to  its  own  need.  The  effects  of  this 
power  are  seen  where  there  is  no  difference  of  condition 
except  difference  of  exposure.  It  is  said  that  they  are 
observable,  for  example,  in  the  shells  which  lie  on  the 
different  sides  of  Plymouth  Breakwater,  —  the  sheltered 
side  and  the  exposed  side.  The  same  power  of  adapta- 
tion is  seen  in  many  other  forms.  Trees  which  are 
most  exposed  to  the  blast  are  the  most  strongly  anchored 
in  the  soil.  Limbs  which  are  the  most  used  are  the 
most  developed.  Organs  which  are  in  constant  use,  are 
strengthened,  whilst  organs  in  habitual  disuse  have  a 
tendency  to  become  weaker. 


2l6  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

All  these  results  arise  by  way  of  natural  consequence. 
How  shall  we  describe  them  ?  Shall  we  say  that  they 
are  the  result  of  Law  ?  We  may  safely  do  so,  remem- 
bering only  that  by  Law,  in  this  sense,  we  mean  nothing 
but  the  co-operation  of  different  natural  Forces,  which, 
under  certain  conditions,  work  together  for  the  fulfil- 
ment of  an  obvious  intention.  Of  the  nature  of  those 
Forces  we  know  nothing  ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  conceive 
how  they  have  been  so  co-ordinated  as  to  produce 
effects  fitting  with  such  exactness  into  the  conditions 
requisite  for  the  preservation  of  Organic  Life.  If  there 
were  any  evidence  that  by  the  same  means  new  Forms 
of  Life  could  be  developed  from  the  old,  I  cannot  see 
why  there  should  be  any  reluctance  to  admit  the  fact. 
It  would  be  different  from  anything  that  we  see ;  but 
I  do  not  know  that  it  would  be  at  all  less  wonderful, 
or  that  it  would  bring  us  much  nearer  than  we  now 
stand  to  the  great  mystery  of  Creation.  The  adaptation 
and  arrangement  of  natural  forces,  which  can  compass 
these  modifications  of  animal  structure,  in  exact  propor- 
tion to  the  need  of  them,  is  an  adaptation  and  arrange- 
ment which  is  in  the  nature  of  Creation.  It  can  only 
be  due  to  the  working  of  a  power  which  is  in  the  nature 
of  Creative  power. 

We  are  so  accustomed  to  these  and  other  similar  phe- 
nomena, and  so  apt  to  hide  our  own  ignorance  of  their 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  217 

cause,  by  describing  them  as  the  result  of  "  Law,"  that 
we  forget  what  a  multitude  of  natural  Forces  must  be 
concerned  in  their  production,  and  what  complicated 
adjustments  of  these  amongst  each  other  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  Purpose.  It  is  purely,  therefore,  in 
my  view,  a  question  of  evidence,  whether  this  particular 
law  of  adaptation  has  or  has  not  been  the  means  of 
introducing  new  Forms  of  Life.  There  is  no  evidence 
that  it  has.  So  far  as  we  know,  this  power  of  self- 
adaptation,  wonderful  as  it  is,  has  a  comparatively  limited 
application;  when  that  limit  is  outrun  by  changes  in 
outward  conditions,  which  are  too  great  or  too  rapid, 
whole  Species  die  and  disappear.  Nevertheless,  the 
introduction  of  new  Species  to  take  the  place  of  those 
which  have  passed  away,  is  a  work  which  has  been 
not  only  so  often,  but  so  continuously  repeated,  that 
it  does  suggest  the  idea  of  having  been  brought  about 
through  the  instrumentality  of  some  natural  process. 
But  we  may  say  with  confidence,  that  it  must  have 
been  a  process  different  from  any  that  we  yet  know — a 
process  not  the  same  as  that  (obscure  as  that  is)  which 
produces  the  lesser  modifications  of  Organic  Forms. 

It  has  not,  I  think,  been  sufficiently  observed,  tnat 
the  theory  of  Mr.  Darwin  does  not  address  itself  to 
che  same  question,  and  does  not  even  profess  to  trace 
the  Origin  of  new  Forms  to  any  definite  law.  His 


2l8  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

theory  gives  an  explanation,  not  of  the  processes  by 
which  new  Forms  first  appear,  but  only  of  the  pro- 
cesses by  which,  when  they  have  appeared,  they  acquire 
a  preference  over  others,  and  thus  become  established 
in  the  world.  A  new  Species  is,  indeed,  according  to 
his  theory,  as  well  as  with  the  older  theories  of  Develop- 
ment, simply  an  unusual  birth.  The  bond  of  connexion 
between  allied  specific  and  generic  Forms,  is  in  his 
view  simply  the  bond  of  Inheritance.  But  Mr.  Darwin 
does  not  pretend  to  have  discovered  any  law  or  rule 
according  to  which  new  Forms  have  been  born  from 
old  Forms.  He  does  not  hold  that  outward  conditions, 
however  changed,  are  sufficient  to  account  for  them. 
Still  less  does  he  connect  them  with  the  effort  or  aspira- 
tions of  any  Organism  after  new  faculties  and  powers. 
He  frankly  confesses  that  "  our  ignorance  of  the  laws 
of  variation  is  profound ;"  and  says,  that  in  speaking  of 
them  as  due  to  chance,  he  means  only  "  to  acknowledge 
plainly  our  ignorance  of  the  cause  of  each  particular 
variation."1  Again  he  says—"  I  believe  in  no  law  of 
necessary  development."  2 

This  distinction  between  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  and 
other  theories  of  Development,  has  not,  I  think,  been 
sufficiently  observed.  His  theory  seems  to  be  far  better 

J  "Origin  of  Species,"  p.  131  (first  edition).  9  Ibid.  p.  351. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  219 

than  a  mere  theory — to  be  an  established  scientific 
truth — in  so  far  as  it  accounts,  in  part  at  least,  for  the 
success  and  establishment  and  spread  of  new  Forms 
when  they  have  arisen.  But  it  does  not  even  suggest 
the  law  under  which,  or  by  which,  or  according  to  which, 
such  new  Forms  are  introduced.  Natural  Selection  can 
do  nothing  except  with  the  materials  presented  to  its 
hands.  It  cannot  select  except  among  the  things  open 
to  selection.  Natural  Selection  can  originate  nothing; 
it  can  only  pick  out  and  choose  among  the  things 
which  are  originated  by  some  other  law.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, therefore,  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  is  not  a  theory  on 
the  Origin  of  Species  at  all,  but  only  a  theory  on  the 
causes  which  lead  to  the  relative  success  or  failure  of 
such  new  Forms  as  may  be  born  into  the  world.  It 
is  the  more  important  to  remember  this  distinction, 
because  it  seems  to  me  that  Mr.  Darwin  himself  fre- 
quently forgets  it.  Not  only  does  he  speak  of  Natural 
Selection  "producing"  this  and  that  modification  of 
structure,  but  he  undertakes  to  affirm  of  one  class  of 
changes  that  they  can  be  produced,  and  of  another 
class  of  changes  that  they  cannot  be  produced  by  this 
process.1 

Now,  what  are  the  changes  for  the  preservation  of 

*  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p.  200  (first  edition). 


220  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

which  Natural  Selection  does,  in  some  sense,  account? 
They  are  such  changes,  and  these  only,  as  are  of  some 
direct  use  to  the  Organism  in  the  "struggle  for  exist- 
ence." Any  change  which  has  not  this  direct  value,  is 
not  provided  for  in  the  theory.  All  structures,  there- 
fore, are  unaccounted  for — not  only  as  respects  their 
origin,  but  even  as  respects  their  preservation — in  which 
the  variations  have  no  other  value  than  mere  beauty 
or  variety.  Accordingly,  Mr.  Darwin  is  tempted,  as 
I  have  already  had  occasion  to  observe,  to  deny  that 
any  such  structures  xist  in  Nature.  Any  theory  of 
which  this  denial  is  really  a  necessary  part,  is  self- 
condemned.  Yet  a  theory  may  be  good  as  accounting 
for  the  preservation  of  some  structures,  although  it  fails 
to  account  for  the  preservation  of  others.  And  so  the 
fact  that  Natural  Selection  cannot  have  operated  on 
structures  of  mere  beauty  and  variety  is  no  proof  that 
the  theory  of  Natural  Selection  is  false,  but  only  that  it 
is  incomplete.  It  does  not  account  for  the  origin  of  any 
structure ;  and  it  accounts  for  the  preservation  of  only  a 
certain  number.  Surely,  then,  Mr.  Darwin  assigns  to 
his  "law"  of  Natural  Selection  a  range  far  wider  than 
really  belongs  to  it,  when,  on  the  strength  of  it,  he 
denies  that  beauty  for  its  own  sake  can  be  an  end  or 
object  in  Organic  Forms.  He  says — "  This  doctrine,  if 
true,  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to  my  theory."  Why 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  221 

should  this  be  fatal  to  his  theory,  except  on  the  sup- 
position that  Natural  Selection  gives  a  complete  account 
both  of  the  Origin  of  new  Forms,  (of  which,  in  reality, 
it  gives  no  account  at  all,)  and  of  their  preservation, 
of  which  it  does  give  some  account,  but  one  which  is 
only  partial?  I  dwell  on  this,  because  it  lies  at  the 
very  root  of  the  question,  how  far  Mr.  Darwin's  theory 
can  be  said  to  suggest  anything  in  the  nature  of  a  Crea- 
tive Law  of  a  kind  to  explain  the  Method  which  lias 
been  followed  in  the  introduction  of  new  Forms. 

We  may  test  this  question  by  bringing  to  bear  upon  it 
some  particular  example  of  specific  variation.  I  selett 
for  this  purpose  one  example,  which  will  illustrate  tbe 
subject  better  than  any  abstract  discussion.  It  is  the 
case  of  the  Humming  Birds. 

This  group  of  Birds  seems  to  exhibit,  in  the  most 
striking  form,  not  a  few  of  those  mysteries  of  Creation 
which  at  once  tempt  us  to  speculate  on  the  Origin  of 
Species,  and  at  the  same  time  confound  every  endeavoui 
to  bring  it  into  relation  with  any-  process  which  we  know 
or  can  conceive.  In  the  first  place,  they  are  sharply 
defined  from  all  other  forms  in  that  Class  of  the  animal 
kingdom  to  which  they  belong.  It  is  most  difficult  to 
say  what  is  their  nearest  affinity,  and  the  nearest,  when 
it  .is  found,  is  very  distant.  Secondly,  they  are  abso- 
lutely confined  to  one  Continent  of  the  Globe.  In  the 


222  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

third  place,  the  various  Species  as  amongst  themselves 
are  very  closely  united,  ranging,  indeed,  over  a  great 
variety  of  forms,  but  for  the  most  part  connected  with 
each  other  by  very  nice  gradations.  In  the  fourth  place, 
there  are,  so  to  speak,  some  gaps  in  the  scale,  which 
suggest  that  some  Species  have  either  been  lost,  or  have 
not  yet  beeri  discovered.  In  the  fifth  place,  each  of 
these  Species,  however  nearly  allied  to  some  other, 
appears  to  be  absolutely  fixed  and  constant,  there  being 
not  the  slightest  indication  of  any  mixture — of  any 
hybrid  forms.  In  the  sixth  place,  there  is  the  most 
wonderful  adaptation  of  special  organs  for  the  per- 
formance of  special  functions,  and  for  the  relation  of 
these  organs  to  particular  structures  in  the  vegetable 
kingdom.  In  the  seventh  place,  there  is  a  development, 
for  which,  in  extent  and  variety,  there  is  no  parallel  in 
the  world,  of  structures  designed  apparently  for  mere 
ornament,  and  entirely  separate  from  any  other  known 
or  conceivable  use. 

A  few  words  on  some  of  these  characters  will  show 
their  separate  and  joint  bearing  on  the  idea  of  Creation 
by  Law. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  the  absolute  distinctiveness 
from  all  others  of  this  Family  of  Birds,  coupled  with  its 
immense  extent,  gives  the  idea  of  some  common  bond, 
some  physical  cause,  to  which  such  an  identity  in 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  223 

physical  characters  must  be  due.  This  identity  prevails 
not  only  in  such  essential  matters  as  the  structure  of  the 
bill  and  tongue,  in  the  form  of  the  feet  and  of  the  wings, 
in  the  habits  of  flight,  and  in  the  nature  of  the  food,  but 
runs  also  into  some  very  curious  details,  as,  for  example, 
in  the  number  of  feathers  in  the  tail  and  in  the  wings, 
which  are  constant  numbers — adhered  to  even  when 
some  of  the  feathers,  not  being  used  even  for  ornament, 
are  reduced  almost  to  rudiments.  But  under  degrees  of 
Development  which  are  very  variable,  the  number  is 
invariable.  This  identity  of  structure  is  the  more 
remarkable  from  the  immense  extent  of  the  group  which 
it  characterises.  There  a~e  now  known  to  science  no 
less  than  about  430  different  species  of  Humming  Bird ; 
and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  many  more  remain  to  be 
discovered  among  the  immense  forests  and  mountain 
ranges  of  Central  America. 

Now,  what  is  the  bond  that  unites  so  closely,  in  a 
common  structure,  all  the  forms  of  this  great  Family  of 
birds  ?  We  think  it  a  sufficient  explanation  sometimes 
of  the  likeness  of  things,  that  they  are  made  for  a 
common  purpose.  And  so  it  is  an  explanation  in  one 
,ense,  but  not  in  another.  It  gives  the  reason  why 
likeness  should  be  aimed  at,  but  not  the  cause  or  the 
means  through  which  it  has  been  brought  about.  Same- 
ness in  the  purpose  for  which  things  are  intended,  is 


224  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

a  reason  why  those  things  should  be  made  alike  ;  but  it 
is  no  explanation  of  the  process  to  which  the  common 
aspect  is  due.  It  is  an  explanation  of  the  "  why ; "  but 
it  is  no  explanation  of  the  "  how."  Purpose  is  attained 
in  Nature  through  the  instrumentality  of  means;  and 
community  of  aspect  in  created  things  suggests  the  idea 
of  some  common  process  in  the  creative  work.  Thus, 
the  likeness  which  is  due  to  common  parentage  serves 
the  most  important  purposes ;  but  it  is  not  the  less  the 
result  of  a  physical  cause,  out  of  which  it  arises  by  way 
of  natural  consequence.  The  likeness  of  the  Humming 
Birds  to  each  other  suggests  this  kind  of  cause.  It  is 
true  that  the  organs  which  it  principally  affects  are 
specially  adapted  for  a  special  habit  of  life.  They  are 
fitted  to  enable  the  Bird  to  feed  on  the  nectar,  and  the 
insects  which  frequent  the  nectar  of  flowers,  or  the 
leaves  or  bark  of  trees.  But  there  are  flowers«and  insects 
in  abundance  in  other  quarters  of  the  globe  where  there 
are  no  Humming  Birds. 

And  here  we  come  on  the  curious  facts  of  geogra- 
phical distribution, — a  class  of  facts  which,  as  much  as 
any  other,  suggest  some  specific  methods  as  having  been 
followed  in  the  work  of  Creation.  Humming  Birds  are 
absolutely  confined  to  the  great  Continent  of  America  with 
its  adjacent  islands.  Within  those  limits  there  is  every 
ran^e  of  climate,  and  there  are  particular  species  of 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  225 

Humming  Bird  adapted  to  every  region  where  a  flowering 
vegetation  can  subsist.  It  is  therefore  neither  climate 
nor  food  which  confines  the  Humming  Birds  to  the 
New  World.  What  is  it,  then  ?  The  idea  of  "  centres 
of  Creation"  is  at  once  suggested  to  the  mind.  It 
seems  as  if  the  Humming  Birds  were  introduced  at  one 
spot,  and  as  if  they  had  spread  over  the  whole  Con- 
tinent which  was  accessible  to  them  from  that  spot. 
They  are  absent  elsewhere,  simply  because  from  that 
spot  the  other  Continents  of  the  world  were  inaccessible 
to  them.  But  if  these  ideas  are  suggested  to  the  mind 
by  the  general  aspect  of  this  family  as  a  whole,  they 
are  strengthened  by  some  of  the  facts  which  we  dis- 
cover when  we  examine  and  compare  with  each  other 
the  genera  and  species  of  which  it  is  composed.  There 
is  a  beautiful  gradation  between  the  different  genera 
and  the  different  species, — so  much  so,  that  it  has 
been  found  impossible  to  divide  the  Humming  Birds 
into  more  than  two  sub-families,  from  the  absence  of 
sufficiently  well-marked  divisions.  '  And  yet  on  the  other 
hand,  they  cannot  be  arranged  in  anything  like  a  con- 
tinuous series,  because  some  links  appear  to  be  missing 
in  the  chain. 

But  these  general  facts  terminate  in  nothing  more 
definite  than  a  vague  surmise.  When  we  enter  farther 
into  details,  we  feel  at  once  how  little  they  agree  with 

Q 


226  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

any  physical  law  which  is  known  or  even  conceivable 
"by  us.  If  the  likeness  which  prevails  in  the  whole 
group  reminds  us  of  the  likeness  which  is  due  to  com- 
munity of  blood,  it  is  equally  true  that  the  differences 
between  the  species  are  totally  distinct,  both  in  kind 
and  degree,  from  the  variation  which  we  ever  see 
arising  among  the  offspring  of  the  same  parents.  Let 
us  look  at  what  these  differences  are.  The  generic 
and  specific  distinctions  between  the  Humming  Birds 
are  mainly  of  two  kinds, — ist,  Differences  in  the  form 
of  essential  organs,  such  as  the  bill  and  the  wings ;  zdt 
Differences  in  those  parts,  of  the  plumage  which  are 
purely  ornamental.  Now,  of  these  two  kinds  of  varia- 
tion, the  only  one  on  which  the  law  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion has  any  bearing  at  all  is  the  first.  And  on  that 
kind  of  variation,  the  only  bearing  which  Natural  Selec- 
tion has  is  this — that  if  any  Humming  Bird  were  born 
with  a  new  form  of  bill,  or  a  new  form  of  wing,  which 
enabled  it  to  feed  better  and  to  range  farther,  then  that 
improved  bill  and  wing  would  naturally  tend  to  be  per- 
petuated by  ordinaiy  generation.  This  is  unquestion- 
ably true  ;  but  it  really  does  not  touch  the  facts  of  the  case. 
The  bills  and  wings  of  the  different  genera  do  not  differ 
from  each  other  in  respect  of  any  comparative  advan- 
tage of  this  kind,  but  simply  in  respect  to  variety  cor- 
responding with  the  variety  of  certain  vegetable  Forms. 


CREATION    EY    LAW.  227 


One  form  of  bill  is  as  good  as  another,  but  some  forms 
are  adapted  to  some  special  class  of  flower.  Some 
bills,  for  example,  are  formed  of  enormous  length, 
specially  adapted  to  obtain  access  to  the  nectar  cham- 
bers of  long  tubular  flowers,  such  as  the  Brugmansia. 
Some,  on  the  other  hand,  as  if  to  show  that  the  same 
end  may  be  attained  by  different  means,  obtain  access 
to  the  same  flowers  by  a  shorter  process,  and  pierce  the 
bases  of  the  corolla  instead  of  seeking  access  by  the 
mouth.  Some  have  bills  bent  downwards  like  a  sickle, 
adapted  to  searching  the  bark  of  Palm-trees  for  the 
insects  hid  under  the  scaly  covering ;  others  have  bills 
curved  in  the  opposite  direction,  fitted,  apparently,  to 
the  curious  construction  of  some  of  the  great  family  of 
Orchids  so  immensely  developed  in  the  forests  of  Central 
America.  Some  have  bills  equally  well  adapted  for 
searching  a  vast  variety  of  flowers  and  blossoms,  and 
these,  accordingly,  migrate  with  the  flowering  season, 
and,  issuing  from  the  great  stronghold  of  the  family 
in  tropical  America,  spread  like  our  own  summer  Birds 
of  passage,  northwards  to  Canada,  and  southwards  to 
Cape  Horn,  in  the  corresponding  seasons  of  the  year. 
In  contrast  with  these  species  of  extended  range,  there 
are  many  species  whose  habitat  is  confined,  perhaps  to 
a  single  mountain,  and  there  are  a  few  which  never  have 
been  seen  beyond  the  edges  of  some  extinct  volcano, 


228  THE    REIGN    OF    LAV/. 

whose  crater  is  now  filled  with  a  special  flora.  Many  of 
the  great  mountains  of  the  Andes  have  each  of  them 
species  peculiar  to  themselves.  On  Chimborazo  and 
Cotopaxi,  and  other  summits,  special  forms  of  Hum- 
ming Birds  are  found  in  special  zones  of  vegetation 
even  close  up  to  the  limits  of  perpetual  snow.  Again, 
many  of  the  Islands  have  species  peculiar  to  themselves. 
The  little  island  of  Juan  Fernandez,  300  miles  from  the 
mainland,  has  three  species  peculiar  to  itself,  of  which 
two  are  so  distinct  from  all  others  known,  that  they 
cannot  for  a  moment  be  confounded  with  any  of  them.1 
It  is  impossible  not  to  see,  in  such  complicated  facts 
as  these,  that  the  creation  of  new  Species  has  followed 
some  plan  in  which  mere  variety  has  been  in  itself  an 
object  and  an  aim.  The  divergence  of  form  is  not  a 
divergence  which  can  have  arisen  by  way  of  natural  con- 
sequence, merely  from  comparative  advantage  and  dis- 
advantage in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Bills  highly 
specialised  in  form  are  certainly  not  those  which  would 
give  the  greatest  advantage  to  birds  which  have  equal 
access  to  the  abundant  Flora  of  an  immense  Continent. 
Some  form  ot  bill  adapted  to  the  probing  or  piercing  of 
all  flowers  with  almost  equal  ease,  would  seem  to  be  the 
form  most  favourable  to  the  multiplication  and  spread  of 

1  Gould's  "Trochilidae." 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  22 9 


Humming  Birds.  Continued  approximation  to  some 
common  type  would  seem  to  be  quite  as  natural  a 
change,  and  a  much  more  advantageous  kind  of  change 
as  regards  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  than 
endless  divergence  and  special  adaptation  to  limited 
spheres  of  enjoyment.  At  all  events,  we  may  safely  say 
that  mere  advantage,  in  Mr.  Darwin's  sense,  is  not  the 
rule  which  has  chiefly  guided  Creative  Power  in  the  Origin 
of  these  new  Species.  It  seems  rather  to  have  been  a 
rule  having  for  its  object  the  mere  multiplying  of  Life, 
and  the  fitting  of  new  Forms  for  new  spheres  of  enjoy- 
ment, according  as  these  might  arise  out  of  corresponding 
changes  in  other  departments  of  the  organic  world. 

If,  now,  we  turn  to  the  other  kind  of  specific  distinc- 
tion between  Humming  Birds,  viz.,  that  which  consists 
in  differences  in  the  mere  colouring  and  disposition 
of  the  plumage,  we  shall  find  the  same  phenomena  still 
more  remarkable.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  observed 
of  the  whole  group  that  there  is  no  connexion  which 
can  be  traced  or  conceived  between  the  splendour  of 
the  Humming  Birds  and  any  function  essential  to  their 
life.  If  there  were  any  such  connexion,  that  splendour 
could  not  be  confined,  as  it  almost  exclusively  is,  to  one 
sex.  The  female  Birds  are  of  course  not  placed  at  any 
disadvantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence  by  their  more 
sombre  colouring.  Mere  utility  in  this  sense,  therefore, 


230  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

can  have  had  no  share  in  determining  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  of  all  the  characteristics  of  this  family  of 
Birds.  It  is  obviously  beside  the  question  to  account, 
as  Mr.  Wallace  and  Mr.  Darwin  do,  for  the  beauty 
of  the  Humming  Birds  upon  the  ground  that  the 
males  are  thus  rendered  more  attractive  to  the  females. 
This  attractiveness  can  only  operate  as  between  different 
individuals  of  the  same  species,  since  no  one  ever  heard 
of  the  females  of  a  dull-coloured  species  wandering  in 
their  affection  from  their  rightful  lords  to  the  more 
brilliant  males  of  some  other  species.  Every  animal, 
however  little  beautiful  it  may  be  in  our  eyes,  has 
sufficient  attractiveness  as  between  the  sexes  to  secure 
the  great  object  of  the  continuation  of  its  race.  Utility, 
indeed,  in  a  different  sense,  can  be  quoted  with  pro- 
bability, as  accounting  for  the  comparative  plain  colour- 
ing of  females  in  this  and  in  almost  all  other  genera  of 
Birds.  But  then  it  is  Utility  conceived  as  operating  by 
way  of  motive  in  a  Creative  Mind,  and  not  operating  as 
a  physical  cause  in  the  production  of  a  mechanical 
result.  And  here  we  find  Mr.  Wallace  instinctively 
testifying  to  this  great  distinction,  and  employing  lan- 
guage which  indicates  the  passage  from  one  order  of 
ideas  to  another.  He  says,  "The  REASON  WHY  female 
birds  are  not  adorned  with  equally  brilliant  plumes  is 
sufficiently  clear ;  they  would  be  injurious  by  rendering 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  231 


their  possessors  too  conspicuous  during  incubation."1 
This  is,  no  doubt,  the  true  explanation  of  the  purpose 
which  the  plain  colouring  of  female  Birds  is  intended 
to  serve ;  but  it  is  no  explanation  at  all  of  the  physical 
causes  by  which  this  special  protection  is  secured. 

Those  who,  by  special  study,  have  laid  their  minds 
alongside  the  Mind  of  Nature  in  any  of  her  Pro- 
vinces, have  generally  imparted  to  them  a  true  sense, 
so  far  as  it  goes,  in  the  interpretation  of  her  mys- 
teries. Let  us  then  hear  what  Mr.  Gould  says  on  the 
beauty  of  the  Humming  Birds  : — "  The  members  of 
most  of  the  genera  have  certain  parts  of  their  plumage 
fantastically  decorated ;  and  in  many  instances  most 
resplendent  in  colour.  My  own  opinion  is,  that  this 
gorgeous  colouring  of  the  Humming  Birds  has  been 
given  for  the  mere  purpose  of  ornament,  and  for  no 
other  purpose  of  special  adaptation  in  their  mode  of 
life ;  in  other  words,  that  ornament  and  beauty,  merely 
as  such,  was  the  end  proposed."  2  Different  parts  of  the 
plumage  have  been  selected  in  different  genera  as  the 
principal  subject  of  ornament.  In  some,  it  is  the 
feathers  of  the  crown  worked  into  different  forms  of 
crest ;  in  some,  it  is  the  feathers  of  the  throat,  forming 
gorgets  and  beards  of  many  shapes  and  hues ;  in  some, 
it  is  a  special  development  of  neck  plumes,  elongated 

1  Qtiarterly  Journal  of  Science,  Oct.  1867,  p.  481. 
>  Gould's  "Trochilidce,"  Introduction, 


232  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

into  frills  and  tippets  of  extraordinary  form  and  beauty. 
In  a  great  number  of  genera  the  feathers  of  the  tail  are 
the  special  subjects  of  decoration,  and  this  on  every 
variety  of  plan  and  principle  of  ornament.  In  some, 
the  two  central  feathers  are  most  elongated,  the  others 
decreasing  in  length  on  either  side,  so  as  to  give  the 
whole  the  wedge  form.  In  others,  the  converse  plan  is 
pursued,  the  two  lateral  feathers  being  most  developed, 
so  that  the  whole  is  forked  after  the  manner  of  the 
common  Swallow.  In  others,  again,  they  are  radiated 
or  pointed  and  sharpened  like  thorns.  In  some  genera 
there  is  an  extraordinary  development  of  one  or  two 
feathers  into  plumes  of  enormous  length,  with  flat  or 
spatulose  terminations.  Mere  ornament  and  variety  of 
form,  and  these  for  their  own  sake,  is  the  only  principle 
or  rule  with  reference  to  which  Creative  Power  seems  to 
have  worked  in  these  wonderful  and  beautiful  Birds. 
And  if  we  cannot  account  for  the  differences  in  the 
general  style  and  plan  of  ornament  followed  in  the 
whole  group,  by  referring  them  to  any  sort  of  use  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  still  less  is  it  possible  to  account, 
on  this  principle,  for  the  kind  of  difference  which 
separates  from  each  other  the  different  species  in  each 
of  the  genera.  These  differences  are  often  little  more 
than  a  mere  difference  of  colour.  The  radiance  of  the 
ruby  or  topaz  in  one  species,  is  replaced  perhaps  by 
the  radiance  of  the  emerald  or  the  sapphire  in  another. 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  233 

In  all  other  respects  the  different  species  are  some- 
times almost  exact  counterparts  of  each  other.  As  an 
example,  let  me  refer  to  the  two  species  figured  by  Mr. 
Gould  as  the  Blue-tailed  and  the  Green -tailed  Sylphs; 
and  also  to  two  species  of  the  "  Comets,"  in  which  two 
different  kinds  of  luminous  reds  or  crimsons  are  nearly 
all  that  serve  to  distinguish  the  species. 

A  similar  principle  of  variation  applies  in  other  genera, 
where  the  amount  of  difference  is  greater.  For  example, 
one  of  the  most  singular  and  beautiful  of  all  the  tribe  is 
comprised  within  the  genus  Lophornis,  or  the  "Co- 
quettes." The  principle  of  ornament  in  this  genus  is, 
that  the  different  species  are  all  provided  both  with 
brilliant  crests,  and  with  frills  or  tippets  on  the  neck. 
The  feathers  of  these  parts  are  generally  of  one  colour, 
ending  in  spots  or  spangles  of  another;  the  spangles 
being  generally  of  metallic  lustre.  There  seems  to  be  a 
rule  of  inverse  proportion  between  the  two  kinds  of 
ornament.  The  species  which  have  the  neck  plumes 
longest  have  the  shortest  crests,  and  vice  versa.  In  the 
shape  and  structure  of  all  essential  organs  there  is  hardly 
any  difference  between  the  species. 

One  very  curious  example  of  variety  for  the  sake  of 
ornament  may  be  mentioned  in  connexion  with  this 
wonderful  family  of  Birds.  It  is  a  law — in  the  sense  of 
an  observed  order  of  facts — regulating  the  ornament  of 
Humming  Birds,  that  where  white  is  introduced  into  the 


234  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

colouring  of  the  tail  feathers,  it  is  not  applied  to  the 
central  feathers,  but  is  confined  to  the  marginal  feathers 
on  either  side.  There  is,  however,  one  species  (Uros- 
tlcte  Beng&miw),  recently  discovered,  which  affords  the 
only  example  yet  known  of  a  departure  from  this  rule. 
It  is  a  species  in  which  white  is  one  of  the  principal 
ornaments  of  the  Bird,  and  is  used  in  places  where  it 
can  be  placed  in  conspicuous  contrast  with  the  darkest 
tints.  Tufts  and  lines  of  purest  white  shine  among  the 
greens  and  violets  of  the  neck  and  head  ;  whilst,  in 
exquisite  harmony  with  this,  the  four  central  feathers  of 
the  tail  are  alone  dipped,  as  it  were,  in  a  solid  glaze  of 
the  same  white,  and  the  marginal  feathers  on  either  side 
are  kept  wholly  dark.  Then,  as  if  to  mark  with  em- 
phasis the  meaning  of  this  departure  from  the  ordinary 
rule,  it  is  a  departure  confined  to  the  ornamented  sex ; 
and  the  Female  Form  of  the  same  species  follows  the 
ordinary  law— white  being  introduced  in  the  marginal 
feathers,  and  in  these  alone. 

Now,  what  explanation  does  the  law  of  Natural 
Selection  give — I  will  not  say  of  the  origin,  but  even  of 
the  continuance  and  preservation  —  of  such  specific 
varieties  as  these  ?  None  whatever.  A  crest  of  topaz  is 
no  better  in  the  struggle  for  existence  than  a  crest  of 
sapphire.  A  frill  ending  in  spangles  of  the  emerald  is 
no  better  in  the  battle  of  life  than  a  frill  ending  in 
the  spangles  of  the  ruby.  A  tail  is  not  affected  for  the 


.      CREATION   BY   LAW.  235 

purposes  of  flight,  whether  its  marginal  or  its  central 
feathers  are  decorated  with  white.  It  is  impossible  to 
bring  such  varieties  into  relation  with  any  physical  law 
known  to  us.  It  has  relation,  however,  to  a  Purpose, 
which  stands  in  close  analogy  with  our  own  knowledge 
of  Purpose  in  the  works  of  Man.  Mere  beauty  and 
mere  variety,  for  their  own  sake,  are  objects  which  we 
ourselves  seek  when  we  can  make  the  Forces  of  Nature 
subordinate  to  the  attainment  of  them.  There  seems  to 
be  no  conceivable  reason  why  we  should  doubt  or  ques- 
tion, that  these  are  ends  and  aims  also  in  the  Forms  given 
to  living  Organisms,  when  the  facts  correspond  with  this 
view,  and  with  no  other.  In  this  sense,  we  can  trace  a 
creative  law, — that  is,  we  can  see  that  these  Forms  of 
Life  do  fulfil  a  purpose  and  intention,  which  we  can 
appreciate  and  understand. 

But  then  it  may  be  asked,  has  this  purpose  and  inten- 
tion been  attained  without  the  use  of  means  ?  Have  no 
physical  laws  been  used,  whereby  these  new  forms  of 
beauty  have  been  evolved,  the  one  from  the  other,  in  a 
series  so  wonderful  for  its  variety  in  unity,  and  its  unity 
in  variety?  I  am  not  now  seeking  to  answer  this  ques- 
tion in  the  negative.  All  I  say  is,  that  the  physical  laws 
which  are  made  subservient  to  this  purpose  are  entirely 
unknown  to  us.  That  particular  combination  of  a  great 
many  natural  laws,  which  Mr.  Darwin  groups  under  the 


236  THE    REIGN 'OF    LAW. 

name  of  Natural  Selection,  does  not  in  the  least  answer 
the  conditions  which  we  seek  in  a  law  to  account  for 
either  the  origin  or  the  spread  of  such  creatures  as  the 
various  kinds  of  Humming  Birds.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
I  am  asked  whether  I  believe  that  every  separate  Species 
has  been  a  separate  creation — not  born,  but  separately 
made — I  must  answer,  that  I  do  not  believe  it.  I  think 
the  facts  do  suggest  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  the  working 
of  some  creative  Law,  almost  as  certainly  as  they  con- 
vince us  that  we  know  nothing  of  its  nature,  or  of  the 
conditions  under  which  it  does  its  glorious  work.  Our 
experience  of  the  existing  Order  of  Nature  is,  that  the 
young  of  each  species  repeat  the  form  and  the  colours  of 
their  parent,  and  that  even  where  variations  occur,  they 
are  inconstant,  and  tend  to  disappear.  We  have  no 
knowledge,  for  example,  that  from  the  eggs  of  the  Blue- 
tailed  Sylph  a  pair  of  Green-tailed  Sylphs  can  ever  be 
produced.  We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  a  species 
of  Lophornis  with  a  tippet  of  emerald  spangles,  can  ever 
hatch  out  a  pair  of  young  adorned  with  spangles  of  some 
other  gem.  And  yet  we  cannot  assert  that  such  pheno- 
mena are  impossible,  nor  can  it  be  denied  that,  as  a 
matter  of  speculation,  this  process  is  natural  and  easy  of 
conception,  as  compared  with  the  idea  of  each  Species 
being  separately  called  into  existence,  out  of  the  in- 
organic elements  of  which  its  body  is  composed. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  237 

Such  new  births— if  they  do  take  place — would  per- 
fectly fulfil,  I  think,  the  only  idea  we  can  ever  form  of 
new  creations.  For  example,  it  would  appear  that  every 
variety  which  is  to  take  its  place  as  a  new  Species  must 
be  born  male  and  female  ;  because  it  is  one  of  the  facts 
of  specific  variation  in  the  Humming  Birds,  that  although 
the  male  and  female  plumage  is  generally  entirely  dif- 
ferent, yet  the  female  of  each  Species  is  as  distinct  from 
the  female  of  every  other,  as  the  male  is  from  the  male 
of  every  other.  If,  therefore,  each  new  variety  were  not 
born  in  couples,  and  if  the  divergence  of  Form  were  not 
thus  secured  in  the  organisation  of  both  the  sexes,  it 
would  fail  to  be  established,  or  would  exhibit  for  a  time 
the  phenomena  of  mixture,  and  terminate  in  reversion 
to  the  original  type.  Now  here  again  we  have  the 
emphatic  declaration  of  Mr.  Gould,  that  among  the 
thousands  of  specimens  which  have  passed  through  his 
hands,  from  all  the  genera  of  this  great  family,  he  has 
never  seen  one  case  of  mixture  or  hybridism  between 
any  two  Species,  however  nearly  allied.  But  this  pas- 
sage is  so  important,  that  I  quote  it  entire.  "  It  might 
be  thought  by  some  persons  that  four  hundred  species  of 
birds  so  diminutive  in  size,  and  of  one  family,  could 
scarcely  be  distinguished  from  each  other ;  but  any  one 
who  studies  the  subject,  will  soon  perceive  .that  such  is 
not  the  case.  Even  the  females,  which  assimilate  more 


238  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

closely  to  each  other  than  the  males,  can  be  separated 
with  perfect  certainty;  nay,  even  a  tail-feather  will  be 
sufficient  for  a  person  well  versed  in  the  subject  to  say  to 
what  genus  and  species  the  Bird  from  which  it  has  been 
taken  belongs.  I  mention  this  fact  to  show  that  what 
we  designate  a  Species  has  really  distinctive  and  con- 
stant characters ;  and  in  the  whole  of  my  experience, 
with  many  thousands  of  Humming  Birds  passing  through 
my  hands,  I  have  never  observed  an  instance  of  any 
variation  which  would  lead  me  to  suppose  that  it  was 
the  result  of  a  union  of  two  species.  I  write  this  with- 
out bias,  one  way  or  the  other,  as  to  the  question  of  the 
Origin  of  Species.  I  am  desirous  of  representing  Nature 
in  her  wonderful  ways  as  she  presents  herself  to  my 
attention  at  the  close  of  my  work,  after  a  period  of 
twelve  years  of  incessant  labour,  and  not  less  than 
twenty  years  of  interesting  study."1 

If,  therefore,  new  Species  are  born  from  the  old,  it 
is  not  by  accidental  'mixture;  it  is  not  by  the  mere 
nursing  of  changes  advantageous  in  the  battle  of  life ; 
it  must  be  from  the  birth  of  some  one  couple,  male  and 
female,  whose  organisation  is  subjected  to  new  con- 
ditions corresponding  with  each  other,  and  having  such 
force  of  self-continuance  as  to  secure  it  against  rever- 

• 

*  Gould's  "  Trochilidae,"  Introduction. 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  239 


sion.  It  matters  not  how  small  the  difference  may  be 
from  the  parent  Form ;  if  that  difference  be  constant, 
and  if  it  be  associated  with  some  difference  equally 
constant  in  the  female  Form,  it  becomes  at  once  a  new 
Species.  There  are  some  cases  mentioned  by  Mr.  Gould 
which  may  possibly  be  examples  of  the  first  founding  of 
a  new  Species.  In  the  beautiful  genus  Cynanthus,  he  tells 
us  that  there  are  some  local  varieties  near  Bogota,  in 
which  the  ornament  is  partially  changing  from  blue. to 
green  ;  and  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  this  variation  appears 
to  be  taking  effect  under  the  direction  of  some  definite 
rule  or  "  law," — inasmuch  as  it  is  only  the  eight  central 
feathers  of  the  tail  which  are  tipped  with  the  new  colour. 
Mr.  Gould  expressly  says  of  one  such  variety  from 
Ecuador,  that  it  possesses  characters  so  distinctive  as 
to  entitle  it,  in  his  opinion,  to  the  rank  of  a  separate 
Species.  The  very  discussion  of  such  a  question  shows 
the  possibility  of  new  births  being  the  means  of  intro- 
ducing new  Species.  But  my  object  here  is  simply  to 
point  out  that  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  offers  no  explanation 
of  such  births,  either  as  respects  their  origin  or  their 
preservation,  neither  does  it  even  approach  to  tracing 
these  births  to  any  physical  law  whatever.  It  fails 
also  to  recognise,  even  if  it  does  not  exclude,  the  rela- 
tion which  the  birth  of  new  Species  has  to  the  mental 
purpose  of  producing  mere  beauty  and  mere  variety. 


24°  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

Nevertheless  it  may  be  true  that  ordinary  generation 
has  been  the  instrument  employed  ;  but  if  so,  it  must  be 
employed  under  extraordinary  conditions,  and  directed 
to  extraordinary  results. 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  the  principle  of  Natural 
Selection  has  no  bearing  whatever  on  the  Origin  of 
Species,  but  only  on  the  preservation  and  distribution 
of  Species  when  they  have  arisen.  I  have  already 
pointed  out  that  Mr.  Darwin  does  not  always  keep 
this  distinction  clearly  in  view,  because  he  speaks  of 
Natural  Selection  "producing"  organs,  or  "adapting" 
them.  It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that  Natural 
Selection  can  produce  nothing  whatever,  except  the 
conservation  or  preservation  of  some  variation  other- 
wise originated.  The  true  Origin  of  Species  does  not 
consist  in  the  adjustments  which  help  varieties  to  live 
and  to  prevail,  but  in  those  previous  adjustments  which 
cause  those  varieties  to  be  born  at  all.  Now  what  are 
these?  Can  they  be  traced  or  even  guessed  at?  Mr. 
Darwin  has  a  whole  chapter  on  the  Laws  of  Variation ; l 
and  it  is  here,  if  anywhere,  that  we  look  for  any  sug- 
gestion as  to  the  physical  causes  which  account  for 
the  Origin  as  distinguished  from  the  mere  Preservation 
of  Species.  He  candidly  admits  that  his  doctrine  of 

I  "Origin  of  Species,"  chap.  v. 


CREATION   BY   LAW.  241 

Natural  Selection  takes  cognisance  of  variations  only 
after  they  have  arisen,  and  that  it  regards  those  varia- 
tions as  purely  accidental  in  their  origin,  or,  in  other 
words,  as  due  to  chance.  This,  of  course,  he  adds,  is  a 
supposition  wholly  incorrect,  and  only  serves  "  to  indi- 
cate plainly  our  ignorance  of  the  cause  of  each  particular 
variation."  Accordingly,  the  Laws  of  Variation  which 
he  proceeds  to  indicate  are  merely,  for  the  most  part, 
certain  observed  facts  in  respect  to  Variation,  and  do 
not  at  all  come  under  the  category  of  Laws,  in  that 
higher  sense  in  which  the  word  Law  indicates  a  dis- 
covered method  under  which  Natural  Forces  are  made 
to  work.  There  is,  however,  in  this  chapter,  one  Law 
which  approaches  to  a  Law  in  the  higher  sense.  Mr. 
Darwin,  whilst  candidly  confessing  our  profound  igno- 
rance of  the  cause  or  origin  of  varieties,  yet  groups 
together  a  great  class  of  facts  as  connected  by  a  tie 
which  he  calls  the  "  Correlation  of  Growth."  Now  what 
is  this  law — this  observed  Order  of  facts?  It  is,  that 
variation  in  one  part  of  an  organism  is,  as  a  rule,  ac- 
companied with  corresponding  variations  in  other  parts, 
and  especially  in  those  parts  which  are  "  homologous," 
that  is  to  say,  which  occupy  the  same  relative  place 
in  the  general  Plan. 

This,  however,  is  but  a  very  imperfect  definition  of 
the  vast  Order  of  mysterious  facts  which  are  covered 

R 


242  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

by  the  words,  "  Correlation  of  Growth."  The  funda- 
mental idea  which  these  words  express  is  an  Idea  of 
wider  and  deeper  significance  in  Nature,  than  Mr. 
Darwin  seems  to  have  perceived.  There  is  a  corre- 
lation between  all  natural  organic  growths;  that  is  to 
say,  that  any  variation  of  form  in  a  single  part  has  a 
constant  relation  to  other  variations  of  form  in  some 
Other  part  or  parts  of  the  same  organism.  But  "rela- 
tion "  is  a  vague  word.  There  are  many  kinds  of  "  re- 
lation"— there  are  indeed  an  infinite  variety  of  kinds. 
What  is  the  kind  of  relation  that  we  detect  in  Cor- 
related Growths  ?  It  is  not  until  we  ask  ourselves  this 
question  that  we  discover  what  a  deep  question  it  is — 
how  endless  are  the  avenues  of  thought  and  of  inquiry 
which  it  opens  up. 

First,  one  relation  which  we  detect  in  all  variations  of 
organic  growth,  is  simply  the  relation  of  symmetry.  This 
kind  and  degree  of  Correlation  of  Growth  prevails  even 
in  the  world  which  we  call  Inorganic.  The  correspond- 
ing sides  and  angles  of  a  crystal,  for  example,  may  be 
said  to  be  correlated  together.  The  nature  of  this  rela- 
tion is  geometrical  and  numerical.  It  is  a  relation  having 
reference  to  invariable  rules  of  number.  As  regards  its 
physical  cause,  all  we  can  say  is,  that  it  is  the  result  of 
forces  whose  property  it  is  to  aggregate  the  particles  of 
matter  in  definite  forms,  which  forms  are  symmetrical — 


CREATION    BY   LAW.       ';  243 

that  is  to  say,  they  are  forms  having  an  axis  with  equal 
developments  on  either  side.  Correlation  of  Growth, 
therefore,  in  this  sense  points  to  the  work  of  Forces,  one 
of  whose  essential  properties  is  Polarity — that  is,  equal 
and  similar  action  in  opposite  directions.  Now,  this 
kind  of  Correlation  of  Giowth  may  be  traced  upwards 
from  simple  Minerals  through  all  the  infinite  compli- 
cations of  the  organic  world.  It  is  unquestionably  the 
basis  of  many  of  the  Correlations  of  Growth  prevailing 
in  Plants  and  Animals.  It  is  seen  in  the  symmetrical 
arrangement  of  all  vegetable  and  of  all  animal  Forms. 
A  central  axis  is  traceable  in  them  all ;  and  the  Bilateral 
or  Radiated  arrangement  of  their  subordinate  parts  is 
one  of  the  most  fundamental  and  universal  of  all  the 
Correlations  of  Growth. 

This  is  one,  but  it  is  one  only,  of  the  Correlations  of 
Growth  which  are  constantly  observed.  It  would  lead 
us  to  expect  that  any  change  of  form  on  one  side  of  an 
animal  would  be  accompanied  by  an  exactly  correspond- 
ing change  on  the  other  side :  so  that  limbs  on  one  side 
of  the  central  axis,  if  changed  at  all,  would  change  in 
exact  and  symmetrical  accordance  with  the  limbs  on 
the  opposite  and  corresponding  side.  This,  accordingly, 
is  one  of  the  Correlations  of  Growth  most  constantly 
observed. 

Now,  it  will  be  seen  that  Correlation  of  Growth,  iu 
R  a 


244  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

this  first  and  simplest  sense,  runs  alongside,  as  it  were, 
of  Correlation  in  another  and  higher  sense.  The  relation 
between  two  equal  and  opposite  growths,  which  is  a 
relation,  in  the  first  place,  of  simple  symmetry  as  between 
themselves,  is  always  accompanied  by  another  relation, 
in  the  second  place,  of  correspondence  or  fitness  as 
between  these  growths  and  external  conditions.  An 
organism  which  is  developed  un symmetrically,  unequally, 
would  be  not  only  ugly  in  its  form,  but  it  would  be 
maimed  and  imperfect  in  its  functions.  Here,  then,  we 
see  one  kind  and  one  idea  of  Correlation  rising  above 
another.  Two  growths  might  be  correlated  as  regards 
each  other,  and  might  yet  be  wanting  in  any  correspond- 
ing correlation  of  fitness  and  of  function  towards  out- 
ward things.  But  the  first  of  these  two  kinds  of  cor- 
relation would  be  useless  without  the  last.  And  this  last 
is  obviously  the  higher  and  more  complex  Correlation  of 
the  two.  It  is  higher,  not  only  in  the  sense  of  being 
more  complex,  but  as  involving  an  idea  which  lifts  us 
at  once  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  region  of  thought. 
Growths  correlated  as  between  each  other  according  to 
mere  symmetry  of  arrangement  suggest  nothing,  except 
the  work  of  Forces  with  inherent  Polarity  of  action.  But 
growths  correlated  with  things  outside  the  organism  in 
which  those  growths  occur, — and  which  can  exert  no 
physical  effect  upon  it, — suggest  at  once  the  operation 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  245 

of  Forces  working  under  Adjustment  with  a  view  to 
Purpose. 

When  we  see  a  Mineral  salt  crystallising  uiyler  the 
power  of  a  Voltaic  Current,  we  see  Correlation  of  Growth 
in  its  simplest  form,  and  in  visible  connexion  with  its 
immediate  cause.  The  particles  of  salt  are  marshalled 
in  a  constant  Order — an  Order,  the  principle  of  which  is 
some  central  axis,  with  branches  and  branchlets  grouped 
around  it  in  equal  and  exquisite  arrangement.  Won- 
derful as  this  arrangement  is,  it  suggests  no  other  ques- 
tion to  the  mind  than  that  which  may  be  asked  in  respect 
to  the  ultimate  nature  and  source  of  Polarity  in  Magnetic 
Force.  But  when  we  see  two  growths  in  an  organism  which 
not  only  are  correlated  to  each  other  with  reference  to  a 
centre,  but  are  correlated  also  to  external  things  with 
reference  to  Function,  we  see  something  which  raises 
questions  altogether  different  in  kind.  We  have  passed 
at  once  from  the  region  of  the  What,  and  the  How,  into 
the  region  of  the  Why.  The  one  kind  of  Correlation 
has  reference  to  Physical  Causes,  the  other  kind  of  cor- 
relation has  reference  to  those  Mental  Purposes  which 
Physical  Causes  are  made  to  serve.  These  two  kinds  of 
Correlation  are  perfectly  distinct.  They  are  as  distinct 
as  the  correlation  of  equal  pressures  which  a  given 
volume  of  steam  exerts  upon  the  opposite  sides  of  a 
boiler  is  distinct  from  the  correlation  between  that  pres« 


246  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

sure  and  its  conversion  into  the  driving-force  of  cranks 
and  wheels,  with  all  their  adaptations  for  running  on  the 
rails,  or  for  paddling  in  the  sea.  They  are  as  distinct  as 
the  correlations  of  force  developed  in  a  Voltaic  Battery 
are  distinct  from  the  adjustments  which  convert  those 
forces  into  the  means  of  communicating  Thought. 

Mr.  Darwin  has  not  pointed  out  this  distinction 
clearly.  Indeed,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  had  it  in 
his  view.  He  groups  under  one  name, — the  Correlation 
of  Growth, — two  classes  of  Phenomena,  which  are  in- 
deed always  combined  in  fact,  but  which  are  entirely 
separate  in  i4ea.  Correlation  of  Growth,  in  one  sense, 
is  that  law  of  vital  force  which  secures  that  any  change 
in  the  shape  of  one  limb  in  an  animal  shall  be  accom- 
panied by  a  corresponding  change  in  all  the  other  limbs. 
Correlation  of  Growth  in  tke  other  sense,  is  that  adjust- 
ment of  vital  forces  to  the  contingencies  of  external 
circumstance,  which  secures  that  all  the  changes  which 
do  take  place  shall  be  changes  adapted  to  the  discharge 
of  new  functions — to  the  fulfilment  of  new  conditions  of 
life— to  command  over  new  sources  of  enjoyment. 

Keeping,  then,  clearly  in  our  view  the  distinction 
between  these  two  different  kinds  of  Correlation  of 
Growth,  let  us  look  at  the  phenomena  actually  presented 
in  the  aspect  and  history  of  Organic  Forms,  as  respects 
both  these  kinds  of  Correlation. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  247 

As  regards  the  first  kind  of  Correlation,  I  have  re- 
ferred to  the  law  of  Bilateral  Symmetry  as  the  simplest 
and  most  obvious  illustration.  It  is  a  law  which  at 
once  connects  itself  with  the  idea  of  Polarity  of  Force. 
But  though  this  be  one  kind  of  Correlation,  almost 
universal,  and  may  very  probably  be  the  foundation  of 
every  other,  there  are  many  Correlations  of  Growth 
between  which  and  mere  Polarity  there  is  no  visible 
connexion.  The  truth  is  that  all  the  parts  of  an  or- 
ganism are  bound  together  as  one  whole  by  a  pervading 
system  of  correlations  as  intricate  as  .they  are  obscure. 
When  the  organism  is  in  health,  and  all  its  parts  are 
working  in  harmony,  the  wonder  of  these  correlations 
is  not  perceived.  But  they  are  brought  out  in  a  marked 
degree  by  the  phenomena  of  disease,  and  also  by  the 
phenomena  of  monstrosity  or  malformation.  The  "  sym- 
pathy" which  the  most  distant  and  apparently  uncon- 
nected parts  of  an  organism  show  with  each  other,  when 
one  of  them  is  affected  by  disease,  is  the  index  of  cor- 
relations whose  nature  is  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of 
our  anatomy.  It  is  the  same  with  malformations.  Mr. 
Darwin  mentions  one  case  of  curious  unintelligible  cor- 
relation— viz.,  that  a  blue  iris  is  associated  in  Cats 
with  deafness ;  and,  again,  that  the  tortoise-shell  colour 
of  the  fur  is  associated  with  the  female  sex  in  the  same 
animal.  In  like  manner  the  bright  colours,  and  the 


248  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

more  conspicuous  ornaments  of  plumage  in  Birds,  are  cor- 
related with  the  male  sex.  So  likewise  are  vocal  organs 
with  the  wonderful  gift  of  song.  In  many  insects  the 
differences  of  form  which  are  correlated  with  the  differ- 
ences of  sex,  are  far  greater  than  the  differences  which 
separate  species  and  even  genera.  There  are  insects  of 
which  the  male  is  a  fly,  whilst  the  female  is  a  worm. 
There  are  many  other  cases  of  correlation  between 
different  growths  in  respect  to  which  the  nature  and 
source  of  the  connexion  is '  equally  unknown.  For 
example,  the  complex  stomachs  of  the  Ruminant  Order 
are  uniformly  associated  with  a  particular  form  of  hoof. 
Sometimes  correlations  the  most  constant  and  invariable 
are  at  the  same  time  the  most  subtle  and  the  most 
secret,  because  they  are  hid  under  other  growths  which 
are  not  so  correlated,  and  which  produce  total  diversi- 
ties of  outward  aspect.  One  very  curious  class  of  cor- 
relations is  the  correlation  between  the  internal  struc- 
ture of  the  teeth  in  animals,  and  the  structure  of  other 
very  distant  portions  of  their  frame.  There  lately  was, 
for  example,  in  the  Zoological  Gardens,  a  little  animal, 
the  Hyrax,  not  unlike  a  Rabbit  in  general  appearance, 
and  very  like  it  in  habit.  It  is  the  "  Cony "  of  Scrip- 
ture. Now  this  little  animal  will  be  found  on  exami- 
nation to  have  limbs  which  do  not  terminate  in  a  foot 
like  a  Rabbit,  but  in  a  divided  hoof  of  peculiar  form. 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  249 

This  hoof  is  in  miniature  like  the  hoof  a  Rhinoceros. 
If  next  we  examine  the  teeth  of  the  Hyrax  we  shall 
find  that  the  materials  of  these  teeth  are  also  combined 
in  the  same  manner,  and  after  the  same  pattern  as  the 
teeth  of  the  Rhinoceros.  So  it  is  with  other  parts  of 
the  same  two  animals.  Along  with  the  teeth  and  the 
hoofs  there  are  certain  other  shapes  of  bones  which 
seem  to  be  under  the  same  bond  of  likeness.  Now 
these  are  Correlations  of  Growth  between  different 
parts  of  the  same  animal,  and  between  the  correspond- 
ing parts  in  two  different  species. 

The  conception,  then,  which  we  are  led  to  form  by 
this  kind  of  Correlation  between  organic  growths,  is 
more  complex  than  we  had  at  first  supposed.  Mere 
Polarity  of  Force,  leading  to  equal  and  opposite  arrange- 
ment of  subordinate  parts,  is  not  enough  to  satisfy  the 
facts.  This,  indeed,  may  continue  to  be  the  type 
to  which  our  thoughts  refer,  and  by  which  we  are 
helped  to  some  more  adequate  idea  of  the  facts.  But 
the  general  impression  left  on  the  mind  is  this — that 
some  One  Force  directs  the  form  and  structure  of 
every  organism,  so  that  any  change  in  one  part  of  it 
is  but  the  index  of  changes  which  run  visibly  or  in- 
visibly throughout  the  whole.  The  growths  between 
which  we  detect  a  correlation,  are  not  really  separate 
things  connected  only  by  the  few  correspondences  which 


250  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

\vc  may  be  able  to  detect,  but  are  part  and  parcel  of 
one  operation,  the  result  of  one  Force,  exerting  its 
energies  through  channels  which  we  cannot  see,  and 
according  to  laws  of  which  we  can  form  but  a  distant 
and  faint  conception.  The  truth  is  that  Correlation  in 
this  sense  is  involved  in  the  very  word  "  Growth." 
Each  part  of  eveiy  structure  which  is  the  result  of 
growth  must  be  correlated  to  every  other  part.  This 
is  essential  to  the  very  idea  of  growth,  and  to  the  very 
idea  of  an  organism  due  to  growth.  When,  therefore, 
Mr.  Darwin  says  that  one  of  the  laws  on  which  varia- 
tion of  form  depends  is  Correlation  of  Growth,  he 
simply  says  that  variations  of  Growth  depend  on  growth 
—for  all  growths  must  be  correlated. 

But  Correlation  in  this  sense  helps  but  a  little  way 
indeed  in  conceiving  the  origin  of  a  new  Species. 
There  might  be  the  most  minute  and  perfect  harmony 
between  the  changes  effected  in  an  animal  newly  bom 
without  those  changes  tending  even  in  the  most  remote 
degree  towards  the  establishment  of  a  new  Form  of 
Life.  In  order  to  that  establishment  there  must  be 
another  correlation,  and  a  correlation  of  a  higher  kind. 
There  must  be  a  correlation  between  those  changes 
and  all  the  outward  conditions  amidst  which  the  new 
Form  is  to  be  placed  and  live.  If 'this  correlation  fails 
the  new  Form  will  die.  Yet,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  this 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  251 


kind  of  correlation  is  without  any  physical  cause.  It 
is  not  necessarily  involved,  as  the  other  kind  of  corre 
lation  is,  in  the  very  idea  of  Growth.  On  the  contrary, 
it  is  not  only  entirely  separable  in  thought,  but,  as  we 
see  in  monstrosities,  it  is  sometimes  separated  in  fact. 
We  have  no  conception  of  any  Force  emanating  from 
external  things  which  shall  mould  the  structure  of  an 
organism  in  harmony  with  themselves.  Mr.  Darwin 
freely  confesses  this,  and  says  that  many  considerations 
"  incline  him  to  lay  very  little  weight  on  the  direct 
action  of  the  conditions  of  life"  in  producing  variety 
of  Form.  We  can  conceive,  dimly  indeed,  but  still  we 
can  conceive,  how  in  the  Humming  Birds  a  special 
form  of  Wing  shall  be  correlated  with  a  special  form 
of  Bill.  But  we  have  no  conception  whatever  how  a 
special  form  of  Bill  should  be  correlated  with  a  special 
form  of  Flower  from  which  the  Bill  is  to  extract  its 
food.  Mr.  Darwin  has  shown  how  an  improved  Bill, 
when  once  produced,  will  be  preserved  by  finding 
external  conditions  to  which  it  is  adapted.  But  he 
has  not  shown,  and  he  frankly  confesses  he  has  no 
idea,  how  the  adapted  variation  of  Bill  comes  to  be 
born  at  all. 

Yet  it  is  this  higher  and  more  complex  Correlation 
which  is  the  most  constant  and  the  most  obvious  of  all 
the  facts  of  Nature.  In  these  facts  we  see  that  the 


252  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

forces  of  Organic  Growth  are  worked  under  rules  of  close 
adjustment  to  external  conditions ;  and  that  particular 
shapes  which  might  seem  inseparably  associated,  if  we 
looked  at  one  Genus  or  one  Family  alone,  are  at  once 
disjoined  where  different  adaptations  to  Function  are 
required.  Let  us  take  another  example  from  the  great 
Class  of  Birds.  If  we  were  to  look  only  to  the  family 
of  the  Anatidce,  (Ducks  and  Geese),  we  might  suppose 
that  there  is  a  constant  Correlation  of  Growth  between 
webbed  feet  and  spoon- shaped  bills.  But  the  real  and 
efficient  Correlation  of  Growth  in  this  case  is  not  be- 
tween the  spoon-bill  and  the  web-foot,  but  between  both 
of  these  and  certain  external  conditions  of  life.  The 
web-foot  is  correlated  to  an  aquatic  habitat :  and  the 
spoon-bill  is  correlated  to  spoon-food.  And  accordingly 
this  association  of  form  in  foot  and  bill  is  at  once  dis- 
solved where  different  external  functions  require  a  sepa- 
ration. In  the  Gulls,  the  Fulmars,  and  the  Petrels,  the 
web-foot  is  retained,  because  action  upon  the  element  of 
water  is  still  required ;  but  the  correlated  form  of  bill 
vanishes,  and  shapes  altogether  different  are  given, — • 
shapes  adapted,  that  is  correlated,  to  different  kinds  of 
food,  and  to  different  methods  of  capture. 

Againj  there  is  another  great  family  of  Birds  where 
some  of  the  same  forms  are  correlated  with  other  forms 
entirely  different,  because  of  the  different  external  Cor- 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  253 

relations  which  are  required  by  Function.  In  the  Divers 
the  web-foot  is  mounted  upon  a  flattened  leg-bone,  with 
the  sharp  edge  set  "  fore  and  aft."  Now  what  is  this 
Correlation  of  Growth  ?  It  is,  first,  the  Internal  Corre- 
lation of  those  parts  to  each  other,  but  secondly  and 
principally,  it  is  the  External  Correlation  of  both  to  their 
function  of  propelling  under  water.  The  form  of  the 
foot  is  correlated  to  the  function  of  opposing  the  largest 
possible  area  of  resistance  to  that  medium,  exactly 
where,  for  the  purpose  of  swimming,  the  maximum  of 
resistance  is  required ;  the  knife-shaped  leg-bone  is 
correlated  to  the  function  of  opposing  the  least  possible 
resistance,  precisely  where,  for  the  same  purpose,  the 
minimum  of  resistance  is  required.  In  Australia  we 
have,  in  the  Ornithorynchns  paradoxus,  the  webbed  ieet 
correlated  with  the  Duck-shaped  Bill  in  an  animal  which 
does  not  belong  to  the  Class  of  Birds  at  all. 

There  is  another  case  of  what  may  be  called  Corre- 
lated Correlations,  which  brings  out  very  clearly  the  dis- 
tinction which  is  so  important  in  the  philosophy  of  this 
great  subject.  Feathers  are  a  kind  of  covering  peculiar 
to  the  Class  of  Birds.  Under  every  variety  of  modifica- 
tion they  have  one  fundamental  plan — a  central  shaft  or 
quill  to  which  lateral  filaments  are  attached.  Now  there 
is  a  vast  range  of  correlations  between  the  different 
kinds  of  feather  and  the  different  Families  or  Species, 


254  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

and  between  different  parts  of  the  body  in  the  same 
Species.  But  there  are  two  Correlations  of.  Growth  in 
respect  to  feathers  which  are  constant.  In  all  cases, 
(excepting,  of  course,  the  Wingless  Birds,)  the  feathers 
which  grow  from  the  fore-arm  and  finger-bones,  consti- 
tuting the  Wings,  are  comparatively  long,  strong,  taper- 
ing, elastic,  and  with  thin  lateral  filaments,  which  fila- 
ments are  closely  hooked  together  by  means  of  minute 
teeth  fitting  into  each  other,  so  that  the  whole  shall  form 
one  continuous  surface  or  web.  This  is  a  Correlation  of 
Growth  between  one  particular  kind  of  feather,  and  one 
particular  member  of  the  body,  which,  in  all  Birds 
capable  of  flight,  is  constant,  and  amounts  to  a  universal 
Law.  Now  let  us  contrast  this  with  another  Correlation 
of  Growth  which  is  equally  constant.  On  the  side  of 
the  head  of  all  Birds,  there  is  a  patch  of  feathers  of 
peculiar  structure,  with  fine  and  slender  shafts,  and  with 
the  lateral  filaments  not  hooked  together  as  in  the  other 
case,  but,  on  the  contrary,  always  separated  from  each 
other — the  whole  series  forming  a  fine  and  open  network 
spread  over  the  surface  which  they  cover  and  protect. 
These  feathers  cover  the  orifice  of  the  ear,  and  are  called 
the  auriculars.  They  are  correlated  with  the  curious 
passages,  the  finely  hung  clapper-bones,  and  all  the 
elaborate  mechanism  of  that  organ.  Such  are  the  In- 
ternal Correlations.  But  they  are  intelligible  only  when 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  255 

considered  in  the  light  shed  by  other  correlations  which 
are  external.  The  wing  feathers  with  close  continuous 
webs  are  correlated  to  the  laws  by  which  the  passage  of 
air  may  be  prevented — the  auricular  feathers,  with  open 
unconnected  webs,  are  correlated  to  the  laws  by  which 
the  passage  of  sound  may  be  rendered  easy.  The  one 
set  of  feathers  are  adapted  to  the  active  function  of 
evoking  and  resisting  atmospheric  pressure  by  striking 
strong,  yet  light  and  elastic  blows,  upon  the  air — the 
Other  set  of  feathers  are  adapted  to  the  passive  function 
of  allowing  the  free  access  of  the  waves  of  sound  into 
the  passages  of  the  ear.  These  are  but  a  few  examples 
out  of  millions.  Throughout  the  whole  range  of  Nature 
the  system  of  Internal  Correlation  is  entirely  subordinate 
to  the  system  of  External  Correlation.  Forms  or 
growths  which  are  inseparably  joined  with  each  other  in 
one  group  of  animals,  are  wholly  divorced  from  each 
other  in  another  group;  whereas  Forms  which  have 
correlations  adapted  to  external  conditions,  are  repeated 
over  and  over  again  across  the  widest  gaps  in  the  scale 
of  Natural  affinity. 

If,  then,  it  be  true  that  New  Species  are  created  out  of 
small  variations  in  the  form  of  Old  Species,  and  this  by 
\vay  of  Natural  Generation,  there  must  be  some  bond 
of  connexion  which  determines  those  variations  in  a 
definite  direction,  and  keeps  up  the  External  Correla- 


256  .      THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

&QWS,  pari passu  with  the  Internal  Correlations.  Natural 
Selection  can  have  no  part  in  this.  Natural  Selection 
seizes  on  these  External  Correlations  when  they  have 
come  to  be.  But  Natural  Selection  cannot  enter  the 
secret  chambers  of  the  womb,  and  there  shape  the  new 
Form  in  harmony  with  modified  conditions  of  external 
life.  How,  then,  are  these  external  correlations  provided 
for  beforehand  ?  There  can  be  but  one  reply.  It  is  by 
Utility,  not  acting  as  a  Physical  Cause  upon  organs 
already  in  existence,  but  acting  through  Motive  as  a 
Mental  Purpose  in  contriving  organs  before  they  have 
begun  to  be.  And  where  obvious  utility  does  result, 
the  only  connecting  Bond  which  can  be  conceived  as 
capable  of  maintaining  the  Internal  Correlations  in 
harmony  with  the  External  Correlations,  is  the  Bond  of 
Creative  Will  giving  to  Organic  Forces  a  foreseen  direc- 
tion. It  is,  in  short,  precisely  the  same  bond  which 
in  all  mechanism  produces  Structure  in  harmony  with 
intended  Function. 

Hence  it  is  that  scientific  men,  in  seeking  expression 
for  the  ultimate  ideas  arrived  at  in  the  course  of  Physical 
research,  find  themselves  compelled  to  borrow  the  lan- 
guage of  Mechanical  Invention.  There  is  no  other  lan- 
guage which  conveys  an  impression  of  the  facts,  or  of 
the  tie  by  which  the  facts  are  connected  with  each 
other.  In  the  first  chapter  of  this  work  I  have  had 


CREATION   BY   LAW.  2 57 

occasion  to  point  out  how  true  this  is  of  Mr.  Darwin's 
description  of  the  Orchids,  and  of  the  curious  functions 
of  their  structure.  The  correlations  there  are  all  ex- 
ternal. But  the  same  result  appears  in  every  other 
department  of  Science.  In  a  remarkable  paper  on  the 
"  Constitution  of  the  Universe/'  Professor  Tyndall  has 
occasion  to  speak  of  the  non-luminous  rays  of  heat 
emitted  by  all  incandescent  bodies, — rays  which,  though 
intensely  hot,  are  altogether  insensible  to  the  eye.  Now 
the  Retina  of  the  eye  is  a  piece  of  mechanism  whose 
Correlations  are  essentially  External.  It  is  the  expan- 
sion of  a  special  nerve  whose  function  it  is  to  be  sensitive 
to  certain  particular  vibrations,  and  to  no  other  vibra- 
tions whatever.  Light  itself,  therefore,  is  discovered  to 
be  merely  a  relative  term — a  word,  in  short,  denoting 
nothing  but  an  external  Correlation  between  the  Retina 
and  vibrations  of  a  certain  kind  and  quality.  Now  what 
is  the  language  which  Professor  Tyndall  is  constrained 
to  use  in  explanation  of  facts  so  difficult  of  conception  ? 
It  is  the  language  cf  Mechanism,  of  mental  Purpose  and 
Design.  "  It  is  not,"  he  says,  "  the  size  of  a  wave  which 
determines  its  power  of  producing  light ;  it  is,  broadly 
speaking,  the  fitness  of  the  wave  to  the  Retina.  The 
ethereal  pulses  must  follow  each  other  with  a  certain 
rapidity  of  succession  before  they  can  produce  light,  and 
if  their  rapidity  exceed  a  certain  limit,  they  also  fail  to 

s 


258  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

produce  light.  The  Retina  is  attuned,  if  I  may  use  the 
term,  to  a  certain  range  of  vibrations,  beyond  which,  in 
both  directions,  it  ceases  to  be  of  use."  These  are 
indeed  wonderful  Correlations  which  reveal  to  us  fit- 
tings and  adjustments  of  which  we  had  no  previous 
conception  :  but  they  give  us  no  glimmering  even,  of 
knowledge  as  to  the  physical  causes  which  have  "at- 
tuned "  a  material  organ  so  as  to  catch  certain  ethereal 
pulsations  in  the  external  world,  and  to  make  these  the 
means  of  conveying  to  Man's  Intelligence  the  enjoyment 
and  the  power  of  sight 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  when  Mr.  Darwin  speaks  of 
the  Law  of  Correlation  of  Growth  as  a  Law  which  deter- 
mines variation  in  organic  growths,  he  is  really  present- 
ing to  us  under  one  phase  two  separate  ideas  which  are 
radically  distinct.  One  is  the  idea  of  different  growths 
in  the  same  organism,  corresponding  with  each  other 
in  respect  to  arrangement, — or  in  respect  to  texture, 
or  in  respect  to  form, — or  to  some  other  point  of  com- 
parison. The  other  idea  is  that  these  growths  (each  and 
all)  correspond  with  the  conditions  of  external  nature  in 
such  a  way  as  to  fit  them  for  the  discharge  of  Function 
with  some  new  adaptation,  and  consequently  with  some 
new  advantage.  In  one  aspect  the  Law  of  Correlation 
of  Growth  is  (or  at  least  may  probably  be)  a  Law  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  word ;  that  is  to  say,  the  result 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  259 

of  a  Force  acting  according  to  its  own  definite  modes 
and  measures  of  operation.  But  the  Law  of  Correlation 
of  Growth  in  the  other  aspect,  is  a  law  only  in  the 
sense  (i)  of  an  observed  order  of  facts;  and  (2)  of 
that  Order  depending  on  Adjustment  with  a  view  to 
Purpose. 

Many  naturalists  have  spoken  of  the  facts  of  organic 
likeness  as  sufficiently  accounted  for  by  referring  them  to 
Adherence  to  Type.  Mr.  Darwin  complains  that  this 
phrase,  as  an  explanation  of  organic  likeness,  is  no 
explanation  at  all,  but  amounts  only  to  a  re-statement  of 
the  facts  in  another  form  of  language.  This  is  true ;  but 
it  is  equally  true  of  his  own  phrase  of  Correlation  of 
Growth.1  "  Adherence  to  Type  "  is  not  in  the  nature  of 
a  Physical  Cause,  but  in  the  nature  of  a  Mental  Purpose. 
It  is  no  explanation,  therefore,  to  those  faculties  of  the 
mind  which  seek  for  Methods  of  operation.  In  like 
manner  "  Correlation  of  Growth,"  in  the  only  sense  in 
which  it  is  possible  to  connect  it  with  the  Origin  of 
Species,  is  not  a  Physical  Cause,  but  a  Mental  Purpose. 
The  physical  means  by  which  that  purpose  is  secured 

1  Mr.  Wallace  traces  the  whole  Darwinian  theory  to  six  "general 
laws  of  the  simplest  kind — laws  which,''  he  emphatically  adds, 
"are  in  most  cases  mere  statements  of  admitted  facts"  Again  h« 
says,  "  This  series  of  facts  or  laws  are  mere  statements  of  what  is 
the  condition  of  nature." — Journal  of  Science,  No.  XVI.  p.  472. 

S  2 


260  THE    REIGN   OF    LAW. 

remain  as  dark  as  ever;  and  such  of  them  as  are  con- 
ceivable by  us,  are  seen,  like  all  other  physical  forces, 
working  to  order,  subject  to  direction,  and  having  that 
direction  determined  by  foresight,  forethought,  and  con- 
trivance. 

Correlation  of  Growth,  in  the  sense  of  external  adapta- 
tions, may  be  said  to  be  the  most  universal  of  all  the 
Laws  of  Nature.  But  it  accounts  for  the  Origin  of 
Organic  Forms  only  in  the  same  sense  in  which  it 
accounts  for  the  origin  of  all  other  phenomena,  which  in 
their  result  exhibit  adaptations,  or  fittings  into  use  and 
service.  Let  us  take,  as  an  example,  the  origin,  nature, 
and  capacities  of  Coal.  That  substance  is  correlated  in 
a  truly  wonderful  manner  with  the  needs,  the  powers, 
and  the  capacities  of  Man.  It  contains  within  itself,  in 
a  form  condensed  and  portable,  a  store  of  physical  Force 
of  incredible  amount.  The  particles  of  one  pound  weight 
of  it  are  held  together  by  a  Force  which,  when  liberated 
and  applied  in  the  form  of  heat,  is  capable  of  lifting  one 
million  times  its  own  weight  to  the  height  of  one  foot.1 
No  other  substance  known  to  Man  is  to  be  compared 
with  this  as  a  furnisher  of  Force.  This  is  its  function  in 
the  world.  It  is  a  function  relating  to  Man's  mechanical 
and  inventive  powers ;  and  coal  has  been  rendered 

l  "The  Coal  Question."— W.  S.  Jevons,  1865. 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  26 1 

capable  of  discharging  this  function  by  processes  of  pre- 
paration which  began  millions  of  ages  before  Man  was 
born.  But  these  External  Correlations  are  a  result  arising 
by  way  of  natural  consequence  out  of  certain  physical 
causes  working  to  order,  that  is  to  say,  out  of  Internal 
Correlations  of  Growth  between  Solar  Heat  and  Vege- 
table Structure,  and  again  between  these  and  the  causes 
which  occasion  interchange  between  sea  and  land.  No 
explanation  so  definite  as  this  can  be  given  of  the 
method  in  which  Vital  Forces  are  made  to  evolve  a  new 
Form  of  Life.  But  even  if  such  explanation  could  be 
given,  it  would  render  no  account  at  all  of  the  fittings  of 
that  Form  into  the  outward  requirements  of  its  life. 
These  are  Correlations  which  in  their  very  nature  belong 
to  Mind,  are  the  work  of  Mind,  and  are  intelligible  only 
in  the  light  of  Mind. 

I  do  not  represent  this  conclusion  as  one  necessarily 
adverse  to  Mr.  Darwin's  Theory  on  the  Origin  of  Species. 
It  is  a  conclusion  which  he  would  probably  be  willing  to 
accept.  I  only  desire  to  point  out  in  how  very  limited 
a  sense  that  Theory  can  be  said  to  trace  Creation  to  a 
"  Law  "  at  all,  and  how  entirely  inadequate  that  Theory 
is  to  account  by  any  physical  cause  for  the  Origin  of 
Species. 

The  only  senses,  therefore,  in  which  we  get  any 
glimpse  of  Creation  by  Law  are  these — ist,  That  the 


262  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW.     ' 

close  physical  connexion  between  different  Specific 
Forms  is  probably  due  to  the  operation  of  some 
Force  or  Forces  common  to  them  all;  2d,  That  these 
Forces  have  been  employed  and  worked,  with  others 
equally  unknown,  for  the  attainment  of  such  ends  as 
the  multiplication  of  Life,  in  Forms  fitted  for  new 
spheres  of  enjoyment,  and  for  the  display  of  new  kinds 
of  beauty. 

Is  there  anything  in  this  conclusion  to  conflict  with 
such  knowledge  as  we  have  from  other  sources  of  the 
nature  and  working  of  Creative  Power?  I  do  not  know 
on  what  authority  it  is  that  we  so  often  speak  as  if 
Creation  were  not  Creation  unless  it  work  from  nothing 
as  its  material,  and  by  nothing  as  its  means.  We  know 
that  out  of  the  "  dust  of  the  ground" — that  is,  out  of  the 
ordinary  elements  of  Nature — are  our  own  bodies  formed, 
and  the  bodies  of  all  living  things.  Nor  is  there  any- 
thing which  should  shock  us  in  the  idea  that  the  creation 
of  new  Forms,  any  more  than  their  propagation,  has 
been  brought  about  by  the  use  and  instrumentality  of 
means.  In  a  theological  point  of  view  it  matters  nothing 
what  those  means  have  been.  I  agree  with  M.  Guizot, 
•when  he  says  that  "Those  only  would  be  serious 
adversaries  of  the  doctrine  of  Creation  who  could  affirm 
that  the  universe — the  earth,  and  Man  upon  it — have 
been  from  all  eternity,  and  in  all  respects,  just  what  they 


CREATION   BY   LAW.  263 

are  now."1  But  this  cannot  be  affirmed  except  in  the 
teeth  of  facts  which  Science  has  clearly  ascertained. 
There  has  been  a  continual  coming-to-be  of  new  Forms 
of  Life.2  This  is  Creation,  no  matter  what  have  been  the 
laws  or  forces  employed  by  Creative  Power. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  theory  which  fixes  upon  In- 
heritance as  the  cause  of  organic  likeness,  startles  us 
only  when  it  is  applied  to  Forms  in  which  unlikeness 
is  more  prominent  than  resemblance.  The  idea,  for 
example,  that  the  different  kinds  of  Pigeon,  or  of  Hum- 
ming Birds,  have  all  descended  through  successive  varia- 
tion from  some  one  ancestral  pair,  whether  it  be  true 
or  not,  would  not  startle  any  one.  Yet,  if  this  be  true, 
\ve  must  be  prepared  for  the  same  surmise  extending 
farther.  The  advocates  of  Development  urge  that  Time 
is  a  powerful  factor.  They  say  that  if  changes  small, 
but  constant  enough,  and  definite  enough,  to  consti- 
tute new  Species,  can  and  do  arise  out  of  born  varieties, 
it  is  impossible  to  fix  the  limits  of  divergence  which 
may  be  reached  in  the  course  of  ages.  It  does  not 
follow,  on  the  other  hand,  that  there  is  no  such  limit 

1  "  Meditations  sur  1'Essence  de  la  Religion  Chretienne,"  p.  49. 

*  "  We  discern  no  evidence  of  a  pause  or  intromission  in  the 
creation  or  coming-to-be  of  new  plants  and  animals." — Instances 
of  the  Power  of  God  as  manifested  in  His  Animal  Creation^  by 
Professor  Owen, 


264  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

because  we  cannot  fix  it.  It  does  not  necessarily  follow 
that  because  we  admit  the  idea  of  the  Rock-dove,  and 
the  Turtle-dove,  and  the  Ring-dove  being  all  descended 
from  one  ancestral  Pigeon,  we  are  bound  to  accept 
the  idea  of  the  Whale,  and  the  Antelope,  and  the 
Monkey  being  all  descended  from  some  one  primeval 
Mammal.  Mr.  Darwin  says,  truly  enough,  that  Inherit- 
ance "  is  that  cause  which  alone,  as  far  as  we  positively 
know,  produces  organisms  quite  like,  or  nearly  like,  each 
other."  But  this  is  no  reason  why  we  should  conclude 
that  Inheritance  is  the  only  cause  which  can  produce 
Organisms  quite  unlike,  or  only  very  partially  like  each 
other.  We  are  surely  not  entitled  to  assume  that  all 
degrees  and  kinds  of  likeness  can  arise  only  from  this 
single  cause.  Yet  until  this  extreme  proposition  be 
proved,  or  rendered  probable,  we  have  a  sound  scien- 
tific basis  for  doubting  the  application  of  the  theory, 
precisely  in  proportion  to  the  unlikeness  of  the  animals 
to  which  it  is  applied. 

And  this  is  the  ground  of  reasoning,  besides  the 
ground  of  feeling,  on  which  we  revolt  from  the  doc- 
trine as  applied  to  Man.  We  do  so  because  we  are 
conscious  of  an  amount  and  of  a  kind  of  difference 
between  ourselves  and  the  lower  animals,  which  is,  in 
sober  truth,  immeasurable,  in  spite  of  the  close  affini- 
ties of  bodily  structure.  Yet  the  closeness  of  these 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  265 

affinities  is  a  fact;  and  it  may  with  truth  be  said  that 
in  contrast  with  the  gulf  of  separation  in  all  resulting 
characters,  these  affinities  are  among  the  profoundest 
mysteries  of  Nature.  Professor  Huxley,  in  his  work 
on  "  Man's  Place  in  Nature,"  has  endeavoured  to 
prove  that,  so  far  as  mere  physical  structure  is  con- 
cerned, "the  differences  which  separate  him  from  the 
Gorilla  and  the  Chimpanzee  are  not  so  great  as  those 
which  separate  the  Gorilla  from  the  lower  Apes."  On 
the  frontispiece  of  this  work  he  exhibits  in  series  the 
skeletons  of  the  Anthropoid  Apes  and  of  Man.  It  is 
a  grim  and  grotesque  procession.  The  Form  which 
leads  it,  however  like  the  others  in  general  structural 
plan,  is  wonderfully  different  in  those  lines  and  shapes 
of  Matter  which  have  such  mysterious  power  of  express- 
ing the  characters  of  Mind.  And  significant  as  those 
differences  are  in  the  skeleton,  they  are  as  nothing  to 
the  differences  which  emerge  in  the  living  creatures. 
Huxley  himself  admits  that  these  differences  amount 
to  "  an  enormous  gulf," — to  a  ;*  divergence  immeasurable 
— practically  infinite."  What  more  striking  proof  could 
we  have  than  this,  that  Organic  Forms  are  but  as  clay 
in  the  hands  of  the  Potter,  and  that  the  "  Law "  of 
Structure  is  entirely  subordinate  to  the  "  Law  "  of  Pur- 
pose and  Intention  under  which  the  various  parts  of 
that  structure  are  combined  for  use  ? 


266  THE  REIGN   OF   LAW. 

But  Science  will  continue  to  ask,  even  if  she  never 
gets  an  answer,  What  is  the  community  of  physical 
cause  which  produces  this  community  of  resulting  struc- 
ture ?  The  fact  which  it  is  most  difficult  to  disengage 
from  the  theory  of  Development,  or,  in  other  words, 
from  the  theory  of  Creation  by  Birth,  is  the  exist- 
ence of  rudimentary  or  aborted  organs ;  the  existence 
of  teeth,  for  example,  in  the  jaws  of  the  Whale — teeth 
which  never  cut  the  gum,  and  which  are  entirely  useless 
to  the  animal.  We  have  an  inherent  conviction  that 
this  must  have  some  use  in  the  future, — that  is,  in  some 
organism  to  be  born  from  this  one, — or  else  it  must 
have  had  some  use  in  the  past, — that  is,  in  some 
organism  from  which  this  one  has  descended.  In  either 
case  the  power  of  Inheritance  is  suggested  to  the  mind. 
We  think  instinctively  of  the  existence  of  some  Derivative 
Form  in  which  these  teeth  have  been,  or  are  to  be  turned 
to  use.  It  is  only  fair  towards  the  Theory  of  Creation 
by  Birth,  to  admit  that  it  does  explain  the  existence 
of  useless  organs  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other  Theory 
explains  them.  It  would  be  almost  a  necessary  con- 
sequence of  Creation  by  Birth,  that  there  must  be 
stages  in  which  the  ultimate  use  of  new  Forms  could 
not  be  yet  apparent.  And  if  mere  beauty  or  variety 
were  in  themselves  objects  which  Creative  Power  sets 
before  itself,  then,  also,  we  might  expect  to  meet  with 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  267 

modifications  of  structure  having  no  other  apparent 
use.  Both  these  explanations,  however,  exclude  Mr. 
Darwin's  idea  of  Natural  Selection;  because  this  is  a 
process  which  can  never  operate,  except  through  the 
agency  of  actual  use  and  disuse,  upon  organs  already 
existing  and  capable  of  discharging  function.  The  only 
theory  of  Creation  by  Birth  which  really  does  afford 
some  explanation  of  the  facts,  is  a  theory  which  assumes 
modifications  of  structure  to  be  entirely  independent 
of  the  effect  of  actual  use  or  disuse.  Mr.  Darwin  him- 
self candidly  admits  that  in  flowers,  at  least,  the  forces 
of  Correlated  Growth  do  "  modify  important  structures 
independent  of  Utility,  and  therefore  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion." This  admission  must  be  extended  to  all  organic 
growths.  There  must  have  been  a  time  with  all  of  them 
when  they  began  to  be ;  and,  therefore,  a  time  before 
Natural  Selection  had  room  to  play.  These  considera- 
tions, however,  only  serve  to  put  a  higher  interpretation 
on  the  Theory  of  Creation  by  Birth.  They  do  not  con- 
demn it. 

One  suggestion,  indeed,  has  been  made  on  this  sub- 
ject which  I  think  it  is  impossible  to  accept.  When 
men  were  yet  unwilling  to  admit  the  existence  of  life 
and  death  upon  the  globe  so  long  before  the  creation  of 
Man,  it  used  to  be  said  that  fossils  were  only  "  sports  of 
nature."  So  in  our  own  day,  I  have  heard  it  said  that 


268  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

rudimentary  organs  are  merely  intended  to  satisfy  that 
condition  of  our  finite  minds  in  virtue  of  which  we  are 
unable  to  conceive  Creation,  except  in  connexion  with 
some  History  and  Method  of  growth.  And  so,  as  a 
condescension  to  this  weakness,  aborted  members  are 
given  to  suggest  a  History  which  was  never  true,  and  a 
Method  which  was  never  followed  !  Now  of  one  thing 
we  may  be  sure,  that  there  are  no  fictions  of  this  kind 
in  Nature,  and  no  bad  jokes.  Whatever  natural  things 
really  point  to,  they  point  to  faithfully;  and  the  con- 
clusions really  indicated  are  never  false.  Abortive 
organs  mean  something,  and  they  mean  it  truly. 

Still,  there  is  no  proof  that  Inheritance  is  the  only 
cause  from  which  such  structures  can  arise.  In  the 
inorganic  world  we  know  that  not  mere  similarity,  but 
absolute  identity  of  form,  as  in  crystals,  is  the  result  of 
laws  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  Inheritance,  but 
of  forces  whose  nature  it  is  to  aggregate  the  particles  of 
matter  in  identic  shapes.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how- 
far  a  similar  unity  of  effect  may  have  been  impressed  on 
the  forces  through  which  vital  Organisms  are  first  started 
on  their  way.  There  are  some  essential  resemblances 
between  all  Forms  of  Life  which  it  is  impossible  even 
in  imagination  to  connect  with  community  of  blood  by 
descent.  For  example,  the  Bilateral  arrangement  is 
common  to  all  Organisms,  down  at  least  to  the  Radiata, 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  269 

and  in  this  great  class  we  have  the  same  principle  of 
Polarity  developed  in  a  circle.  Again,  the  general 
mechanism  of  the  digestive  organs  by  which  food  is 
in  part  assimilated  and  part  rejected,  is  also  common 
through  a  range  of  equal  extent.  Indeed,  it  may  be 
said  with  truth,  that  never  in  all  the  changes  of  Time 
has  there  been  any  alteration  throughout  the  whole 
scale  of  Organic  Life,  in  the  fundamental  principles 
of  chemical  and  mechanical  adjustment,  on  which  the 
great  animal  functions  of  Respiration,  Circulation,  and 
Reproduction,  have  been  provided  for.1  These  are 
fundamental  similarities  of  plan,  depending  probably 
on  the  very  nature  of  Forces  which  necessitate  these 
adjustments  in  order  to  the  production  of  the  pheno- 
mena of  Life — Forces  of  which  we  know  nothing,  but 
which  we  have  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  to 
be  due  to  Inheritance.  Other  similarities  of  plan  may 
depend  on  the  same  laws,  equally  unconnected  with 
Inheritance  by  descent. 

Inheritance,  indeed,  has  been  suggested  as  the  cause 
of  organic  likeness,  mainly  because  there  is  a  difficulty 
in  conceiving  any  other.  But  there  is  at  least  an  equal 
difficulty  in  conceiving  the  applicability  of  this  cause  to 
Man.  We  have  already  seen2  that  M.  Guizot  lays  it 

i  Agassiz'  "Geological  Sketches,"  p.  41.     London,  1860. 
*  Ante,  page  28. 


270  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

<>. 

down  as  a  physical  impossibility  that  Man — the  human 
pair — can  have  been  introduced  into  the  world  except 
in  complete  stature — in  the  full  possession  of  all  his 
faculties  and  powers.  He  holds  it  as  certain  that  on  no 
other  condition  could  Man,  on  his  first  appearance, 
have  been  able  to  survive  and  to  found  the  human 
family.  Even  those  who  question  whether  this  argument 
is  entitled  to  the  rank  of  a  self-evident  physical  truth, 
must  admit  that  it  is  at  least  quite  as  good  as  the 
opposite  assertion,  that  any  origin  except  the  origin  of 
natural  birth  is  inconceivable.  Where  our  gnorance 
is  so  profound,  no  reasoning  of  this  kind  is  of  much 
value.  There  is  undoubtedly  much  to  be  said  in 
support  of  M.  Guizot's  position.  Certainly,  Man  as  a 
mere  animal  is  the  most  helpless  of  all  animals.  His 
whole  frame  has  relation  to  his  mind,  and  apart  from 
that  relation,  it  is  feebler  than  the  frame  of  any  of  the 
brutes.  All  its  members  are  Correlated  amongst  each 
other  with  the  functions  of  his  Brain,  so  that  action  may 
follow  upon  Knowledge — so  that  embodiment  may  be 
possible  to  Thought.  Yet  in  its  plan  and  structure  his 
frame  is  homologically,  that  is  ideally,  the  same  as  the 
frame  of  the  brutes — organ  answering  to  organ,  and 
bone  to  bone. 

The  words  "Adherence  to  Type"  are  words  expres- 
sive of  an  Idea,  of  a  Purpose,  which  we  see  fulfilled  in 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  27! 

Organic  Forms.  But  this  purpose  must  have  sought 
its  own  accomplishment  by  the  use  of  means,  and  the 
question  of  Science  always  is,  what  were  these  means?. 
Love  of  beauty  is  equally  a  Purpose  which  we  see  ful- 
filled in  Nature,  but  in  the  case  of  the  Humming  Birds 
this  has  been  accomplished  by  giving  to  their  plumes  the 
structure  of  "Thin  Plates," — a  structure  which  decom- 
poses light  and  flings  back  its  prismatic  colours  to  the 
eye.  Fitness  and  special  adaptation  is  another  of  the 
purposes  of  Creation,  but  this  also  is  attained  through 
the  careful  arrangement,  and  pliability  to  use,  of  physical 
laws.  In  like  manner,  "Adherence  to  Type"  is  the  ex- 
pression of  a  fact,  or  the  statement  of  a  Purpose,  which, 
like  all  the  other  purposes  fulfilled  in  Nature,  invites  to 
an  investigation  of  the  instrumentality  employed.  We 
see  the  Purpose,  but  we  do  not  see  the  Method.  We  see 
the  purpose,  for  example,  in  the  wonderful  adaptability 
of  the  Vertebrate  Type  to  the  infinite  varieties  of  Life 
to  which  it  serves  as  an  organ  and  a  home.  Science 
should  be  allowed  without  suspicion  or  remonstrance  to 
pursue  her  proper  object,  which  is  to  detect,  if  she  can, 
what  the  method  of  this  work  has  been.  There  is  no 
point,  short  of  the  last  and  highest,  at  which  Science 
can  be  satisfied.  Her  curiosity  is  insatiable.  It  is  a 
curiosity  representing  man's  desire  of  knowledge.  But 
that  desire  extends  into  regions  where  the  means  of 


272  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

investigation  cease,  and  in  which  the  processes  of  Veri- 
fication are  of  no  avail.  Above  and  behind  every 
Detected  Method  in  Nature  there  lies  the  same  ultimate 
question  as  before — What  is  it  by  which  this  is  done  ? 

It  is  the  great  mystery  of  our  Being  that  we  have 
powers  impelling  us  to  ask  such  questions  on  the  history 
of  Creation,  when  we  have  no  powers  enabling  us  to 
solve  them.  Ideas  and  faint  suggestions  of  reply  are 
ever  passing  across  the  outer  limits  of  the  Mind,  as 
meteors  pass  across  the  margin  of  the  atmosphere,  but 
we  endeavour  in  vain  to  grasp  or  understand  them. 
The  faculties  both  of  reason  and  of  imagination  fall  back 
with  a  sense  of  impotence  upon  some  favourite  phrase — 
some  form  of  words  built  up  out  of  the  materials  of 
analogy,  and  out  of  the  experience  of  a  Mind,  which, 
being  finite,  is  not  creative.  We  beat  against  the  bars 
in  vain.  The  only  real  rest  is  in  the  confession  of 
ignorance,  and  the  confession,  too,  that  all  ultimate 
physical  Truth  is  beyond  the  reach  of  Science.1  It  is 

i  I  have  slightly  altered  this  passage  as  it  stood  in  the  earlier 
editions,  because,  although  the  context  clearly  indicates  its  refer- 
ence to  Physical  truth,  it  has  been  quoted  by  Mr.  Lewes  as  granting 
all  that  the  Positive  Philosophy  demands.  There  is  a  sense,  of 
course,  in  which  it  may  be  said  that  no  Truth  kuowable  by  map 
can  be  "ultimate."  That  is  to  say,  there  is  no  Truth  even  con- 
ceivable, respecting  which  we  might  not  ask,  or  desire  to  ask,  far- 
ther questions.  But  there  is  no  use  in  appearing  to  ?gree  with  those 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  273 

probable  that  even  the  nearest  methods  of  Creation, 
though  far  short  of  ultimate  truths,  lie  behind  a  veil  too 
thick  for  us  to  penetrate.  It  is  here  surely,  if  it  is 
anywhere  in  the  sphere  of  natural  investigation,  that  the 
Man  of  Science  may  lay  down  the  weapons  of  his 
analysis,  and  say,  "  I  do  not  exercise  myself  in  great 
matters,  or  in  things  which  are  too  high  for  me." 1 

There  is  at  least  one  conclusion  which  is  certain, 
namely,  this — that  no  theory  in  respect  to  the  means 
and  method  employed  in  the  work  of  Creation — pro- 
vided such  theory  takes  in  all  the  facts — can  have  the 
slightest  effect  in  removing  that  work  from  the  relation 
in  which  it  stands  to  the  attributes  of  Will.  All  such 
theories  are,  and  can  only  be  "  simply  questions  of  how 
the  Creator  has  worked."  This  is  the  confession  made 
in  respect  to  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  by  one  of  the  most 
competent  of  its  supporters.2  Creation  by  Law — Evolu- 
tion by  Law — Development  by  Law,  or,  as  including  all 
those  kindred  ideas,  the  Reign  of  Law,  is  nothing  but 
the  reign  of  Creative  Force  directed  by  Creative  Know- 
ledge, worked  under  the  control  of  Creative  Power,  and 
in  fulfilment  of  Creative  Purpose. 

from  whom  in  reality  I  so  widely  differ.  The  definition  of  Truth 
which  Mr.  Lewes  would  consider  "ultimate,"  and  therefore  unat- 
tainable, is  very  different  from  the  definition  which  I  should  give, 
and  have  given.  J  Psalm  cxxxi. 

2  Mr.  Wallace.— Journal  of  Science,  No.  XVI.  p.  473 
T 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   REIGN   OF  LAW   IN   THE   REALM   OF  MIND. 

WHEN  we  pass  from  the  phenomena  of  Matter 
to  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  we  do  not  pass 
from  under  the  Reign  of  Law.  Here,  too,  facts  do 
range  themselves  in  an  observed  Order :  here,  too,  there 
is  a  chain  of  cause  and  effect  running  throughout  all 
events :  here,  too,  we  see  around  us,  and  feel  within  us, 
the  work  of  Forces  which  have  always  a  certain  definite 
tendency  to  produce  certain  definite  results :  here,  too, 
it  is  by  combination  and  adjustment  amon^  these  Forces 
that  they  are  mutually  held  in  check :  here,  too,  accord- 
ingly, special  ends  can  only  be  accomplished  by  the 
use  of  special  means. 

But  then  the  question  immediately  occurs  to  us — 
can  we  speak  of  Law,  or  of  Force,  or  of  "  cause  and 
effect,"  as  applied  to  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  we  speak  of  them  as  applied  to 
the  phenomena  of  Matter?  Is  it  only  by  distant  ana- 
logy, or  as  expressing  ideas  really  the  same,  that  we 
use  the  same  terms  of  both  ? 


THE  REIGN  OF  LAW  IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND.          275 

Undoubtedly  the  first  thought  which  suggests  itself  to 
the  mind  is,  that  a  material  Force  and  a  moral  or  in- 
tellectual Force  are  essentially  different  in  kind, — not 
subject  to  conditions  the  same,  or  even  similar.  But 
are  we  sure  of  this  ?  Are  we  sure  that  the  Forces  which 
we  call  Material  are  not,  after  all,  but  manifestations  of 
mental  energy  and  Will?  We  have  already  seen  that 
such  evidence  as  we  have  is  all  tending  the  other  way. 
The  conclusions  forced  upon  us  have  been  these  : — first, 
that  the  more  we  know  of  Nature  the  more  certain  it 
appears  that  a  multiplicity  of  separate  forces  does  not 
exist,  but  that  all  her  forces  pass  into  each  other,  and 
are  but  modifications  of  some  One  Force  which  is  the 
source  and  centre  of  the  rest :  secondly,  that  all  of  them 
are  governed  in  their  mutual  relations  by  principles  of 
arrangement  which  are  purely  mental  :  thirdly,  that  of 
the  ultimate  seat  of  Force  in  any  form  we  know  nothing 
directly  :  and  fourthly,  that  the  nearest  conception  we 
can  ever  have  of  Force  is  derived  from  our  own  con- 
sciousness of  vital  power. 

If  these  conclusions  be  true,  it  follows  that,  whether 
as  regards  that  in  which  Force  in  itself  consists,  or  as  re- 
gards the  conditions  under  which  Force  is  used,  it  need 
not  surprise  us  if  in  passing  from  the  material  world  to 
the  world  of  Mind,  we  see  that  Law,  in  the  same  sense, 
prevails  in  the  phenomena  of  both.  But  as  this  is  a 
T  2 


276  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW 

subject  of  much  difficulty,  and  of  much  importance,  it 
may  be  well  to  examine  it  a  little  nearer. 

The  first  and  most  palpable  form  in  which  we  see  that 
Mind  is  subject  to  Law,  is  in  its  connexion  with  the 
Body.  Ard  this  connexion  is  so  close  that  we  know 
neither  where  it  begins  nor  where  it  ends.  The  extent 
and  nature  of  it  can  be  known  only  by  the  same  kind  of 
reasoning  and  observation  by  which  we  attain  to  any 
knowledge  of  the  external  world.  For  indeed  our  Bodies 
seem  part  of  the  external  world  to  us.  We  see  their 
form  as  we  see  the  form  of  other  things,  but  we  do  not 
see  their  structure,  neither  do  we  feel  it,  nor  can  we 
arrive  at  it,  except  as  a  matter  of  obscure  and  difficult 
research.  It  is  literally  true  that  some  of  the  most 
distant  objects  in  the  Universe  are  more  accessible  to 
our  observation,  and  in  some  respects  more  intelligible 
to  our  understanding,  than  the  material  frame  in  which 
we  live.  Man  had  discovered  much  concerning  the  cir- 
culation of  the  Planets  before  he  had  discovered  anything 
concerning  the  circulation  of  his  own  blood.1  Yet  so  near 
is  the  current  of  that  blood  to  him,  so  much  is  it  a  part 
of  himself,  that  when  it  stops,  in  an  instant  "  all  his 
thoughts  perish."  Nevertheless,  the  Mind  is  not  con- 
scious of  its  own  dependence  on  material  organs.  Even 

1  Kepler  and  Harvey  were  contemporaries ;  but  Copernicus  had 
preceded  them  by  nearly  a  hundred  years. 


IN   THE   REALM    OF    MIND.  277 

in  respect  to  those  exertions  of  the  Will  which  are  ex- 
pressed in  movements  of  the  Body,  we  are  conscious  only 
of  the  Will,  and  of  the  Will  being  exerted  with  success  ; 
but  we  are  entirely  unconscious  of  the  machinery  which 
intervenes  between  the  intention  and  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  act  intended.  Such  movements  of  the 
Body  appear  to  us  as  if  they  were  direct  acts  of  Will. 
Yet  nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  the  communi- 
cation is  not  direct  but  indirect — and  even  elaborately 
circuitous.  It  is  only  when  the  ropes  and  pulleys  are 
broken  that  we  discover  how  that  which  we  call  our  Will 
can  only  run  in  appointed  channels — which  channels  are 
material,  and  are  laid  down  upon  a  plan,  like  conducting 
wires,  as  if  for  the  conveyance  of  a  material  Force. 

Nor  does  it  end  here — this  close  connexion  between 
Mind  and  Matter.  So  far  from  being  less  close,  it  seems 
to  be  only  closer  and  closer  when  we  pass  to  mental 
operations  in  which  no  apparent  movements  of  the  Body 
are  concerned.  In  the  exercise  of  pure  Reason,  in 
passing  from  one  mental  conception  to  another,  when  by 
an  effort  of  our  Will  we  turn  our  attention  to  a  new 
question,  and  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  pursue  a  fresh 
train  of  thought, — above  all,  when  our  affections  go  forth 
towards  those  who  are  the  objects  of  them — in  all  these 
operations,  if  anywhere,  we  feel  as  if  we  were  free  from 
mechanism— from  "organs" — from  Matter  in  any  form. 


278  THE  REIGN   OF   LAW 

So  it  seems  till  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
terrible  phenomena  of  disease.  Then  our  delusion  is 
dispelled,  and  we  know  how  frail  we  are.  Then  we 
find  that  the  same  stroke  which  paralyses  the  movement 
of  a  limb,  may  paralyse,  not  less  effectually,  all  the 
powers  of  Reason,  of  Memory,  and  of  Will.  And  the 
Affections, — what  becomes  of  them  ?  These  too,  which 
seem  so  purely  spiritual,  we  find  out  to  be  dependent  on 
material  structure.  Every  physician  knows  that  a 
frequent  consequence  of  cerebral  disease  is  a  total 
change  of  character.  There  is  no  symptom  of  insanity 
more  common  than  the  growth  of  dislike  and  aversion  to 
those  who,  in  health,  had  been  the  most  loved  on  earth. 
Change  of  every  kind  and  degree  in  the  character  and 
structure  of  Mind  is  the  immediate  result  of  correspond- 
ing changes  in  the  structure  and  substance  of  the  Brain. 
The  pure  may  become  impure  ;  the  loving  may  become 
malignant ;  the  simple-minded  may  become  suspicious ; 
the  generous  may  become  engrossed  with  self;  the 
strong-minded  may  become  imbecile, — the  whole  man 
may  be  broken  down,  and  may  live  for  years  without 
consciousness  and  without  emotion.  How  painfully 
does  the  Brain  sometimes  indicate  its  functions  !  What 
is  it  in  the  aspect  of  Idiotcy,  in  many  of  its  forms,  which 
we  instantly  recognise,  and  never  can  mistake?  In  that 
low,  pinched,  and  retiring  brow,  we  see  instinctively  that 


IN   THE    REALM   OF   MIND.  279 

Reason  cannot  hold  her  seat.  These  facts  do  not  stand 
alone.  Not  only  are  there  some  parallel  facts,  but  all 
the  living  world  is  full  of  them.  The  whole  range  of 
animal  creation,  from  Man  down  to  the  Reptile  and  the 
Fish,  testifies  to  the  universal  law  of  an  ascending  scale 
of  mental  capacity  being  coincident  with  an  ascending 
degree  of  cerebral  organisation.  No  series  of  facts, 
tending  to  the  establishment  of  any  physical  truth,  is 
more  complete  or  more  conclusive  than  the  chain  which 
connects  the  functions  of  the  Brain  with  the  phenomena 
of  Mind. 

But  here,  again,  let  us  beware  of  the  fallacies  which 
may  arise  from  a  failure  to  recognise  the  exact  import  of 
the  words  we  use.  In  the  ears  of  many  it  sounds  like 
Materialism  to  say  that  Thought  is  a  function  of  the 
Brain.  But  it  has  been  already  shown  in  a  previous 
chapter  that  Function  is  merely  the  word  by  which  we 
describe  that  work  which  any  given  piece  of  mechanism 
has  been  adjusted  to  perform.  The  Power,  or  Force, 
which  is  developed  by  means  of  an  "  organ,"  is  not 
identical  with  that  organ,  nor  with  any  of  its  parts,  nor 
w^th  the  materials  of  which  it  is  composed,  nor  even 
with  its  mechanism  as  a  whole.  It  does  not  follow,  for 
example,  that  Electricity  is  identical  with  the  tissues  of  a 
fish,  because  it  is  developed  out  of  the  battery  of  a  Tor- 
pedo or  a  Gymnotus.  Yet  it  is  true  that  the  develop- 


280  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW 

ment  and  discharge  of  Electricity  is  the  "function"  of 
those  Fish-organs  : — that  is  to  say,  this  is  the  work  which 
they  have  been  adjusted  to  perform.  Still  less  do  we 
confound  Thought  with  Brain  when  we  acknowledge  the 
fact  that  Brain  in  our  Organism  is  inseparably  connected 
with  the  power  of  thinking. 

Yet  inferences  as  false  as  this,  and  very  nearly  related 
to  it,  have  actually  been  drawn  by  eminent  men  from  the 
facts  of  cerebral  action.  Thus  it  has  been  declared  that 
a  knowledge  of  Brain,  under  a  name  which  is  in  itself  a 
fallacy  —  Phrenology — is  the  only  sure  foundation  of 
Mental  Science.  This  is  a  mere  confusion  of  thought, 
even  if  the  phrenological  mapping  of  the  Brain  were  as 
certainly  correct  as  it  is  really  doubtful.  That  particular 
faculties  of  the  Mind  may  be  connected  with  particular 
portions  of  the  Brain,  is  not  in  itself  more  difficult  to 
understand  or  to  believe  than  that  the  Mind,  as  a  whole, 
is  connected  with  the  Brain  as  a  whole.  Whether  it 
be  so  or  not  is  a  question  purely  of  observation  and  of 
fact  But  this,  at  least,  is  certain, — that  the  different 
faculties  and  affections  of  the  Mind  must  be  discrimi- 
nated from  each  other  before  it  is  possible  to  assign  to 
them  a  local  habitation.  The  Mind  must  be  mapped 
first,  and  then  its  Organ.  No  additional  knowledge  is 
given  to  us  of  any  one  mental  faculty,  by  proving  that  it 
is  connected  with  some  special  bit  of  the  mysterious 


IN   THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  28 1 

substance  of  which  that  organ  is  composed.  Love  is 
Love,  and  nothing  else  \  Hatred  is  Hatred,  and  nothing 
else ;  Reverence  is  Reverence,  and  nothing  else ;  the 
pure  intellectual  perception  of  a  Logical  Necessity  is 
itself,  and  nothing  else; — however  clearly  it  may  be 
proved  that  each  of  these  is  a  function  of  some  separate 
region  of  the  Brain.  When  the  Phrenologist,  taking  in 
his  hand  a  human  skull,  and  lifting  its  upper  cover,  tells 
us  that  the  oval  of  convoluted  matter  which  is  thus  ex- 
posed to  view  "manifests  the  moral  sentiments,"  what 
light  does  he  throw  on  these  ?  The  moral  sentiments  ! — 
what  do  these  include?  The  power  of  seeing  Moral 
Beauty,  and  of  loving  Truth — the  sense  of  Justice,  and 
the  desire  of  serving  in  her  cause — Conscience  and 
Benevolence,  Charity  and  Faith — all  that  is  best  and 
noblest  in  the  human  spirit — these  are  "  manifested  "  in 
that  bit  of  Matter !  What  new  information  does  this 
give  us  on  the  nature  or  the  office  of  those  glorious  attri- 
butes which  are  the  joy  of  Earth  and  Heaven?  None 
at  all.  They  are  just  what  we  knew  them  before  to  be. 

Phrenology  is  no  longer  popular,  as  it  once  was,  among 
Physiologists.  Its  mapping  of  the  Brain  is  now  gene- 
rally admitted  to  be  imaginary.  But  the  fundamental 
error  of  the  Phrenological  School  did  not  lie  merely,  or 
even  mainly,  in  any  mistake  as  to  the  mapping  of  the 
Brain.  It  lay  in  the  idea  that  a  Science  of  Mind  can  be 


282  .         THE   REIGN   OF  LAW 

founded  in  any  shape  or  form  upon  the  discoveries  of 
anatomy.  Their  error  lay  in  the  notion  that  Physiology 
can  ever  be  the  basis  of  Psychology.  And  this  is  an 
error,  and  a  confusion  of  thought,  which  survives 
Phrenology.  A  profound  interest  indeed  attaches  to 
every  new  fact  which  connects  together  the  parallel 
phenomena  of  Mind  and  of  Organisation.  But  it  is  the 
phenomena  of  Mind,  and  it  is  these  alone,  of  which  we 
are  directly  cognisant,  and  it  is  from  these  that  we  must 
start  as  the  basis  of  all  Psychological  research.  This  is 
true  even  of  those  phenomena  of  the  mind  which  are 
most  purely  animai.  Sensation,  for  example,  may  be 
traced  with  absolute  demonstration  to  certain  nerves. 
This  may  throw  a  new  light  on  the  method  by  which 
Sensation  is  rendered  possible  ;  but  it  throws  no  new 
light  whatever  upon  what  Sensation  is.  It  is  that  which 
we  know  and  feel  it  to  be,  and  it  is  neither  more  nor  less 
since  the  knife  of  the  anatomist  has  laid  bare  the 
channels  along  which  it  comes.  Still  more  is  this  true 
of  the  Intellectual  Powers.  Yet  there  are  Philosophers 
who  appear  to  think  that  some  new  light  is  cast  upon 
Sensation  when  they  call  it  an  affection  of  the  "  Sensory 
Ganglia ; "  that  Thought  is  in  some  measure  explained 
when  it  is  called  "Cerebration,"  and  that  the  Laws  of 
Intellect  are  reduced  to  scientific  expression  when  they 
are  described  as  the  working  of  the  "  Cerebral  Ganglia." 


IN   THE   REALM   OF   MIND. 


all  this  is  a  mere  idle  play  on  words.  It  is  an  attempt  to 
put  that  first  which  must  be  last,  and  that  last  which 
must  be  first.  The  general  fact  of  the  dependence  of 
Mind  on  a  Bodily  organisation  is  a  fact  which  contains 
within  itself  all  the  lesser  facts  of  Physiological  dis- 
covery. They  are  not,  and  they  cannot  be,  new  in 
kind.  They  do  not  even  help  us  to  conceive  how, 
through  any  mechanism,  the  power  of  Thought  can  be 
evolved.  Still  less  do  they  give  us  any  new  view  of  that 
which  Thought,  in  itself,  is. 

This  connexion,  therefore,  between  Mind  and  Brain, 
although  it  is  a  universal  "  law  "  of  our  being,  is  a  law 
recognised  by  us  only  in  the  sense  in  which  Law  is 
applied  to  "an  observed  Order  of  facts."  But  like 
every  other  Order  of  this  kind,  it  implies  a  Force  or  an 
arrangement  of  Forces  out  of  which  the  Order  comes. 
It  implies,  too,  that  this  arrangement  of  Forces  is  neces- 
sary to  the  evolution  and  play  of  mental  faculties  in  the 
form  in  which  they  are  possessed  by  us.  Consequently 
these  faculties  are  seen  taking  their  place  among  all  the 
other  phenomena  of  the  world.  They  are  seen  to  be 
under  the  Reign  of  Law  in  this  largest  and  highest  sense 
of  all—  that  they  depend  upon  Adjustment,  and  that 
adjustment  so  delicate  that  the  slightest  disturbance  of 
it  deranges  the  whole  resulting  phenomena  of  Mind. 
Mind,  as  developed  in  us,  has  its  very  existence  and 


284.  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW 

working  dependent  on  imperative  physical  conditions, 
which  conditions  are  met  only  by  elaborate  contrivance. 
We  have  no  knowledge  what  the  Forces  are  which 
demand  this  obedience,  and  which  call  for  this  con- 
trivance. We  have  even  an  insuperable  difficulty  in 
conceiving  what  they  can  be.  It  almost  seems  as  if 
there  were  a  barrier  in  the  very  nature  of  our  minds 
against  the  possibility  of  conceiving  how  any  com- 
bination of  material  forces  can  either  result  in  Mind, 
or  can  be  necessary  to  the  working  of  its  powers,  or 
can  be  concerned  even  in  giving  it  an  abode.1  "We 
cannot  conceive,"  says  Dr.  Andrew  Combe,  "even  in 
the  remotest  manner,  in  what  way  the  Brain — a  com- 
pound of  water,  albumen,  fat,  and  phosphate  salts — 
operates  in  the  generating  of  Thought."  And  yet  there 
is  one  experience  which  brings  the  fact  of  this  close 
connexion  within  the  direct  recognition  of  Conscious- 
ness. We  know  and  feel  that  the  act  of  severe  thinking 
is  attended  with  the  expenditure  of  Force.  The  close, 
steady,  continuous  application  of  the  mind  to  any  sub- 
ject requiring  the  exercise  of  our  higher  intellectual 

1  "  Aperta  simplexque  mens,  nulla  re  adjuncta  quoe  sentire  possit, 
fugere  intelligently  nostrse  vim  et  notionem  videtur." — Cicero,  "  DC 
Nat.  Deor."  lib.  x.  c.  II. 

This  is  true  only  in  one  sense.  It  is  very  far  from  being  true, 
that  the  connexion  between  Mind  and  Matter  is  a  necessity  oi 
thought. 


IN   THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  285 

faculties,  is  well  known  to  be  "hard  work."  Without 
causing  any  bodily  movement  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious, it  produces,  nevertheless,  bodily  exhaustion.  It 
occasions  the  expenditure  of  a  physical  force,  or  at  least 
of  a  force  for  which  we  have  no  other  name.  It  is  not 
uncommon  for  men  of  great  age  to  be  able  to  exert 
undiminished  powers  of  mind  for  one  or  two  hours,  and 
then  to  lapse  into  comparative  imbecility.  Thus  the 
exertion  of  the  Brain  is  like  the  exertion  of  a  muscle, 
and  is  attended  with  the  same  effects.  There  is  fatigue ; 
and  with  excessive  fatigue  the  power  of  motion  stops. 

Yet  such  facts  as  these  only  puzzle  us — they  do  not 
help  us  to  any  clear  idea  of  the  nature  or  manner  of 
a  connexion  which  is  indeed  incomprehensible.  We 
know  of  Mind  only  as  itself,  and  as  nothing  else.  The 
difference  between  it  and  all  other  things  seems  infinite 
and  immeasurable.  No  doubt  this  difficulty,  or  at  least 
part  of  it,  arises  not  from  any  misconception  as  to  what 
Mind  is,  (for  of  this  our  knowledge  is  direct,)  but  from 
a  misconception  as  to  what  Matter  is — and  what  the 
Forces  ar^  which  we  call  material.  Close  analysis  of 
the  phenomena  of  Nature,  and  of  our  own  ideas  in 
regard  to  them,  has  already  prepared  us  to  believe,  that 
these  Forces  which  work  in  Matter  and  produce  in  us 
the  impressions  from  which  we  derive  our  conceptions  of 
it,  are  themselves  immaterial,  and  can  be  traced  running 


286  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW 

up  into  a  region  where  they  are  lost  in  the  light  of  Mind. 
The  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Resurrection  of  the  Body 
sanctions  and  involves  the  notion  that  there  is  some 
deep  connexion  between  Spirit  and  Form  which  is 
essential,  and  which  cannot  be  finally  sundered  even  in 
the  divorce  of  Death.  The  affections  hold  to  this  idea 
even  more  firmly  than  the  intellect.  Hence  the  noble 
and  passionate  exclamation  of  the  Poet — 

"  Eternal  Form  shall  still  divide 

The  Eternal  Soul  from  all  beside, 
And  I  shall  know  him  when  we  meet."1 

But  this  first  sense  in  which  Mind  is  under  the  Reign 
of  Law — that  is,  its  dependence  on  the  Body,  prepares 
us  for  yet  other  senses  in  which  it  lies  under  the  same 
dominion.  The  very  fact  that  the  Mind  is  itself  uncon- 
scious of  its  dependence  upon  Matter,  and  of  the  manner 
and  conditions  of  its  connexion  with  "  organs,"  teaches 
us  that  there  is  a  large  class  of  phenomena  connected 
with  Mind,  of  which  we  should  be  entirely  ignorant  if  we 
trusted  to  the  direct  evidence  of  Consciousness  alone. 
This  ought  not  to  inspire  us  with  any  distrust  of  Con- 
sciousness in  those  matters  in  which  it  is  a  competent 
and  indeed  the  only  witness.  But  there  is  a  large  class 
of  phenomena  of  which  Consciousness  properly  so 

1  Tennyson's  "  In  Memoriam,"  No.  xlvL 


IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND.  287 

called,  that  is,  the  direct  perception  of  the  Mind  of  its 
own  present  workings,  does  not  inform  us.  The  Mind 
looking  in  upon  itself  sees  itself  only,  and  does  not  see 
either  the  mechanism  through  which  it  is  able  to  work 
at  all,  nor  many  of  the  forces  which  operate  in  it  and 
upon  it.  These,  some  of  them  at  least,  can  only  be 
arrived  at  by  the  same  processes  of  reasoning  and 
observation  which  we  apply  to  the  external  world,  and 
by  which  we  ascertain  the  action  and  reaction  of  in- 
voluntary agents. 

There  is  nothing  of  which  it  is  so  difficult  to  per- 
suade ourselves  as  of  this.  In  the  apprehension  of 
Consciousness  the  sense  of  Will  is  so  strong  within  us 
that  it  blinds  us  to  the  insuperable  conditions  which 
limit  both  what  we  will  and  what  we  do.  That  our 
Wills,  of  whose  freedom  we  are  conscious,  should  often 
be  determined  by  influences  of  which  we  have  no  con- 
sciousness at  all ;  that  our  opinions  should  as  often  be 
the  result  of  causes  and  not  of  reasons  ;  that  our 
actions  should  follow  a  course  marked  out  by  con- 
ditions which  we  fail  to  recognise  as  having  any  deter- 
mining effect  upon  them — these  are  conclusions  against 
which  we  are  apt  to  rebel — as  depriving  us  of  a  part 
of  our  free  and  intelligent  agency.  Hence  the  indig- 
nation with  which  men  resent  being  told  that  they 
have  been  impelled  by  motives  other-  than  the  motives 


288  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

which  are  avowed,  and  other  than  the  motives  which 
are  consciously  entertained.  Yet  the  fact  of  their 
being  so  impelled  is  often  perfectly  plain  to  those 
around  them.  The  reply,  however,  is  always  ready : 
"  You  seem  to  know  my  motives,  and  the  causes  of 
my  conduct  better  than  I  know  them  myself," — as  if 
the  proposition  so  stated  were  evidently  absurd.  But 
it  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  proposition  which  may  well 
be  true.  Bystanders  very  often  see  the  forces  telling 
upon  our  Will  much  more  clearly  than  we  see  them 
ourselves.  It  is  possible,  indeed,  by  a  vigorous  effort 
of  self-analysis  to  see  all  that  others  see,  and  a  great 
deal  more.  Those  who  are  able  really  to  look  in  upon 
themselves,  can  often  detect  the  influences  which  have 
been  acting  on  their  minds,  colouring  their  opinions, 
and  determining  their  conduct  in  a  degree  which  the 
higher  faculties  would  be  glad  to  disown  and  disavow. 
There  is  nothing  more  wonderful  in  the  constitution  of 
our  minds  than  the  power  we  have  of  standing  aside, 
as  it  were,  for  a  time,  from  the  ordinary  channel  of  our 
own  thoughts,  and  of  looking  back  upon  their  currents 
coming  down  from  the  hills  of  Memory  and  Association 
to  join  their  issues  in  our  present  life.  But  this  sort  of 

looking  in  upon  ourselves,  and  treating  ourselves  as  a 

% 
subject  of  natural  history,  is  to  all  men  a  difficult,  and 

to   most   men   an  impossible,   operation.     They  have 


IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND.  289 

neither  time  for  it  nor  thought  for  it.  The  conscious 
energies  of  the  Will  are  so  near  us,  and  so  ever  present 
with  us,  that  they  shut  out  our  view  of  the  forces  which 
lie  behind.  Yet  there  are  some  facts  common  in  the 
experience  of  all  men  which  may  help  us  to  a  concep- 
tion of  the  truth.  One  of  these  is  the  fact  of  Mind 
growing  with  the  growth  of  years — a  fact  determined 
by  the  recollection  of  childhood,  of  youth,  and  of 
maturity.  By  comparing  ourselves  with  ourselves  at 
former  periods  of  life — by  the  memory  of  feelings,  and 
of  opinions,  and  of  methods  of  thought  which  we  have 
outgrown  and  left  behind  us,  we  can  detect  the  action  of 
forces  which  have  told  upon  our  minds— traces,  in  short, 
of  the  laws  to  which  they  have  been  subject.  Some  of  these 
laws  have  been  nothing  more  than  laws  of  physical  growth 
— the  conceptions  of  the  Mind  undergoing  a  develop- 
ment consequent  on  the  growth  of  our  material  Organism. 
Another  fact  bearing  on  the  same  question,  but  which 
is  more  easily  observed  in  others  than  in  ourselves,  is 
the  frequent  determination  of  mental  qualities  by  here- 
ditary transmission.  The  famous  question,  as  to  the 
Origin  of  our  Ideas,  and  how  far  they  are  due  respec- 
tively to  Experience,  to  Association,  or  to  Intuition,  has 
been  discussed  by  Metaphysicians  with  far  too  little 
reference  to  the  organic  phenomena  which  are  so  closely 
related  to  the  phenomena  of  Mind.  It  is  not  true, 

U 


THE   REIGN   OF   LAW 


indeed,  that  Psychology  is  subordinate  to  Physiology; 
but  it  is  true  that  these  two  are  so  intimately  connected, 
that  neither  is  independent  of  the  other.     Man  is  not 
a  disembodied  Spirit,  but  a  Being  whose  mental  powers 
are  subject  to  the  laws  of  a  material  organisation.     And 
so  it   is   that  almost  every  fact  in  Physiology  has  an 
intimate   bearing   on   some    question    or   other  in   the 
Philosophy  of  Mind.     No  better  illustration   could   be 
given   than  one   which  arises  out   of  this   question  of 
the  Origin  of  our  Ideas.     In  one  of  the  many  formulae 
of  expression  to  which  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  has  reduced  the 
assertion  that  Experience  is  the  source   and   origin  of 
all  our  thoughts  and  actions,  he  is  obliged  to   except 
from  the  sweep  of  that  assertion  the  voluntary  move- 
ments of  the  Body.     He  says,   "  We  bring  about  any 
fact,  other  than  our  own  muscular  contractions  •,  by  means 
of  some  other  fact  which  experience  has  shown   to   be 
followed   by   it."  x     Now   let   us   observe   the  immense 
significance  which  attaches  to  this  exception.     Why  is 
Mr.  Mill  compelled  to  make  it  ?    Because  he  mixes  up  in 
one  assertion  two  propositions  which  are  totally  distinct, 
one  being  true  universally,  and  the  other  being  true  only 
partially.     The  first  proposition  is,  that  all  facts  which 
we  can  "bring  about,"  must  be  so  brought  .about  by 

:  l  "  Auguste  Comte  and  Positivism,"  by  J.  S.  Mill,  p.  7, 


IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND.  2QI 

the  use  of  means.  This  is  true  universally.  The  second 
proposition  is,  that  we  are  guided  to  the  knowledge  of 
those  means  by  Experience  alone.  Now,  this  last  pro- 
position is  not  true,  as  Mr.  Mill  is  obliged  to  confess,  of 
the  whole  class  of  facts  which  are  brought  about  by  vital 
effort.  But  the  muscular  contractions  of  the  Body  are 
no  exception  whatever  to  the  mere  general  affirmation 
that  all  actions  must  have  a  cause,  or  in  other  words, 
must  be  brought  about  by  the  use  of  means.  Excep- 
tions they  are,  however,  to  the  affirmation  that  the 
nature  of  those  means  is  made  known  to  us  by  Ex- 
perience. The  sentence,  in  so  far  as  it  asserts  the 
universal  Law  of  Causation,  might  have  been  so  framed 
as  to  require  no  abatement  or  exception  whatever. 
"  We  bring  about  any  fact  by  means  of  some  other  fact 
which  we  know  either  by  experience  or  by  Intuition 
to  be  followed  by  it."  In  this  form  the  sentence  is 
absolutely  true,  and  applies  to  "  our  own  muscular  con- 
tractions," as  well  as  to  every  other  action.  But  philo- 
sophers who  support  the  doctrine  of  Experience  do  not 
like  the  word  "  intuition  •"  and  though  they  cannot  do 
without  it  altogether,  they  use  it  as  seldom  as  they  can. 
They  feel  very  naturally,  and  very  truly,  that  if  Intuition 
be  admitted  in  regard  to  the  ultimate  phenomena  of 
Volition,  the  idea  will  not  easily  be  dispelled  that  In- 
tuition may  extend  also  to  the  ultimate  phenomena  of 


2Q2  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW 

Thought.  JSlow  the  muscular  contractions  of  the  Body 
stand  at  the  very  fount  and  origin  of  all  we  do ;  and  it 
is  more  than  probable  that  analogous  movements  of  the 
Brain  stand  as  near  to  the  origin  of  all  we  think. 

The  bearing  of  this  question  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Mind  cannot  be  mistaken.  The  muscular  contractions 
of  the  Body  are  of  two  kinds — one  kind  is  constant, 
automatic,  and  lasting  with  the  duration  of  life  itself. 
The  other  kind  is  intermittent,  voluntary,  and  capable 
of  being  destroyed  whilst  the  Consciousness,  and  the 
Intelligence,  and  the  Will  are  still  in  use.  Both  these 
kinds  of  action  are  rendered  possible  by  the  use  of 
means  :  but  it  is  only  in  the  case  of  one  of  them 
that  those  means  are  placed  at  the  bidding  of  the  Will. 
Yet  it  is  not  Experience  which  teaches  us  how  to  use 
those  means.  It  is  purely  Instinct  or  Intuition.  We 
are  not  even  conscious  of  the  very  existence  of  the 
means  which  we  employ,  and  the  profoundest  researches 
of  Science  do  not  even  yet  give  us  the  faintest  notion 
what  their  ultimate  nature  is.  No  experience  whatever 
is  required  to  teach  a  child  how  to  extend  its  limbs  or 
how  to  exert  its  voice.  Nevertheless,  neither  of  these 
things  can  be  done  except  through  the  use  of  means. 
The  only  difference  between  these  actions  and  actions 
of  a  more  complicated  kind  is,  that  the  appropriate 
means  are  resorted  to  and  employed  by  Intuition. 


IN   THE   REALM   OF   MIND.  293 

The  Will  which  moves  the  limbs,  and  moves  them 
through  the  use  of  a  complicated  machinery,  is  born 
with  the  Organism  of  which  that  machinery  forms  a 
part,  and  has  an  instinctive  knowledge  how  to  use  it. 
Now,  it  is  against  the  analogy  of  Nature  to  suppose 
that  this  great  class  of  facts  respecting  the  powers  of 
the  Body  are  without  some  corresponding  facts  respect- 
ing the  powers  of  Mind.  Indeed,  all  vital  pheno- 
mena of  this  kind  are  in  themselves  necessarily  pheno- 
mena both  of  Body  and  of  Mind.  The  close  connexion 
which  exists  between  the  two,  and  the  inseparable 
analogies  which  unite  all  their  workings,  render  it  there- 
fore almost  certain  that  the  Mind  is  to  be  regarded  as 
having  both  kinds  of  movement  which  the  physical 
Organism  possesses— that  is,  faculties  which  are  auto- 
matic in  their  action — and  other  faculties  which,  though 
subject  to  direction  by  the  Will,  yet  work  upon  the 
materials  presented  to  them  in  a  manner  strictly  in- 
tuitive and  independent  of  all  experience. 

And  as  the  abnormal  phenomena  of  disease,  or  of 
malformation,  often  throw  an  important  light  on  the 
structure  of  the  body,  so  do  certain  abnormal  intellectual 
phenomena  give  us  strange  glimpses  occasionally  into 
the  powers  of  Mind.  Among  those  phenomena,  none 
are  more  curious  than  the  intuitive  powers  of  numerical 
computation  which  a  few  individuals  have  possessed. 


294  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW 

There  are  well  attested  cases  of  this  power  in  virtue  of 
which  the  mind  reaches  the  result  of  difficult  calculations 
by  a  species  of  Intuition — that  is  to  say,  without  any 
consciousness  of  the  process  by  which  that  result  is 
made  apparent  to  the  Mind.  This  is  not  a  proof  that 
there  is  no  process,  but  only  that  it  is  a  process  gone 
through  as  a  machine  goes  through  a  process — that  is, 
according  to  its  own  pre-adjusted  laws  of  Motion.  Per- 
haps, indeed,  this  process  may  not  be  different  in  kind 
from  the  process  by  which  the  average  mind  reaches  the 
most  elementary  of  arithmetical  truths.  The  product  of 
one  and  one,  or  of  two  and  two,  may  be  self-evident  to 
all  of  us  only  in  the  same  way  in  which  the  product  of  a 
long  series  of  figures  may  be  self-evident  to  minds  with 
an  abnormal  gift  of  the  arithmetical  faculty.  Thus  the 
distinction  breaks  down  between  self-evident  truths  and 
truths  which  are  not  self-evident.  A  truth  may  be  self- 
evident  to  one  mind  which  is  not  self-evident  to  another, 
but  may  require,  on  the  contrary,  a  laborious  process  of 
verification.  And  does  not  this  again,  lead  us  to  see 
how  entirely  dependent  are  the  phenomena  of  Mind 
upon  the  power  of  special  Faculties,  and  how  this  power 
is  itself  dependent  on  the  Adjustments  of  Organisation? 
In  the  world  of  Physics,  we  know  that  we  are  surrounded 
by  movements  which  never  make  themselves  sensible  to 
us — pulsations  which  excite  in  our  eyes  no  sense  of  light 


IN   THE   REALM    OF   MIND.  295 

- — and  others  which  excite  in  our  ears  no  sense  of  sound, 
— and  all  this  for  want  of  adjusted  organs.  And  so  it 
would  seem  as  if  the  Mind  of  Man  were  an  Instrument 
attuned  only  to  a  certain  range  of  knowledge,  but  as  if 
within  that  range  it  were  capable  of  finer  and  finer  adjust- 
ments to  the  harmonies  of  Truth.  These  cannot  make 
themselves  heard  where  there  is  no  organ  to  catch  the 
sound.  Nor  could  that  organ  translate  them  into 
Thought — into  that  conscious  apprehension  of  which 
an  Idea  essentially  consists, — had  it  not  its  own  pre- 
adjusted  relation  to  the  Verities  of  the  World. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  in  the  discussion 
of  such  questions  as  to  the  Origin  of  our  Ideas,  there 
has  been  a  great  want  of  definition  in  the  use  of  terms. 
Are  fear,  and  love,  and  hatred,  and  anger,  and  jealousy, 
and  remorse,  and  joy, — are  these  "  ideas,"  or  are  they 
only  conditions  or  powers  of  mind?  If  by  Ideas  we 
mean  those  imaginings  which,  as  the  very  word  implies, 
involve  "images"  of  external  things,  it  is  certain  that 
contact  with  external  impressions,  and,  in  this  sense, 
Experience,  is  essential  to  the  formation  .of  them.  But 
if  by  Ideas  we  mean  the  elementary  passions,  or  if  we 
mean  even  those  peculiarities  of  thought — those  special 
tendencies  of  mind  which  lead  us  to  view  things  in  some 
particular  light  rather  than  in  others,  and  which  con- 
stitute the  essential  distinction  between  the  ideas  of 


296  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW 

different  men — if,  in  short,  we  include  in  the  terra  any- 
thing which  belongs  to  the  Thinking  Faculty  itself,  or 
anything  of  the  method  according  to  which  it  works  up 
the  raw  material  of  Thought— then  it  is  equally  certain 
that  Ideas  in  this  sense  are  born  with  all  of  us,  and 
that  Imitation,  and  Experience,  and  Association,  do  but 
pour  their  material  into  moulds  already  cast  for  their 
reception. 

But  in  reality  here,  as  in  many  other  questions,  the 
rival  disputants  have  each  had  some  portion  of  the  truth. 
They  have  been  both  right  and  both  wrong.  An  Idea 
is  not  a  simple,  but  a  composite  thing.  It  has  not  one 
origin,  but  a  plurality  of  origins.  An  Idea  is,  as  it  were, 
a  fabric  of  which  the  threads  come  from  the  spinner,  and 
the  weaving  from  the  loom.  Or  it  is,  as  it  were,  an 
organic  growth,  of  which  the  materials  are  supplied  from 
the  external  world,  and  the  structure  from  the  world 
within.  There  are  many  elements  in  every  Idea  which 
come,  and  can  only  come,  from  without.  There  are 
other  elements,  and  among  them  the  Formative  Power, 
which  come,  -and  only  can  come,  from  within.  The 
Mind  stands  in  pre-established  relations  to  the  things 
around  it — bound  to  them  by  the  infinite  adjustments 
which  may  be  called  External  Correlations  of  Growth. 
Out  of  these  relations  it  is  not  itself,  nor  do  its  powers 
possess  the  materials  whereon  to  work.  We  cannot 


IN   THE    REALM    OF   MIND.  2Q7 

conceive  a  mind  having  no  points  of  contact  with  the 
external  world.  From  that  world  must  come  all  the 
exciting  causes  of  Thought  and  of  Emotion.  But  the 
form  into  which  these  are  cast — the  tissue  into  which 
these  are  woven — the  force  by  which  Ideas  become  a 
Power — all,  in  short,  that  constitutes  Thought  as  distin- 
guished from  the  things  about  which  we  think — all  this 
comes  from,  and  belongs  to,  the  Mind  itself. 

Among  the  lower  animals,  young  ones,  taken  from 
the  litter  or  the  nest,  and  brought  up  under  conditions 
wholly  removed  from  the  teaching  of  their  parents, 
whether  by  imitation  or  otherwise,  will  reproduce  exactly 
all  those  habits  of  their  race  which  belong  to  their 
natural  modes  of  life.  Many  of  these  habits,  perhaps  it 
may  be  safely  said  all  of  them,  imply  Ideas — that  is  to 
say,  they  imply  instincts  ;  and  instincts  are  in  the  nature 
of  ideas — that  is  to  say,  they  belong  to  the  phenomena 
of  Mind.  And  of  this  there  is  another  indication  in  a 
fact  which  at  first  sight  may  seem  trivial  or  irrelevant. 
It  has  been  often  said  tha.^  one  great  difficulty  in  reason- 
ing on  this  subject,  is  the  inaccessibility  to  observation 
of  the  mental  condition  of  all  infant  creatures.  But 
even  if  this  were  more  true  than  it  really  is,  there  are 
some  creatures,  not  low  in  the  scale  of  creation,  of  wlncu 
it  may  be  said  that,  comparatively,  they  have  no  infancy 
at  all.  These  are  the  Gallinaceous  Birds  in  general, 


298  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW 

and  some  Species  in  particular.  They  come  forth  from 
the  egg  perfect  miniatures  of  their  parents,  and  with 
minds  as  fully  equipped  with  parental  instincts  as  their 
bodies  are  provided  with  feather  or  their  wings  with 
quills.  Antecedent  to  all  experience  of  injury,  they 
exhibit  fear,  and  not  only  fear,  but  fear  of  the  proper 
objects.  They  will  flee  when  they  see  a  hawk,  and  they 
will  carefully  avoid  a  stinging  insect.  In  Europe  the 
young  of  the  Woodgrouse  or  Gelinotte  are  able  to  fly 
from  the  moment  they  break  the  shell.  In  Australia, 
and  the  great  group  of  islands  which  connect  Australia 
with  the  Asiatic  continent,  there  is  a  still  more  curious 
example  of  the  same  fact.  There  is  a  Family  of  Birds 
(Megapodidcz)  of  which  the  young  are  hatched,  not  by 
the  incubation  of  the  parents,  but  by  the  heat  of  fermen- 
tation generated  in  earthen  mounds,  scraped  together 
for  the  purpose.  From  the  moment  the  young  are 
hatched  they  feed  themselves,  and  run,  and  fly,  and 
roost  on  trees,  as  if  the  world  on  which  they  have  just 
opened  their  eyes  had  been  long  familiar.  It  is  said, 
indeed,  that  the  Parent  Bird  watches  the  Hatching 
Mound,  and  is  ready  to  escort  the  chicks  upon  their 
first  appearance  in  the  surrounding  scrub.  But  the 
recognition  of  the  Parent  by  the  young,  and  the  answei 
to  her  call,  are  the  most  remarkable  of  all  among  these 
proofs  of  motive  ideas.  "  As  a  moth  emerges  from  a 


IN  THE.  REALM   OF   MIND. 


Chrysalis,  dries  its  wings,  and  flies  away,  so  the  young 
Telegallus,  when  it  leaves  the  egg,  is  sufficiently  perfect 
to  be  able  to  act  independently.1  Nor  is  this  all;  the 
curious  instinct  by  which  the  Bird  prepares  an  artificial 
Incubator  for  its  young  is  an  instinct  born  with  it  —  an 
Innate  Idea  expressing  itself  in  congenital  habits  of 
body.  The  chick  of  another  Species  of  this  singular 
family  of  Birds,  the  Megapode,  was  found  in  confine- 
ment to  be  incessantly  scraping  up  sand  and  gravel  into 
heaps,  and  the  rapidity  and  power  with  which  it  effected 
this  operation  is  described  with  astonishment  by  its 
captor. 

These  may  seem  far-fetched  illustrations,  and  of  slight 
value  in  so  dark  a  subject;  but  let  us  remember  that 
there  are  no  solitary  facts  in  Nature.  There  are  indeed 
extreme  cases,  —  extreme  examples  of  universal  laws,  — 
that  is  to  say,  of  laws  whose  operation  is  ordinarily 
restrained  within  narrower  limits.  But  there  is  no  fact 
standing  really  alone  —  not  one  which  is  not  bound  to 
the  whole  Order  of  Nature  by  deep  analogies.  That 
any  creatures  should  be  ushered  into  life  so  completely 
organised  and  furnished  as  the  young  of  the  Gallinaceous 
Birds  and  of  the  Megapodes,  is  a  fact  of  immense  signifi- 
cance in  the  phenomena  of  Organic  Life.2 

i  Gould's  "  Birds  of  Australia."  ?  See  l?ote  E. 


300  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW 

In  Man  analogous  facts  appear,  modified  by  his 
infinitely  wider  range  of  character,  and  the  infinite 
degrees  in  which  the  different  elements  of  Mind  are 
capable  of  being  mixed  in  him.  But  although  these 
conditions  greatly  complicate  the  result,  the  general 
phenomena  are  the  same.  Orphans,  who  have  never 
had  any  opportunities  of  acquiring,  by  imitation,  the 
peculiarities  of  their  parents,  will  often,  nevertheless, 
reproduce  these  peculiarities  with  curious  exactness. 
This  is  a  familiar  fact,  and  how  much  this  fact  im- 
plies !  Even  when  the  inheritance  is  merely  some 
congenital  habit  of  body,  or  some  trick  of  manner,  it 
may,  probably,  imply  some  resemblance  deeper  than 
appears.  For  the  Body  and  the  Mind  are  in  such  close 
relationship,  that  congenital  habits  of  Body  are  sure 
to  be  connected  with  congenital  habits  of  Mind.  But 
the  inheritance  is  very  often,  so  far  as  we  can  see, 
purely  mental.  How  often  do  we  recognise  the  tone, 
character,  and  the  very  turn  of  thought  of  dead  friends, 
in  the  conversation  and  conduct  of  their  children  !  The 
innate  tendency  to  look  at  things  in  the  same  point  of 
view,  is  evidenced  in  the  reproduction  of  the  same 
mental  combinations,  of  the  same  images,  of  the  same 
opinions,  in  short,  of  the  same  ideas.  Cases,  more 
remarkable  than  others  of  this  kind,  attract  our  atten- 
tion, and  we  at  once  recognise  ideas  as  innate  which  are 


IN   THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  30! 

so  obviously  determined  by  the  forces  of  hereditary 
transmission.  But  we  forget  how  often  these  laws  of 
inheritance  must  be.  working  invisibly  where  they  never 
break  ground  upon  the  surface.  And  thus  it  is  brought 
home  to  us  how  the  Mind  may  be  subject  to  laws  of 
which  it  is  unconscious — how  its  whole  habit  of  thought, 
and  the  aspect  in  which  different  questions  present 
themselves  to  its  apprehension,  are  in  a  great  measure 
determined  by  the  mysterious  forces  of  congenital  con- 
stitution. And  what  is  true  in  one  measure  of  the  indi- 
vidual mind,  is  true,  also,  in  other  measures,  of  whole 
families  and  of  races  of  Men. 

But  the  laws  of  Material  Organisation  are  not  the  only 
laws  to  which  Mind  is  subject.  Obscure  as  these  laws 
are,  there  are  others  which  are  obscurer  still.  What  we 
cannot  see  in  detail,  we  can  see  in  the  gross.  What  we 
cannot  recognise  in  ourselves,  we  are  able  to  recognise 
in  others.  WTe  can  see  that  the  actions  and  opinions 
of  men,  which  are  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  do  range 
themselves  in  an  observed  Order,  upon  which  Order  we 
can  found,  even  as  we  do  in  the  material  world,  very  safe 
conclusions  as  to  the  phenomena  which  will  follow  upon 
definite  conditions.  And  when  we  go  back  to  former 
generations — to  the  history  of  nations,  and  the  progress 
of  the  human  race— we  can  detect  still  more  clearly  an 
orderly  progress  of  events.  In  that  order  the  operation 


302  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW 

of  great  general  causes  becomes  at  once  apparent.  On 
the  recognition  of  such  causes  the  Philosophy  of  History 
depends  ;  and  upon  that  recognition  depends  not  less  the 
possibility  of  applying  to  the  exigencies  of  our  own  time, 
and  of  our  own  society,  a  wise  and  successful  legislation. 
But  what  are  these  causes,  and  what  is  the  nature 
of  those  "  laws "  to  which  voluntary  agents  are  uncon- 
sciously obedient?  Is  man's  Voluntary  agency  a  de- 
lusion, or  is  it,  on  the  contrary,  just  what  we  feel  it 
to  be,  and  is  it  only  from  misconception  of  its  nature 
that  we  puzzle  over  its  relation  to  Law  ?  W  :  speak,  and 
speak  truly,  of  our  Wills  being  free ;  but  free  from  what  ? 
J.t  seems  to  be  forgotten  that  Freedom  is  not  an  absolute 
but  a  relative  term.  There  is  no  such  thing  existing  as 
absolute  freedom — that  is  to  say,  there  is  nothing  exist- 
ing in  the  world,  or  possible  even  in  thought,  which  is 
absolutely  Alone — entirely  free  from  inseparable  relation- 
ship to  some  other  thing  or  things.  Freedom,  therefore, 
is  only  intelligible  as  meaning  the  being  free  from  some 
particular  kind  of  restraint  or  of  inducement  to  which 
other  beings  are  subject.  From  what,  then,  is  it  that 
our  Wills  are  free  ?  Are  they  free  from  the  influence  of 
motives?  Certainly  not.  And  what  are  motives?  A 
motive  is  that  which  moves,  or  tends  to  move,  the  mind 
in  a  particular  direction.  Like  all  other  words  which 
are  used  to  describe  tke  phenomena  of  Mind,  it  is  taken 


IN   THE   REALM    OF   MIND.  303 

from  the  language  applicable  to  material  things,  and 
suggests  the  analogies  which  exist  between  them.  It 
belongs  to  the  profound  but  unconscious  metaphysics 
of  Human  Speech.  That  which  moves  the  Mind  in  a 
particular  direction  is  best  conceived  of  as  something 
which  exerts  a  force  upon  it,  and  the  aggregate  of  such 
forces  may,  in  a  general  sense,  be  called  the  laws  which 
determine  human  action  and  opinions. 

But  here  we  come  upon  the  great  difficulty  which 
besets  every  attempt  to  reduce  to  system  the  laws  or 
forces  which  operate  on  the  Mind  of  Man.  It  is  the 
immense,  the  almost  boundless  variety  and  number  of 
them.  This  variety  corresponds  with  the  variety  of 
powers  with  which  his  Mind  is  gifted.  For  pre-established 
relations  are  necessary  to  the  effect  of  every  force, 
whether  in  the  material  or  in  the  moral  world.  Special 
forces  operate  upon  special  forms  of  matter,  and  except 
upon  these,  they  exert  no  action  whatever.  For  no  force 
can  operate  except  where  there  are  pre-established  rela- 
tions between  its  energies  and  the  things  upon  which  its 
energies  are  to  work.  The  Polar  Force  of  magnetism 
acts  on  different  metals  in  different  degrees,  and  there  is 
a  large  class  of  substances  which  are  almost  insensible 
to  its  power.  In  like  manner  there  are  a  thousand 
things  that  exercise  an  attractive  power  on  the  mind  of 
a  civilised  man,  which  would  exercise  no  power  whatever 


304  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW 

upon  the  mind  of  a  savage.  And  in  this  lies  the  only 
difference  between  subjection  to  Law  under  which  the 
lower  animals  are  placed,  and  the  subjection  to  Law 
which  is  equally  the  condition  of  Mankind.  Free  Will, 
in  the  only  sense  in  which  this  expression  is  intelligible, 
has  been  erroneously  represented  as  the  peculiar  pre- 
rogative of  Man.  But  the  Will  of  the  lower  animals 
is,  within  their  narrow  spheres  of  action,  as  free  as  ours. 
A  man  is  not  more  free  to  go  to  the  right  hand  or  to  the 
left  than  the  Eagle,  or  the  Wren,  or  the  Mole,  or  the 
Bat.  The  only  difference  is,  that  the  Will  of  the  lower 
animals  is  acted  upon  by  fewer  and  simpler  motives. 
And  the  lower  the  organisation  of  the  animal,  the  fewer 
and  simpler  these  motives  are.  Hence  it  is  that  the 
conduct  and  choice  of  animals — that  is,  the  decision 
of  their  Will  under  given  conditions — can  be  predicted 
with  almost  perfect  certainty.  Their  faculties,  few  in 
number  and  limited  in  range,  are  open  only  to  the  small 
number  of  forces  which  are  related  to  them ;  and  in  the 
absence  of  higher  faculties  accessible  to  other  motives, 
these  few  attractions  exert  a  determining  effect  upon 
their  Will.1 

Accordingly  we  may  see  that,  in  proportion  as  there  is 
an  approach  among   the   lower    animals  to  the  higher 
faculties  of  Mind,  there  is,  in  corresponding  proportion,  a 
i  See  Note  F, 


IN   THE   REALM    OF   MIND.  305 

difficulty  in  predicting  their  conduct.  Perhaps  the  best 
illustration  of  this  is  a  very  homely  one — it  is  the  effect 
of  baits  and  traps.  Some  animals  can  be  trapped  and 
caught  with  perfect  certainty;  whilst  there  are  others 
upon  which  the  motive  presented  by  a  bait  is  counter- 
acted by  the  stronger  motive  of  caution  against  danger, 
when  a  higher  degree  of  intelligence  enables  the  animal 
to  detect  its  presence.  Yet  the  Will  of  the  cunning 
animal  is  not  more  free  than  the  Will  of  the  stupid 
animal, — nor  is  the  Will  of  the  stupid  animal  more  sub- 
ject to  Law  than  the  Will  of  the  cunning  one.  The 
Will  of  the  young  Rat,  which  yields  to  the  temptation  of 
a  bait,  and  is  caught,  is  not  more  subject  to  Law  than 
the  Will  of  the  old  Rat,  who  suspects  stratagem,  resists 
the  temptation  and  escapes.  They  are  both  subject  to 
Law  in  precisely  the  same  sense  and  in  precisely  the 
same  degree — that  is  to  say,  their  actions  are  alike  deter- 
mined by  the  forces  to  which  their  faculties  are  acces- 
sible. Where  these  are  few  and  simple,  the  resulting 
action  is  simple  also ;  where  these  are  many  and  compli- 
cated, the  resulting  action  has  a  corresponding  variety. 
Thus  the  conduct  of  animals  is  less  capable  of  being 
predicted  in  proportion  as  it  is  difficult  or  impossible  to 
foresee  the  nature  or  number  of  the  motive  forces  which 
are  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Will.  Man's  Will  is  free  in 
the  same  sense,  and  in  the  same  sense  only.  It  is  sub- 

x 


306  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

ject  to  Law  in  the  same  sense,  and  in  the  same  sense 
alone.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  subject  to  the  influence  of 
motives,  and  it  can  only  choose  among  those  which  are 
presented  to  it,  or  which  the  mind  has  been  given  the 
power  of  presenting  to  itself.1 

But  in  this  last  power  we  touch  the  secret  of  that 
boundless  difference  which  separates  Man  from  the 
highest  of  the  animals  below  him.  There  is  such  a  gulf 
between  the  faculties  of  his  mind  and  those  of  the  lower 
animals,  that  the  forces  acting  on  the  human  spirit  be- 
come, by  comparison,  innumerable,  and  involve  motives 
belonging  to  a  wholly  different  class  and  order.  He  is 
exposed,  indeed,  to  the  lower  motives  in  common  with 
the  beasts.  But  there  are  others  which  operate  largely 
upon  him  which  never  can  and  never  do  operate  upon 
them.  Foremost  among  these  are  the  motives  which 
Man  has  the  power  of  bringing  to  bear  upon  himself, 
arising  out  of  his  power  of  forming  Abstract  Ideas,  out 
of  his  possession  of  Beliefs,  and,  above  all,  out  of  his 
Sense  of  Right  and  Wrong.  So  strong  are  these  motives 
that  they  are  able  constantly  to  overpower,  and  some- 
times almost  to  destroy,  the  forces  which  are  related  to 
his  lower  faculties.  Again,  among  the  motives  which 
operate  upon  him,  Man  has  a  selecting  power.  He  can, 
as  it  were,  stand  oi-'t  from  among  them, — look  down  from 

»  See  Note  G. 


IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND.  307 

above  them,  —  compare  them  among  each  other,  and 
bring  them  to  the  test  of  Conscience.  Nay  more,  he  can 
reason  on  his  own  character  as  he  can  on  the  character 
of  another  Being, — estimating  his  own  weakness  with 
reference  to  this  and  the  other  motive,  as  he  is  conscious 
how  each  may  be  likely  to  tell  upon  him.  When  he 
knows  that  any  given  motive  will  be  too  strong  for  him, 
if  he  allow  himself  to  think  of  it,  he  can  shut  it  out  from 
his  mind  by  "  keeping  the  door  of  his  thoughts."  He 
can,  and  he  often  does,  refuse  the  thing  he  sees,  and  hold 
by  another  thing  which  he  cannot  see.  He  may,  and  he 
often  does,  choose  the  Invisible  in  preference  to  the 
Visible.  He  may,  and  he  often  does,  walk  by  Faith  and 
not  by  Sight.  It  is  true  that  in  doing  this  he  must  be 
impelled  by  something  which  is  itself  only  another 
motive,  and  so  it  is  true  that  our  Wills  can  never  be  free 
from  motives,  and  in  this  sense  can  never  be  free  from 
"Law."  But  this  is  only  saying  that  we  can  never  be 
free  from  the  relations  pre-established  between  the  struc- 
ture of  our  minds,  and  the  system  of  things  in  which 
they  are  formed  to  move.  From  these,  it  is  true  indeed, 
that  we  never  can  be  free.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
know  that  these  relations  do  not  involve  compulsion.  It  is 
from  compulsion  that  our  Wills  are  free,  and  from  nothing 
else  ;  and  for  this  freedom  we  have  the  only  evidence 
we  can  ever  have  for  any  ultimate  truth  respecting  the 

X  2 


308  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW 

powers  of  Mind — the  evidence  of  Consciousness — that 
is,  the  evidence  of  observation  turned  in  upon  ourselves. 
The  discussions  of  many  centuries  seem  to  have  re- 
sulted, at  last,  in  some  real  progress  upon  this  vexed 
question  of  Necessity  and  Free-will.  That  progress  lies 
mainly  in  a  clearer  definition  of  terms.  The  most  emi- 
nent living  philosopher  who  represents  the  doctrine, 
commonly  called  the  Doctrine  of  Necessity,  repudiates 
that  name  as  incorrect,  expressly  on  the  ground  that  the 
word  Necessity,  as  commonly  applied,  signifies  com- 
pulsion. Undoubtedly  it  does  ;  and  if  this  meaning  be 
repudiated,  then  the  word  is  not  used  in  its  ordinary 
and  legitimate  sense.  This,  indeed,  Mr.  Mill  confesses, 
whilst  yet  he  casts  upon  his  opponents  the  blame  of  a 
misunderstanding,  which  assuredly  lies  with  those  who 
do  not  employ  ordinary  words  in  the  ordinary  signifi- 
cation. "  The  truth  is,"  he  says,  "  that  the  assailants  of 
the  doctrine  (of  Necessity)  cannot  do  without  the  asso- 
ciations engendered  by  the  double  meaning  of  the  word 
Necessity,  which  in  this  application  signifies  only  in- 
variability, but,  m  its  common  employment,  compulsion"**- 
He  believes,  therefore,  in  Necessity  only  in  the  sense  of 
Invariability.  But  if  the  doctrine  which  Mr.  Mill  favours 
has  suffered  from  one  ambiguity,  it  seeks  to  shelter  itself 

i  "Examination  of  Sir  W.   Hamilton's  Philosophy,"    by  J.  S. 
Mill,  p.  492,  note. 


IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND,  309 

under  the  protection  of  another  ambiguity  much  more 
deceptive.  If  there  is  a  double  meaning  in  the  word 
Necessity  which  has  exposed  the  Necessitarian  doctrine 
to  unjust  objections,  it  is  equally  true  that  there  is  a 
double  meaning  in  the  word  Invariability  which  lends  to 
that  doctrine  an  undue  advantage.  Invariability  can  be 
predicated  of  mental  action  in  this  vague  general  sense 
— that  all  the  movements  of  Mind  must  invariably  arise 
from  some  motive.  But  this  is  a  kind  of  "  Invariability  " 
which  admits  of  any  amount  of  variation.  For,  as 
in  the  language  of  this  philosophy,  Necessity  does  not 
mean  compulsion,  so  by  Invariability,  as  applied  to 
the  phenomena  of  Mind,  nothing  more  is  meant  than 
that,  in  respect  to  mental  action,  there  is  an  "  abstract 
possibility  of  its  being  foreseen."  "  If,"  says  Mr.  Mill, 
'*  necessity  means  more  than  this  abstract  possibility  of 
being  foreseen ;  if  it  means  any  mysterious  compulsion, 
apart  from  simple  invariability  of  sequence,  I  deny  it 
as  strenuously  as  any  one." l 

But  now  let  us  insist,  as  in  such  subjects  we  are 
bound  to  do,  on  still  clearer  definitions.  We  shall  find, 
in  the  first  place,  that  the  "  abstract  possibility "  of 
foreseeing  mental  action  depends  on  nothing  less  than 
such  absolute  knowledge  of  character  and  of  motive 

1  "Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,"  p.  517.  See 
Note  H. 


3IO  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW 

as  can  belong  to  God  alone.  We  shall  then  find,  in 
the  second  place,  that  this  favourite  phrase,  "  in- 
variability of  sequence,"  is  as  ambiguous  as  others  of 
the  same  class.  It  does  not  mean  that  any  particular 
sequences  are  invariable,  but  only  that  there  must 
always  be  some  sequence — that  it  is  invariably  true 
that  everything  which  happens  has  proceeded  from  some- 
thing as  a  cause,  and  leads  to  something  as  a  conse- 
quence. But  this  is  a  proposition  which  evidently,  when 
reduced  to  its  true  dimensions,  has  no  adverse  bearing 
whatever  on  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will.  The  "  abstract " 
possibility  of  foreseeing  mental  action  depends  on  these 
two  propositions :  first,  that  where  all  the  conditions  of 
that  action  are  constant,  the  resulting  action  will  be  con- 
stant also ;  and,  secondly,  that  absolute  and  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  whole  of  those  conditions  would  carry 
with  it  sure  foreknowledge  also  of  the  choice  to  which 
they  lead.  But  surely  this  is  not  only  true,  but  some- 
thing very  like  a  truism.1  There  is  nothing  to  object  to 

1  Mr.  Mansel,  following  other  philosophers  on  this  point,  reduces 
the  modified  doctrine  of  Necessity  to  this  identical  proposition, 
"  that  the  prevailing  motive  prevails."  Mr.  Mill's  reply  is  altogether 
unsatisfactory. — Examination,  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy, 
pp.  518,  519. 

I  cannot  help  adding  here — although  the  observation  has  reference 
to  another  subject — that  Mr.  Mill  appears  to  me  to  have  exposed 
with  great  force  and  clearness  the  verbal  fallacies  involved  in  Mr. 
Hansel's  work  on  the  "Limits  of  Religious  Thought,"  and  espe* 


IN    THE   REALM   OF    MIND.  311 

or  deny  in  the  doctrine,  that  if  we  knew  everything  that 
determines  the  conduct  of  a  man,  we  should  be  able  to 
know  what  that  conduct  will  be.  That  is  to  say,  if  we 
knew  all  the  motives  which  are  brought  by  external 
agencies  to  bear  upon  his  mind,  and  if  we  knew  all  the 
other  motives  which  that  mind  evolves  out  of  its  own 
powers,  and  out  of  previously  acquired  materials,  to  bear 
upon  itself;  and  if  we  knew  the  character  and  dis- 
position of  that  mind  so  perfectly  as  to  estimate  exactly 
the  weight  it  will  allow  to  all  the  different  motives 
operating  upon  it, — then  we  should  be  able  to  predict 
with  certainty  the  resulting  course  of  conduct. 

This  is  true,  not  only  as  an  abstract  conception,  but  as 
a  matter  of  experience  in  the  little  way  towards  perfect 
knowledge  along  which  we  can  ever  travel.  We  can  pre- 
dict conduct  with  almost  perfect  certainty  when  we  know 
character  with  an  equal  measure  of  assurance,  and  when 
we  know  the  influences  to  which  that  character  will  be 
exposed.  In  proportion  as  we  are  sure  of  character,  in 
the  same  proportion  we  are  sure  of  conduct.  Yet  we 
never  think  of  the  Will  being  the  less  free,  because  we 
can  predict  its  course.  What  we  know  in  such  cases  is 
simply  the  use  which,  under  given  conditions,  will  be 

cially  in  the  use  he  makes  of  such  forms  of  expression  as  "The 
Absolute,"  "The  Infinite,"  &c.— See  the  chapter  (vii.)  on  "The 
Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned  as  applied  by  Mr,  Mansel  to  Reli- 
gion," in  the  same  work. 


312  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

made  of  freedom.  There  is  no  certainty  in  the  world  of 
Physics  more  absolute  than  some  certainties  in  the  world 
of  Mind.  We  know  that  a  humane  man  will  not  do 
a  uselessly  cruel  action.  We  know  that  an  honourable 
man  will  not  do  a  base  action.  And  if  in  such  cases  we 
are  deceived  in  the  result,  we  know  that  it  is  because  we 
were  ignorant  of  some  weakness  or  of  some  corruption ; 
that  is  to  say,  we  were  ignorant  of  some  elements  of 
character.  But  we  never  doubt  that,  if  those  had  been 
known,  we  could  have  foreseen  the  resulting  lapse.  Per- 
fect knowledge  must  therefore  be  perfect  foreknowledge. 
To  know  the  present  perfectly,  is  to  know  the  future 
certainly.  To  know  all  that  is,  is  to  know  all  that  will 
be.  To  know  the  heart  of  Man  completely,  is  to  know 
his  conduct  completely  also ;  for  "•  out  of  the  heart  are 
the  issues  of  life."  So  far  from  this  conclusion  being 
dangerous  or  hostile  to  any  part  of  the  Christian  system, 
it  is  a  conclusion  which  enables  us,  in  a  dim  way,  not 
merely  to  hold  as  a  Belief,  but  to  see  as  a  necessary 
truth,  that  there  can  be  no  chance  in  this  world, — and 
how  it  is,  and  must  be,  that  to  the  All-seeirg  and  All- 
knowing  the  Future  is  as  open  as  the  Present  and  the 
Past  But  none  of  these  ideas  involve  the  idea  ot  com- 
pulsion ;  and  the  absence  of  compulsion  is  all  that  can 
be  meant  by  Freedom. 

And  as  by  Freedom,  we  do  not  mean  freedom  from 


IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  313 

motives,  so  neither  do  we  mean  that  any  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  Mind,  any  more  than  any  of  the  phenomena 
of  Matter,  can  arise  without  "  an  antecedent."  In  this 
sense  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  doctrine  of 
Free  Will  and  the  amended  doctrine  of  Necessity.  Man 
is  subject  to  the  law  of  Causation  in  this  sense,  "that 
his  volitions  are  not  self-caused,  but  determined  by 
spiritual  antecedents  in  such  sort  that  when  the  ante- 
cedents are  the  same,  the  volitions  will  always  be  the 
same." J  But  this  word  "  antecedent "  is  one  of  the 
many  vague  words  in  which  metaphysicians  delight. 
The  highest  antecedents  which  we  can  ever  trace  as 
determining  conduct,  are  to  be  found  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  mind  itself.  Love  is  an  antecedent,  so  is  Rever- 
ence, so  is  Gratitude,  so  is  the  Hunger  after  Knowledge, 
so  is  the  Desire  of  Truth.  So  also  is  the  action  of 
nther  Spirits  upon  our  own.  Higher  than  these — further 
up  the  chain  of  Cause  and  Effect — we  cannot  go.  And 
yet  we  need  not  conceive  of  these  as  "  Final  Causes," 
nor  does  the  doctrine  of  our  Free  Will  assign  to  the 
human  Mind  any  self-originating  power.  Man  has 
nothing  which  he  did  not  receive.  Such  freedom  as 
his  Will  possesses  has  been  given  to  him,  and  given 
him,  too,  as  we  have  dimly  seen,  by  the  employment 
and  by  the  device  of  means.  It  is  a  power  belonging 
f  "Mill  on  Hamilton,"  pp.  492,  493. 


3T4  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

to  his  structure,  and  derived  from  Him  by  whom  that 
structure  has  been  devised. 

"  Our  Wills  are  ours,  we  know  not  how." 

The  power  which  in  health  we  possess  of  preferring 
one  motive  to  all  others,  whilst  yet  the  influence  of 
those  others  may  be  strongly  felt,  is  a  power  which 
like  every  other,  must  have  its  own  "  antecedent " — 
that  is  to  say,  its  own  cause,  and  its  own  purpose.  But 
these  are  to  be  found  in  the  Adjustment  from  which  the 
power  arises, — in  the  Mind  by  which,  that  adjustment 
has  been  contrived,  and  in  the  Purposes  which  it  reveals. 
The  freedom  of  Man's  Will  is  not  more  mysterious, 
when  it  is  exerted  in  directing  the  Mind  to  one  motive, 
and  averting  it  from  another,  than  when  it  is  exerted  in 
turning  the  Body  to  the  right  hand  rather  than  to  the  left.1 
The  difficulty  of  reconciling,  in  one  clear  Order  of 
Thought,  the  idea  of  the  Freedom  of  our  own  Will 
with  the  idea  of  Causation,  is  not  really  so  great  a  diffi- 

1  The  whole  of  this  passage  on  Necessity  and  Free  Will  has 
been  severely  criticised  in  an  article  in  the  Dublin  Review  for  April 
1867,  as  involving  a  practical  abandonment  of  the  very  doctrine 
which  I  profess  to  defend.  The  argument  there  maintained  seems 
to  me  altogether  erroneous  ;  and  I  have  seen  no  reason  to  alter  the 
text  in  any  material  point.  The  subject,  however,  is  so  important 
in  itself,  and  so  interesting  as  regards  the  history  of  Philosophy, 
that  I  have  thought  it  right  to  deal  with  it  in  a  separate  note  (F) 
already  referred  to. 


IN   THE    REALM    OF   MIND.  315 

culty  as  the  use  of  ambitious  and  ambiguous  language 
has  made  it  appear  to  be.  There  are  two  sentences 
in  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill's  work,  on  the  Philosophy  of  Comte, 
which  afford  the  best  possible  illustration  both  of  the 
true  doctrine  on  the  relation  in  which  Will  stands  to 
Law,  and  of  the  false  doctrine  into  which  it  may  be 
merged  by  the  ambiguous  use  of  words.  In  one  pas- 
sage Mr.  Mill  defines  the  Positive  as  distinguished  from 
the  Theological  Mode  of  Thought  to  be—"  that  all 
phenomena,  without  exception,  are  governed  by  in- 
variable laws,  with  which  no  volitions  either  natural  or 
supernatural  interfere" *  It  is  at  least  satisfactory  to 
find  in  this  sentence  so  clear  an  avowal  that  the  idea 
of  free  Divine  Volition  in  the  region  of  the  Supernatural, 
and  the  idea  of  free  Human  Volition  in  the  region  of 
the  Natural,  stand  on  the  same  ground,  are  exposed  to 
the  same  intellectual  difficulties,  and  are  both  equally 
denied  by  the  new  Philosophy.  But  as  a  definition  of 
the  Positive  mode  of  thought  it  stands  in  curious  con- 
trast with  another  passage  of  the  same  work,  in  which 
Mr.  Mill  says  that  "the  Theological  mode  of  explain- 
ing phenomena  was  once  universal,  with  the  exception, 
doubtless,  of  the  familiar  facts  which  being  even  then  seen 
to  be  controllable  by  human  Will  belonged  already  to  tht 
Positive  Mode  of  Thought:'  2 

1  "Aug.  Comte  and  Positivism,"  p.  12.         2  Ibid.  pp.  31,  32. 


316  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

These  two  sentences  involve,  on  the  face  of  them, 
contradictory  positions.  The  one  affirms  that  no  vo- 
litions can  interfere  with  the  laws  which  govern  pheno- 
mena, and  that  the  recognition  of  this  is  the  very  essence 
of  the  Positive  Philosophy.  The  other  affirms  that  the 
Positive  Mode  of  Thought  is  involved  in  the  very  idea 
of  facts  being  controllable  by  human  Will. 

It  is  not,  perhaps,  very  important  to  ask  which  of 
these  two  sentences  gives  the  most  accurate  description 
of  the  Positive  Philosophy;  but  it  is  of  much  impor- 
tance to  ask  which  of  these  two  positions  is  nearest  to 
the  truth?  Beyond  all  doubt,  it  is  the  last.  If  the 
Positive  Philosophy  were  content  with  the  assertion  that 
the  power  of  Will  over  facts  depends  on  the  invaria- 
bility of  Laws — that  is,  on  the  constancy  of  Natural 
Forces — it  would  be  sound  enough.  And  so,  the  second 
of  the  two  sentences  I  have  quoted  sets  forth  the  central 
idea  of  that  Philosophy  in  its  most  favourable  light.  But 
in  the  first  of  those  two  sentences  we  have  a  concen- 
tration of  all  that  is  erroneous  in  Positivism,  and  at  the 
same  time  a  typical  example  of  the  ambiguities  and 
obscurities  of  language  on  which  the  fallacies  of  that 
Philosophy  depend.  There  is  hardly  a  single  word  in  that 
sentence  which  is  not  ambiguously  used.  "  Phenomena  " 
and  "  facts,"  "  govern  "  and  "  control,"  and  "  interfere 
with,"  are  all  used  in  ambiguous  senses ;  whilst,  as  usual, 


IN    THE    REALM    OF   MIND.  317 

the  words  "  Law "  and  "  Invariable,"  are  used  not  only 
ambiguously,  but  unintelligibly.  In  order  to  test  these 
ambiguities  we  have  only  to  compare  the  two  sentences 
together.  "Phenomena"  in  the  one  sentence  seems  to 
correspond  with  "  facts "  in  the  other.  Yet,  we  have 
this  result, — that  "phenomena"  are  governed  by  In- 
variable Law,  whilst  "  facts  "  are  controllable  by  human 
Will.  It  would  appear,  then,  that  the  "  phenomena " 
which  are  governed  by  Law  cannot  be  the  same  with  the 
"  facts,"  which  are  controllable  by  Will : — or  else,  if  they 
be  the  same,  then  there  must  be  some  essential  dis- 
tinction between  "  controlling  "  and  "  governing."  What 
is  this  distinction  ?  It  is  not  denned,  or  even  suggested. 
Then,  again,  if  no  volitions  can  ''interfere  with"  Laws, 
how  can  volitions  -'control"  facts?  if  Will  controls 
facts,  and  yet  can't  "  interfere  with  "  Laws,  how  is  the 
control  over  facts  exercised?  What  is  the  relation  be- 
tween the  Laws  which  no  volitions  can  "interfere  with," 
and  the  "  facts  "  which  volitions  do  actually  "  control  ?  " 
Can  Will  control  facts,  which  again  are  governed  by  laws, 
(in  some  sense  or  other)  either  by  interfering  with  those 
laws,  or  controlling  them  ? 

If  it  were  possible  to  get  any  definite  meaning  out 
of  this  confusion  of  words,  perhaps  it  might  be  said 
that  Will  can  "control"  Law,  but  cannot  "interfere 
with  "  it.  There  is  at  least  a  glimmering  of  the  truth  in 


3*8  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW 

this.  But  no  man  could  gather  from  those  two  sen- 
tences of  Mr.  Mill  what  the  truth  is,  although,  after  all, 
the  truth  is  plain  enough,  if  only  some  care  be  taken 
to  confine  definite  words  to  some  sort  of  definite  mean- 
ing. If  by  Laws  are  meant  the  elementary  Forces  of 
Nature,  and  if  by  "  interfering  "  with  them  is  meant  any 
power  of  altering  their  own  essential  energies — then  it 
is  true  that  no  volitions  of  ours  can  interfere  with  them. 
But  then  it  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that,  in  this 
sense,  phenomena  are  NOT  governed  by  Invariable  Laws ; 
because  phenomena  are  never  the  result  of  individual 
Forces,  but  are  always  the  result  of  the  conditions 
under  which  several  Forces  are  combined,  and  these 
conditions  are  always  variable.  If,  again,  "  interference  " 
means  or  includes  the  power  of  setting  Natural  Forces 
(Laws)  to  work  under  new  conditions,  then  it  is  the 
reverse  of  truth  to  affirm  that  they  cannot  be  "  inter- 
fered "  with.  Man  controls  facts  only  because  (in  this 
sense)  he  can,  and  he  does,  interfere  with  Laws.  His 
volitions  can,  and  do,  govern  those  combinations  of 
Force  which  are  the  immediate  cause  of  all  phenomena. 

There  is  no  fault  in  philosophical  discussion  more 
pestilent  than  that  of  using  common  words  in  some 
technical  or  artificial  sense,  without  any  warning  to  the 
reader,  (often  apparently  without  any  consciousness  on 
the  part  of  the  writer,)  that  ideas  fundamentally  involved, 


IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  319 

in  the  ordinary  use  of  the  word,  are  eliminated  and  set 
aside.  We  have  seen  one  instance  of  this  in  the  word 
"  necessity,"  emptied  of  its  meaning  of  compulsion.  We 
have  another  example  in  the  use  made  of  such  words  as 
"changeable,"  and  others  of  a  like  kind.  Thus  Mr. 
Mill1  quotes,  with  approbation,  a  remark  of  Comte,  that 
"  our  power  of  foreseeing  phenomena,  and  our  power 
of  controlling  them,  are  the  two  things  which  destroy 
the  belief  of  their  being  governed  by  changeable  Wills." 
All  through  this  sentence  there  run  the  same  confusions 
which  have  been  pointed  out  in  the  two  sentences 
already  quoted.  But  there  is,  in  addition,  another  con- 
fusion which  has  a  special  bearing  on  the  subject  of  this 
chapter.  Phenomena  which  can  be  controlled  are 
phenomena  which  can  be  changed.  There  is  no  other 
meaning  in  the  words.  The  assertion,  therefore,  is,  that 
the  changeability  of  phenomena  through  human  agency 
is  a  fact  which  must  destroy  our  belief  in  the  change- 
ability of  the  human  Will  itself.  The  sentence  thus  ren- 
dered is,  of  course,  either  pure  nonsense,  or  else  must  be 
dependent  for  a  rational  sense  upon_  some  artificial 
meaning  being  attached  to  the  word  "  changeable."  A 
Will  under  the  guidance  of  some  settled  principle — that 
is  to  say,  following  habitually  some  prevailing  motives — 

*  "Auguste  Ccmte  and  Positivism,"  p.  48. 


320  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW 

might,  by  a  certain  licence  of  language,  be  called  an 
unchangeable  Will.  But  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  that 
kind  of  changeability  which  can  alone  concern  the 
power  of  altering  and  controlling  material  phenomena. 
Stability  of  character,  whether  moral  or  purely  intel- 
lectual, is  not  only  compatible  with  a  variable  Will,  but 
it  is  inseparably  connected  with  it.  No  man  can  pursue 
one  rule  of  conduct  under  changing  conditions  unless  he 
himself  retains  his  own  capacities  of  change.  He  can- 
not control  phenomena  without  changing  them,  and  he 
cannot  change  phenomena  without  changing  his  own 
course  of  action ;  and  a  change  in  the  course  of  action 
is  a  change  in  the  course  of  Will. 

That  which  is  really  at  the  bottom  of  all  this  ambi- 
guity of  language,  is  a  constant  endeavour  to  get  rid 
altogether  of  an  essential  element  in  the  very  idea  of 
Will, — to  reduce  it  to  something  different  from  that  which 
we  all  know  and  feel  it  to  be.  The  word  Will  is  indeed 
retained  in  the  Positive  vocabulary,  but  some  other  word 
is  generally  inserted  before  it,  to  prejudice  the  common 
understanding  of  it,  or  to  impart  some  element  of  mean- 
ing which  can  with  more  plausibility  be  denounced. 
Thus  the  Will  which  is  denied  in  Nature  is  often  de- 
scribed as  an  "arbitrary"  Will  or  a  "capricious"  Will. 
But  surely  these  qualifying  epithets  do  .but  add  to  the 
confusion.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  Will  we  see  in 


IN   THE   REALM    OF    MIND.  32! 

Nature  is  not  a  capricious  Will.  But  this  is  not  the 
question.  The  question  is,  whether  there  is,  or  is  not, 
such  a  thing  possible  as  caprice  in  Will.  If  there  -be 
such  a  thing  as  caprice,  then  the  existence  of  it,  and  the 
power  of  it  "  to  control  phenomena,"  cannot  be  denied. 
If  there  be  nb  such  thing,  then  "capricious"  is  of  no 
meaning  as  an  epithet  applied  to  Will.  Caprice  implies 
not  only  changeableness,  but,  so  to  speak,  a  double 
degree  of  changeableness — a  changeableness  which  has 
no  rule  or  reason  in  its  shiftings.  It  is  a  fact  that  there 
are  human  Wills  of  this  character,  and  the  mischief  they 
have  done  in  the  world  arises  from  the  power  they  pos- 
sess, in  common  with  all  other  Wills,  of  changing 
phenomena  after  their  own  unreasonable  nature.  The 
truth  is,  that  if  the  human  Will  can  be  described  as  un- 
changeable, then  there  is  no  such  thing  as  changeability 
even  conceivable  in  thought.  There  is  no  contrast  so 
absolute  between  any  two  different  forms  of  Matter,  as 
there  is  between  two  different  states  of  the  same  Mind. 
There  is  no  transition  in  Nature  from  one  physical  con- 
dition to  another  so  absolute  or  so  radical  as  the  trans- 
ition  to  which  human  character  is  subject  when  it 
passes  under  the  power  of  new  convictions.  There  is 
no  change  like  the  change  from  hatred  to  affection,  from 
vice  to  virtue,  from  evil  to  good.  And  this  change  in 
Mind  is  the  efficient  cause  of  a  whole  cycle  of  other 


322  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW 

changes  among  the  phenomena  which  the  human  Will 
can  and  does  alter,  regulate,  and  control. 

There  is,  then,  not  much  real  difficulty  aftei  all  in  dis- 
engaging the  great  facts  of  our  own  Free  Will  from  the 
verbal  confusions  of  the  Positive  Philosophy.  Nor  will 
the  same  methods  of  solution  fail  us  when  we  apply  them 
to  the  further  question,— How  far,  and  in  what  sense,  are 
our  own  volitions  themselves  subject  to  law — that  is,  to 
the  influence  of  Adjusted  Forces?  For  as  one  great 
consequence  of  the  Reign  of  Law  over  material  things 
is  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the  use  of  appropriate 
means  for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose,  so  does  the 
same  necessity  arise  out  of  the  same  conditions  among 
the  phenomena  of  Mind.  If  we  wish  to  operate  upon 
human  action,  we  must  go  to  work  by  presenting  to  the 
Will  some  motive  tending  to  produce  the  action  we 
desire.  Above  all,  if  we  seek  to  operate  not  merely  on 
individual  actions,  but  upon  that  which  mainly  deter- 
mines conduct,  viz.  human  character,  we  must  direct  our 
efforts  to  place  that  character  under  outward  conditions 
which  we  know  to  have  a  favourable  effect  upon  it.  In 
the  material  world  we  should  be  powerless  to  control  any 
event  if  we  did  not  know  it  to  be  subject  to  laws — that 
is,  to  Forces  which,  though  not  liable  to  change  in 
essence,  are  subject  to  endless  change  in  combination  and 
in  use.  The  same  impotency  would  affect  us,  if  in  the 


IN   THE    REALM  OF   MIND.  323 

moral  world  also  definite  conditions  had  not  always  an 
invariable  tendency  to  produce  certain  definite  results. 
It  is  a  mere  confusion  of  thought  and  of  language  which 
confounds  the  "  invariability "  of  "  Laws,"  either  moral 
or  material,  with  the  denial  of  the  power  of  Will  to  vary, 
alter,  and  modify  in  infinite  degrees  the  course  of  things. 
It  is  the  fixedness  of  all  Forces  in  one  sense  which  con- 
stitutes their  infinite  pliability  in  another.  It  is  the  un- 
changing relation  which  they  bear  to  those  mental  facul- 
ties by  which  we  discover  them  and  recognise  uiem,  that 
renders  them  capable  of  becoming  the  supple  instruments 
of  those  other  faculties  of  Will,  of  Reason,  and  of  Con- 
trivance by  which  we  can  work  them  for  altered  and 
better  purposes. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

LAW   IN   POLITICS. 

A  T  first  sight  it  may  be  thought  that  the  means 
-^~^  by  which  we  can  operate  on  the  Wills  of  indi- 
vidual men,  and  of  communities  of  men,  are  contained 
within  a  narrow  compass,  and  are  such  as  to  be  all, 
if  not  within  easy  reach,  at  least  within  easy  recognition. 
And  it  is  true  that  some  methods  of  operating  on  the 
minds  of  men  we  do  know  instinctively,  just  as  in  the 
material  world  we  know  by  the  first  rudiments  of  intelli- 
gence how  to  accomplish  a  few  physical  results.  But 
experience  and  observation  teach  us,  although  they  teach 
us  very  slowly,  that  direct  appeals  to  the  reason,  or  direct 
appeals  to  the  feelings  of  men,  are  entirely  useless,  when 
those  faculties  have  not  been  placed  under  conditions 
favourable  to  their  exercise  in  a  right  direction.  And  as 
in  the  material  world,  the  knowledge  we  have  acquired  of 
the  powers  of  Nature,  and  of  the  methods  of  turning  them 
to  use,  has  been  slowly  gained  in  the  lapse  of  ages,  and 
as  all  we  discover  does  but  reveal  how  much  we  have  yet 
to  know;  so  in  the  immense  world  of  the  Mind  and 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  325 


Character  of  Man,  our  knowledge  of  the  methods  by 
which  it  may  be  well  and  wisely  governed,  has  advanced 
only  by  slow  degrees.  There  is  a  boundless  field  of  dis- 
covery still  open  to  those  who  investigate  the  laws  which 
govern  the  development  of  our  nature.  When  we  look 
at  the  high  degrees  of  excellence  which  that  nature  so 
often  attains  under  favourable  conditions  for  the  growth 
and  exercise  of  its  better  powers,  and  when  we  contrast 
this  with  its  stunted  and  distorted  growth  as  exhibited 
among  large  portions  of  Mankind,  it  becomes  a  question 
of  deep  and  endless  interest  to  know  how  far  these  con- 
ditions are  subject  to  the  control  of  Will  through  the 
use  of  means.  If  such  means  can  ever  be  devised, 
it  must  be  by  knowledge,  first  of  the  elementary  forces 
which  have  a  constant  operation  on  Human  Character, 
and  secondly  by  contrivance  in  so  combining  them  as  to 
make  them  operate  in  the  direction  we  desire.  And  it 
is  in  this  search  that  we  discover  the  intimate  blending 
and  inseparable  connexion  between  mental  and  material 
laws — that  is,  between  the  forces  which  operate  on  the 
material  frame  and  the  forces  which  operate  on  the 
Mind  and  Character  of  Man. 

And  here  we  come  on  a  great  subject— the  function 
of  Human  Law  as  distinguished  from  Natural  Law. 
Just  as  the  Will  of  the  individual  can  operate  upon 
itself  by  the  use  of  means,  some  of  which  are  known 


326  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

instinctively,  whilst  others  are  found  out  by  reason ;  so 
can  the  collective  Will  of  Society  operate  upon  the 
conduct  of  its  members  in  two  ways — first,  directly  by 
authority ;  and  secondly,  indirectly  by  altering  the  con- 
ditions out  of  which  the  most  powerful  motives  spring. 
This  last  is  a  principle  of  government,  which  has  been 
distinctly  recognised  only  in  modern  times,  and  which 
admits  of  applications  not  yet  foreseen.  The  idea  of 
founding  Human  Law  upon  the  Laws  of  Nature,  is  an 
idea  which,  though  sometimes  instinctively  acted  upon, 
was  never  systematically  entertained  in  the  ancient  world. 
Indeed,  the  true  conception  of  Natural  Law  is  one 
founded  on  the  progress  of  physical  investigation,  and 
growing  out  of  the  habits  of  scientific  thought.  It  was 
long  before  Man  came  to  apprehend  the  prevalence  of 
Law  in  the  phenomena  of  Matter;  and  it  was  still 
longer  before  he  could  even  entertain  the  notion  of 
Natural  Law  as  applicable  to  himself.  The  ancient 
lawgivers  were  always  aiming  at  standards  of  Political 
Society,  framed  according  to  some  abstract  notions  of  their 
own  as  to  how  things  ought  to  be,  rather  than  upon  any 
attempt  to  investigate  the  constitution  of  human  nature 
as  it  actually  is.  It  was  a  mistake  in  the  science  of 
Politics  analogous  to  that  which  Bacon  complained  of 
so  bitterly  in  the  science  of  Physics.  Men  were  always 
trying  to  evolve  out  of  their  own  minds  knowledge  which 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  327 


could  only  be  acquired  by  patient  inquiry  into  facts. 
How  worse  than  useless  this  method  is,  received  an 
illustration  in  ancient  philosophy  still  more  striking  than 
in  ancient  legislation.  Fortunately  for  mankind,  no 
actual  legislators  have  ever  been  quite  so  foolish  as 
some  philosophers.  Perhaps,  all  things  considered,  the 
most  odious  conceptions  of  Human  Society  which  the 
world  has  ever  seen,  were  the  conceptions  of  an  intellect 
certainly  among  the  loftiest  which  has  ever  exercised  its 
powers  in  speculative  thought.  Plato's  Republic  is  an 
Ideal  State,  founded  on  abstract  conceptions  of  the 
mind,  and  one .  of  its  leading  ideas  is  the  destruction 
of  Family  Life,  and  the  annihilation  of  the  family  affec- 
tions. And  yet  this  result,  odious  and  irrational  as  it  is, 
was  arrived  at  from  reasoning  which  is  not  in  itself 
odious,  but  which  is  false,  chiefly  because  it  takes  no 
account  of  the  facts  of  Nature.  The  welfare  of  the 
State  was  to  be  the  one  object  of  desire  in  every  mind. 
All  separate  interests  and  affections  were  to  .be  sup- 
pressed, and  amongst  these  the  very  idea  of  special 
property  in  Wife  or  Child.  The  highest  type  of  man 
was  to  be  bred  by  the  Republic  as  the  highest  type 
of  dogs  and  horses  is  bred  by  an  intelligent  owner.1 
Such  are  the  humiliating  results  of  abstract  reasoning, 

i  "The  breeding  is  regulated,  like  that  of  noble  horses  or 
by  an  intelligent  proprietor."— Crete's  "  Plato,"  vol.  iii.  p.  203. 


328  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

pursued  in  ignorance  of  the  great  Law,  that  no  purpose 
can  be  attained  in  Nature  except  by  legitimate  use  of  the 
means  which  Nature  has  supplied.  For  as  in  the  material 
world,  all  her  Forces  must  be  acknowledged  and  obeyed 
before  they  can  be  made  to  serve,  so  in  the  Realm  of  Mind 
there  can  be  no  success  in  attaining  the  highest  moral  ends 
until  due  honour  has  been  assigned  to  those  motives 
which  arise  out  of  the  universal  instincts  of  our  race. 

Accordingly  it  is  remarkable  that  the  system  of  ancient 
philosophy,  which  for  so  many  ages  continued  to  rule 
the  th  :>ughts  of  men  —  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  —  owes 
almost  all  the  strength  it  has  in  Politics  as  in  other 
matters,  to  occasional  and  almost  unconscious  resort 
to  the  true  methods  of  scientific  reasoning  and  inves- 
tigation. Aristotle  founds  his  adverse  criticism  on  Plato, 
where  it  is  most  successful,  upon  the  actual  facts  of  what 
men,  under  specified  conditions,  naturally  do,  and  think, 
and  feel.  From  these  facts  he  argues  justly  as  to  what 
they  would  do  under  the  artificial  restrictions  of  a  theo- 
retical philosophy.  When,  for  exampH  he  argues  against 
communism,  and  in  favour  of  private  property,  upon  the 
ground  of  the  watchfulness  and  attention  which  self- 
interest  produces  in  the  conduct  of  business,1  and  when 
he  adds,  "It  is  unspeakable  how  advantageous  it  is  that 


1  /nd\\ov   5'    ^TTiSuxrovanv  cJi    7:005  ttitov    e*«<TTOu 
—  "Aristot  Pol."  Bk.  ii.  c.  5. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  329 

a  man  should  think  he  has  something  which  he  may  call 
his  own,  for  it  is  by  no  means  to  no  purpose  that  each 
person  should  have  an  affection  for  himself,  for  that  is 
natural"  *  he  touches  the  very  root  idea  of  the  modern 
science  of  Political  Economy.  He  touches  it,  but  he 
does  not  grasp  it.  It  is  a  line  of  argument  which  is 
never  consistently  maintained;  and  though  there  are 
perpetual  appeals  to  "nature" — to  that  which  is  "na- 
tural"— to  that  which  nature  teaches — no  definite  mean- 
ing can  be  attached  to  these  expressions ;  and  dogmas 
are  laid  down  as  "natural"  which  are  purely  abstract 
and  metaphysical  conceptions.  Nature  is  called  as  a 
witness,  and  then  the  witness  she  gives  is  condemned 
and  put  out  of  court.  Industry  is  occasionally  praised, 
whilst  the  means  and  the  motives  to  industry  are  sys- 
tematically despised.  The  exercise  of  any  mechanical 
employment,  or  the  following  of  merchandise,  is  con- 
demned in  an  Ideal  Government  as  "  ignoble  and 
destructive  to  virtue."2  A  maritime  situation  is  recom- 
mended, because  of  its  convenience  in  enabling  a  city 
to  receive  from  others  produce  which  its  own  country 

1  en  8e  KCL\  trpbs  ^Sof^i/  &/j.id-riTov  oaov  Smepe'pet  TO  vofj.l£fiv  t8t6v  rt' 
f.tf)  yap  ov  \3LO.Tt]v  rr)v  irpds  avrdv  avros  ej^ct  fyi\tav  eKacrroy,  oAA,'  e<rrt 
rovro  fyvffiKov. — Bk.  ii.  c.  5« 

2  ovre  fravavffov  ftiov  OUT'  dyopcuov  Sel  ffjp  robs  iroXiras'  dyevvrjs 
•yap  6  roiovros  jSt'oy   KOI  irpbs  dp6Tj}j/  VTrtvavrios. — Bk.  vii,  C.  9.      In 
Mr.  Congreve's  edition,  Bk.  iv.  c.  9. 


33O  THE   REIGN  OF  LAW. 

does  not  afford,  and  to  export  those  necessaries  of  life 
of  which  it  has  more  than  plenty.  This  looks  like  a 
perception  of  the  soundest  maxims  of  Commerce.  But 
in  the  next  breath,  the  whole  richness  and  blessing  of 
Commerce,  as  an  element  of  civilisation,  is  repudiated 
and  destroyed  by  the  stupid  and  selfish  maxim  that  a 
city  must  traffic  to  supply  its  own  wants  only,  and  not 
the  wants  of  others ;  "  for  those  who  make  themselves 
into  an  open  market  for  every  one,  do  it  for  the  sake  of 
revenue ;  but  if  a  State  ought  to  have  no  part  in  this  kind 
of  gain,  neither  ought  it  to  furnish  such  a  mart." l 

It  is  surely  wonderful  that  such  a  mind  as  that  of 
Aristotle  should  have  supposed  that  it  was  either  pos- 
sible, or,  if  possible,  desirable  that  the  benefits  of  traffic 
should  all  be  on  one  side ;  nor  is  it  less  wonderful  that, 
with  his  hands,  as  it  were,  upon  the  spot,  and  touching 
with  his  very  fingers  the  foundation-facts,  he  should  yet 
have  failed  to  feel  and  to  seize  the  great  secret  of  modern 
Political  Science— the  links  of  Natural  Consequence  in 
which  the  blessedness  of  Commerce  lies.  But  all  this 
comes  of  thinking  that  we  can  be  wiser  than  Nature, 
and  of  failing  to  see  that  every  natural  instinct  has  its 

1  av-frj  yap  f/jiiropiK^,  &\\'  ov  rois  &\\ots  Sel  eTi/cw  rriv  ir6\iv.  ol  5* 
iraptxovTes  <r<f)as  avroits  iraffiv  dyop&v  vpoffoSov  x<*PLV  TOVTO  irpa.rrov<riv' 
yv  8e  /ui)  8e?  ir6\iv  roiavrrjs  Merexew  frAeoj/e^my,  oi)5'  6^6piov  Set 
Ke/cTij0-0eu  TQIOUTOV. — Bk.  viL  c.  6. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  33! 


own  legitimate  field  of  operation,  within  which  we  cannot 
do  better  than  let  it  alone.  It  comes  from  the  notion 
that  we  can  arrive  at  that  v/hich  ought  to  be,  without 
taking  any  note  of  that  which  actually  is. 
I  The  bondage  under  which  all  true  Science  lies  to  fact 
— the  necessity  of  groping  among  the  detail  of  little  and 
common  things — this  is  a  hard  lesson  for  the  human 
Intellect  to  learn — conscious  as  that  Intellect  is  of  its 
own  great  powers — of  its  own  high  aims — of  its  own 
large  capacities  of  intuitive  understanding.  But  it  is  a 
lesson  which  must  be  learnt.  There  are  no  short  cuts  in 
Nature.  Her  results  are  always  attained  by  Method. 
Her  purposes  are  always  worked  out  by  Law.  So  must 
ours  be.  For  our  bodies  and  our  spirits  are  both  parts 
of  the  great  Order  of  Nature ;  and  our  Wills  can  attain 
no  end,  and  can  accomplish  no  design,  except  through 
knowledge  and  through  use  of  the  appropriate  and 
appointed  means.  Nor  can  those  means  be  ascertained 
except  by  careful  observation,  and  as  careful  reasoning. 
It  is  a  hard  thing  to  know  all  the  forces  which  operate 
even  on  our  own  individual  minds ;  and  -it  is  a  much 
harder  problem  to  understand  the  forces  which  arise  out 
of  the  complicated  conditions  of  human  society.  But 
the  very  idea  of  Natural  Law  as  affecting  mankind  is 
founded  on  the  possibility  of  tracing  in  human  nature  the 
existence  and  pperation  of  forces  which  under  given  con- 


33 2  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

ditions  do  actually  determine  the  course  of  human  con- 
duct in  particular  directions.  Amongst  these  forces  there 
are  a  certain  number  which  are  constant,  or  at  least  so 
constant  that  they  may  be  calculated  upon  as  certainly 
affecting  the  great  majority  of  mankind.  These  are 
chiefly  the  motives  which  arise  out  of  our  physical  con- 
stitution— the  desires  and  affections  which  are  common 
to  the  race.  To  follow  these  motives — to  be  actuated 
by  them — is,  therefore,  natural.  And  yet  to  follow  these 
motives  exclusively,  may,  and  generally  does,  lead  to 
great  evils,  often  to  calamities,  sometimes  to  destruction. 
How,  then,  can  these  motives  be  controlled  ?  Only  by 
appealing  to  other  motives — to  forces  lying  in  the  higher 
regions  of  the  mind,  and  placed  there  like  the  forces  of 
external  Nature,  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Intelligence 
and  the  Will. 

Are,  then,  these  higher  motives  not  also  natural  ? — are 
they  above  nature? — are  they  supernatural?  It  would 
really  seem  as  if  this  were  the  idea  involved  in  the  dis- 
tinction which  is  so  vaguely  drawn  between  that  which  is 
said  to  be  natural  and  that  which  is  said  to  be  not 
natural — between  Natural  Law  and  Positive  Institution. 
Yet  Reason,  and  Conscience,  and  Fancy,  and  Imagina- 
tion, and  Belief,  or  whatever  other  faculties  may  direct, 
wisely  or  unwisely,  the  course  of  legislation,  are  all 
equally  natural  to  Man.  They  are  all  as  much  parts  of 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  333 


his  mental  constitution  as  the  desires  and  instincts  to 
which  the  term  natural  is  usually  confined.  There  is  no 
extravagance  of  the  individual  Will — there  is  no  folly  of 
blind  and  irrational  legislation  which  has  not  been  the 
fruit  of  some  part  or  another  of  Man's  nature.  I  dwell 
on  this  only  because  it  is  important  here,  as  in  other 
cases,  to  attach  a  definite  meaning  to  the  words  we  use, 
and  especially  to  a  word  which  plays  so  important  a  part 
in  the  language  both  of  Philosophy  and  of  Politics. 

It  appears,  then,  that,  as  applied  to  human  conduct, 
we  mean  by  "  natural "  conduct  that  which  men  are 
prompted  to  pursue  rather  by  instinct  and  impulse  than 
by  calculation  of  consequences  and  by  reason.  Human 
Laws,  or  Positive  Institutions,  as  being  the  result  of 
deliberation,  stand  contrasted  with  Natural  Law  in  this 
sense,  and  in  this  sense  alone.  For  as  Reason  and 
Reflection  are  natural  to  Man,  and  are  as  important 
parts  of  his  nature  as  the  highest  of  his  instincts,  so  Laws 
founded  on  a  right  exercise  of  that  Reason  are  Natural 
Laws  in  the  best  and  highest  sense  of  all.  Laws,  how- 
ever, whether  in  this  sense  natural  or  not — that  is,  whether 
founded  on  a  right  or  a  wrong  exercise  of  reason — are 
always  intended  to  act  as  restraints  on  the  actions  of 
individuals,  and  to  interfere  with  the  motives  by  which 
their  conduct  would  be  otherwise  determined.  This 
restraint  may  be  said  to  be  artificial  as  opposed  to  the 


334  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

natural  restraints  of  die  indr  Mual  reason ;  and  this,  per- 
haps, is  the  distinction  most  generally  intended  when  the 
natural  conduct  of  men  is  contrasted  with  their  conduct 
under  the  control  of  Positive  Institution.  But  as  the 
motives  which  determine  individual  conduct  are  not 
always  reasonable  motives,  so  it  is  clear  that  what  men 
naturally  do  is  no  sure  test  either  of  what  they  ought  to 
do,  or  of  what  they  ought  to  be  allowed  to  do.  It  is 
their  nature,  under  certain  conditions,  to  do  all  that  is 
bad  and  injurious  to  themselves  and  others.  Hence  it 
is  the  most  difficult  of  all  problems  in  the  Science  of 
Government  to  determine  when,  where,  and  how  it  is 
wise  to  interfere  by  the  authority  of  Law  with  the  motives 
which  are  usually  called  the  natural  motives  of  men. 
The  question  is  no  other  than  this :  How  far  the  abuse 
of  those  motives  can  be  checked  and  resisted  by  that 
public  authority  whose  duty  and  function  it  is  to  place 
itself  above  the  influences  which,  in  individual  men,  over- 
power the  voice  of  reason  and  of  conscience  ? 

No  more  signal  illustration  has  been  ever  given  of  the 
relation  between  Natural  Law  and  Human  Law — of  the 
circumstances  in  which  Natural  Law  may  be  trusted,  and 
of  those  in  which  it  absolutely  requires  to  be  controlled — 
than  the  illustration  afforded  by  the  history  of  Legis- 
lation in  our  own  country  within  the  present  century. 
During  that  period  two  great  discoveries  have  been  made 


LAW   IN    POLITICS. 


in  the  Science  of  Government :  the  one  is  the  immense 
advantage  of  abolishing  restrictions  upon  Trade;  the 
other  is  the  absolute  necessity  of  imposing  restrictions 
upon  Labour.  The  rise,  the  growth,  and  the  final  ac- 
ceptance of  these  two  ideas  as  the  basis  of  practical 
Legislation,  is  a  history  so  curious,  and  having  such  close 
relation  to  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  that  I  propose  to 
deal  with  it  somewhat  in  detail. 

Since  the  dissolution  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  Com- 
monwealths, no  nation  has  acted  on  the  one  great  error 
of  all  the  ancient  systems  of  political  philosophy — that 
the  natural  desire  of  men  for  the  accumulation  of  wealth 
is  an  evil  to  be  dreaded  and  repressed.  So  far  as  this 
goes  there  is  a  sharp  and  striking  contrast  between  the 
spirit  of  ancient  and  of  modern  policy.  The  great  object 
of  the  ancient  policy,  says  Dugald  Stewart,  "  was  to 
counteract  the  love  of  money  and  a  taste  for  luxury  by 
positive  institutions,  and  to  maintain  in  the  great  body 
of  the  people  habits  of  frugality  and  a  severity  of  man- 
ners. The  -decline  of  States  is  uniformly  ascribed  by 
philosophers  and  historians,  both  of  Greece  and  Rome, 
to  the  influence  of  riches  on  national  character ;  and 
the  laws  of  Lycurgus,  which,  during  a  course  of  ages, 
banished  the  precious  metals  from  Sparta,  are  proposed 
by  many  of  them  as  the  most  perfect  model  of  legislation 
devised  by  human  wisdom.  How  opposite  to  this  is  the 


33  6  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

doctrine  of  modern  politicians  !  Far  from  considering 
poverty  as  an  advantage  to  a  State,  their  great  aim  is  to 
open  new  sources  of  national  opulence,  and  to  animate 
the  activity  of  all  classes  of  the  people  by  a  taste  for  the 
comforts  and  accommodations  of  life." 1  This  is  true, 
and  has  been  true  more  or  less  of  all  the  modern  nations 
of  the  world.  But  although  they  E  ver  held  the  absurd 
doctrine  that  Nature  was  wrong  when  she  taught  men  to 
desire  wealth,  they  did  hold  the  doctrine,  hardly  less 
mischievous,  that  Nature  was  incompetent  to  teach  them 
how  best  to  acquire  it.  It  would  be  difficult  to  say 
whether  the  law  of  ancient  Sparta,  prohibiting  gold  from 
ever  coming  into  the  State,  was  worse  than  the  law  of 
modern  Spain,  which  prohibited  gold  from  ever  being 
allowed  to  leave  it.  It  is  certain  that  the  Spanish  law 
was  at  least  the  more  irrational  of  the  two.  If  a  State 
wishes  to  be  poor,  it  is  not  absurd  to  prohibit  the  making 
of  money.  But  if  a  State  wishes  to  be  rich,  it  is  mere 
stupidity  to  prohibit  the  natural  use  of  the  medium  of 
exchange.  Yet  this  law  of  Spain  is  only  an  extreme 
example  of  the  system  and  the  theories  which  governed, 
until  the  other  day,  the  legislation  of  all  the  nations  of 
Europe,  and  which  still  largely  prevails  amongst  them. 

1  "  Account  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Adam  Smith,"  by 
Dugald  Stewart.— -"Collected  Works  of  Dugald  Stewart,"  vol.  x. 
P- 57- 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  337 


It  was  no  oratorical  exaggeration,  but  a  strict  and 
literal  description  of  the  truth,  when  Mr.  Gladstone  said1 
of  the  old  commercial  policy  that  it  was  "  a  system  of 
robbing  and  plundering  ourselves."  And  how  was  it  so  ? 
What  was  the  essence  of  its  error  ?  These  questions  are 
best  answered  by  another.  What  was  the  central  idea  of 
the  new  system  which  has  superseded  the  old  one  ?  The 
essential  idea  of  these  new  opinions  cannot  be  better 
given  than  in  the  words  of  Dugald  Stewart :  "  The  great 
and  leading  object  of  Adarn  Smith's  speculations  is  to 
illustrate  the  provision  made  by  Nature  in  the  principles 
of  the  human  mind,  and  in  the  circumstances  of  man's 
external  situation,  for  a  gradual  progressive  augmentation 
in  the  means  of  national  wealth  ;  and  to  demonstrate  that 
the  most  effectual  plan  for  advancing  a  people  to  great- 
ness is  to  maintain  that  order  of  things  which  Nature  has 
pointed  out ;  by  allowing  every  man,  as  long  as  he  ob- 
serves the  rules  of  justice,  to  pursue  his  own  interest  in 
his  own  way,  and  to  bring  both  his  industry  and  his 
capital  into  the  freest  competition  with  those  of  his 
fellow-citizens."2 

Adam  Smith  found  Positive  Institutions  regulating  and 
restricting  natural  human  action  in  two  different  direc- 
tions. There  were  laws  restricting  free  interchange  in 

In  his  Speech  at  Glasgow,  Oct.  1865. 
Account,  see  p.  72. 

Z 


338  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


the  products    of  labour:  and    there    were    other    laws 
restricting  the   free   employment   of  labour  itself.     He 
denounced   both.     Labour  was  deprived  of  its  natural 
freedom  by  laws  forbidding  men  from  working  at  any 
skilled  labour,  unless  they  had  served  an  apprenticeship 
of  a  specified  time.     It  was  also  deprived  of  its  natural 
freedom    by   monopolies,    which    prevented  men   from 
working   at   any   trade   within  certain   localities,   unless 
allowed    to   do   so   by   those   who    had    the    exclusive 
privilege.     The  first  mode  of  restriction  prevented  labour 
from  passing  freely  from  one  employment  to  another,  even 
in  the  same  place.     The  second  mode  of  restriction  pre- 
vented labour  passing  freely  from  place  to  place,  even  in 
the  same  trade.     Both  of  these  restrictions  were  as  mis- 
chievous, and  as  destructive  of  their  own  object,  as  re- 
strictions in  the  free  interchange  of  goods.     They  both 
depended  on  the  same  vicious  principle  of  attempting  to 
obtain  by  Legislation  results  which  would  be  more  surely 
attained  by  allowing  every  man  to  sell  his  goods  or  his 
labour  when,  where,  and  how  he  pleased.     The  labour  of 
a  poor  man  was  his  capital.     He  had  a  natural  right  to 
employ  it  as  he  liked.     And  as  for  protecting  the  com- 
munity from  bad  or  imperfect  work,  that  would  be  best 
secured  by  unrestricted  competition.      The  natural  in- 
stincts  and   respective  interests  of  producers  and  con- 
sumers would  secure  mutual  adaptation.    Perfect  freedom 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  339 


of  exchange  in  goods,  the  products  of  labour,  and  perfect 
freedom  in  the  application  of  labour  itself— this  was  the 
rule  to  follow.  Natural  Law  was  the  best  regulator  of 
both.  Such  were  the  doctrines  of  Adam  Smith,  then  new 
in  the  world. 

It  is  not  a  little  remarkable  that,  during  the  same  years 
in  which  Adam  Smith  was  working  out  his  memorable 
Inquiry,  other  minds,  working  in  a  very  different  depart- 
ment of  human  thought,  were  preparing  events  which 
were  to  bring  to  a  speedy  test  how  far  these  doctrines  of 
Natural  Law  were  true  absolutely,  or  true  only  under 
limitations,  which  he  did  not  foresee.  When  Adam 
Smith  was  lecturing  with  applause  in  Glasgow  from  the 
chair  of  Moral  Philosophy,  James  Watt  was  selling 
mathematical  instruments  in  an  obscure  shop  within  the 
precincts  of  the  same  University.  It  may  seem  as  if  no 
two  departments  of  human  thought  are  more  widely 
separated  than  those  in  which  these  two  men  were  work- 
ing. One  was  a  region  purely  mental.  The  other  was  a 
region  purely  physical.  The  one  had  reference  to  the 
Laws  of  Matter.  The  other  had  reference  to  the  Laws 
of  Mind.  Yet  the  work  of  James  Watt  and  the  work  of 
Adam  Smith  were  inseparably  connected,  not  only  as 
involving  analogous  methods  of  investigation,  but  as 
showing  in  their  result  the  blending  and  co-operation  of 
mental  and  material  laws. 

Z  2 


340  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 


It  was  the  labour  of  Watt  to  reduce  to  obedience, 
under  the  power  of  Mind,  one  of  the  most  tremendous 
Forces  of  Nature,  and  this  he  did  through  many  years  of 
curious  inquiry,  and  of  laborious  contrivance.  He  found 
only  a  rude  and  imperfect  mechanism  through  which  this 
great  Force  had  been  misdirected  and  dissipated  and  lost. 
He  collected  it  in  fitter  vessels ;  he  led  it  into  smoother 
channels ;  he  opened  for  it  doors  of  passage,  through 
which  the  rushing  of  its  escape  did  for  him  what  he 
wanted  it  to  do.  Other  forces,  which  before  had  con- 
spired against  it,  were  so  guided  as  to  work  along  with 
it,  not  only  in  perfect  harmony,  but  in  close  alliance.  He 
made,  in  short,  its  invariable  energies  subject  to  the 
variable  conditions  of  Adjustment.  And  so,  he  governed 
it  and  controlled  it,  and  handed  it  over  to  the  Human 
Family  as  the  servant  of  their  Will  for  ever. 

The  work  of  Adam  Smith  was  not  dissimilar  in  its 
relation  to  the  Reign  of  Law.  It  was  his  labour  to  prove 
that  in  the  rude  contrivances  of  Legislation,  due  account 
had  not  been  taken  of  the  natural  forces  with  which  it 
had  to  deal.  Pie  showed  that  among  the  very  elements 
of  human  character  there  were  instincts,  and  desires,  and 
faculties  of  contrivance,  all  of  which  by  clumsy  ma- 
chinery had  been  impeded,  and  obstructed,  and  diverted 
from  the  channels  in  which  they  ought  to  work.  He 
could  not,  however,  test  his  reasoning  as  the  Inventor 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  34! 


could,  by  continual  experiment.  He  had  to  rely  on  ab- 
stract reasoning,  and  on  such  verification  as  could  be 
drawn  from  the  complicated  phenomena  of  the  Body 
Politic.  In  this  respect  the  work  of  Adam  Smith  was 
harder  than  the  work  of  Watt.  And  why  it  was  harder 
is  a  question  which  it  may  be  well  to  ask.  It  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  methods  of  applying  to  our  own  use  the 
Powers  of  external  Nature,  should  be  matter  of  difficult 
research.  But  it  may  well  seem  strange  that  the  forces 
which  have  their  seat  within  ourselves — in  the  Mind  and 
Character  of  Man — should  be  so  unknown  to  us  as  to 
require  careful  reasoning  and  observation  before  we  know 
how  to  use  them  with  success  for  the  attainment  of  our 
ends.  Yet  so  it  is.  The  conscious  energies  of  the  Will 
are  ever  tempted  to  march  directly  upon  objects  which 
can  only  be  reached  by  circuitous  methods  of  approach. 
And  so  the  Wealth  of  Nations,  and  the  skill  of  Crafts, 
and  the  success  of  Trade,  had  all  been  hindered  by  the 
measures  designed  for  their  protection.  The  promptings 
of  individual  interest  had  been  checked  and  thwarted  and 
driven  into  channels  less  fruitful  than  those  which  they 
\vould  have  naturally  found. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  discovery  of  the  Steam  Engine, 
like  every  other  weapon  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Mind, 
gave  a  new  stimulus  to  the  motives,  and  a  new  form  to 
the  conditions,  by  which  the  conduct  of  thousands  was 


342       v  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

determined.  Little  did  the  brilliant  Professor  know  that 
the  discoveries  of  his  humble  friend  would  yet,  in  their 
results,  serve  to  limit  the  conclusions  of  his  own  Philo- 
sophy. In  the  meantime,  all  that  he  knew  of  Watt  and 
of  his  personal  history  seemed  to  be,  and  really  was,  a 
signal  illustration  of  the  follies  of  restriction.  For  no 
Other  reason  than  that  he  had  not  been  born  in  Glasgow, 
Watt  could  not  legally  sell  the  products  of  his  ingenuity 
and  labour  in  that  City.  The  spirit  and  the  laws  of 
corporate  monopoly  rigidly  excluded  him ;  and  the  com- 
pany of  "  Hammermen  "  insisted  on  the  exclusion  being 
maintained,  for  fear  of  "  loss  and  skaith  to  the  Burgesses 
and  Craftsmen  of  Glasgow,  by  the  intrusion  of  strangers."1 
The  working-classes  themselves  were  among  the  most 
strenuous  supporters  of  a  system  which  diminished  the 
value  by  restricting  the  area  of  their  labour.  Fortunately 
the  University  had  privileges  of  its  own,  which,  within 
its  own  property,  excluded  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Muni- 
cipality and  a  Craft  not  more  ignorant  or  more  selfish 
than  their  contemporaries  at  the  time.  It  may  well  be 
supposed,  that  Adam  Smith's  opinions  on  freedom  of 
labour  must  have  been  influenced  by  personal  observa- 
tion of  the  working  of  such  laws  in  the  case  of  a  man 
who,  though  still  obscure,  was  even  then  appreciated  by 
those  who  knew  him  for  ingenuity  and  resource. 
1  Smiles'  "Life  of  Watt,"  p.  105. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  343 


In  looking  at  restrictions  such  as  these,  there  was 
nothing  then  to  suggest  to  Adam  Smith  the  consequences 
which  might  arise  from  the  entire  freedom  of  labour, 
when  that  labour  was  placed  under  new  conditions.  He 
had  no  knowledge,  and  he  could  then  have  no  con- 
ception, what  these  new  conditions  were  to  be.  Yet 
they  were  being  silently  prepared  and  determined  in  the 
very  years  in  which  he  spoke  and  wrote.  His  friend  Watt 
was  a  principal  agent  in  the  great  impending  change. 
But  Watt  was  not  alone.  Other  minds  were  working 
at  the  same  time  whose  labours  were  to  match  with 
a  curious  fittingness  into  his.  Indeed,  the  work  which 
was  going  on  in  those  years  is  only  one  example  of  a 
law  of  which  many  other  examples  may  be  found.  It 
is  an  order  of  facts  observable  in  the  progress  of  Man- 
kind, that  long  ages  of  comparative  silence  and  inaction 
are  broken  up,  and  brought  to  an  end,  by  shorter  periods 
of  almost  preternatural  activity.  And  that  activity  is 
generally  spent  in  paths  of  investigation,  which,  though 
independent,  are  converging.  Different  minds,  pursuing 
different  lines  of  thought,  find  themselves  meeting  upon 
common  ground.  Such,  in  respect  to  literature,  was  the 
period  of  the  Revival  of  Learning :  such,  in  respect  to 
Religion,  was  the  period  of  the  Reformation :  such,  in 
respect  to  the  abstract  sciences,  was  the  period  of  Tycho 
Brahe,  of  Galileo,  and  of  Kepler.  Hardly  less  memo- 


344  THE   k£IGN    OF   LAW. 

rable  than  these,  certainly  not  less  powerful,  as  affecting 
the  condition  of  society,  were  those  few  years  in  the  last 
quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  were  marked  by 
such  an  extiaordinary  burst  of  Mechanical  Invention. 
Hargreaves,  and  Arkwright,  and  Watt,  and  Crompton, 
and  Cartwright,  were  all  contemporaries.  They  were 
all  working  at  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same  direction. 
Out  of  their  inventions  there  arose  for  the  first  time 
what  is  now  known  as  the  Factory  system;  and  out 
of  the  Factory  system  arose  a  condition  of  things  as 
affecting  human  labour,  which  was  entirely  new  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  The  change  thus  effected  is  a 
signal  illustration  of  the  relation  in  which  Natural  Law 
stands  to  Positive  Institution  in  the  realm  of  Mind.  Let 
us  look  for  a  moment  at  its  history  and  results. 

The  Common  Law  of  England  had  placed  no  restric- 
tions upon  labour.  The  only  restrictions  which  existed 
arose  either  from  the  special  monopolies  of  Corporate 
Bodies,  or  from  the  General  Statute  of  Apprenticeship. 
This  statute  had  been  passed  in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth. 
It  provided  that  no  man  should  work  at  any  craft  on 
his  own  account  until  he  had  served  an  apprenticeship 
of  seven  years.  But  the  Statute  of  Apprenticeship  being 
in  derogation  of  common  rights,  had  always  been  con- 
strued strictly  by  the  Courts  of  Law ;  and  so  it  had  come 
to  pass  that  two  great  rules  of  limitation  had  been. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  345 


applied  to  it.  First,  it  was  held  to  apply  only  to  such 
crafts  of  skill  as  were  known  at  the  time  of  its  being 
passed  ;  and  secondly,  it  was  held  not  to  apply  at  all  to 
rural  districts,  but  only  to  market  towns.  From  these 
two  rules  of  limitation,  it  resulted,  first,  that  all  trades 
and  employments  were  free  which  had  arisen  since  the 
commencement  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and,  secondly, 
that  even  the  older  crafts  were  free  also  if  they  were  pro- 
secuted outside  the  boundaries  of  towns. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  law  when  the  inven- 
tions of  Adam  Smith's  contemporaries  brought  into 
existence  employments  which  were  entirely  new,  and 
opened  them  to  that  unrestricted  competition,  the 
advantage  of  which  he  had  laid  down  as  a  universal 
doctrine. 

Spinning  and  weaving  were  not  new.  They  were  as 
old  as  the  memory  of  Mankind.  But  the  simple  me- 
chanism by  which  these  arts  were  prosecuted  were  almost 
equally  old,  and  had  undergone  little  change  and  little 
improvement.  In  1760  the  Spinning-Wheel,  and  the 
common  Loom,  as  used  by  the  people  of  Yorkshire, 
were  little  in  advance  of  the  implements  for  the  same 
purpose  which  had  been  in  use  beyond  the  reach  of 
History.  The  Spindle  which  is  depicted  on  the  monu. 
ments  of  Egypt  was,  until  a  few  years  ago,  familiar  in 
the  Highlands.  The  essential  feature  of  this  ancient 


346  THE   REIGN    OF  LAW. 

industry,  so  far  as  its  effects  upon  social  conditions  are 
concerned,  was  that  it  was  separate  and  not  gregarious. 
It  did  not  interfere  with,  but  rather  was  congenial  to, 
Family  Life,  for  thousands  of  years, 

"  Maids  at  the  Wheel,  the  Weaver  at  his  Loom, 
Sat  blithe  and  happy." l 

But  the  pressure  of  new  necessities  had  arisen,  and 
these  could  be  met  only  by  new  inventions.  Towards 
the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty was  experienced  by  weavers  and  spinners  in  Eng- 
land in  maintaining  their  position  in  the  markets  of  the 
world.  It  is  curious  how  each  new  mechanical  invention 
gave  rise  to  the  necessities  out  of  which  the  next  arose. 
The  invention  of  the  Fly  Shuttle  in  weaving,  so  early  as 
1733,  seems  to  have  given  the  first  impulse  to  all  that 
followed.  By  means  of  this  invention  the  power  of 
weaving  overtook  the  power  of  spinning.  An  adequate 
supply  of  yarn  could  not  be  procured  under  the  ancient 
methods  of  that  most  ancient  industry.  New  conditions 
gave  rise  to  new  motives,  and  new  motives  called  into 
play  the  latent  energies  of  Mind.  The  time  and  the 
cost  of  collecting  the  products  of  so  many  scattered 
labourers  enhanced  unduly  the  cost  of  manufacture,  and 

1  Wordsworth's  noble  sonnet — 

"Nuns  fret  not  at  their  convent's  narrow  room." 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  ,         347 


even  when  the  remuneration  was  reduced  to  the  lowest 
point  compatible  with  existence,  that  cost  was  still  too 
high.  Something  was  imperatively  required  to  econo- 
mise the  work  of  human  hands — some  more  elaborate 
contrivance  to  make  that  work  go  further  than  before. 
And  so  Hargreaves'  invention  arose,  not  before  the  time.1 
And  when  his  Spinning  Jenny  had  been  invented,  a  still 
more  elaborate  and  powerful  combination  of  mechanical 
adjustments  was  soon  perfected  in  the  hands  of  Ark- 
wright.2  When  the  Spinning  Frame  was  invented,  and 
when  Crompton's  farther  invention  of  the  Mule  Jenny 
speedily  followed,3  the  new  order  of  things  had  been 
fairly  inaugurated.  The  great  change  had  come,  and  the 
survivance  of  the  ancient  domestic  industries  of  so  many 
centuries  was  no  longer  possible. 

And  just  as  Hargreaves  and  Arkwright  and  Crompton 
v/ere  inventing  the  new  machines  which  were  to  be 
moved,  Watt  was  labouring  at  the  new  Power  which 
was  to  move  them.  But  meanwhile  before  the  Steam 
Engine  had  been  made  available,  the  Factory  system 
had  begun  under  the  old  motive-power  of  Water ;  and 
here  it  is  very  curious  to  observe  how  each  stage  in  the 
progress  of  discovery  had,  by  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence, its  own  special  effect  on  the  conduct  and  the 
Wills  of  men.  Very  soon  the  course  of  every  moun- 
i  1765-7-  .2  17^9-71.  3  1787. 


348  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

tain  stream  in  Lancashire  and  Yorkshire,  was  marked 
by  Factories.  This  again  had  another  consequence.  It 
was  a  necessity  of  the  case  that  such  Factories  must 
generally  be  situated  at  a  distance  from  pre-existing 
populations,  and,  therefore,  from  a  full  supply  of  labour. 
Consequently  they  had  to  create  communities  for  them- 
selves. From  this  necessity,  again,  it  arose  that  the 
earlier  mills  were  worked  under  a  system  of  Apprentice- 
ship. The  due  attendance  of  the  requisite  number  of 
"  hands  "  was  secured  by  engagements  which  bound  the 
labourer  to  his  work  for  a  definite  period. 

And  now  for  the  first  time  appeared  some  of  the  con- 
sequences of  gregarious  labour  under  the  working  of 
Natural  Laws,  and  under  no  restrictions  from  Positive 
Institution.  The  millowners  collected  as  Apprentices 
boys  and  girls,  and  youths  and  men,  and  women,  of  all 
ages.  In  very  many  cases  no  provision  adequate,  or 
even  decent,  was  provided  for  their  accommodation. 
The  hours  of  labour  were  excessive.  The  ceaseless 
and  untiring  agency  of  machines  kept  no  reckoning  of 
the  exhaustion  of  human  nerves.  The  Factory  system 
had  not  been  many  years  in  operation  when  its  effects 
were  seen.  A  whole  generation  were  growing  up  under 
conditions  of  physical  degeneracy,  of  mental  ignorance, 
and  of  moral  corruption. 

The  first  public  man  to  bring  it  under  the  notice  of 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  349 


Parliament  with  a  view  to  remedy,  was,  to  his  immortal 
honour,  a  master  manufacturer,  to  whom  the  new  in- 
dustry had  brought  wealth,  and  power,  and  station.  In 
1802  the  elder  Sir  Robert  Peel  was  the  first  to  introduce 
a  bill  to  interfere  by  law  with  the  natural  effects  of  un- 
restricted competition  in  human  labour.  It  is  charac- 
teristic of  the  slow  progress  of  new  ideas  in  the  English 
mind,  and  of  its  stiong  instinct  to  adopt  no  measure 
which  does  not  stand  in  some  clear  relation  to  pre- 
existing laws,  that  Sir  Robert  Peel's  bill  was  limited 
strictly  to  the  regulation  of  the  labour  of  Apprentices. 
Children  and  young  persons  who  were  not  Apprentices 
might  be  subject  to  the  same  evils,  but  for  them  no 
remedy  was  asked  or  provided.  The  notion  was,  that 
as  Apprentices  were  already  under  Statutory  provisions, 
and  were  subjects  of  a  legal  contract,  it  was  permissible 
that  their  hours  of  labour  should  be  regulated  by  positive 
enactment.  But  the  Parliament  which  was  familiar  with 
restrictions  on  the  products  of  labour,  and  with  restric- 
tions of  monopoly  on  labour  itself — which  restrictions 
were  for  the  purpose  of  securing  supposed  economic 
benefits,  would  not  listen  to  any  proposal  to  regulate 
"  free  "  labour  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  even  the  most 
frightful  moral  evils.  These  evils,  however  great  they 
might  be,  were  the  result  of  "natural  laws,"  and  were 
incident  to  the  personal  freedom  of  Employers  and 


350  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. ._ 

Employed.  In  the  case  of  Apprentices,  however,  it  was 
conceded  that  restriction  might  be  tolerated.  And  so 
through  this  narrow  door  the  first  of  the  Factory  Acts 
was  passed.  It  is  a  history  which  illustrates,  in  the 
clearest  light,  the  sense  in  which  human  conduct,  both 
individually  and  collectively,  is  determined  by  Natural 
Law.  If  Watt's  Steam  Engine  had  been  invented  earlier 
— if  mills  had  not  been  at  first  erected  away  from  the 
centres  of  population,  in  order  to  follow  the  course  of 
streams — if  consequently  the  evils  of  the  Factory  system 
had  not  begun  to  be  observable  in  the  labour  of  Appren- 
tices, there  is  no  saying  how  much  longer  those  evils 
might  have  been  allowed  to  fester  without  even  an  asser- 
tion of  the  right  to  check  them.  The  Act  of  I802,1 
though  useless  in  every  other  sense,  was  invaluable  at 
least  in  making  this  assertion. 

Meanwhile  Watt's  great  invention  had  been  completed. 
And  now  a  new  cycle  of  events  began,  arising  by  way 
of  natural  consequence  out  of  the  Reign  of  Law.  When 
the  perfected  Steam  Engine  became  applicable  to  mills, 
it  was  no  longer  always  cheaper  to  erect  them  in  rural 
districts ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  often  cheaper  to  have 
them  in  the  towns,  near  a  full  supply  of  labour,  and  a  cheap 
supply  of  fuel.  With  this  change  came  the  abandon- 

1  42  and  43  Geo.  III.,  cap.  73. 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  351 

ment  of  the  system  of  Apprenticeship.  It  was  now  "  free  " 
labour  which  more  and  more  supplied  the  mills.  But 
this  only  led  to  the  same  evils  in  an  aggravated  form. 
Children  and  women  were  especially  valuable  in  the 
work  of  mills.  There  were  parts  of  the  machinery  which 
might  be  fed  by  almost  infant  "  hands."  The  earnings 
of  children  became  an  irresistible  temptation  to  the 
parents.  They  were  sent  to  the  factory  at  the  earliest 
age,  and  they  worked  during  the  whole  hours  that  the 
machinery  was  kept  at  work.  The  result  of  this  system 
was  soon  apparent.  In  1815,  thirteen  years  after  he 
had  obtained  the  Act  of  180?,  Sir  Robert  Peel  came 
back  to  Parliament  and  told  them  that  the  former  Act 
had  become  useless — that  mills  were  now  generally 
worked,  not  by  water,  but  by  steam — that  Apprentices 
had  been  given  up,  but  that  f;he  same  exhausting  and 
demoralising  labour,  from  vvh'ch  Parliament  had  intended 
to  relieve  Apprentices,  was  the  lot  of  thousands  and 
thousands  of  the  children  of  the  free  poor.  In  the 
following  year,  1816,  pressing  upon  the  House  of  Com- 
mons a  new  measure  of  restriction,  he  added,  that 
unless  the  Legislature  extended  to  these  children  the 
same  protection  which  it  had  intended  to  afford  to  the 
Apprentice  class,  it  had  come  to  this— that  the  great 
mechanical  inventions  which  were  the  glory  of  the  age 
would  be  a  curse  rather  than  a  blessing  to  the  country. 


352  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

These  were  strong  words  from  a  master  manufacturer ; 
but  they  were  not  more  strong  than  true.1 

Thus  began  that  great  debate  which  in  principle  may 
be  said  to  be  not  ended  yet : — the  debate,  how  far  it 
is  legitimate  or  wise  in  Positive  Institution  to  interfere 
for  moral  ends  with  the  freedom  of  the  individual  Will  ? 
Cobbett  denounced  the  opposition  to  restrictive  measures 
as  a  contest  of  "  Mammon  against  Mercy."  No  doubt 
personal  interests  were  strong  in  the  forming  of  opinion 
and  some  indignation  was  natural  against  those  who 
seemed  to  regard  the  absolute  neglect  of  a  whole  gene- 
ration, and  the  total  abandonment  of  them  to  the  de- 
basing effects  of  excessive  toil,  as  nothing  compared  with 
the  slightest  check  on  the  accumulations  of  the  Ware- 
house. But  the  opposition  was  not  in  the  main  due 
either  to  selfishness  or  indifference.  False  intellectual 
conceptions — false  views  both  of  principle  and  of  fact 
— were  its  real  foundation.  Some  of  the  ablest  men  in 
Parliament,  who  were  wholly  unaffected  by  any  bias  of 
personal  interest,  declared  that  nothing  would  induce 
them  to  interfere  with  the  labour  which  they  called 
"  free."  Had  not  the  working  classes  a  right  to  employ 
their  children  as  they  pleased?  Who  were  better  able 
to  judge  than  fathers  and  mothers  of  the  capacities 

1  "Hansard  Parl.  Deb."  vols.  xxxi.  and  xxxiii. — Sir  Robert's 
Speech  on  Motion  for  a  Committee,  April  3,  1816. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  353 


of  their  children?  Why  interfere  for  the  protection  of 
those  who  already  had  the  best  and  most  natural  of 
all  protections  ?  Such  were  some  of  the  arguments 
against  interfering  with  free  labour. 

I  Now  in  what  sense  was  this  labour  free  ?  It  was  free 
from  legal  compulsion — that  is  to  say,  it  was  free  from 
that  kind  of  compulsion  which  arises  out  of  the  public 
Will  of  the  whole  community  imposed  by  authority  upon 
the  conduct  of  individuals.  But  there  was  another  kind 
of  force  from  which  this  labour  was  not  free — the  force 
of  overpowering  motive  operating  on  the  Will  of  the 
labourers  themselves.  If  one  parent,  more  careful  than 
others  of  the  welfare  of  his  children,  and  moved  less 
exclusively  by  the  desire  of  gain,  withdrew  his  children 
at  an  earlier  hour  than  others  from  Factory  Work,  his 
children  were  liable  to  be  dismissed  and  not  employed 
at  all.1  On  the  other  hand,  motives  hardly  less  power- 
ful were  in  constant  operation  on  the  masters.  The 
ceaseless,  and  increasing,  and  unrestricted  competition 
amongst  themselves, — the  eagerness  with  which  human 
energies  rush  into  new  openings  for  capital,  for  enter- 
prise, and  for  skill, — made  them,  as  a  class,  insensible 
to  the  frightful  evils  which  were  arising  from  that  com- 

1  This  was  very  forcibly  explained,  both  by  Sir  Robert  and  by  his 
son,  Mr.  Peel,  in  the  debate  of  Feb.  23,  1818. 

A  A 


354  THE  KEIGN   OF  LAW. 

petition  for  the  means  of  subsistence  which  is  the  im- 
pelling motive  of  labour. 

Nor  were  there  wanting  arguments,  founded  on  the 
constancy  of  Natural    Laws,  against    any  attempt    on 
the  part  of  Legislative  authority  to  interfere  with   the 
"freedom"   of  individual  Will.     The  competition  be- 
tween the  possessors  of  capital  was  a  competition  not 
confined  to   our  own  country.     It  was  also  an  inter- 
national competition.      In   Belgium   especially,   and  in 
other  countries,  there  was  the  same  ru^h  along  the  new 
paths  of  industry.     If  the  children's  hours  of  labour  were 
curtailed,  it  would  involve  of  necessity  a  curtailment  also 
of  the  adult  labour,  which  would  not  be  available  when 
left  alone.     This  would  be  a  curtailment  of  the  working 
time  of  the  whole  mill ;  and  this  would  involve  a  cor- 
responding reduction  of  the  produce.     No  similar  reduc- 
tion of  produce  would  arise  in  Foreign  mills.     In  com- 
petition with  them  the  margin  of  profit  was  already 
small.    The  diminution  of  produce  from  restricted  labour 
would  destroy  that  margin.     Capital  would  be  driven  to 
countries  where  labour  was  still  free  from  such  restric- 
tions, and  the  result  would  be  more  fatal  to  the  in- 
terest of  the  working  classes  of  the  English  towns  than 
any  of  the  results  arising  from  the  existing  hours  of  work. 
All  these  consequences  were  represented  as  inevitable. 
They  must  arise  out  of  the  operation  of  invariable  laws. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  355 


Such  were  the  arguments — urged  in  every  variety  of 
form,  and  supported  by  every  kind  of  statistical  detail 
—by  which  the  first  Factory  Acts  were  vehemently 
opposed. 

And,  indeed,  in  looking  back  at  the  debates  of  that 
time,  we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  reasoning  of  those 
who  opposed  restriction  on  Free  Labour  met  with  no 
adequate  reply.  Not  only  were  the  supporters  of  restric- 
tion hampered  by  a  desire  to  keep  their  conclusions 
within  the  scope  of  a  very  limited  measure;  not  only 
were  they  anxious  to  repudiate  consequences  which  did 
legitimately  follow  from  their  own  premises ;  but  they 
were  themselves  really  ignorant  of  the  fundamental 
principles  which  were  at  issue  in  the  strife.  Their  con- 
clusions were  arrived  at  through  instincts  of  the  heart. 
The  pale  faces  of  little  children,  stunted  and  outworn, 
carried  them  to  their  result  across  every  difficulty  of 
argument,  and  in  defiance  of  the  alleged  opposition  of 
inevitable  laws.  And  yet,  if  the  supporters  of  the  Fac- 
tory Acts  had  only  known  it,  all  true  abstract  argument 
on  the  subject  was  their  own.  The  conclusions  to  which 
they  pointed  were  as  true  in  the  light  of  Reason,  as 
they  felt  them  to  be  true  in  the  light  of  Conscience. 

The  truth  is,  that  some  of  the  finest  distinctions  in 
Philosophy  were  then  for  the  first  time  emerging  on  the 
stage  of  Politics.  The  newest  debates  of  Parliament 

A  A  2 


356  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

were  circling  unconsciously  round  one  of  the  oldest 
disputations  of  the  Schools.  A  question  of  practical 
legislation  had  arisen  which  involved  one  of  the  most 
difficult  problems  in  metaphysical  analysis.  On  the  one 
hand,  Freedom  was  asserted  for  the  Will  under  con- 
ditions and  in  a  sense  in  which  it  did  not  exist.  On  the 
other  hand,  Freedom  was  denied  to  the  Will  in  a  sense 
in  which  the  instincts  of  humanity  testified  to  its  pre- 
sence, and  to  the  possibility  of  its  being  exerted  with 
effect.  The  true  Doctrine  of  Necessity  was  exemplified 
in  the  conduct  of  Employers  and  Employed — that  con- 
duct being  determined  in  a  wrong  direction  by  the  force 
of  overpowering  motives.  The  false  Doctrine  of  Neces- 
sity was  exemplified  in  the  argument,  that  this  conduct 
could  not  be  changed  under  the  force  of  higher  motives 
asserting  themselves  through  the  Will  of  the  Community 
in  the  form  of  Law. 

The  antagonism  which  was  and  still  is  so  often 
assumed  between  Natural  Law  and  Human  Law,  or  in 
other  words  between  Natural  Law  and  Positive  Institu- 
tion, is  an  antagonism  which  may  indeed  exist,  and  does 
very  often  exist.  But  it  is  also  an  antagonism  which 
may  be  eliminated,  and  must  be  eliminated,  if  Legislation 
is  ever  to  be  attended  with  permanent  success.  It  is, 
alas,  a  Natural  Law  that  men  should  be  thoughtless,  and 
selfish,  and  reckless  of  moral  consequences,  when  they 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  357 


are  bent  exclusively  on  material  results.  But  when  the 
consequences  of  this  conduct  have  been  brought  home  to 
their  convictions  by  the  force  of  imminent  danger  or  of 
actual  calamity,  it  is  a  law  not  less  natural  that  they 
should  take  alarm,  that  they  should  retrace  their  steps, 
and  that  by  walking  in  another  course  they  should  bring 
about  conditions  of  a  better  kind.  The  Laws  of  Man 
are  also  Laws  of  Nature,  when  founded  on  a  true  per- 
ception of  natural  tendencies  and  a  just  appreciation  of 
combined  results.  On  the  other  hand,  Human  Laws 
are  at  variance  with,  or  antagonistic  to  the  Laws  of 
Nature,  when  founded  either  on  the  desire  of  attaining 
a  wrong  end,  or  on  the  attempt  to  reach  a  right  end 
by  mistaken  means.  In  either  of  these  cases  Positive 
Institution  and  Natural  Law  become  opposed,  and  thus 
a  bad  contrivance  in  Legislation,  like  a  bad  contrivance 
in  mechanics,  comes  always  to  some  dead-lock  at  last 
Time  and  Natural  Consequence  are  great  Teachers  in 
Politics  as  in  other  things.  Our  sins  and  our  ignorances 
find  us  out.  Both  in  conduct  and  in  opinion  Natural 
Law  is  ever  working  to  convict  error,  to  reveal  and  to 
confirm  the  truth.1 

And  so  it  was  that  the  sad   phenomena  of  Factory 
labour  were  beginning  to  indicate  the  great   difference 

i  "Opinionum  enim  commenta  delet -dies ;  naturse  judicia  cou« 
firraat" — Cicero,  "DeNat.  Deor."  lib.  ii.  c.  3. 


THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


between  -the  results  of  perfect  freedom  of  exchange  in 
the  products  of  labour  and  the  results  of  perfect  freedom 
of  competition  in  Labour  itself.  Perhaps  that  difference 
ought  to  have  been  foreseen,  for  the  cause  of  it  is  plain 
enough.  There  are  certain  results  for  the  attainment  of 
which  the  natural  instincts  of  individual  men  not  only 
may  be  trusted,  but  must  be  trusted  as  the  best  and 
indeed  the  only  guide.  There  are  other  results  of  which 
as  a  rule  those  instincts  will  take  no  heed  whatever,  and 
for  the  attainment  of  which,  if  they  are  to  be  attained 
at  all,  the  higher  faculties  of  our  nature  must  impose 
their  Will  in  authoritative  expressions  of  Human  Law. 
In  all  that  wide  circle  of  operations  which  have  for  their 
immediate  result  the  getting  of  wealth,  there  is  a  sagacity 
and  a  cunning  in  the  instincts  of  labour  and  in  the  love 
of  gain  compared  with  which  all  legislative  wisdom  is 
ignorance  and  folly.  But  the  instincts  of  labour,  having 
for  their  conscious  purpose  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  are 
instincts  which,  under  the  stimulus  and  necessities  of 
modern  society,  are  blind  to  all  other  results  whatever. 
They  override  even  the  love  of  life  ;  they  silence  even 
the  fear  of  death.  Trades  in  which  the  labourers  never 
reach  beyond  middle  life  —  trades  in  which  the  work  is 
uniformly  fatal  within  a  few  years  —  trades  in  which  those 
who  follow  them  are  liable  to  loathsome  and  torturing 
disease  —  all  are  filled  by  the  enlistment  of  an  unfailing 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.     '  359 


series  of  recruits.  If,  therefore,  there  be  some  things 
desirable  or  needful  for  a  Community  other  than  the 
acquisition  of  wealth, — if  mental  ignorance,  and  physical 
degeneracy,  be  evils  dangerous  to  social  and  political 
prosperity,  then  these  results  cannot  and  must  not  be 
trusted  to  the  instincts  of  individual  men.  And  why? 
Because  the  few  motives  which  bear  upon  them,  and 
which  consequently  determine  their  conduct,  have  be- 
come almost  as  imperious  as  the  motives  which  deter- 
mine the  conduct  of  the  lower  animals.  Observers  whose 
duties  have  called  them  to  a  close  investigation  of  the 
facts,  have  never  failed  to  be  impressed  with  those  facts 
as  the  result  of  Laws  against  which  the  individual  Will 
is  unable  to  contend.  Overpowering  motives  arise  out 
of  the  conditions  of  society — out  of  the  force  of  habit — 
out  of  the  helplessness  of  poverty — out  of  the  thought- 
lessness of  wealth — out  of  the  eagerness  of  competition 
— out  of  the  very  virtues  even  of  industrial  skill.  These 
constitute  an  aggregate  of  power  tending  in  one  direction, 
which  make  the  resulting  action  of  Mind  as  certain  as 
the  action  of  Inanimate  Force.  "  Thus,"  says  Mr.  Baker, 
one  of  the  most  experienced  of  our  Factory  Inspectors, 
"  most  of  the  workshops  of  this  great  commercial  country 
are  found  to  have  fallen  into  the  inevitable  track  of  com- 
petitive industry,  when  unrestricted  by  law, — namely,  to 
cheapen  prices  by  the  employment  of  women  and  chil- 


360  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

dren  in  the  first  instance,  and  then  to  increase  production 
by  protracted  hours  of  work,  without  much  regard  to 
age,  to  sex,  or  to  physical  capability."  This  is  the  result 
of  Nature — of  Nature,  at  least,  such  as  ours  now  is.  But 
it  is  the  result  of  that  Nature  with  all  its  nobler  powers 
allowed  to  sleep.  Power  to  control  such  evils  has  been 
given  to  Man,  and  he  is  bound  to  use  it.  "  Free  labour, 
even  in  a  free  country,"  as  Mr.  Baker  says,  "  requires  the 
strong  arm  of  the  law  to  protect  it  from  the  cupidity 
and  ignorance  of  parents." l  And  by  the  "  strong  arm 
of  the  law  "  is  meant  nothing  but  the  law  of  Conscience 
and  of  Reason  asserting  itself  over  the  lower  instincts  of 
our  nature.  If  under  such  conditions  of  society,  higher 
motives  are  ever  to  prevail,  they  must  be  supplied  from 
without,  and  must  be  imposed  in  authoritative  form 
through  the  legitimate  organs  of  Positive  Institution.2 

And  so  the  Factory  Acts  instead  of  being  excused  as 
exceptional,  and  pleaded  for  as  justified  only  under  ex- 
traordinary conditions,  ought  to  be  recognised  as  in  truth 
the  first  Legislative  recognition  of  a  great  Natural  Law, 

1  "Reports  of  the  Inspectors  of  Factories,  half-year  Oct.  1864," 
p.  84. 

2  Bad  as  the  consequences  were  of  individual  freedom  under  un- 
restricted competition  in  the  case  of  labour  in  factories,  the  results 
were  still  more  horrible  in  the  case  of  labour  in  mines.     In  1842  it 
was  found  absolutely  necessary  to  prohibit  altogether  the  labour  of 
women  and  young  children  in  mines  and  collieries. 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  361 


quite  as  important  as  Freedom  of  Trade,  and  which  like 
this  last,  was  yet  destined  to  claim  for  itself  wider  and 
wider  application. 

Accordingly,  since  the  year  when  the  first  Sir  Robert 
Peel  pleaded  the  cause  of  Factory  Apprentices,  there  has 
been  going  on  a  double  movement  in  Legislation,  one  a 
movement  of  retreat,  the  other  a  movement  of  advance. 
Step  by  step  Legislation  has  retired  .from  a  Province  once 
considered  peculiarly  its  own  :  step  by  step  it  has  ad- 
vanced into  another  Province  within  which  the  Schools 
of  Political  Economy  would  have  denied  it  a  foot  of 
ground.  Since  1802,  there  have  been  passed  a  long 
series  of  laws  removing,  one  after  another,  all  restrictions 
which  aimed  at  guiding  the  individual  Will  in  its  sharp 
and  sagacious  pursuit  of  material  wealth.  During  the 
same  period  there  have  been  passed  another  long  series 
of  Acts  imposing  restrictions  more  and  more  stringent  on 
the  individual  Will  in  its  blind  and  reckless  disregard  of 
moral  ends.1  In  neither  of  these  movements  was  Par- 

i  It  was  not  till  1819  that  Sir  Robert  Peel  succeeded  in  passing 
an  Act  restricting  the  labour  of  unapprenticed  children.  This  Act 
(59  Geo.  III.  c.  66)  is  therelore,  properly  speaking,  the  first  of  the 
Factory  Acts — the  first  which  affirmed  the  principle  of  restriction  as 
legitimately  applicable  to  "Free"  Labour.  But  this,  as  well  as  a 
subsequent  Act  passed  in  1825,  at  the  instance  of  Sir  J.  Hobhouse, 
were  practically  inoperative  from  defective  enforcing  clauses.  It 
was  thus  apparent  that  the  State  must  charge  itself  not  only  with 


362  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

liament  impelled  by  the  light  of  reason,  but  under  the 
blessed  teaching  which  belongs  to  the  Reign  of  Law. 
False  theory  and  mistaken  conduct  have  been  found  out 
by  the  working  of  Natural  Consequence.  The  abstract 
reasonings  of  Adam  Smith  had  indeed  long  before  pre- 
pared the  minds  of  a  few  to  perceive  the  true  theory  of 
unrestricted  competition  in  the  interchange  .of  goods. 
But  as  it  needed  the  practical  results  of  restriction — dis- 
tress, discontent,  and  the  danger  of  civil  commotion — to 
bring  home  to  the  national  understanding  the  economic 
error  of  the  old  commercial  systems ;  so  also  as  regards 
the  grievous  results  of  unrestricted  competition  in  human 
labour,  our  only  effective  teaching  has  been  that  of  hard 
experience.  The  doctrines  of  Adam  Smith,  when  applied 
here,  were  a  hindrance  and  not  a  help.  The  Political 
Economists  were,  almost  to  a  man,  hostile  to  restrictive 
legislation.  They  did  not  see  what  would  be  the  working 
of  Natural  Law  upon  the  Human  AVill,  when  that  "Will 
was  exposed  to  overpowering  motives  under  debased 
conditions  of  understanding  and  of  heart  They  did  not 

laying  down  the  law,  but  also  with  the  duty  of  seeing  it  obeyed. 
It  was  not  till  this  great  question  was  taken  in  hand  by  Lord 
Ashley  that  any  effectual  measure  was  passed.  His  Bill  became 
Law  in  1833,  as  3  and  4  Will  IV.  c.  103.  Nothing  but  a  stringent 
system  of  Government  Inspection  was  of  any  avail  against  the 
powerful  combination  of  motives,  out  of  which  the  evils  of  the 
Factory  system  arose. 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  363 


see  the  higher  Law  which  Parliament  was  asserting  when 
it  was  driven  by  sheer  instinctive  horror  of  actual  results, 
to  prohibit  "  free "  labourers  from  disposing  as  they 
pleased  of  the  labour  of  their  children. 
I  To  this  hour  the  principle  on  which  this  great  counter- 
movement  rests  as  regards  our  ideas  of  the  legitimate 
province  of  Legislation,  has  never  been  philosophically 
treated.  The  Laws  on  which  it  depends,  and  which  it 
does  but  recognise,  have  never  been  scientifically  defined. 
We  are  still  in  a  state  of  tutelage — advancing  with  slow 
and  reluctant  steps1  in  the  path  indicated  by  the  teach- 
ings of  Natural  Consequence.  The  last  Report  on  the 

i  l  The  steps  here  referred  to  are  certainly  becoming  every  year  less 
slow  and  less  reluctant.  Since  this  work  was  published,  the  "  Fac- 
tory Acts'  Extension  Act"  of  1867  has  extended  the  provisions  of 
those  Acts  to  all  establishments  which  employ  fifty  persons  ;  and  the 
"  Workshop  Regulation  Act "  of  the  same  year,  has  carried  the  pro- 
tection of  the  law  into  the  precincts  of  "any  room  or  place  what- 
ever in  which  any  handicraft  is  carried  on."  Nay  more,  it  extends 
that  protection  even  to  children  who  are  working,  not  for  wages  at 
all,  but  only  "under  a  parent."  The  principle  of  "State  inter- 
ference" is  here  carried  to  its  utmost  length.  It  is  characteristic  of 
the  cautious  and  tentative  character  of  English  Legislation  that  it 
becomes  gradually  committed  to  great  general  principles,  not  through 
any  perception  of  the  truth  and  value  of  those  principles  in  th$ 
abstract,  but  gradually,  and  through  the  compulsion  of  particular 
necessities.  And  to  the  last  possible  moment  the  general  application 
of  such  principles  is  always  resisted.  But  no  argument  can  be  used 
in  favour  of  compulsory  education,  as  regards  children  in  "  work- 
shops," which  is  not  equally  applicable  to  all  children  whatever. 


364  THE    REIGN   OF    LAW. 

Employment  of  Children  shows  that  evils  as  bad  as  ever 
existed  before  the  passing  of  the  Factory  Acts,  prevail  at 
this  moment  among  large  classes  of  our  operative  popu- 
lation, and  demand  again,  as  imperatively  as  before,  an 
authoritative  interference  of  Positive  Institution  with  the 
freedom  of  the  individual  Will.  The  fact  of  such  legis- 
lation has  indeed  gained  a  sort  of  silent  acquiescence,  and 
some  of  the  old  opponents  have  admitted  that  their  fear 
of  the  results,  in  an  economical  point  of  view,  has  proved 
erroneous.  But  there  is  still  no  clear  and  well-grounded 
intellectual  perception  of  the  deep  foundations  of  prin- 
ciple on  which  it  rests.  Nor  is  there  among  a  large 
section  of  Politicians  any  adequate  appreciation  of  the 
powerful  influence  it  has  had  in  improving  the  physical 
condition  of  the  people,  and  securing  their  contentment 
with  the  Laws  under  which  they  live. 

When,  however,  we  think  for  a  moment  of  the  frightful 
nature  of  the  evils  which  this  Legislation  has  checked, 
and  which  to  a  large  extent  it  has  remedied — when  we 
recollect  the  inevitable  connexion  between  suffering  and 
political  disaffection — when  we  consider  the  great  moral 
laws  which  were  being  trodden  under  foot  from  mere 
thoughtlessness  and  greediness — we  shall  be  convinced 
that  if,  during  the  last  fifty  years,  it  has  been  given  to  this 
country  to  make  any  progress  in  Political  Science,  that 
progress  has  been  in  nothing  happier  than  in  the  Factory 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  365 


Legislation.  The  names  of  those  who  strove  for  it,  and 
through  whose  faith  and  perseverance  it  was  ultimately 
carried,  are,  and  ever  will  be,  in  the  history  of  Politics, 
immortal  names.  No  Government  and  no  Minister  has 
ever  done  a  greater — perhaps,  all  things  considered,  none 
has  ever  done  so  great  a  service.  It  was  altogether  a  new 
era  in  Legislation — the  adoption  of  a  new  principle — the 
establishment  of  a  new  idea.  Nor  is  that  principle  and 
that  idea  even  now  thoroughly  understood.  The 
promptings  of  individual  self-interest  are  still  relied  upon 
for  the  accomplishment  of  good  which  it  does  not  belong 
to  them  even  to  suggest,  and  which  they  can  never  be 
trusted  to  pursue.  Proposals  for  legislative  interference 
with  a  view  to  arrest  some  of  the  most  frightful  evils  of 
Society,  are  still  constantly  opposed,  not  by  careful 
analysis  of  their  tendency,  but  by  general  assertions  of 
Natural  Law  as  opposed  to  all  legislation  of  the  kind. 
"You  cannot  make  men  moral  by  Act  of  Parliament" — 
such  is  a  common  enunciation  of  Principle,  which,  like 
many  others  <  .'  the  same  kind,  is  in  one  sense  a  truism, 
and  in  every  other  sense  a  fallacy.  It  is  true  that  neither 
wealth,  nor  health,  nor  knowledge,  nor  morality,  can  be 
given  by  Act  of  Parliament.  But  it  is  also  true  that  the 
acquisition  of  one  and  of  all  of  these  can  be  impeded 
and  prevented  by  bad  laws,  as  well  as  aided  and  encou- 
raged by  wise  and  appropriate  legislation. 


366  '        THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

There  is  no  doctrine  in  Physics  more  certainly  true 
than  this  doctrine  in  Politics — that  every  practice  which 
the  authority  of  Society  recognises  or  supports  has  its  own 
train  of  consequences,  which,  for  evil  or  for  good,  can 
be  modified  or  changed  in  an  infinite  variety  of  degrees 
according  as  that  sanction  is  given  or  withheld.  In- 
numerable illustrations  of  this  truth  will  arise  wherever 
we  take  the  trouble  to  trace  any  social  or  political  pheno- 
mena through  the  sequences  of  cause  and  effect  from 
which  they  come.  Not  unfrequently  these  illustrations 
are  of  a  melancholy  kind,  and  give  us  much  to  think 
of  respecting  the  better  understanding  and  the  better 
management  of  our  complicated  nature.  Thus,  for 
example,  there  seems  good  reason  to  believe  there 
is  a  direct  relation  between  the  amount  of  life  and  pro- 
perty annually  sacrificed  by  shipwreck,  and  the  legislation 
which  recognises  and  sanctions  Insurance  to  the  full 
amount  of  the  value  of  ship  and  cargo.  The  cause  of 
this  is  obvious.  Care  for  life  is  less  eager  and  less  wake- 
ful than  care  for  property.  This  is  true  even  when  men 
are  dealing  equally  with  their  own  property,  and  with 
their  own  lives.  It  is  still  more  true  when  they  are 
dealing  not  only  with  property  which  is  their  own,  but 
with  lives  which  belong  to  others.  The  inevitable  effect 
of  such  Insurance  is  therefore  to  relax  the  motives  of 
self-interest,  which  are  the  strongest  incitements  to  pre- 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  367 


caution.1  Similar  results  appear  in  a  thousand  other 
cases,  both  of  laws  still  existing,  and  of  laws  which  have 
been  repealed.  The  conduct  of  men  depends  on  the 
balance  of  motives  which  are  brought  to  bear  upon 
them.  In  supplying  those  motives,  external  conditions 
and  mental  character  act  and  react  upon  each  other. 
Both  of  these  can  be  affected,  and  affected  powerfully, 
by  Positive  Institution. 

The  restraints  of  Positive  Institution  are  not,  however, 
the  only  means, — very  often  they  are  not  the  best  means 
by  which  to  lighten  the  overpowering  pressure  of  par- 
ticular motives  upon  the  individual  Will.  For  as  the 
Reason  and  the  Conscience  of  the  whole  Political  Com- 
munity can  interfere  by  the  exercise  of  authority,  so 
also  may  adequate  remedies  be  found  in  the  reason  and 
the  conscience  of  Voluntary  Societies.  The  external 
conditions  which  tell  upon  the  individual  Will  are  them- 
selves very  often  nothing  but  conditions  depending  on 
the  aggregate  Will  of  those  around  us ;  and  if  upon 
them,  by  any  means,  new  motives  can  be  brought  to 
bear,  then  the  whole  of  those  external  conditions  may 
be  changed.  The  language  which  is  used  in  the  name 
of  Economic  Science  constantly  involves  in  this  matter 

1  A  curious  and  instructive  Paper  upon  this  subject  has  been 
published  by  Mr.  Edwin  Chadwick,  having  been  read  before  a 
recent  meeting  of  the  Social  Science  Association. 


368  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

the  same  fallacy  which  has  already  been  pointed  out 
in  the  language  used  in  the  name  of  Physical  Science. 
It  is  often  said  that  the  conduct  and  condition  of  men 
are  governed  by  invariable  laws;  and  the  conclusion 
is  that  the  evils  which  arise  by  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence out  of  the  action  of  those  laws,  are  evils  against 
which  the  struggles  of  the  Will  are  hopeless.  But  the 
facts  on  which  this  conclusion  is  founded,  are,  as  usual, 
inaccurately  stated.  The  conditions  of  human  life  and 
conduct,  like  the  conditions  of  all  natural  phenomena, 
are  never  governed  by  those  separate  and  individual 
forces  which  alone  are  invariable,  but  always  by  com- 
binations among  those  forces — which  combinations  are 
of  endless  variety,  and  of  endless  capability  of  change. 
Different  motives  arise  out  of  the  inborn  gifts  of  charac- 
ter, and  out  of  the  conditions  of  external  circumstance. 
It  is  true,  indeed,  that  there  are  in  the  mind  of  Man, 
as  there  are  in  Nature,  certain  forces  originally  im- 
planted, which  are  unchangeable  in  this  sense,  that  they 
have  an  invariable  tendency  to  determine  conduct  in 
a  particular  direction.  But  as  in  Nature  we  have  a 
power  of  commanding  her  elementary  forces  by  the 
methods  of  adjustment,  so  in  the  Realm  of  Mind  we 
can  operate  on  the  same  principle,  by  setting  one  motive 
to  counteract  another :  and  by  combination  among  many 
motives,  we  can  influence  in  a  degree,  and  to  an  extent 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  369 


as   yet   unknown,    the    conduct    and   the    condition  -of 
Mankind. 

Nor  are  the  resources  of  Contrivance  limited  to  adjust- 
ment among  the  motives  which  arise  only  out  of  exist- 
ing conditions.  New  motives  can  be  evoked  and  put 
in  action  by  the  adopting  of  appropriate  means.  The 
mere  founding,  for  example,  of  a  Voluntary  Society  for 
any  given  purpose,  evolves  out  of  the  primary  elements 
of  human  character  a  latent  force  of  the  most  powerful 
kind ;  namely,  the  motive — the  sentiment — the  feeling — 
the  passion  as  it  often  is,  of  the  Spirit  of  Association. 
This  is  a  passion  which  defies  analysis.  The  cynic  may 
reduce  it  to  a  form  of  selfishness — and  undoubtedly  the 
identification  of  the  interests  and  the  desires  of  Self 
with  the  Society  for  which  this  passion  is  conceived, 
lies  at  its  very  root  and  is  of  its  very  essence.  It  is 
true,  also,  that  it  is  a  passion  so  powerful  as  to  need 
strong  control — without  which  control  it  generates  some 
of  the  very  meanest  emotions  of  the  heart.  Out  of  it 
there  has  come,  and  there  comes  again  and  again  from 
age  to  age,  a  spirit  of  hatred  even  against  good  itself, 
when  that  good  is  the  work  of  any  one  who  "  follo\\  eth 
not  us."  It  is  a  force,  nevertheless,  rooted  in  the  Nature 
of  Man,  implanted  there  as  part  of  its  constitution,  and 
like  all  others  of  this  character,  given  him  for  a  purpose, 
and  having  its  own  legitimate  field  of  operation.  Nor  is 

B  B 


37°  THE   REIGN    OF    LAV/. 

that  field  a  narrow  one.  The  spirit  of  Association  is  the 
fountain  of  much  that  is  noblest  in  human  character,  and 
of  much  that  is  most  heroic  in  human  conduct.  For  all 
the  desires  and  aspirations  of  Self  are  not  selfish.  The 
interests  of  Self,  justly  appreciated  and  rightly  under- 
stood, may  be,  nay  indeed  must  be,  the  interests  also 
of  other  men — of  Society — of  Country — of  the  Church, 
and  of  the  World. 

And  so  it  is  that  when  the  aim  of  any  given  Asso- 
ciation is  a  high  aim,  directed  to  ends  really  good,  and 
seeking  the  attainment  of  them  by  just  methods  of  pro- 
cedure, the  spirit  it  evokes  becomes  itself  a  new  "  Law" 
— a  special  force  operating  powerfully  for  good  on  the 
mind  of  every  individual  subject  to  its  influence.  Some 
pre-existing  motives  it  modifies — some  it  neutralises — 
some  it  suppresses  altogether— some  it  compels  to  work 
in  new  directions.  But  in  all  cases  the  Spirit  of  Asso- 
ciation is  in  itself  a  power — a  force — a  Law  in  the  Realm 
of  Mind.  What  it  can  do,  and  what  it  cannot  do,  in 
affecting  the  conditions  of  Society,  is  a  problem  not  to 
be  solved  so  easily  and  so  summarily  as  some  dogmatists 
in  political  philosophy  would  have  us  to  believe.  It  is 
a  question  which,  like  so  many  others,  is  not  likely  to 
be  solved  by  abstract  reasoning  without  the  help  of 
actual  experiment.  And  this  experiment  is  being  tried. 
The  instincts  of  men,  truer  often  than  the  conclusions 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  371 


of  philosophy,  have  rebelled  against  the  doctrine  that 
they  are  the  sport  of  circumstances.  Yet  finding  by 
hard  experience  that  this  is  often  true  of  the  individual 
Will  when  standing  by  itself,  they  have  resolved  to  try 
whether  it  is  equally  true  of  the  Collective  Will,  guided 
by  the  spirit  and  strengthened  under  the  discipline  of 
Association.  Kence  the  phenomena  of  Combination  as 
a  means  of  affecting  the  condition  of  labour— pheno- 
mena so  alarming  to  many  minds,  and  certainly  so  well 
deserving  of  attention.  Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at 
the  important  illustrations  of  the  Reign  of  Law  which 
these  phenomena  afford. 

A  moment's  consideration  will  convince  us  that  the 
same  necessities  of  labour  which  were  found  to  deter- 
mine so  fatally  the  condition  of  women  and  children,  are 
necessities  which  apply  without  any  abatement  to  the 
labour  of  adult  men.  They  must  be  subject  to  the  same 
pressure  of  inducements.  Nay,  more,  it  is  only  through 
them  that  this  pressure  can  reach  the  women  who  are 
their  wives,  and  the  children  who  are  their  children.  If 
overpowering  motives  did  not  equally  determine  the 
conduct  and  condition  of  adult  men,  no  legislation  would 
have  been  required  for  the  protection  of  their  families. 
If  a  man  is  placed  under  such  conditions  that  he  can- 
not save,  his  wife  and  child  from  exhausting  labour,  it 
is  certain  that  the  same  conditions  will  impose  a  like 
BB  2 


372  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

necessity  upon  himself.  Nevertheless,  Parliament  has 
resolutely  and  wisely  refused  to  interfere  on  his  behalf. 
And  why  ?  Because  the  argument  is  that  the  adult  man 
is  able,  or  ought  to  be  able,  to  defend  himself.  And  so 
he  can;  but  how?  Only  by  combination.  The  "law" 
which  results  in  excessive  labour  is  the  law  of  competi- 
tion— that  is,  it  is  the  attraction  exerted  upon  the  Wills 
of  a  multitude  of  individual  men  by  the  rewards  of 
labour.  The  pressure  of  this  attraction  can  only  be 
lightened  by  bringing  those  Wills  under  the  power  of 
counter  motives,  which  may  induce  them  to  postpone,  to 
some  higher  interest,  the  immediate  appetites  of  gain. 
And  this  is  the  work  which  Combination  does.  It  comes 
in  the  place  of  Positive  Institution.  Those  who  are  under 
it  "  are  a  Law  unto  themsel/es." 

Nor  is  it  unimportant  to  observe  that  what  Combina- 
tion does  for  the  protection  of  labour,  it  does  better,  and 
with  better  consequences,  than  Positive  Institution  can 
ever  do.  Men  are  driven  to  excessive  labour,  because  if 
they  don't  work  excessively,  others  will.  But  it  is  the 
effect  of  Combination  that  others  won't.  Under  Positive 
Institution  they  are  not  allowed.  Under  Combination 
they  are  determined  not.  And  as  the  forming  of  an 
intelligent  resolution,  and  the  abiding  by  it;  are  higher 
exercises  of  mind  than  the  mere  passive  obedience 
to  authority,  so  is  the  good  effected  by  Combination  a 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  373 


higher  good  than  that  resulting  from  Factory  Legislation. 
It  tends  to  form  and  to  strengthen  character.  It  tends  to 
subordinate  the  present  to  the  future,  and  the  temporary 
interests  of  Self  to  the  permanent  welfare  of  a  Brother- 
hood of  men.  And  this  it  tends  to  do  in  classes  other- 
wise prone  to  follow  only  the  impulse  of  the  moment, 
and  to  consider  only  the  apparent  interests  of  the  in- 
dividual. 

These  considerations  should  disabuse  our  minds  of 
the  unjust  and  unreasonable  prejudice  against  the  prin- 
ciple of  Combination  which  still  betrays  itself  so  strongly 
in  the  language  of  many  politicians.     When  the  Working 
Classes  combine  for  the  protection  of  their  own  labour 
against  the  effects  of  unrestricted  competition,  they  are 
simply  taking  that  course  which  is  recommended  alike 
by  reason  and  by  experience.     It  is  the  course  which 
Parliament  has  indicated  as  the  right  course  both  by 
what  it  has  itself  done,  and  by  what  it  has  declined  to  do. 
Nor  can  there  be  any  greater  mistake  than  to  suppose 
that  this  course  involves  necessarily  any  rebellion  against 
the  laws  of  economic  science.    Combination  is  an  appeal 
to  the  most  fundamental  of  all  Natural  Laws — to  the  law 
of  Contrivance — to  the  power  of  Adjustment — wielding, 
through  Reason  and  Conscience,  the  elementary  forces 
of  Human  Character.     Of  the  constancy  and  "  invaria- 
bility "  of  these  no  doubt  or  denial  is  involved.     Rather 


374  TIIE   REION   OF  LAW. 

the  reverse.  It  is  upon  instinctive  trust  in  that  constancy 
that  all  social  and  political  Contrivance  rests.  And  so 
we  need  not  be  surprised  to  find  that,  through  the  orga- 
nised efforts  of  communities  of  men,  the  evils  which  arise 
by  way  of  natural  consequence  out  of  the  helplessness 
and  thoughtlessness  of  the  individual  Will,  are  evils 
which  to  a  large  extent  can  be  met  and  overcome. 

But  though  all  this  is  true,  universally,  of  the  principle 
of  Combination,  it  is  very  far  from  being  true,  univer- 
sally, of  the  particular  purposes  to  which  Combination  is 
applied.  All  the  sources  of  error  which  have  so  long 
perverted  Legislation,  are  equally  powerful  in  perverting 
the  aims,  and  in  misdirecting  the  efforts  of  Voluntary 
Association.  If  the  upper  classes,  with  all  the  advan- 
tages of  leisure,  and  of  culture,  and  of  learning,  have 
been  so  unable,  as  we  have  seen  them  to  be,  to  measure 
the  effect  of  the  laws  they  made,  how  much  more  must 
we  expect  errors  arid  misconceptions  of  the  most  grievous 
kind  to  beset  the  action  of  those  who — through  poverty 
and  ignorance,  and  often  through  much  suffering — have 
been  able  to  do  little  more  than  strike  blindly  against 
evils  whose  pressure  they  could  feel,  but  whose  root  and 
remedy  they  could  neither  see  nor  understand  ? 

Accordingly,  the  history  of  Combination  among  the 
Working  Classes  has,  until  a  very  recent  period,  been  a 
sad  history  of  misdirected  effort — of  strength  put  forth 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  375 


only  in  violence  and  disorder,  and  of  the  virtues  of  Bro- 
therhood lost  in  tyrannical  suppression  of  all  individual 
freedom.  Its  heaviest  blows  have  been  often  aimed  at 
the  most  powerful  agencies  for  good.  One  of  the  very 
earliest  forms  of  Combination  has  been  that  which  was 
directed  against  the  introduction  and  improvements  of 
machinery.  The  Working  Classes  have  always  encoun- 
tered with  jealousy  and  fear  those  triumphs  of  Mecha- 
nical Invention  whose  function  it  is  to  economise  labour 
and  to  multiply  the  fruits  of  industry.  It  would  be  hard 
to  blame  them.  What  class  is  there  which  can  say  with 
truth  that  they  have  themselves  been  able  always  to 
follow  with  intelligent  foresight  the  links  of  Natural  Con- 
sequence through  the  darkness  into  which  they  so  often 
lead  ?  For  almost  every  great  step  in  the  advance  of  civi- 
lization plunges  at  first  through  some  passage  which  seems 
dangerous,  or  at  least  obscure.  The  happiest  achieve- 
ments of  Contrivance  have  their  own  aspects  of  apparent 
danger,  and  their  own  real  incidents  of  temporary  evil. 
Every  new  machine  displaces  and  disorganises  pre-existing 
forms  of  labour;  and  we  have  seen  that,  even  in  its 
ultimate  effects,  the  advance  of  Mechanical  Invention 
developed  new  dangers  to  the  Working  Classes — dangers 
only  to  be  avoided  by  measures  which  were  not  taken, 
and  by  precautions  which  were  not  adopted. 

It  would  be  well  if,  from  the  past  convicted  errors, 


376  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

both  of  Legislation  and  of  Combination,  we  could  extract 
some  conclusions  of  general  principle  capable  of  helping 
us  in  the  difficulties  of  our  own  time.  In  looking  at  the 
root  of  those  errors,  it  would  seem  that,  in  order  to  avoid 
them,  two  things  are  necessary — first,  unshaken  faith  in 
great  Natural  Laws ;  and,  secondly,  a  faith  not  less 
assured  in  the  free  agency  of  Man  to  secure  by  appro- 
priate means  the  working  of  those  laws  for  good.  Thus, 
the  love  of  gain  is  an  instinct  implanted  in  the  human 
mind,  and  the  endeavour  to  suppress  it  has  always  been 
the  violation  of  a  Natural  Law.  In  like  manner,  Mecha- 
nical Invention  is  a  Law  of  Nature  in  the  highest  and 
strictest  sense.  The  power  of  it  and  the  love  of  it  are 
among  the  elementary  forces  of  human  character.  Each 
fresh  exertion  of  it  is,  and  must  be,  according  to  the  con- 
stitution and  course  of  Nature — leading  to  higher  and 
higher  fulfilments  of  the  original  Purpose  of  Man's  Crea- 
tion, which  was,  that  he  should  not  only  inhabit  the 
Earth,  as  the  beasts  inhabit  it,  but  that  he  should 
subdue  it. 

So  also  combination  is  natural  to  Man.  The  desire 
for  it  and  the  need  of  it,  grow  with  the  growth  of  know- 
ledge and  with  the  increasing  complications  of  Society. 
It  has  now,  for  the  most  part,  emerged  from  the  stage  of 
rude  ignorance  which  led  to  the  breaking  of  machinery. 
It  is  conducted,  comparatively  at  least,  with  high  intei- 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  377 


ligence,  and  aims  for  the  most  part  at  legitimate  objects 
of  desire.  Yet  in  the  rebellion  which  has  been  roused 
against  the  doctrines  of  Necessity,  founded  on  false  con- 
ceptions of  Invariable  Law,  there  is  a  constant  danger 
lest  the  Spirit  of  Association  should  attempt  to  act  against 
Nature  instead  of  acting  with  it.  There  is,  for  example, 
a  Law — an  observed  order  of  facts — in  respect  to  Man, 
which  the  Working  Classes  too  often  forget,  but  which 
can  neither  be  violated  nor  neglected  with  impunity. 
That  Law  is  the  Law  of  inequality — the  various  degrees 
in  which  the  gifts  both  of  Body  and  of  Mind  are  shared 
among  men.  This  is  one  of  the  most  fundamental  facts 
of  human  nature.  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  see  how  it  should 
be  also  one  of  the  most  beneficent.  But  it  is  a  fact 
against  which  the  spirit  of  Combination  is  very  apt  to 
assume  an  attitude  of  permanent  insurrection.  It  is,  of 
course,  the  business  and  the  function  of  Combination  to 
subordinate  in  some  things  the  Individual  to  the  Class ; 
and  the  temptation  is  to  make  that  subordination  exclu- 
sive and  complete.  Hence  the  jealousy  so  often  shown 
of  wages  measured  by  the  amount  of  work  performed. 
This' is  a  jealousy  of  the  superiority  of  reward  which  is 
naturally  due  to  superiority  of  power,  of  industry,  or  of 
skill.  But  these  are  things  which  God  has  joined  to- 
gether, and  which  no  man  or  combination  of  men  have  a 
right  to  put  asunder.  It  is  a  marriage  made  in  the 


THE   REIGN   OF   LAW, 


morning  of  the  world,  and  in  every  step  of  human  pro- 
gress we  see  its  blessing  and  its  fruit.  If  it  be  stupid 
to  break  machines  and  to  proscribe  Mechanical  Inven- 
tion, it  is  not  less  stupid  to  be  jealous  of  this  primeval 
adjustment  between  the  varying  energies  of  human 
character  and  the  varying  results  which  they  are  com- 
petent to  attain. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  in  detail  on  the  difficult 
and  complicated  question  as  to  the  limits  within  which 
Combinations  can,  and  beyond  which  they  cannot,  affect 
the  rewards  of  labour.  They  have,  certainly  succeeded 
in  limiting  the  hours  of  labour  in  cases  where  Legislation 
could  not  well  have  interfered  ;  *  and  wherever  the  hours 
of  labour  are  reduced  without  a  corresponding  reduction 
in  wages,  a  substantial  economic  advantage  is  unques- 
tionably secured.  Equal  confidence  is  expressed  by 
many  Associations,  that  as  a  matter  of  experience  and  of 
fact,  they  have  succeeded  in  establishing  higher  rates  of 

i  Of  this  the  Baking  Trade  is  a  good  example.  The  hours  ot 
adult  labour  in  this  trade,  under  the  effects  of  unrestricted  compe- 
tition, had  come  to  be  most  injurious  and  oppressive.  In  Glasgow 
and  in  Edinburgh  this  condition  of  things  has  been  effectually  re- 
medied by  a  Combination,  whose  exertions  were  successful,  without 
(I  believe)  resort  being  ever  had  to  the  extreme  measure  of  a  Strike. 
The  Baking  Trade  in  London  is  still  afflicted  by  the  same  oppressive 
hours  of  labour,  because  of  the  difficulty  which  has  hitherto  been 
experienced  in  organising  there  any  Combination  equally  complete. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  379 


wages  than  would  have  accrued  under  the  system  of 
unrestricted  competition.  This  may  very  well  be  true. 
It  is  a  truth  which  casts  no  doubt  whatever  on  the 
Invariability  of  Economic  Laws  when  these  are  rightly 
understood.  They  are  invariable  in  the  same  sense,  and 
in  no  other,  in  which  all  other  Natural  Laws  are  in- 
variable. That  is  to  say,  they  represent  tendencies  in 
human  character  determined  by  motives,  which  ten- 
dencies are  constant,  and  may  surely  be  relied  on  as 
producing  always,  under  like  conditions,  their  own  appro- 
priate effects.  It  is  upon  this  constancy  that  Com- 
bination must  rely  for  any  power  it  can  ever  have :  and 
it  is  the  same  constancy  in  the  action  of  specific  motives 
which  sets  bounds  to  the  power  of  Combination,  beyond 
which  it  can  never  pass.  The  same  motive  which  impels 
the  Workman  to  secure  an  adequate  reward  for  his 
labour,  impels  the  Manufacturer  or  the  Trader  to  secure 
an  adequate  reward  for  his  capital,  his  knowledge,  and 
his  skill.  And  although  the  desire  of  gain. is  not  the  only 
motive,  and  is  often  not  the  strongest  motive,  which 
impels  men  to  persevere  in  enterprises  once  begun,  yet 
if  Combinations  of  Workmen  should  attempt  to  raise 
wages  so  high  as  to  trench  upon  the  minimum  rate  of 
profit  which  will  induce  men  to  carry  on  any  given  trade, 
then  by  a  natural  consequence,  not  less  certain  than  any 
other,  capital  and  enterprise  and  skill  will  be  withdrawn 


380  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

from  that  trade,  and  those  who  depend  upon  it  will  be 
the  first  to  suffer.  Short,  however,  of  this  extreme  result, 
there  is  generally  a  margin  of  ground  upon  which  Com- 
bination may  act  with  more  or  less  effect.  It  may  pre- 
vent arbitrary  or  capricious  changes;  and  as  there  are 
practically  many  impediments  in  the  way  of  men  moving 
their  capital  from  one  employment  to  another,  Com- 
bination may  compel  them  to  submit  to  lower  rates  of 
profit  than  would  otherwise  content  them  if  those  diffi- 
culties did  not  exist. 

But  to  all  these  possibilities  of  influence  there  is  a 
limit  in  the  nature  of  things — in  Natural  Laws — that  is, 
in  the  new  motives  which  are  brought  into  operation  by 
new  conditions.  What  that  limit  is,  it  must  always 
be  difficult  to  determine  except  by  actual  experiment. 
It  is  enough  here  to  observe  that  in  this,  as  in  every 
other  department  of  human  conduct,  men  are  being  led 
gradually  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth  by  the  teachings  of 
Natural  Consequence.  It  is  by  the  experience  of  actual 
results  that  we  are  taught  both  as  to  the  objects  which 
are  legitimate  objects  of  desire,  and  as  to  the  proper 
methods  by  which  these  may  be  attained.  The  very 
attempt  of  the  Working  Classes  to  govern  through  Com- 
bination their  own  affairs,  and  to  determine  their  own 
condition,  is  an  Education  in  itself.  On  the  extended 
scale  in  which  that  attempt  is  being  made,  it  must 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  381 


accustom  them  to  consider  great  general  causes,  and  to 
estimate  the  manner  and  the  degree  in  which  these  can 
be  effected  by  the  methods  of  Adjustment.  Last,  not 
least,  it  must  lead  them  to  study  and  to  recognise  the 
moral  duties  which  are  indeed  the  most  fundamental  of 
all  Natural  Laws.  For  it  ought  to  be  remembered,  that 
the  first  and  most  important  object  of  Combinations  is 
one  against  which  there  can  be  no  opposition  founded 
on  the  doctrines  of  Economic  Science.  That  object 
is  to  secure  for  the  Working  Classes  those  provisions 
against  misfortune,  sickness,  accident,  and  age,  v/hich 
are  amongst  the  first  duties  of  all  organised  societies  of 
men.  How  far  through  such  agency  the  causes  of 
pauperism  may  be  successfully  attacked,  is  a  question 
on  which  we  are  only  entering.  In  like  manner,  the 
conditions  and  limitations  under  which  Combination 
may  succeed  in  blending  the  functions  and  in  uniting 
the  profits  of  Capital  and  of  Labour— this  also  is  a 
question  to  be  determined  by  Natural  Laws,  not  yet 
fully  explored  or  understood.  But  enough  is  known, 
and  results  sufficiently  determinate  have  already  been 
secured,  to  convince  us  that  in  this  great  department 
of  Natural  Law,  as  in  every  other,  the  Will  of  Man  is 
not  powerless  when  its  energies  are  directed  by  wisdom, 
and  when  the  choice  of  its  methods  is  founded  upon 
knowledge. 


382  THE   REIGN    OF   LAW. 

This  is,  indeed,  the  great  lesson  to  be  learnt  from 
every  inquiry  into  the  constitution  and  course  of  things. 
Nature  is  a  great  Armoury  of  weapons,  and  implements, 
for  the  service  and  the  use  of  Will.  Many  of  them 
are  too  ponderous  for  Man  to  wield.  He  can  only  look 
with  awe  on  the  tremendous  Forces  which  are  every- 
where seen  yoked  under  the  conditions  of  Adjustment — 

* 

on  the  smoothness  of  their  motions, — on  the  magnitude 
and  the  minuteness,  on  the  silence  and  the  perfection, 
of  their  work.  But  there  are  also  many  weapons  hung 
upon  the  walls  which  lend  themselves  to  human  hands 
— lesser  tools  which  Man  can  use.  He  cannot  alter 
or  modify  them  in  shape  or  pattern — in  quality,  or  in 
power.  The  fashion  of  them  and  the  nature  of  them 
are  fixed  for  ever.  These  are,  indeed,  invariable.  Only 
if  we  know  how  to  use  them,  then  that  use  is  ours. 
Then  also  the  lesser  contrivances  which  we  can  set  in 
motion  are  ever  found  to  work  in  perfect  harmony  with 
the  vaster  mechanisms  which  are  moving  overhead. 
And  as  in  the  material  world  no  effort  gives  so  fully  the 
sense  of  work  achieved  as  the  subjugation  of  some 
Natural  Force  under  the  command  of  Will,  so  in  the 
world  of  Mind  no  triumphs  of  the  Spirit  are  happier  than 
those  by  which  some  natural  tendency  of  Human  Cha- 
racter is  led  to  ihe  accomplishment  of  a  purpose  which 
is  wise  and  good.  It  is  for  the  gaining  of  these  triumphs 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  383 


that  Man  has  been  gifted  with  the  desire  of  Knowledge, 
and  with  the  sense  of  Right,  and  with  the  faculties  of 
Contrivance.  In  such  triumphs  lie  the  aim  and  purpose 
of  all  Natural  Laws — for  these  they  were  all  established — 
for  these  they  all  work,  whether  by  way  of  encourage- 
ment, or  of  restraint,  or  of  retribution. 

Nothing  is  more  striking  in  the  history  of  Discovery 
than  the  ages  during  which  men  have  been  blind  to 
the  suggestions  of  Natural  Law — suggestions  which  now 
appear  so  obvious  that  we  wonder  how  the  interpreta- 
tion of  them  could  have  been  missed  so  long.  It  is 
very  easy  to  feel  this  wonder  concerning  others ;  it  is 
much  more  difficult  to  remember  that  the  same  wonder 
will  certainly  be  felt  concerning  ourselves.  Such  as  we 
now  see  to  have  been  the  position  of  former  generations 
in  respect  to  things  which  they  failed  to  understand, — 
such,  we  may  depend  upon  it,  is  precisely  our  own 
position  in  regard  to  innumerable  phenomena  now  con- 
stantly passing  before  our  eyes.  We  may  be  sure  of 
this ;  and  we  ought  to  be  as  glad  of  it  as  we  are  sure. 
For  the  world  is  not  so  prosperous  or  so  happy  as  that 
we  should  readily  or  willingly  believe  in  the  exhaus- 
tion of  the  means  which  are  at  our  disposal  for  its 
better  guidance.  Especially  in  the  great  Science  of 
Politics,  which  investigates  the  complicated  forces  wnose 
action  and  reaction  determine  the  condition  of  Organised 


384  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 


Societies  of  men,  we  are  still  standing,  as  it  were,  only 
at  the  break  of  day.  Our  command  over  the  external 
elements  of  Nature  is,  beyond  all  comparison,  in  advance 
of  our  command  over  the  resources  of  Human  Cha- 
racter. 

Special  causes  retard  the  progress  of  knowledge  in 
this  department  of  inquiry.  Many  .problems  so  difficult 
and  intricate  that  they  never  can  be  solved  except  by 
patient  observation,  patient  thought,  and  yet  more 
patient  action,  are  as  yet  hardly  recognised  to  be  pro- 
blems at  all.  We  look  on  the  facts  of  Nature  and  of 
human  life  through  the  dulled  eyes  of  Custom  and  Tra- 
ditional Opinion.  And  when  some  misery  worse  than 
others  forces  itself  upon  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
world,  men  are  slow  to  discover  or  admit  their  own 
power  over  the  sources  whence  such  miseries  come  to 
be.  That  which  is  needed  to  open  our  eyes  to  such 
questions,  is  not  mere  intellectual  power.  Rarer  and 
finer  qualities  have  this  work  to  do.  Among  the  cha- 
racteristics of  the  individual  men  who  have  exerted  the 
most  powerful  influence  for  good  on  the  condition  of 
Society,  no  quality  has  been  more  remarkable  than  a 
certain  natural  openness  and  simplicity  of  mind.  Readi- 
ness to  entertain,  willingness  to  accept,  and  enthusiasm 
to  pursue,  a  new  idea,  have  always  been  among  the  most 
fruitful  gifts  of  genius. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  385 


I  Is  it  vain  to  hope  that  the  thoughtfulness  and  candour 
which  have  been  the  natural  inheritance  of  a  few,  may 
yet  be  more  common  among  all  educated  men?  The 
whole  constitution  and  course  of  things  would  receive 
an  earlier  fulfilment  did  we  carry  about  with  us  an 
habitual  belief  in  the  inexhaustible  treasures  which  it 
holds — in  the  power  of  the  agencies  which  it  offers  to 
Knowledge  and  Contrivance.  For  then  the  results  of 
Natural  Consequence  would  be  accepted  for  that  which 
they  teach,  and  not  simply  submitted  to  for  that  which 
they  inflict.  The  disorders  of  Society  would  not  so 
often  be  supinely  regarded  as  the  result  of  inevitable  laws, 
but  would  be  seen  as  the  fruit  always  of  some  ignorance 
or  of  some  rebellion ;  and  so  the  exhilarating  conviction 
would  be  ours,  that  those  disorders  are  within  the  reach 
of  remedy  through  larger  Knowledge  and  a  better  Will. 

We  hear  much  now  of  the  "  blessed  light  of  Science ; " l 
and  if  the  methods  and  conditions  of  Physical  inquiry 
were  applied  in  a  really  philosophical  spirit  to  Spiritual 
Phenomena,  the  influence  of  Science  for  good  would 
be  more  powerful  than  it  is.  Meanwhile  it  is  well  to 
remember  that  although  readiness  to  accept  a  new  idea 
is  essential  to  Discovery,  it  is  equally  true  that  new 
dangers  beset  and  surround  all  new  aspects  of  the  truth. 

i  See  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  concluding  pages  of  "  Ecce 
Homo." 

CC 


386  THE   REIGN   OF  LAW. 

Paradoxical  as  it  may  sound  to  say  so,  this  is  a  consequence 
of  the  splendour  of  Man's  endowments,  of  his .  freedom 
from  direction, — of  the  swiftness  and  the  subtlety  of 
his  mental  powers.  On  her  own  narrow  path  Instinct 
is  a  surer  guide  than  Reason,  and  accordingly  it  is  often 
the  higher  faculties  of  the  mind  which  are  the  most 
misleading.  The  Speculative  Faculty  is  impatient  of 
waiting  upon  Knowledge,  and  is  ever  as  busy  and  as 
ingenious  in  finding  out  new  paths  of  error  as  in  sup- 
plying new  interpretations  of  the  truth.  Hence  in  Philo- 
sophy the  most  extravagant  errors  have  been  constantly 
associated  with  the  happiest  intuitions,  and  it  has 
remained  for  the  successors  of  great  men  in  another 
generation  to  separate  their  discoveries  from  their  delu- 
sions. Hence  also  in  Politics  the  great  movements  of 
Society  have  seldom  been  accomplished  without  raising 
many  false  interpretations  of  the  Past,  and  many  extra- 
vagant anticipations  of  the  Future.1  It  cannot,  indeed, 
be  said  with  truth  that  the  calamities  of  Nations  have 
generally  arisen  from  too  great  play  being  given  to  novel 
or  theoretical  conclusions.  Rather  the  reverse.  They 
have  arisen,  for  the  most  part,  from  too  little  attention 
being  paid  to  the  progress  of  opinion,  and  to  the  insen- 
sible development  of  new  conditions. 

i  "  Nos  peres  en  1789  ont  etc  condamnes  a  passer  des  perspectives 
du  Paradis  aux  scenes  de  1'Enfer." — Guizot,  "  L'Eglise  et  la  Societe,'1 
p.  218. 


LAW  IN   POLITICS.  387 


The  question  has  been  often  raised,  whether  there  is 
any  law  of  growth,  of  progress,  and  of  decay  prevailing 
over  Nations,  as  over  individual  Organisms.  Whatever 
the  solution  of  this  question  may  be,  it  is  certain  that 
some  causes  are  no  longer  in  existence  which  produced — 
not  indeed  the  corruption,  but — the  final  overthrow  of 
the  great  historical  Nations  of  Antiquity.  The  epoch 
of  conquering  Races  destroying  the  Governments,  and 
reconstructing  the  Populations  of  the  World,  is  an  epoch 
which  has  passed  away.  Whatever  causes  there  may  be 
now  of  political  decline  are  causes  never  brought  to  such 
rough  detection,  and  never  ending  in  catastrophes  so 
complete.  Yet,  in  modern  days  a  condition  of  stagnation 
and  decline  has  been  the  actual  condition  of  many  Poli- 
tical Societies  for  long  periods  of  time.  It  is  a  condition 
prepared  always  by  ignorance  or  neglect  of  some  moral 
or  economic  laws,  and  determined  by  long-continued 
perseverance  in  a  corresponding  course  of  conduct. 
Then  the  laws  which  have  been  neglected  assert  them- 
selves, and  the  retributions  they  inflict  are  indeed 
tremendous.  In  the  last  generation,  and  in  our  own 
time,  the  Old  and  the  New  Worlds  have  each  afforded 
memorable  examples  of  the  Reign  of  Law  over  the 
course  of  Political  events.  Institutions  maintained 
against  the  natural  progress  of  Society  have  "  foundered 
amidst  fanatic  storms."  Other  institutions  upheld  and 

C  C  2 


388  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

cherished  against  justice,  and  humanity,  and  conscience, 
have  yielded  only  to  the  scourge  of  War. 

It  is  in  the  wake  of  such  convulsions  that  reactions  of 
opinion  so  often  sweep  over  the  Human  Mind,  as  hurri- 
canes sweep  over  the  surface  of  the  Sea.  But  whatever 
new  forms  of  error  are  begotten  of  reaction,  it  is  a  com- 
fort to  believe  that  there  are  always  some  steps  gained 
which  are  never  lost.  No  man  can  look  back  on  the 
history  of  modern  civilisation  without  seeing  that  it  pre- 
sents the  phenomena  of  development  and  growth.  Nor 
can  it  be  doubted,  surely,  that  whatever  may  be  the 
decline  of  particular  Communities,  the  progress  of  man- 
kind, on  the  whole,  is  a  progress  to  higher  and  better 
things.  And  if  this  be  true,  no  particular  exceptions 
should  shake  our  faith  in  the  general  rule  that  all  safe 
progress  depends  on  timely  recognition  being  given  to 
the  natural  developments  of  Thought.  They  can  never 
be  resisted  in  the  end,  and  they  are  most  liable  to  take 
erroneous  directions  when  they  are  resisted  long.  For 
this  is  among  the  most  certain  of  all  the  laws  of  Man's 
nature — that  his  conduct  will  in  the  main  be  guided  by 
his  moral  and  intellectual  convictions.  "All  human 
society  is  grounded  on  a  system  of  fundamental 
opinions."  Such  is  the  Law  arrived  at  by  the  newest  of 
modern  Philosophies,1  and  it  would  be  well  if  all  its 

*  "  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Aug.  Comte,"byJ.  S.  Mill,  p.  101. 


LAW   IN   POLITICS.  389 

discoveries  were  as  near  the  truth.  This  is  the  Law  to 
which  Christianity  appeals,  and  in  which  its  very  roots 
are  laid,  when  it  asserts,  as  no  other  Religion  has  ever 
asserted,  the  power  and  virtue  of  Belief.  And  in  this 
Law  lies  the  error  which  those  commit  who  imagine  they 
can  hold  by  the  Ethics  of  Christianity,  whilst  regarding 
with  comparative  indifference  its  History  and  its  Creed. 
This,  too,  is  the  Law  which  lends  all  their  importance 
to  the  speculations  of  Philosophy.  False  conceptions 
of  the  truth,  in  apparently  the  most  distant  provinces  of 
Thought,  may  and  do  relax  the  most  powerful  springs 
of  action.  Among  these  false  conceptions  of  the  truth, 
none  are  now  more  prevalent  than  those  which  concern 
the  definition,  and  the  function  and  the  power  of 
"  Law."  Instead  of  regarding  the  Constancy  of  Nature 
r.s  incompatible  with  the  energies  of  Will,  we  must  learn 
to  see  in  it  the  most  powerful  stimulus  to  inquiry,  and  the 
rrost  cheering  encouragement  to  exertion. 

The  superstition  which  saw  in  all  natural  phenomena 
the  action  of  capricious  Deities  was  not  more  irrational 
than  the  superstition  which  sees  in  them  nothing  but  the 
action  of  Invariable  Law.  Men  have  been  right  and 
not  wrong,  when  they  saw  in  the  facts  of  Nature  the 
Variability  of  Adjustment  even  more  clearly  and  more 
surely  than  they  saw  the  Constancy  of  Force.  They 
were  right  when  they  identified  these  phenomena  with 


39°  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

the  phenomena  of  Mind.  They  were  right  when  they 
regarded  their  own  faculty  of  Contrivance  as  the  nearest 
and  truest  analogy  by  which  the  Constitution  of  the 
Universe  can  be  conceived  and  its  order  understood. 
They  were  right  when  they  regarded  its  arrangements 
as  susceptible  of  Change ;  and  when  they  looked  upon 
a  change  of  Will  as  the  efficient  cause  of  other  changes 
without  number  and  without  end.  It  was  well  to  feel 
this  by  the  force  of  Instinct ;  it  is  better  still  to  be  sure 
of  it  in  the  light  of  Reason.  It  is  an  immense  satis- 
faction to  know  that  the  result  of  Logical  Analysis  does 
but  confirm  the  testimony  of  Consciousness,  and  run 
parallel  with  the  primeval  Traditions  of  Belief.  It  is 
an  unspeakable  comfort  that  when  we  come  to  close 
quarters  with  this  vision  of  Invariable  Law  seated  on  the 
Throne  of  Nature,  we  find  it  a  phantom  and  a  dream — 
a  mere  nightmare  of  ill-digested  Thought,  and  of  "  God's 
great  gift  of  speech  abused."  We  are,  after  all,  what  we 
thought  ourselves  to  be.  Our  freedom  is  a  reality,  and 
not  a  name.  Our  faculties  have  in  truth  the  relations 
which  they  seem  to  have  to  the  Economy  of  Nature. 
Their  action  is  a  real  and  substantial  action  on  the 
Constitution  and  Course  of  things.  The  Laws  of  Nature 
were  not  appointed  by  the  great  Lawgiver  to  baffle  His 
creatures  in  the  sphere  of  Conduct,  still  less  to  confound 
them  in  the  region  of  Belief.  As  parts  of  an  Order  cf 


LAW  IN   POLITICS.  391 


things  too  vast  to  be  more  than  partly  understood,  they 
present,  indeed,  some  difficulties  which  perplex  the  intel- 
lect, and  a  few  also,  it  cannot  be  denied,  which  wring 
the  heart.  But,  on  the  whole,  they  stand  in  harmonious 
relations  with  the  Human  Spirit.  They  come  visibly 
from  One  pervading  Mind,  and  express  the  authority 
of  one  enduring  Kingdom.  As  regards  the  moral  ends 
they  serve,  this,  too,  can  be  clearly  seen,  that  the  pur- 
pose of  all  Natural  Laws  is  best  fulfilled  when  they  are 
made,  as  they  can  be  made,  the  instruments  of  intelligent 
Will,  and  the  servants  of  enlightened  Conscience, 


NOTES. 


NOTE  A.— PAGE  46. 

THE  article  by  Mr.  Wallace  in  the  Journal  of 
Science  (No.  XVI.)  for  Oct.  1867,  on  "Creation  by 
Law,"  implies  much  misconception  of  the  whole  drift 
and  aim  of  the  observations  I  have  made  on  Mr. 
Darwin's  "  Theory  of  the  Origin  of  Species." 

Two  separate  questions  arise  in  respect  to  that 
Theory  :— 

ist.  Does  it  adequately  explain  the  Physical  Agencies 
by  which  new  Forms  have  come  to  be  ? 

zd.  Docs  it,  even  if  successful  in  this  explanation, 
supplant  or  impair  the  argument  for  Purpose  and 
Design,  as  founded  both  on  the  results  and  on  the 
methods  of  Creation  ? 

Of  these  questions,  which  are  entirely  distinct,  the 
last  is  by  far  the  most  important  of  the  two:  and 


394  NOTES. 


this  second  question  is  the  one  which  I  have  chiefly 
dealt  with  in  the  "Reign  of  Law."  As  regards  the 
first  question,  indeed,  I  have  indicated  my  opinion  that 
the  explanation  of  Physical  Agencies  is  very  far  from 
being  complete,  and  that  the  hypothesis  can  always 
be  driven  back  to  some  starting  point  where  the  very 
condition  of  things  is  assumed  for  which  the  theory 
professes  to  account.  In  this  edition,  and  in  answer  to 
Mr.  Wallace's  challenge,  I  have  added  some  farther 
indication  of  the  difficulties  which  remain  unsolved, 
and  indeed  untouched. 

But  my  main  argument  has  been  addressed  to 
the  second  question,  and  has  been  aimed  chiefly  at 
this  conclusion  —  that  even  supposing  the  theory  to 
be  established,  so  far  as  it  can  go,  it  cannot  affect  or 
disturb  the  inseparable  relation  which  exists  between 
the  intricate  adjustments  of  Nature  and  Mental  Purpose 
— as  their  sole  conceivable  origin  and  cause.  In  respect 
to  this  argument,  Mr.  Wallace  virtually  admits  all 
I  have  maintained,  when  he  says,  "  It  is  simply  a 
question  of  how  the  Creator  has  worked."1  I  have 
said  nothing  of  "incessant  interference,"  of  "continual 
rearrangement  of  details,"  or  of  "the  direct  action  of 
the  Mind  and  Will  of  the  Creator."  On  the  contrary, 
I  have  said  that  no  purpose  is  ever  attained  in  Nature 
1  Journal  of  Science^  p.  473. 


NOTES.  395 

except  by  the  enlistment  of  Laws  as  the  means  and  in- 
struments of  attainment ; *  that  although  Law  "  is  never 
present  as  a  master,  it  appears  never  to  have  been  absent1 
as  a  servant,"  2  that  we  have  "  no  certain  reason  to  believe 
that  God  ever  works  otherwise  than  through  the  use  of 
means;"  or,  in  other  words,  through  the  instrumentality 
of  those  elementary  forces  or  properties  of  matter  and 
of  mind  which  we  call  "  Laws."  The  idea  of  "  incessant 
interference"  is  one  which  I  hold  to  be  essentially 
erroneous.  It  involves  the  idea  of  natural  forces 
being  agencies  altogether  external  to,  and  indepen- 
dent of,  the  Creative  Mind.  This  is  the  very  idea 
to  which  Mr.  Wallace  himself  gives  expression  in  its 
extremest  form,  when  he  limits  the  function  of  the 
Creator  to  that  of  so  co-ordinating  general  laws  "  at  the 
first  introduction  of  life  upon  the  earth,"3  as  that  they 
shall  work  "  of  necessity"  and  "  by  themselves"  the  results 
we  see.  This  is  unquestionably  the  way  in  which  they 
appear  to  us  to  work.  It  remains  true  that  "no  man  hath 
seen  God  at  any  time."  But  even  this  conception  does 
not  make  the  word  "  contrivance  "  (to  which  Mr.  Wallace 
objects)  less  applicable  to  the  adjustments  of  Nature. 
On  the  contrary,  it  makes  it  more  strictly  and  literally 
applicable  than  any  other  conception,  because  it  likens 
the  Creative  process  more  closely  to  those  methods 
1  P.  100.  ?  P.  208.  *  Joiirnal  of  Scienc^  p.  474. 


39$  NOTES. 

adopted  by  human  ingenuity,  to  which  the  word  con- 
trivance specially  refers.  The  highest  efforts  of  that 
ingenuity  are  precisely  those  in  which  natural  forces  are 
made  to  work  "  necessarily"  and  "by  themselves."  Self- 
acting  machines  are  the  most  ingenious  machines  of  all. 
The  self-action  of  the  "  governor  "  in  a  Steam-engine  is 
the  most  beautiful  of  the  contrivances  by  which  the  ele- 
mentary expansive  force  of  steam  is  made  to  do  the  work 
of  Will.  Mr.  Wallace  thinks  it  "an  extraordinary  idea 
to  imagine  the  Creator  of  the  Universe  contriving  the 
various  complicated  parts  of  an  Orchis,  as  a  mechanic 
might  contrive  an  ingenious  toy  or  puzzle." 1  But  this  is 
precisely  the  idea  he  himself  supports,  when  he  reduces 
the  Creator's  work  to  the  first  starting  of  the  forces  of 
organic  life,  and  to  the  foresight  merely  of  the  conse- 
quences which  must  naturally  and  necessarily  arise  from 
their  first  co-ordination.  This  is  an  accurate 'description 
of  tha  method  in  which  a  mechanic  contrives  the  most 
ingenious  self-operating  machines.  No  doubt  the  idea  of 
Omnipresence,  which  is  the  distinctive  idea  of  God's 
work  as  distinguished  from  Man's  work,  is  an  idea  which 
it  is  difficult  for  us  to  grasp  or  to  keep  steadily  in  view. 
I  do  not  deny  or  dispute  that  "  self-action  "  is  and  must 
be  the  aspect  in  which  Nature  presents  herself  to  us. 
It  could  not  be  otherwise,  unless  the  Invisible  were  to 
*  Journal  of  Science,  p.  474. 


NOTES.  397 


become  the  object  of  sight  and  touch.  But  in  proportion 
as  we  appreciate  the  infinite  intricacy  of  Natural  Ad- 
justments, in  the  same  proportion  do  we  estimate  the 
impossibility  of  conceiving  them  as  the  result  of  Me- 
chanical  Necessity,  which  indeed  is  an  inadequate 
explanation  even  of  our  own  methods  of  operation  upon 
the  material  world. 

Mr.  Wallace's  article  is  an  excellent  example  of  the 
arguments  used  in  support  of  the  Danvinian  theory,  both 
in  their  strength  and  in  their  weakness.  Their  strength 
lies  in  the  hold  they  have  of  the  idea  and  of  the  fact 
that  Nature  is  one  vast  system  of  Invisible  Forces  in  a 
condition  of  mutual  adjustment.  Their  weakness  lies  in 
the  idea  that  the  methods  of  that  adjustment  can  ever  be 
explained  as  the  result  of  mecnanical  necessity,  or  of 
the  mere  elementary  properties  of  matter  working  "by 
themselves.* 


398  NOTES. 


NOTE  B.— PAGE  85. 

Although  the  distinction  I  have  made  between  Pur- 
pose as  a  general  inference,  and  Purpose  as  a  particular 
fact,  is  a  distinction  which  seems  to  me  to  be  clear 
enough  when  it  is  pointed  out ;  yet  •  it  may  be  well  to 
give  some  further  illustrations  here  which  could  not  be 
conveniently  added  to  the  text.  What  Positivists  profess 
to  insist  upon  is,  that  in  describing  a  scientific  fact,  we 
shall  not  import  into  it  ideas  which  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily involve,  and  which  are  in  the  nature  of  inferences 
from  the  fact  What  we,  their  opponents,  have  an 
equal  right  to  insist  on  is  this — that  in  describing 
scientific  facts,  the  description  must  not  Delude  any 
of  the  ideas  which  the  facts  do  involve,  and  that 
the  full  and  adequate  description  of  those  facts  be 
not  evaded  in  order  to  keep  out  an  idea  which  the 
describer  may  choose  to  call  an  inference.  Let  us 
take  an  illustration.  Let  us  suppose  that  we  find  a 
tube  placed  anyhow  in  such  a  position  that  we  can 
look  through  it  to  the  sky  at  night.  We  do  so,  and  we 
see  a  star.  The  facts  may  be  such  that  this  descrip- 
tion fully  exhausts  them.  That  the  tube  was  intended 


NOTES.  399 


to  bear  upon  that  particular  star,  or  upon  any  star, 
would  be  a  mere  inference.  But  now  let  us  suppose 
that,  when  we  look  again  after  some  considerable  interval 
of  time,  we  find  that  the  tube  still  bears  upon  the 
same  star,  and  let  us  further  suppose  the  same  experi- 
ment repeated  with  the  same  result  during  some  hours, 
then  we  should  not  describe  the  fact  fully  by  simply 
stating  that  the  tube  bore  upon  the  star.  It  would  be 
necessary,  in  order  to  exhaust  the  facts,  to  say  that  the 
tube  was  so  adjusted  as  to  follow  the  apparent  motion  of 
the  sidereal  heavens,  and  so  to  counteract  the  natural 
effects  of  the  earth's  motion  as  to  keep  its  axis  always 
upon  the  same  star.  Here  instantly  we  have  the  lan- 
guage of  intention,  because  the  idea  of  intention  is 
inseparable  from  the  facts.  We  might  know  nothing  of 
the  method  by  which  this  adjustment  is  achieved— 
nothing  more  of  the  Mind  that  had  devised  the  method 
than  the  bare  fact  of  the  intention.  But  that  bare  fact  is 
an  essential  part  of  the  observed  phenomena.  And  the 
same  argument  applies  to  the  mechanism — if  that  also 
were  discovered — by  which  the  adjustment  is  effected 
between  the  axis  of  the  tube  and  the  apparent  motion 
of  the  star.  That  mechanism  could  not  be  fully  de- 
scribed unless  it  were  described  as  a  mechanism  so  con- 
trived as  to  bring  about  the  adjustment  which  is  actually 
effected. 


400  NOTES. 


Take  again  another  case,  from  the  organic  world.  A 
calf,  or  any  other  young  animal,  discovers  by  smell  or 
by  accident,  the  fact  that  milk  is  contained  inside  a  skin 
or  bag,  and  that,  by  applying  its  mouth  or  its  tongue  to 
some  opening,  it  can  get  at  the  milk.  The  whole  fact 
in  this  case  is  exhausted  when  we  say  that  the  calf  gets 
the  milk.  It  is  no  part  of  this  fact  that  the  calf  was 
intended  to  get  it.  But  when  a  calf  goes  for  milk  to  its 
mother's  udder — when  the  lacteal  glands  of  the  cow  are 
recognised  as  an  apparatus  for  secreting  that  milk,  and 
the  teat  for  delivering  it, — then  the  facts  are  not  ex- 
hausted, the  scientific  description  is  not  complete  or 
truthful,  unless  we  use  language  importing  this  adjust- 
ment of  apparatus  to  Purpose  in  the  plan  by  which 
nourishment  is  afforded  to  the  young  in  all  mammalia. 
This  idea  cannot  be  expelled  from  science  as  a  mere 
"inference,"  except  on  the  same  arguments  of  bad 
metaphysics,  as  I  hold  them  to  be,  by  which  also 
the  existence  of  Matter  and  of  an  External  World  are 
referred  to  the  same  category. 


NOTES.  401 


NOTE  C.— PAGE  86. 

In  illustration  of  the  assertion  in  the  text,  that  the 
relations  of  Number,  which  are  the  very  basis  of  all 
"verifiable"  knowledge,  may  be  reduced  by  similar 
arguments  to  mere  creations  of  the  Mind,  I  may  here 
remind  the  reader  of  the  passage  which  relates  to  this 
subject  in  the  famous  argument  of  Berkeley  : — 

"  That  number  is  entirely  the  creature  of  the  mind,  even 
though  the  other  qualities  be  allowed  to  exist  without, 
will  be  evident  to  whoever  considers  that  the  same  thing 
bears  a  different  denomination  of  number  as  the  mind 
views  it  with  different  respects.  Thus  the  same  exten- 
sion is  one,  or  three,  or  thirty-six,  according  as  the  mind 
considers  it  with  reference  to  a  yard,  a  foot,  or  an  inch. 
Number  is  so  visibly  relative  and  dependent  on  men's 
understanding,  that  it  is  strange  to  think  how  any  one 
should  give  it  an  absolute  existence  without  the  mind. 
We  say  one  book,  one  page,  one  line;  all  these  are 
equally  units,  though  some  contain  several  of  the  others. 
And  in  each  instance  it  is  plain  the  unit  relates  to  some 
particular  combination  of  ideas  arbitrarily  put  together 
by  the  mind." — Prin.  of  Hum.  KnowL,  Part  I.  §  xii. 
D  D 


402  NOTES. 


NOTE  D. — PAGE  204. 

Mr.  Mill,  in  his  "  System  of  Logic  "  (Book  I.  c.  Hi., 
§§  6,  7,  8),  has  told  us  that  both  of  Bodies  and  of  Minds, 
"philosophers  have  at  length  provided  us  with  a  defi- 
nition which  seems  unexceptionable."  As  regards  Body, 
this  definition  is — "The  external  cause,  and  (according 
to  the  more  reasonable  opinion)  the  unknown  external 
cause,  to  which  we  refer  our  sensations."  This  defi- 
nition, though  very  defective,  is  at  least  not  erroneous. 
It  is  necessary,  however,  to  observe  that  the  word 
"  unknown "  cannot  be  accurately  predicated  of  that 
respecting  which  the  very  terms  of  the  definition  imply 
that  something  is  known.  The  definition  of  Body 
is  the  definition  of  that  which  is  known  respecting  it. 
Three  things  are  involved  in  this  definition,  as  known 
respecting  Body; — these  are  (i)  Externality,  (2)  Ex- 
tension, and  (3)  Causation — that  is  to  say,  the  power 
of  causing  or  exciting  sensations  in  sentient  beings. 
Or  perhaps  these  three  items  of  knowledge  may 
be  merged  in  one — the  knowledge  of  Force  acting 
from  outside  upon  us,  and  exciting  sensations  in  us. 
But  this  is  knowledge.  When  the  woid  "unknown" 


NOTES.  403 


therefore  is  inserted  in  the  terms  of  the  definition 
given  by  Mr.  Mill,  it  can  only  mean  that  other 
things  still  remain  to  be  known  respecting  the  nature 
and  properties  of  Body.  In  this  sense — that  is,  when 
translated  into  "  partially  known  "  —  no  philosopher 
would  deny  the  correctness  of  its  application.  The 
definition  of  both  Body  and  Mind  is  given  by  Mr. 
Mill  in  another  passage,  which  also,  so  far  as  it  goes, 
is  unexceptionable.  "  As  Body  is  understood  to  be  the 
mysterious  something  which  excites  the  Mind  to  feel,  so 
Mind  is  the  mysterious  something  which  feels  and 
thinks."  The  same  two  fundamental  ideas  of  Exter- 
nality and  Causation  are  here  also  implicitly  and  inextri- 
cably involved.  Mr.  Mill  adds  that  the  farther  discussion 
of  this  question  belongs  not  to  Logic  but  to  Metaphysics, 
to  which  science  he  leaves  it. 

Two  chapters,  accordingly,  in  Mr.  Mill's  "  Examination 
of  Hamilton  "  (xi.  and  xii.),  are  devoted  to  a  discussion  of 
the  "  Psychological  Theory  of  the  Belief  in  an  External 
World,"  and  of  the  question  how  far  the  same  theory 
may  or  may  not  be  also  applicable  to  Mind.  The 
conclusion  to  which  I  have  referred  in  the  text  is 
the  conclusion  defended  in  the  first  of  these  chap- 
ters. It  is  the  conclusion  of  a  Pure  Idealism — an 
Idealism  much  more  extreme  than  the  theory  of 
Berkeley,  It  is  true  that  Berkeley  denied  the  existence 

D  D  2 


404  NOTES. 


of    Matter   as   a   thing   apart    from    Mind — not,  be   it 
observed,   as   a   thing    apart    from   our    minds,    but   as 
a   thing   apart    from    some   mind.     But    this  was    only 
because    he    sublimed    it    into   the   action   of    another 
Spirit    upon    our    own.      In    his   system    the   idea  of 
Causation  was  tenaciously  retained.     The  very  essence 
of  his    argument    was    that    our    ideas    must    have   a 
cause — "  some   cause  whereon  they  depend,  and  which 
produces    them   and    changes    them."     As    this   cause 
could  not  be  the  ideas  themselves  (which  ideas  are  all 
that  we  know  of  matter),  "  it  remained  that  the  cause 
of  Ideas  is  an  incorporeal  active  substance  or  spirit."1 
This   argument  is  repeated  in  several  forms,  as  again 
where  he  says,2  that  men  were  "  conscious  that  they  were 
not  the  authors   of  their  own    sensations,  which    they 
evidently  knew  were  imprinted  from  without,  and  which 
therefore  must  have  some  cause  distinct  from  the  Minds 
on  which  they  were  imprinted."     But  the  Psychological 
Theory  of  Mr.  Mill  involves  all  the  weak  points  of  the 
Berkeleian  theory  with  none  of  its  strength.     Mr.  Mill's 
formula  is  expressly  framed  so  as  to  eliminate  as  much  as 
possible  the  idea  of  Causation,  and  to  keep  out  of  sight 
the  connexion  which  exists  between  our  sensations  and 
that  which  excites  them.     The  attempt,  indeed,  is  not 
successful,    because    Mr.    Mill   car  not   express    himself 
*  ««  Prin.  of  Hum.  Know."  §  xxvi.  2  Ibid.  §  Ivi. 


NOTES.  405 

through  many  consecutive  sentences  without  assuming 
the  very  ideas  which  he  is  trying  to  account  for  as  a  mere 
product  of  more  elementary  conceptions.  This  has  been 
shown  clearly,  and  with  abundant  illustration,  in  Dr. 
M'Cosh's  "  Examination  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill's  Philosophy." 
Mr.  Mill  pleads  upon  this  point  that  he  must  use  common 
language,  but  that  the  whole  of  this  language  has  its  own 
special  meaning  under  the  Psychological  Theory  as  well 
as  under  the  common  Realistic  Theory.  This  may  be 
true ;  but  there  are  certain  words  which  must  have  the 
same  meaning  under  all  theories ;  and,  in  spite  of  his 
efforts,  he  is  compelled  to  employ  words  which  show 
that  neither  he  nor  any  one  else  can  maintain 
consistently  a  purely  subjective  conception  of  Matter, 
— that  is  to  say,  a  conception  which  dispenses  with 
an  external  agency  or  force.  He  says,  that  "  almost 
all  philosophers,  who  have  narrowly  examined  the  sub- 
ject, have  decided  that  Substance  need  only  be  postu- 
lated as  a  support  for  phenomena,  or  as  a  bond  of 
connexion  to  hold  a  group  or  series  of  otherwise  un- 
connected phenomena  together."  Mr.  Mill  goes  on  with 
much  simplicity :  "  Let  us  only  then  think  away  the 
support,  and  suppose  the  phenomena  to  remain,  and  to 
be  held  together  in  the  same  groups  and  series  by  some 
other  agency,  or  without  any  agency  but  an  internal  law — 
and  every  consequence  follows  without  Substance,  for 


40  6  NOTES. 


the  sake  of  which  Substance  is  assumed."  *  The  de- 
mand here  made  upon  us,  to  "  think  away  "  the  support 
of  phenomena,  is  certainly  made  less  formidable  when, 
in  the  next  breath,  we  are  told  to  think  it  back  again 
under  another  form  of  words,  as  "  another  agency,"  or 
as  an  "  internal  law." 

The  same  vain  attempt  to  get  behind  ultimate  ideas 
may  be  traced  in  the  word  "  Permanent,"  with  which 
Mr.  Mill  qualifies  Matter  considered  as  "A  Possibility 
of  Sensation."  The  new  formula  is  "A  Permanent 
Possibility  of  Sensation."  Why  permanent  ?  Permanent 
means  enduring.  But  what  has  the  element  of  Time  to 
do  with  it  ?  The  percipient  minds  are  not  permanent, 
so  far  as  the  sensations  of  their  existing  organism  is 
concerned.  In  what  sense,  then,  are  the  "  Possibilities 
of  Sensation  "  permanent  ?  What  is  it  that  is  described 
as  permanent?  Not  the  sensations — not  the  individual 
sentient  beings.  What  then?  Clearly  the  Power  or 
Agency  which  causes,  or  is  capable  of  exciting  sensa- 
tions in  organisms  that  are,  or  that  are  to  be.  Here, 
then,  we  have  the  ideas  of  Externality  and  of  Causation 
brought  back  under  the  covering  of  Time.  "  What  is  it 
we  mean,"  asks  Mr.  Mill,  "  when  we  say  that  the  object 
we  perceive  is  external  to  us,  and  not  a  part  of  our  own 

1  Appendix  to  chaps,  xi,  and  xii.  "Mill  on  Hamilton,"  6th  ed, 
p.  246. 


NOTES.  407 

thoughts?"  The  reply  to  this  question,  in  the  first 
Edition,  ran  as  follows :  "  We  mean  that  there  ts  in  our 
perceptions  something  which  exists  when  we  are  not 
thinking  of  it,  which  existed  before  we  ever  thought  of 
it,  and  would  exist  if  we  were  annihilated"  In  the 
recent  Edition,  this  reply  has  been  altered  so  as  to 
avoid  the  obvious  absurdity  of  supposing  that  things 
which  are  conceived  to  exist  only  "  in  our  perceptions," 
could  nevertheless  continue  to  exist  "  if  we  were  anni- 
hilated." Accordingly  the  reply  now  runs  thus:  "We 
mean  that  there  is  concerned  in  our  perceptions,"  &c. 
Yes ;  but  how  concerned  ?  As  an  exciting  Force  or  pro- 
ducing Cause,  and  in  no  other  way.  Similar  observations 
apply  to  the  word  "  Possibility,"  as  applied  in  Mr.  Mill's 
Psychological  Theory.  Possible  can  only  mean  Poten- 
tial. A  Possibility  of  sensation  must  mean  a  Potential 
Cause  of  sensation.  And  here,  again,  we  have  the  same 
fundamental  ideas  involved  in  the  very  language  by 
which  it  is  attempted  to  evade  them. 

Mr.  Mill  appears  to  me  .to  be  equally  unsuccessful  in 
starting  fairly  in  this  Psychological  Theory — that  is  to 
say,  in  the  definition  of  postulates  which  steer  clear 
of  involving  the  very  ideas  for  which  he  professes  to 
account.  His  first  postulate  is  that  the  Human  Mind 
is  capable  of  Expectation.  Certainly;  but  what  does 
Expectation  involve?  It  involves  acts  of  Memory, 


408  NOTES. 


and  of  Comparison,  and  of  Reason.  In  particular,  it 
involves,  or  at  least  he  is  net  entitled  to  deny  that  it  may 
involve,  the  intuitive  belief  that  actual  sensations  already 
experienced  arose  from  an  external  cause,  and  that  the 
same  cause  is  capable  of  exciting  them  again.  My  belief 
is  that  the  mind  cannot  place  itself  in  the  attitude  of 
expectation  without  the  presence  of  ideas  which  involve 
the  whole  question  in  dispute. 

I  am  disposed,  therefore,  to  agree  with  Mr.  Mill,  that 
the  existence  of  an  external  material  world  cannot  be 
proved ;— just  in  the  same  sense,  and  for  the  same 
reason,  that  the  proposition — "Things  that  are  equal 
to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another,"  cannot 
be  proved. 

Mr.  Mill  thinks  that,  though  the  existence  of  an  external 
Material  world  cannot  be  proved,  an  external  Immaterial 
world  can  be  proved — that  is  to  say,  the  existence  of 
other  minds  can  be  proved.  I  think  he  only  succeeds 
in  showing  that  our  belief  in  this  existence  can  be 
confirmed  by  corroborative  evidence.  But  such  cor- 
roboration  and  confirmation  is  equally  available  in 
support  of  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  Matter,  con- 
sidered as  an  External  Cause  of  sensation.  The  truth 
is,  our  knowledge  of  other  minds  is  only  reached  through 
our  previous  knowledge  of  Matter,  and  of  the  impressions 
it  makes  ituon  us.  My  own  mind,  as  well  as  the  mind 


NOTES.  409 


of  all  the  beings  around  me,  is,  or  seems  to  be,  in- 
separably connected  with  a  Material  Organization,  and 
there  are  no  manifestations  of  Mind  which  do  not  come 
to  me  directly  or  indirectly  through  material  signs. 

Mr.  Mill  has  often  warned  us,  and  I  accept  the 
warning,  against  the  system  of  discussing  metaphysical 
questions,  under  the  threat,  as  it  were,  that  the  conclu- 
sions to  which  we  are  opposed  are  inconsistent  with 
some  one  or  more  Theological  Beliefs.  We  know  that 
the  Ideal  Theory,  in  the  form  at  least  which  it  took  in 
the  hands  of  Berkeley,  was  put  forward  in  the  interests 
of  Religion.  "  The  existence  of  matter,  or  bodies  un- 
perceived,  has  not  only  been  the  main  support  of 
Atheists  and  Fatalists,  but  on  the  same  principle  doth 
Idolatry  likewise,  in  all  its  various  forms,  depend.  Did 
men  but  consider  that  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  and 
every  other  object  of  the  senses,  are  only  so  many  sensa- 
tions in  their  own  minds,  which  have  no  other  existence 
but  barely  being  perceived,  doubtless  they  would  never 
fall  down  and  worship  their  own  Ideas y  but  rather 
address  homage  to  that  Eternal  Invisible  Mind  which 
produces  and  sustains  all  things."1  .Such  was  the 
animating  principle  of  the  Bishop  of  Cloyne's  famous 
speculation.  I  confess  I  have  a  profound  distrust  of 

i  "Prin.  of  Hum.  Knowl."  §  xciv. 


4IO  NOTES. 


all  attempts  to  found  the  teachings  of  Faith  upon  the 
principles  of  Scepticism.  I  am  not  tempted,  in  order  to 
escape  the  danger  of  Materialism,  to  deny  the  existence 
of  that,  which  I  know  by  my  own  structure,  and  by 
the  structure  of  all  around  me,  to  be  different  from 
Mind.  I  am  content  to  understand  the  world  as  my 
own  faculties  have  been  co-ordinated  with  external 
things  to  reveal  those  things  to  me.  I  look  in 
my  friend's  face,  and  I  see  the  expression  of  power, 
and  of  intellect,  and  of  goodness.  These  are  attri- 
butes of  Mind.  I  do  not  know  how  these  attributes 
can  be  shown  forth  so  evidently  in  the  colxmrs  and 
in  the  lines  of  flesh  and  blood.  But  I  do  not  try 
to  persuade  myself  that  his  hand  or  his  face  are  the 
same  things,  either  with  the  perceptions  which  they 
excite  in  me,  or  with  the  emotions  which  they  express 
in  him.  I  do  not  pretend  to  understand  the  nature  of 
the  connexion  between  these  Material  Forms  and  the 
qualities  of  Mind.  But  after  their  own  diverse  kinds  and 
measures  they  are  both  equally  "  real "  to  me.  I  will 
not  deceive  myself  by  verbal  quibbles — pretending  to 
be  able  to  stand  outside  myself,  and  to  prove  by  reason 
that  the  very  tools  with  which  reason  works  are  rotten 
in  her  hands.  There  is  but  one  sentence  in  these  two 
chapters  of  Mr.  Mill's  work  which  conveys  any  really 
important  truth.  In  regard  to  the  existence  of  Matter, 


NOTES.  411 


as  well  as  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  Memory  and  of 
Mind,  we  may  indeed  well  say  with  him  :  "  By  far  the 
wisest  thing  we  can  do  is  to  accept  the  inexplicable 
facts,  without  any  theory  how  it  takes  place  ;  and  when 
we  are  obliged  to  speak  of  them  in  terms  which  assume 
a  theory,  to  use  them  with  a  reservation  as  to  their 
meaning." 


412  NOTES. 


NOTE  E. — PAGE  299. 

When  I  wrote  this  passage  in  the  text,  I  had  not  read 
a  curious  note  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  in  his  edition  of 
Reid's  Works.1  It  is  almost  droll  in  its  confession  of  the 
puzzling  significance  of  such  facts,  in  respect  to  animals, 
as  those  I  have  referred  to.  "  Nothing  in  the  compass 
of  inductive  reasoning  appears  more  satisfactory  than 
Berkeley's  Demonstration  of  the  necessity  and  manner  of 
our  learning,  by  a  slow  process  of  observation  in  com- 
parison alone,  the  connexion  between  the  perception  of 
vision  and  touch,  and,  in  general,  all  that  relates  to  the 
distance  and  real  magnitude  of  external  things.  But 
although  the  same  necessity  seems  in  theory  equally 
incumbent  on  the  lower  animals  as  on  man,  yet  this 
theory  is  provokingly  (!) — and  that  by  the  most  manifest 
experience — found  totally  at  fault  with  regard  to  them ; 
for  we  find  that  all  the  animals  who  possess  at  birth  the 
power  of  regulated  motion  (and  these  are  those  only 
through  whom  the  truth  of  the  theory  can  be  brought  to 
the  test  of  a  decisive  experiment),  possess  also  from  birth 
the  whole  apprehension  of  distance,  &c.  which  they  are 
1  Vol.  I.  p.  182,  note. 


NOTES.  413 

ever  known  to  exhibit.  The  solution  of  this  difference 
by  a  resort  to  instinct  is  unsatisfactory ;  for  instinct  is  in 
fact  an  occult  principle — a  kind  of  natural  revelation,—- 
and  the  hypothesis  of  instinct,  therefore,  only  a  confession 
of  our  ignorance  :  and  at  the  same  time,  if  instinct  be 
allowed  in  the  lower  animals,  how  can  we  determine 
whether  and  how  far  instinct  may  not  in  like  manner 
operate  to  the  same  result  in  man  ?  " 

Well  might  Sir  W.  Hamilton  ask  this  question.  It  is 
one  which  Philosophers  will  find  it  hard  to  answer.  My 
own  conviction  is  that  more  than  half  the  "  inductive 
reasoning  "  by  which  men  have  pretended  to  account  for 
their  intuitive  perceptions  is  altogether  unsound.  Man, 
besides  being  man,  is  also  an  animal — and  through  his 
animal  organisation  the  mechanics  of  his  mind  are  to  a 
large  extent  regulated  on  the  same  principles  which  regu- 
late the  lower  Intelligences  around  him — that  is  to  say, 
by  processes  unconsciously  pursued.  This  is  the  proper 
definition  of  operations  which  are  Instinctive;  and,  as 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  observes,  they  may  best  be  conceived 
as  the  result  of  "  Natural  revelation.1*. 


414     *  NOTES. 


NOTE  F. — PAGE  304. 

In  the  number  of  the  Dublin  Review  for  April 
1867,  there  is  an  article  on  "Science,  Prayer,  Free  Will, 
and  Miracles,"  in  which  some  portions  of  this  work  are 
criticised.  With  much  of  that  criticism  I  have  every 
reason  to  be  satisfied.  The  main  objection  taken  may  be 
stated  in  two  sentences.  I  have  said  that  (under  certain 
limitations  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words)  the  "abstract 
predictability  of  human  conduct "  may  be  admitted  with- 
out involving  the  denial  of  anything  essential  to  the  doc- 
trine of  Free  Will.  Dr.  Ward  denounces  this  concession 
as  absolutely  fatal  to  that  doctrine,  and  maintains  that 
in  making  such  a  concession,  as  well  as  in  other  more 
direct  forms  of  statement,  my  view  comes  to  be  "  pre- 
cisely identical  with  Mr.  Mill's,"  which,  nevertheless,  I 
am  "  professing  "  to  oppose.  This  position  he  proceeds 
to  support  by  an  elaborate  argument,  which  I  shall  here 
examine  with  all  the  care  due  to  the  gravity  of  the 
question  raised,  and  to  the  duty  of  using  no  language 
upon  such  a  subject  which  is  not  justified  by  as  much 
precision  of  thought  as  is  attainable  in  regard  to  it 

As  Dr.  Ward  speaks  upon  this   subject  with   some 


NOTES.  415 


warmth  of  feeling,  perhaps  I  may  explain  at  once  that 
he  is  mistaken  in  supposing  that  I  am  "a  Calvinist," 
in  the  sense  of  holding  "the  Necessitarian  Doctrine." 
I  hold  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will  in  the  only  sense 
in  which  it  is  to  me  intelligible.  I  set  the  highest 
value,  upon  it ;  and  in  the  result,  though  not  in  this 
particular  argument,  I  believe  I  agree  with  Dr.  Ward 
himself.  I  am  willing  to  accept  without  reservation 
the  definition  which  he  quotes  from  certain  Jesuit 
theologians :  "  Potentia  libera  est  quae,  positis  omnibus 
requisitis  ad  agendum,  potest  agere  et  non  agere." 
But  Dr.  Ward  does  not  seem  to  observe  that  in  this 
definition  the  whole  question  in  dispute  may  be  covered 
under  its  contingent  clause.  Everything  depends  on 
the  further  definition  to  be  given  of  "  all  the  requisites 
for  action."  Is,  or  is  not,  the  condition  of  the  mind 
itself  to  be  considered  as  one  of  those  "requisites?" 
Is  knowledge,  and  the  possession  of  those  motives 
which  knowledge  gives,  a  "  requisite  "  or  not  ?  Do  the 
"  requisites  "  intended,  by  the  Jesuit  definition,  refer  to 
nothing  more  than  the  presence  or  absence  of  physical 
constraint  ?  The  truth  is  that  such  abstract  definitions 
go  very  little  way  in  explanation  of  themselves.  I  have 
asserted  the  freedom  of  the  Will  under  several  forms  of 
statement  which  are  much  more  explicit,  because  much 
more  full  and  more  detailed.  Thus,  I  have  said,  "  Among 


416  NOTES. 


the  motives  which  act  upon  mirui,  Man  has  a  selecting 
power.     He    can,  as   it   were,  stand   out   from   among 
them — look    down  from    above   them — compare    them 
among  each  other,  and  bring  them  to  the  test  of  con- 
science."    This   is   freedom,  if  there  be  such   a   thing 
conceivable  in  thought.  '  But  Dr.  Ward's  impetuous  zeal 
in  favour  of  Free  Will  blinds  him  to  certain  truths  which 
are  perfectly  compatible  with  this  doctrine,  and  which 
not  only  must  be  admitted,  but  must  be  claimed,  if  we 
are  ever  to  wield  against  Necessitarians  the  weapon  of 
analysis.      The  principal  object  of  this  work  has  been 
to  show  that,  in  so  far  as  science  has  successfully  estab- 
lished in  physics  the  idea  of  the  Reign  of  Law,  that  idea 
does  not  affect  or  traverse  the  Reign  of  Mind,  and  the 
supremacy   of  Purpose.      In    like   manner,  I   think   it 
can  be  shown  that  in  so  far  as  Psychology  can  success- 
fully establish  the  idea  of  Causation,  as  applicable   to 
Mind,  that   idea  is  perfectly  compatible  with   the  true 
freedom  of  the  Will.     Dr.  Ward  says  very  truly,  that  the 
Necessitarian  doctrine  has  in  all  ages  been  embraced  by 
many  powerful  minds.     This  indicates  that,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  false  at  all,  its  falseness  probably  depends  on  some 
partial   aspects   of  truth   mingled  with   the  fallacies  of 
definition.     My    own    opinion    unquestionably  is,  that 
when   Necessitarians    have   been    compelled  to  disown 
and  abjure  the  idea  of  compulsion,  their  doctrine  ceases 


NOTES.  417 


to  be  the  doctrine  of  Necessity  at  all  in  any  legitimate 
sense  of  the  word.  What  I  mean  by  freedom  is  free- 
dom from  compulsion,  and  nothing  else.  When  I  say 
that  the  Will  is  free,  I  do  not  mean  that  its  movements 
can  be  separated  from  the  inducements  internal  and 
external  under  which  it  moves.  But  then  I  insist  that 
"  Motive  "  shall  have  the  widest  meaning — that  it  shall 
include  such  motives,  evolved  out  of  the  very  con^ 
stitution  of  the  mind  itself,  as  "  Love,  and  Reverence, 
and  Gratitude,  and  Hunger  after  Knowledge  and  Desire 
of  Truth."  Of  course  this  is  not  given  as  a  complete 
list,  but  only  a  sample  of  the  things  which  must  be 
claimed  as  "motives."  In  this  sense,  not  only  is  the 
determining  power  of  Motive  inseparable  from  the  very 
idea  of  Mind ;  but  the  higher  is  the  quality  of  a  mind, 
the  more  certain  and  definite  will  be  the  motives  of  its 
action.  By  some  strange  confusion  of  thought,  Dr. 
Ward  seems  to  regard  with  horror  the  idea  of  the 
Will  being  regarded  as  part  of  "the  constitution  of 
the  mind."  This  is  a  mere  question  of  words.  But 
if  by  Will,  Dr.  Ward  does  not  understand  a  particular 
power  of  mind,  1  do  not  know  what  he  means.  To 
analyse  Mind  at  all,  we  must  of  course  consider  its 
different  powers  as  separate  from  each  other;  but  it 
does  not  the  less  remain  true  that  they  are  all  parts 
of  one  whole.  In  this  point  of  view,  Dr.  Ward's 
E  £ 


41 3  NOTES. 


own  definition  of  Free  Will  is  far  from  clear.  "  The 
Will,  we  maintain,  has  a  certain  power  of  deciding 
for  itself  M'hat  weight  it  shall  attach  to  motives." 
Certainly,  if  the  Will  be  understood  as  including  the 
Deliberative  Faculty  whose  function  it  is  to  "weigh."  But 
in  coming  to  this  decision  it  must  be  guided  by  some- 
thing, which  something  may  always  itself  be  resolved 
into  another  "  motive." 

And  if  this  appears  to  be  a  mere  play  on  words,  I 
grant  it.  It  is  the  very  point  and  object  of  my  argu- 
ment to  show  that  in  so  far  as  the  Necessitarian  doc- 
trine has  any  apparent  force,  it  does  depend  on  mere 
ambiguities  of  language.  For  example— exclude  from 
the  word  "motive"  all  the  influences  which  come  upon 
the  spirit  from  the  mind  itself— from  conscience,  from 
the  action  upon  it  of  another  Spirit,  human  or  divine — 
confine  the  word  "motive"  (as  many  do,  tacitly  by 
implication,  though  not  consciously)  to  that  class  of 
motives  which  come  from  external  and  material  things, 
— in  short,  confine  it  to  the  appetites  or  desires,  then  it 
absolutely  ceases  to  be  true  that  the  Will  is  determined 
by  "  motives."  On  the  other  hand,  include  in  the  word 
"  motive  "  all  that  can  ever  influence  the  mind,  whether 
from  within  or  from  without,  then  it  ceases  as  absolutely 
to  be  true  that  the  Will  can  ever  be  "  free "  from  such 
motives.  But  then,  in  this  sense,  the  Necessitarian  doc- 


NOTES.  419 


trine  resolves  itself,  as  Mr.  Mansel  says,  into  the  identical 
proposition  that  "the  prevailing  motive  prevails."  It 
becomes  perfectly  harmless,  because  in  reality  perfectly 
unmeaning.'  Dr.  Ward  is  very  indignant  that  I  should 
represent  my  view  as  "a  mere  truism."  But  it  is  not 
my  own  view,  but  the  Necessitarian  doctrine,  when  thus 
reduced  by  analysis  to  its  real  value,  which  I  have  repre- 
sented as  a  mere  truism. 

All  these  fallacies  and  confusions  of  thought  arise,  in 
my  opinion,  from  neglect  of  the  fact  that  freedom  has  no 
absolute,  but  only  a  relative  meaning.  Freedom  can 
only  mean  "  the  not  being  bound,"  and  bonds  can  only 
consist  in  something  binding.  Freedom  of  the  Will  can 
only  mean  that  the  Will  is  free  from  compulsion.  If 
Necessity  does  not  mean  compulsion,  it  either  means 
nothing  at  all,  or  nothing  inconsistent  with  freedom 
when  properly  denned  and  understood. 

We  now  come  to  what  is  called  the  "Abstract  pre- 
dictability of  human  conduct."  This  is  the  phrase  into 
which  Mr.  Mill  retreats,  as  containing  the  residuum  of 
truth  which  still  belongs  to  the  Necessitarian  doctrine 
after  it  has  abjured  the  idea  of  compulsion.  It  is  not  my 
phrase,  or  one  which  I  approve  of,  because  it  involves  a 
great  number  of  assumptions  which  lie,  as  it  were,  con- 
cealed within  it.  But  I  adhere  to  the  opinion  that,  when 
strictly  denned,  the  idea  it  involves  is  perfectly  capable 

£  E  2 


420  NOTES. 

of  being  reconciled  with  the  freedom  of  the  Will.  The 
truth  is,  that  it  is  capable  of  being  resolved  into  the  same 
identical  proposition  as  the  Necessitarian  doctrine  in 
other  forms. 

If  by  "  abstract  predictability "  is  meant  that  predic- 
tion would  be  possible  under  the  conditions  of  com- 
plete, universal,  and  perfect  knowledge,  I  do  not  see 
either  how  it  can  be  denied,  or  to  what  purpose  it  can 
be  affirmed.  The  proposition  is  that,  if  ALL  the  condi- 
tions were  known  which  determine  the  Will  in  deciding 
for  itself,  or  "  in  giving  weight  to  motives,"  the  result  of 
that  decision  would  thereby  become  also  known.  Of 
the  Necessitarian  doctrine  expressed  in  this  general 
form,  I  have  said,  and  I  repeat,  that  it  is  "very  like 
a  truism."  But  if  it  is  useless  as  an  affirmation,  it  is  at 
least  not  capable  of  denial.  Dr.  Ward,  however,  does 
deny  it,  and  supports  his  denial  by  reasoning  which  is 
clearly  untenable,  as  an  admission  made  by  himself  will 
show.  His  idea  seems  to  be,  that  no  "predictable" 
conduct  can  be  "  free ; "  that  nothing  which  can  be 
abstractedly  foreseen  can  be  the  result  of  freedom.  But 
Dr.  Ward  does  not,  and  cannot  maintain  this  view  con- 
sistently. He  admits  that,  "taking  any  given  man  at 
ciny  given  moment,  there  are  certain  things  so  good,  and 
certain  things  so  bad,  that  we  may  infallibly  calculate 
he  will  do  neither  the  one  nor  the  other."  Would 


NOTES.  421 


Dr.  Ward  then  admit  that  as  regards  those  "  very  bad," 
and  those  "  very  good,"  deeds,  this  man  is  not  "  free  ?" 
Or  does  he  think  he  escapes  this  difficulty,  by  putting 
the  man's  conduct  in  the  negative  instead  of  the  positive 
form  ?  As  regards  the  action  of  the  Will,  no  such  dis- 
tinction is  of  any  avail.  The  not  doing  one  thing  is  the 
doing  of  another.  The  not  doing  a  very  good  deed, 
which  he  has  power  to  do  ("  positis  omnibus  requisitis 
ad  agendum "),  is  willing  not  to  do  it.  The  not  doing 
a  very  bad  deed  is  willing  to  do  something  else.  If 
then  the  conduct  of  the  man  in  those  cases  "  can  be 
calculated  with  perfect  certainty,"  it  is  so  calculable 
only  because  knowledge  of  his  character  is  convertible 
into  knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which  his  Will  is  sure 
to  act.  Is  it  not  then  a  clear  violation,  both  of  the 
ordinary  and  of  I  lie  philosophical  use  of  language,  to  say 
that  a  man  is  not  *'  free  "  to  do  a  very  bad  act,  because 
we  know  certainly  beforehand  that  his  character,  and  the 
motives  on  which  he  habitually  acts,  will  prevent  him 
from  doing  it  ? 

But  then  Dr.  Ward  proceeds  to  argue  that  though  in- 
fallible calculation  may  be  possible  in  respect  to  deeds 
very  good,  and  very  bad,  it  will  not  be  possible  in 
regard  to  deeds  only  a  little  good  and  a  little  bad.  But 
how  does  this  greater  difficulty  arise  ?  Is  it  not  because 
the  number  of  motives  telling  on  the  Will  is  greater, 


422  NOTES. 


more  nicely  balanced,  and  therefore  less  known  ?  And 
is  not  this  difference  precisely  the  kind  of  difference 
which  would  disappear,  if  he  could  pass  from  know- 
ledge which  is  partial  only,  to  knowledge  which  is 
complete  and  absolute  ?  But  whatever  difficulty  may 
arise  from  imperfect  knowledge  is  (as  I  understand  the 
phrase)  eliminated  by  the  word  "  abstract,"  as  qualifying 
"  predictability."  No  one  asserts  that  prediction  can 
be  founded  on  partial  knowledge.  But  the  question 
raised  is  whether  even  perfect  knowledge  of  all  the 
elements  of  motive  and  of  character  can  render  pre- 
dictable the  conduct  of  a  really  Free  Agent.  The 
question  is  one  involving  a  logical  principle,  which, 
if  applicable  to  the  conduct  of  a  Free  Agent  in  any  case, 
must  be  equally  applicable  to  his  conduct  in  all  cases. 
If  it  is  abuse  of  terms,  or  a  confusion  of  thought,  to 
affirm  that  a  man's  Will  is  not  free  to  do  or  not  to  do 
very  bad  actions,  because  we  can  calculate  infallibly  the 
decision  of  his  Will  in  regard  to  them,  it  must  be  equally 
fallacious  to  affirm  that  his  Will  would  not  be  free  in 
regard  to  lesser  degrees  of  vice  and  virtue  if,  in  like 
manner,  we  were  able  from  perfect  knowledge  of  his  cha- 
racter to  predict  his  conduct  also  in  respect  to  them.  The 
doctrine  of  Free  Will,  like  every  other  doctrine  of  Mental 
Science,  can  only  be  defended  by  clear  definitions  of 
*  hat  it  is.  Its  defenders  have  in  my  opinion  established 


NOTES.  423 


their  case  when  they  have  compelled  Necessitarians 
to  discard  the  idea  of  compulsion.  All  attempts  to  deny 
that  the  Will  is  determined  by  "  motives  "  are  futile,  and 
only  result  in  giving  a  seeming  victory  to  those  who  have 
in  reality  been  defeated. 

In  order  to  illustrate  what  I  mean,  I  will  suppose  a 
particular  case;  and  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of 
Dr.  Ward's  argument,  it  shall  be  a  case  where  no  de- 
termination, either  very  good  or  very  bad,  is  involved. 
I  will  suppose  that  in  arguing  with  a  friend  on  the 
subject  of  Free  Will,  a  plate  of  oranges  is  offered  to 
me.  My  friend  tells  me  that  "  he  knows  which  of  these 
oranges  I  shall  choose."  I  tell  him  he  cannot  possibly 
know  this — that  my  Will  is  free,  and  therefore  he  cannot 
predict  my  choice.  He  insists  upon  it  that  he  can.  I 
then  observe  that  one  orange  has  a  smoother  skin  than 
the  others,  and  is  of  a  deeper  yellow  colour.  I  then 
recollect  that  I  had  once  mentioned  in  my  friend's 
hearing  that  I  considered  a  pale  colour,  or  a  rough 
skin,  as  indications  of  sour  or  tasteless  oranges ;  and 
remembering  this  fact,  I  at  once  perceive  that  my  friend 
is  calculating  my  conduct  from  a  motive  which,  as  he 
knows,  does  habitually  determine  my  choice  of  oranges. 
I  am  conscious  also  that  in  this  particular  case  I  should 
have  been  so  determined — if  this  dispute  had  not  arisen. 
But  in  order  to  show  my  friend  that  my  Will  is  really 


424  NOTES. 


free  from  this  power  of  "  motive,"  I  determine  to  exert 
that  freedom  by  choosing  the  palest,  or  the  roughest 
orange  in  the  plate,  and  I  accordingly  do  so.  This  is 
an  assertion  of  my  Free  Will — a  practical  denial  of  the 
doctrine  that  I  am  the  slave  of  "  motives."  But  is  it 
not  clear  in  this  case,  that  my  conduct  has  been  deter- 
mined after  all  only  by  another  and  a  stronger  motive 
than  the  one  which  usually  acts  with  me  in  the  matter 
—even  by  the  motive  of  proving  to  my  friend  that  he 
was  wrong,  and  that  I  was  right  ? — a  motive  which  is 
strong  with  all  men,  and  is  supposed  to  have  special 
attractions  for  a  Scotchman.  And  is  it  not  equally  clear, 
that  if  my  friend  had  had  more  perfect  knowledge  of 
my  character,  and  had  known  that  I  recollected  the 
former  conversation,  and  could  therefore  guess  the 
grounds  of  his  prediction,  he  might,  and  would  have 
been  able  to  foresee  correctly  the  new  motive  which 
had  thus  arisen  to  overpower  the  other?  And  finally, 
is  it  not  equally  evident  that,  if  he  had  been  able  by  this 
extraordinary  sagacity  to  predict  my  choice  correctly, 
the  correctness  of  that  prediction  would  not  have  im- 
plied the  existence  of  any  constraint  on  the  freedom  of 
my  Will,  but,  on  the  contrary,  would  have  been  founded 
on  his  knowledge  of  my  freedom  to  pass  from  the  old 
motive  and  to  give  effect  to  the  new  one  ?  •£* 

A  thousand  different  examples  of  the  same  kind  might 


NOTES.  4.25 


be  given.  That  on  which  the  Will  finally  determines  to 
act  may  always  be  called,  and  is  always  properly  called, 
a  motive.  And  this  is  observable  in  respect  to  the  whole 
question,  that  precisely  in  proportion  to  the  high  qualities 
of  any  given  mind — in  proportion  to  its  intellectual 
power  and  its  moral  strength — in  proportion  to  its  keen 
insight  into  the  causes  and  tendencies  of  things,  and  its 
appreciation  of  truth  and  righteousness — in  the  same 
proportion  will  the  distinction  vanish  in  its  eyes  between 
things  "  very  bad,"  and  things  only  a  little  bad.  In  the 
same  proportion,  therefore,  will  its  own  conduct  be 
guided  by  definite  and  certain  motives  :  in  the  same 
proportion,  finally,  will  that  conduct  become  predictable, 
because  in  the  exercise  of  its  freedom  it  is  governed  by 
moral  laws  which  never  change.  • 


426  NOTES. 


NOTE  G. — PAGE  306. 

Mr.  Mahaffy,  in  his  article  in  the  Contemporary 
Review,  has  taken  objection  to  the  breadth  of  meaning 
which  I  have  given  in  this  passage  to  the  word  "  motive." 
He  says,  I  have  "surely  fused  together  two  opposite 
theories  under  the  ambiguous  meaning  of  motive"  This 
is  precisely  what  I  have  done,  and  what  I  meant  to  do. 
I  adopt  all  that  I  consider  to  be  true  in  the  so-called 
Necessitarian  Doctrine,  which,  when  cleared  from  the 
idea  of  compulsion,  is  no  doctrine  of  necessity  at  all. 
The  residuum  of  truth  is,  that  the  Will  must  always  act 
on  some  motive.  I  have  taken  also  all  that  is  of  any 
value  in  the  Doctrine  of  Free  Will,  which  is — that  among 
the  "  motives "  of  the  mind  must  be  reckoned  those 
inducements  which  arise  out  of  its  higher,  as  well  as 
out  of  its  lower  faculties.  But  Mr.  Mahaffy  is,  in  my 
opinion,  clearly  wrong  when  he  objects  to  the  word 
"  motive  "  being  employed  with  this  breadth  of  meaning. 
His  objection  indeed  is  explained  to  be  that  the  word 
"  motive  "  ought  not  to  be  applied  to  the  "  action  of  the 
Will  upon  itself."  But  I  have  not  so  applied  it,  because 
I  have  no  notion  what  "  the  action  of  the  Will  upon  itself" 


NOTES.  427 


means.  Mr.  Mahaffy  gives  a  farther  explanation  of  this 
expression,  when  he  speaks  of  the  Will  "  creating  prin- 
ciples of  action  for  itself."  But  I  deny  altogether  that 
the  "  creating "  of  anything  is  the  function  of  the  Will. 
It  is  by  an  act  of  Will  that  we  fix  our  attention  upon  any 
given  motive,  or  turn,  on  the  contrary,  our  attention  from 
it.  But  if  we  are  to  analyse  the  mind  at  all,  if  for  the  con- 
venience of  thought  and  of  discussion,  we  are  to  divide  its 
inseparable  Unity  into  different  powers,  we  must  make  the 
division  as  logical  as  we  can — that  is,  as  consistent  as 
possible  with  definite  ideas  of  distinct  mental  functions. 
In  considering  the  Will  as  a  separate  Power,  we  must 
strictly  confine  it  to  what  may  be  called  the  Execu- 
tive of  the  Mind.  In  this  light  it  would  be  altogether 
incorrect  to  ascribe  the  "  creation"  of  any  motive  to  the 
Will.  Motives  of  all  kinds,  both  the  highest  and  the 
lowest,  may  rise,  and  do  rise  unbidden  in  the  mind.  It 
is  by  an  act  of  Will  that  we  summon  different  motives 
to  the  presence  of  the  Deliberative  Faculties,  that  we 
cherish  one  and  dismiss  another,  or  determine  to  spend 
thought  and  time  in  making  our  choice  between  motives 
which  are  conflicting.  But  the  Will  cannot  with  accu- 
racy be  said  to  be  the  creator  of  motives.  Intellectual 
and  moral  conceptions,  held  together  by  the  bonds  of 
Memory,  are  the  fountains  from  which  the  highest 
motives  come.  Mr.  Mahaffy  admits  that  "anything 


428  NOTES. 


brought  to  bear  upon  the  Will  from  without  itself,  even 
from  the  intellectual  part  of  the  mind,  is  a  motive." 
But  according  to  my  definition  of  the  Will  all  motives 
come  equally  from  outside  the  Will,  and  assuredly  I  see  no 
ground  for  the  distinction  Mr.  Mahaffy  seems  to  draw 
between  the  Intellectual  and  the  Moral  faculties.  In 
denying  the  name  of  motive  to  those  inducements  which 
come  from  the  affections  or  from  the  sense  of  right  and 
wrong,  he  imposes  a  restriction  on  the  meaning  of  the 
word  which  is  not  .less  inconsistent  with  common  usage 
than  with  philosophical  accuracy.  Affection  and  grati- 
tude, the  love  of  man  and  the  love  of  God,  are  all  surely 
"  motives  "  in  the  most  proper  sense  of  the  term.  Yet 
Mr.  Mahaffy  asks,  "  Is  it  not  an  abuse  of  language 
to  say  that  the  man  who  resists  temptation  by  creating 
within  his  breast  a  strong  feeling  of  moral  responsibility 
is  determined  by  motives  ? "  To  this  question  I  reply 
at  once  (passing  over  the  question  of  the  "  creation  "  of 
motives)  that  it  is  no  abuse  of  language,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  the  employment  of  language  in  its  natural  and 
ordinary  sense.  On  what  principle  is  the  love  of  know- 
ledge (being  intellectual)  to  be  called  a  motive,  if  the 
love  of  God  is  not?  On  what  principle  is  a  desire 
of  producing  physical  results  to  be  called  a  motive,  if 
the  desire  of  attaining  moral  ends  is  denied  the  name  ? 
No  such  distinction  is  tenable  in  a  philosophical  point 


NOTES.  429 


of  view,  and  no  such  distinction  is  known  in  the  usual 
and  familiar  employment  of  the  word  "motive."  Mr. 
Mahaffy,  however,  in  making  this  objection,  has  put  his 
finger  upon  the  point  on  which  the  whole  discussion 
turns.  Like  many  other  metaphysical  questions,  it 
depends  almost  entirely  on  a  definition  of  terms.  If 
the  word  "motive"  be  arbitrarily  limited  to  mental 
affections  of  one  or  two  particular  kinds,  if  it  be  con- 
fined to  the  lower  appetites  and  desires,  or  even  if  it  be 
extended  to  the  higher  appetites  of  the  Intellect,  whilst 
it  is  denied  to  the  inducements  of  morality,  of  con- 
science, of  Religion, — then  it  ceases  to  be  true  that  the 
mind  is  determined  by  motives  alone.  The  result  is 
that  the  so-called  "Necessitarian"  Doctrine,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  true  at  all,  must  not  only  exclude  the  idea  of 
compulsion,  but  it  must  include  all  that  class  of  induce- 
ments, on  the  pre-existence  of  which,  and  on  the  power 
of  choice  among  them,  the  responsibility  of  the  Will 
depends. 

The  view  presented  in  the  text  of  the  great  question 
of  Necessity  and  Free  Will  does  fuse  together  some 
portions  of  the  two  opposite  Theories  which  have  so 
long  divided  men's  minds  regarding  it.  But  in  this  fusion 
I  do  but  follow  the  process  pursued  by  Dante  in  a  pro- 
found and  beautiful  passage  of  his  "  Purgatorio"  (Canto 
1 8th).  To  Necessity  he  ascribes  the  existence  and  the 


430  NOTES. 


power  of  Motive.  Motives  arise  out  of  the  relations 
pre-established  between  the  Human  Spirit  and  all  the 
Influences  by  which  it  is  surrounded.  No  other  account 
can  be  given  of  them.  Dante  sees  no  difficulty,  as  some 
modern  defenders  of  the  Free  Will  doctrine  do,  in  com- 
paring the  ultimate  nature  and  origin  of  all  our  mental 
desires  with  the  nature  and  origin,  equally  inexplicable, 
cf  the  Instincts  of  the  lower  animals.  Hear  the  lines, 
not  less  musical  in  sense  than  they  are  in  sound — 

"  Per6,  la  onde  venga  lo  intelletto 
Delle  prime  notizie,  uomo  non  sape 
E  de'  primi  appetibili  1'affetto ; 
Che  sono  in  voi,  si  come  studio  in  ape 
Di  far  lo  mele." 

To  Free  Will  he  ascribes  the  power  of  Counsel — of 
deliberation  and  of  choice  among  the  motives  which 
thus  arise  from  the  very  nature  and  constitution  of  the 
Mind.  This  power  guards  the  "  Threshold  of  Assent :" — 

"  Innata  v'e  la  virtu  die  consiglia, 
E  dell'  assenso  de'  tener  la  soglia." 

On  this  power  depends  the  responsibility  of  con- 
duct : — 

"  Quest'  e'l  principio  la  onde  si  piglia 
Cagion  di  meritare  in  voi,  secondo 
Che  buoni  amori  o  rei  accoglie  c  viglia.  , 


NOTES.  431 


The  passage  closes  with  these  beautiful  and  striking 
lines : — 

"  Color  die  ragionando  andaro  al  fondo 
S'accorser  d'esta  innata  libertate ; 
Pero  moralita  lasciaro  al  mondo. 
Onde  pognam  che  di  necessitate 
Surga  ogni  amor,  che  dentro  a  voi  s'accende  ;  ' 
Di  ritenerlo  e  in  voi  la  potestate." 

It  would  be  difficult  to  give  so  much  philosophy  in 
fewer  words. 


432  NOTES, 


NOTE  H. — PAGE  309. 

In  the  last  edition  of  Mr.  Mill's  work  (1867),  he  has 
made  an  addition  to  the  sentence  quoted  in  the  text, 
so  that  it  now  runs  thus  : — "  I  deny  it  as  strenuously  as 
any  one,  in  the  case  of  human  volitions,  but  I  deny  it 
just  as  much  of  all  other  phenomena"  If  Mr.  Mill  means, 
by  this  addition,  to  imply  that  he  can  deny  compulsion 
(for  example)  in  the  behaviour  of  a  billiard-ball,  when 
it  is  struck,  "  just  as  much "  as  he  can  deny  it,  of  the 
behaviour  of  a  man  when  he  is  insulted,  he  renders  his 
previous  explanation  valueless,  and  restores  again  to  the 
doctrine  of  Necessity  that  very  element  of  meaning  which 
he  professes  to  disclaim.  Compulsion  is  predicable  of 
the  effects  of  Physical  Force  exerted  upon  Matter,  in  a 
sense  in  which  it  is  not  predicable  of  the  effects  of  Moral 
or  Intellectual  inducements  exerted  upon  Mind.  This  is 
precisely  the  distinction  which  Necessitarians  are  per- 
petually confounding ;  and  so  long  as  they  do  confound 
it,  their  doctrine  is  justly  open  to  the  objection  implied 
in  the  name  usually  assigned  to  it.  Even  if  it  be  true, 
as  Mr.  Mill  holds,  that  we  have  no  other  idea  of 
Physical  Causation  than  that  of  uniform  and  invariable 


NOTES.  433 


sequence, — no  idea  of  Necessity  in  Causation, — still  it 
remains  true  that  Compulsion  is,  apparently  to  us, 
involved  in  the  effects  of  Physical  Forces  upon  Matter, 
in  a  sense  in  which  it  is  not  involved  in  the  effects 
of  "Motive"  upon  Mind. 


INDEX, 


ABORTED  Limbs  in  various  ani- 
mals, 194-5  J  Member,  no,  in 
man,  201  ;  Organs,  to  be  read 
either  in  the  light  of  History, 
or  of  Prophecy,  205  ;  Organs, 
existence  of,  the  fact  most  diffi- 
cult to  disengage  from  the 
Theory  of  Development,  266. 

Abstract  Conceptions,  Law  as 
applied  to,  65  ;  Men's  Idols 
nowadays  their  own,  1 1 2. 

Acland,  Dr.  H.  W.  on  "  Pur- 
pose,"  83. 

"  Act  of  Parliament,  you  cannot 
make  men  moral  by,"  in  what 
sense  a  truism,  in  what  a  fal- 
lacy, 365. 

Adapted  Colouring  in  the  Ani- 
mal Kingdom,  177,  et  seq. 

"Adherence  to  Type,"  in  the 
nature  of  a  Mental  Purpose, 
259  ;  these  words  express  a 
Purpose  fulfilled  in  Organic 
Forms,  270. 

Adjusted  Organs,  Man's  want 
of  certain,  295  ;  Forces,  how 
fai  our  Volitions  are  subject 
to,  322. 

Adjustment,  Principle  of,  no 
meaning  except  as  the  result 
of  Purpose,  78 ;  fundamental 
Principles  of,  never  altered 
through  the  whole  scale  oi 
Organic  Life,  269 ;  as  applied 
to  the  Mental  Faculties,  283  ; 


how  Watt  subjected  the  in- 
variable energies  of  Steam  to 
the  variable  conditions  of, 
340 ;  Variability  of,  in  the 
facts  of  Nature,  389. 

Adjustments  of  Organization, 
phenomena  of  Mind  mediately 
dependent  on,  294. 

Affections,  the,  dependent  on 
material  structure,  278. 

African  Savages  debating  a  great 
Homological  Cj.  stion,  198. 

Agassiz'  Geological  Sketches, 
269. 

Air,  Navigation  of  the,  a  beau- 
tiful example  of  Animal  Me- 

•  chanics,  129  ;  Elasticity  of,  the 
Law  which,  in  the  flight  f 
birds,  counteracts  gravid, 
132  ;  French  scientific  men 
advance  of  English  on  the 
subject  of  locomotion  in, 
170. 

Albatross,  the  mechanism  of 
flight  in,  150;  the  flight  M, 
described,  152  ;  how  it  sails  or 
wheels  round  a  ship,  154. 

Ammonites,  great  beauty  of,  189. 

Analogy  between  the  operation:; 
of  God  and  the  operations  of 
men's  minds,  illustrated  by 
every  known  instance  of  Con- 
trivance, 128. 

Analogy  in  Use  and  Homolcgy 
in  Structure,  199. 
F  F  2 


436 


INDEX. 


Ancient  Lawgivers  always  aim- 
ing at  Standards  of  Political 
Society,  326. 

Andes,  the,  species  of  Humming 
Birds  peculiar  to,  228. 

Angrctfcum  Scsqnipedale ;  see 
Madagascar  Orchis,  44. 

Animal  Creation,  the  Power  of 
God  as  manifested  in  ;  Pro- 
fessor Owen's  work  quoted, 
263. 

Animals,  a  definite  Pattern  for 
each  class  of,  211. 

Antecedents,  no  phenomena, 
mental  or  physical,  without, 

3r3- 
Anthropoid  Apes,  skeletons  of, 

265. 
Apprenticeship,  earlier  mills 

worked  under    a   system   of, 

348. 
Apteryx,  useless  wing-bones  in, 

195- 

Archetypal  arrangement  in  Or- 
chids, 44. 

Argus  Pheasant,  193. 

Aristotle,    Philosophy  of,    328- 

33°- 

Ark wright,  344,  347. 

Ashley,  Lord,  first  effectual  mea- 
sure on  the  Factory  Question 
passed  through  the  exertions 
of,  362. 

Asiatic  Deserts,  Sand-grouse  of, 
their  colouring,  182. 

Assimilative  Colouring  not  ex- 
tended to  Woodpeckers,  1 79. 

Association,  conditions  under 
which  the  spirit  it  evokes  be- 
comes a  new  "  Law,"  370. 

Associations,  higher  rates  of 
wages  established  under,  than 
under  unrestricted  competi- 
tion, 378. 

Astronomy,  according  to  Sir 
G.  C.  Lewis,  an  interest  almost 
purely  scientific  belonging 


to,  12  ;  Sir  J.  Herschel's  Out- 
lines of,  122. 

Atheism,  false  charge  of,  against 
Professor  Huxley,  89. 

Atmosphere,  the,  resisting  force 
of,  to  a  body  moving  through 
it,  131. 

Automatic  Faculties  in  Mind  as 
well  as  in  Body,  292. 

"Azoic"  Rocks,  the  Rhizopods 
discovered  near  the  very  low- 
est of,  210. 

B. 

Backward  flight  in  a  bird,  why 
impossible,  140. 

Bacon  quoted,  4. 

Baking  Trade,  the,  in  Edinburgh 
and  Glasgow,  good  effects  of 
combination  in,  378. 

Bats'  finger-bones,  how  modified, 
169. 

Beauty,  love  of,  a  purpose  we  see 
fulfilled  in  Nature,  271. 

Being,  the  great  mystery  of  our, 
272. 

Beliefs,  intelligent  spiritual,  only 
widened  by  the  progress  of 
Physical  Science,  1 14. 

Biblical  Narrative  of  Creation, 
the,  room  left  in  it  for  a 
Material  Process,  27. 

Bilateral  Arrangement  of  Or- 
ganisms, 247. 

Bird,  a,  and  a  Balloon,  difference 
between,  130. 

Birds,  aerial  evolutions  of,  made 
possible  by  weight,  not  buoy- 
ancy, 142;  condition  of  the 
atmosphere  indispensable  to 
the  soaring  of,  143 ;  bones 
of,  lighter  and  more  hollow 
than  those  of  mammals,  145  ; 
stationary  power  of,  on  what 
it  depends,  160 ;  the  Hum- 
ming, furnish  the  most  rc« 


INDEX. 


437 


markable  examples  of  the  ma- 
chinery of  flight,  166  ;  species 
of,  amongst  which  the  law  of 
assimilative  colouring  almost 
exclusively  prevails,  181  ; 
bright  colours  and  conspi- 
cuous ornaments  in  male,  247. 
"  Blessed  Light  of  Science,"  the, 

385. 

Bodies,  our,  seem  part  of  the 
external  world  to  us,  276. 

Body,  Congenital  Habits  of  the, 
connected  with  Congenital 
Habits  of  tne  Mind,  300. 

Body  Politic,  the,  Verification 
drawn  by  Adam  Smith  from 
the  complicated  phenomena 
of,  341. 

Borelli's  erroneous  theory  of 
steerage  in  flight,  163. 

Brain,  the,  no  additional  know- 
ledge gained  by  proving  the 
connexion  between  any  one 
mental  faculty  and  a  special 
bit  of,  280  ;  changes  in  the 
substance  and  structure  of, 
cause  of  changes  in  the 
character  of  the  Mind,  278; 
how  Thought  is  a  Function 
of,  279  ;  exertion  of,  like 
the  exertion  of  a  Muscle, 
285. 

Butler,  Bishop,  on  our  ignorance 
of  God's  notion  of  means  and 
ends,  80. 

Butler's,  Bishop,  position,  that 
all  the  truths  and  difficulties  of 
Religion  have  their  type  in 
Natures,  26. 


Carpenter,  Dr.  on  Life  prece- 
ding Organization,  llS. 

Cartwright,  344. 

Cats,  blue  iris  in,  associated  with 
deafness,  247 ;  tortoiseshcll 


colour  in,  associated  with  the 
female  sex,  247. 

Causation  of  the  World,  the, 
agency  of  Man's  Mind  and 
Will,  the  first  and  foremost 
agency  in,  6. 

Central  America,  Orchids  in  the 
forests  of,  227. 

"Cerebration,  "philosophers  who 
fancy  Thought  is  explained  by 
calling  it,  282. 

Cerebral  Organization,  ascending 
scale  of,  coincident  with  as- 
cending scale  of  Mental  capa- 
city, 279. 

Chadwick,  Mr.  on  Insurance  of 
ships  and  cargoes  as  relaxing 
the  motives  of  self-interest, 
366. 

Chameleon,  the,  177- 

Chance,  no  such  thing  as,  a  ne- 
cessary truth,  312. 

"Changeable  Wills,"  Comte's 
confused  idea  of  phenomena 
not  being  governed  by, 

319. 
Chemical  Combination,  laws  of, 

amongst   the  most  wonderful 

and  beautiful,  94. 
Children  in  Factories,  liable  to 

dismissal  if  properly  cared  for 

by  their  parents,  353. 
Christian   miracles,    the  idea  of 

Law  made  the  very  basis  of, 

24. 
Christianity,  what  lies  at  its  root, 

according   to  M.    Guizot,    I  ; 

Gibbon's   attempt  to  account 

for  the  spread  of,  by  natural 

causes,   20;  does  not  require 

a  belief  in  any  exception   to 

the   universal    prevalence    of 

Law,  51. 
Cicero,  De  Nat.  Dear,  201,  284, 

357- 

Circulation  of  the  Blood  not  dis- 
covered before  the  discovery 


438 


INDEX. 


of  much  concerning  the  circu- 
lation of  the  Planets,  276. 

Civilization,  Modern,  its  deve- 
lopment and  growth,  388. 

Classification,  the  marshalling  of 
physical  facts  in  an  ideal  order, 
the  basis  of  Science,  84. 

Coal,  how  correlated  with  the 
needs  and  powers  of  man, 
260 ;  these  external  correla- 
tions of,  arise  out  of  Internal 
Correlations,  261. 

Cobbett,  on  the  opposition  to 
the  restrictive  measures  which 
were  proposed  by  Sir  R.  Peel 
the  Elder,  352. 

Cogilo,  ergo  sum,  7. 

Colour,  power  in  fish  to  change 
rapidly,  177;  determined  in 
young  animals  through  the 
eyes  of  the  female  parent,  178. 

Colouring,  adapted,  in  the  Ani- 
mal Kingdom,  object  of,  177; 
apparent  rule  under  which  ap- 
plied, 178;  assimilated,  not 
extended,  as  Mr.  Darwin  fan- 
cies, to  Green  Woodpeckers, 
179. 

Combe,  Dr.  A.  on  our  ignorance 
of  how  the  Brain  operates  in 
generating  Thought,  284. 

Combination  and  affinity  in  Che- 
mistry, laws  of,  67,  94. 

Combination, — in  Nature,  for  the 
accomplishment  of  Purpose, 
79 ;  this  an  ascertained  fact  in 
Science,  85  ;  and  adjustment 
as  regards  the  phenomena  of 
the  Mind,  274;  coming  in 
the  place  of  Positive  Institu- 
tion, 372 ;  resort  to,  for 
the  protection  of  labour,  re- 
commended by  reason  and 
experience,  373;  all  this  true 
universally  of  the  principle  of, 
but  not  true  universally  of  the 
particular  purposes  to  which  ap- 


plied,  374;  its  history  amongst 
the  Working  Classes,  until  re- 
cently a  sad  history  of  mis- 
directed effort,  374 ;  desire 
for,  and  need  of,  grows  with 
the  growth  of  knowledge,  and 
with  the  increasing  complica- 
tions of  society,  376 ;  business 
of,  in  some  things,  to  subor- 
dinate the  individual  class, 
377 ;  what  sets  bounds  to, 
379  ;  most  important  objects 
of,  amongst  the  first  duties  of 
organized  society,  381  ;  con- 
ditions under  which  it  may 
blend  the  functions,  and  unite 
the  profits,  of  Capital  and 
Labour,  a  question  to  be  de- 
termined by  Natural  Laws 
not  yet  explained  or  under- 
stood, 381. 

Combinations  of  Force,  having 
reference  to  the  fulfilment  of 
Purpose  or  the  discharge  of 
Function,  65. 

Combinations,  limits  of,  as  af- 
fecting rewards  of  Labour, 
378. 

"  Comet  "  Humming  Bird,  233. 

Commercial  Policy,  Modern,  its 
central  idea,  337. 

Common  Words,  pestilent  fault 
of  using  them  in  an  artificial 
sense,  318. 

Community  of  Aspect  in  created 
Things,  what  it  suggests, 
224. 

Comparative  Anatomy,  Profes- 
sor Owen  on,  102;  Professor 
Huxley  on,  119. 

Competition,  International,  be- 
tween Capitalists,  arguments 
based  on,  354. 

Competition,  the  "Law"  of,  re- 
sults in  excessive  labour,  372. 

Competitive  Industry,  inevitable 
track  of,  359. 


INDEX. 


439 


Comte,  Atiguste,  on  "Change- 
able Wills,"  319. 

Conditions,  favourable,  useless- 
ness  of  direct  appeals  to  men's 
faculties  and  feelings  when 
these  have  not  been  placed 
under,  325  ;  external,  which 
tell  on  the  individual  Will, 
are  but  conditions  depending 
on  the  aggregate  Will  of  those 
around  us,  367. 

"  Coney  "  of  Scripture,  the,  248. 

Congenital  Constitution,  charac- 
ter of  Mind  determined  by, 
301. 

Conscience,  how  man,  unlike 
the  lower  animals,  can  bring 
his  motives  to  the  test  of,  306. 

Consciousness,  direct  evidence 
of,  large  class  of  phenomena 
beyond  the,  286. 

Conservation  of  Energy,  modern 
doctrine  of,  122. 

Constancy  in  Nature  not  incom- 
patible with  the  energies  of 
Will,  389. 

Constitution  and  Course  of 
Things,  the  whole,  under  what 
conditions  it  would  receive  an 
earlier  fulfilment,  385. 

Constitution  of  the  Universe, 
the,  man's  faculty  of  Contri- 
vance, the  nearest  analogy  by 
which  to  understand,  390. 

Contractions,  muscular,  two 
kinds  of,  stand  near  the  origin 
of  all  we  do,  292;  of  the 
Brain,  probably  stand  near  the 
origin  of  all  we  think,  292. 

Contrivance,  in  Orchids,  to  be 
traced  as  clearly  as  in  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  a  steam-engine, 

Contrivance  and  Adjustment, 
doctrine  of,  not  so  metaphy- 
sical as  the  doctrine  of  Homo- 
logies,  83. 


Contrivance,  the  word,  impossi- 
bility of  dispensing  with  it  iu 
describing  physical  pheno- 
mena, 90;  what  is?  127;  in 
Nature,  never  reduced  to  a 
single  Purpose,  186;  happiest 
achievements  of  the,  have 
their  own  aspects  of  apparent 
danger,  375. 

"Coquette"  Humming  Bird, 
the,  Principle  of  ornament  in, 

233. 

Correlation  of  Growth,  the,  Mr. 
Darwin's  idea  of,  241  ;  has  a 
deeper  significance  than  this, 
242  ;  in  another  and  higher 
sense,  244;  in  its  simplest 
form,  and  in  visible  connexion 
with  its  immediate  cause,  245  ; 
having  reference  to  certain 
mental  purposes,  245 ;  two 
entirely  separate  classes  of 
phenomena  grouped  by  Mr. 
Darwin  under  the  name  of, 
246 ;  general  impression  left 
by  the  observance  of  organic, 
249  ;  required  in  the  establish- 
ment of  a  new  form  of  Life, 
250;  high  and  complex,  the 
most  constant  and  obvious  of 
all  the  facts  of  Nature,  251  ; 
apparent,  between  webbed 
feet  and  spoon-shaped  bills, 
252;  real,  between  both  these 
conditions  and  external  con- 
ditions of  Life,  252 ,  between 
a  particular  kind  of  feather 
and  a  particular  member  of 
the  body,  in  all  birds  capable 
of  flight,  254;  in  all  birds, 
between  the  auricular  feaihers 
and  the  ear -bones,  254;  In- 
ternal, in  Nature,  entirely  sub- 
ordinate to  External,  25  ^  ; 
External  correlation  between 
the  Retina  and  certain  vi- 
brations, 257;  as  connected 


440 


INDEX. 


with  Origin  of  Species,  259; 
Forces  of,  in  flowers,  indepen- 
dent, as  Mr.  Darwin  admits, 
of  Natural  Selection,  267; 
inference  from  this  admission 
concerning,  a  time  before  Na- 
tural Selection  had  room  to 
play,  267;  External,  between 
the  Mind  and  the  Things 
around  it,  296. 

Correspondences,  perception  of, 
as  much  a  fact  as  the  sight,  or 
touch,  of  the  things  in  which 
they  appear,  33. 

Cotopaxi,  special  forms  of  Hum- 
ming Birds,  peculiar  to,  228. 

Creation, — of  Man,  the,  out  of 
"the  dust  of  the  ground,"  an 
indication  of  the  personal 
agency  of  God,  27  ;  the  em- 
bodiment of  a  Divine  Idea, 
30  ;  work  of,  carried  on  under 
rules  of  adherence  to  Typical 
Forms,  76;  history  of,  "an 
Observed  Order  of  Facts"  in, 
209;  by  Law,  idea  of,  on 
what  founded,  212  ;  adaptation 
and  arrangement  of  Natural 
Forces,  in  what  sense  of  the 
Nature  of,  216  ;  idea  of 
centres  of,  suggested  by  the 
geographical  distribution  of 
Humming  Birds,  225  ;  by  Law, 
only  senses  in  which  we  get  a 
glimpse  of  it  from  the  theory 
of  Natural  Selection,  261; 
spoken  of  as  not  Creation, 
unless  it  work  from  nothing 
as  its  material,  and  by  nothing 
as  its  means,  262 ;  doctrine  of, 
only  possible  serious  adver- 
saries of,  262 ;  by  Birth,  how 
it  explains  the  existence  of 
useless  organs,  266 ;  nearest 
methods  of,  probably  behind  a 
veil  too  thick  for  man  to 
penetrate,  273. 


Creative  Power,  the  rule  which 
seems  to  have  guided,  in  the 
origin  of  New  Species,  229. 

Creeds,  decay  in,  resulting  from 
dissociating  in  the  popular 
exposition  of  them  the  doc- 
trines of  Religion  from  the 
analogy  and  course  of  Nature, 
52. 

Crompton,  344,  347. 

Custom  and  Traditional  Opinion, 
on  the  facts  of  Nature  and 
Human  Life,  as  seen  through 
the  dulled  eyes  of,  384; 

Cuvier's  Science  of  Homologies, 
197. 

Cynanthus  Humming  Bird,  or- 
nament in  the,  changing  from 
blue  to  green,  239. 

D. 

Darwin,  Mr.  his  conclusion  as 
to  "silent  members,"  32  ;  his 
work  on  the  fertilization  ot 
Orchids,  37  ;  answers  the 
question  of  Intention  with 
precision  and  success,  38 ; 
fails  to  solve  the  question,  out 
of  what  "primordial  ele- 
ments" the  parts  of  the  Or- 
chis were  developed,  38 ;  idea 
of  special  use  as  the  control- 
ling principle  of  construction 
never  absent  from  his  mind, 
40  ;  his  reduction  of  the  forms 
of  Orchids  to  the  archetypal 
arrangement  of  Threes  within 
Threes,  44 ;  cannot  con- 
ceive how  a  voltaic  battciy 
can  be  made  out  of  the  tissues 
of  a  fish,  104 ;  his  curious 
mistake  concerning  Green 
Woodpeckers,  1 76 ;  his  re- 
ference to  the  discovery  of 
"  Rhizopods  "  near  the  bottom 
of  "Azoic"  Rocks,  210;  his 


INDEX. 


441 


theory  of  Development  sug- 
gests less  of  anything  ap- 
proaching to  a  Law  in  Crea- 
tion than  did  the  earlier 
theories,  214;  his  theory  of 
Development,  to  what  extent 
an  established  scientific  truth, 
219;  his  theory  self-con- 
demned, 22O ;  claims  for  it 
a  wider  range  than  belongs  to 
it,  220 ;  mere  advantage,  in 
Mr.  Darwin's  sense,  not  the 
rule  in  the  Origin  of  New 
Species  in  Humming  Birds, 
229 ;  his  theory  does  not  ac- 
count for  the  origin  or  spread 
of  Humming  Birds,  234 ;  offers 
no  explanation  how  new  Births 
may  be  the  means  of  intro- 
ducing New  Species,  239  ;  his 
theory  on  Natural  Selection 
has  no  bearing  on  the  Origin 
of  Species,  240  ;  admits  that 
the  doctrine  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion "  takes  cognizance  of  Va- 
riations only  after  they  have 
arisen,  and  regards  Variation 
as  due  to  chance,"  240; 
groups  under  the  name  "  Cor- 
relation of  Growth "  two 
classes  of  phenomena,  en- 
tirely separate  in  idea,  246 ; 
shows  how  an  improved  Bill, 
once  produced,  will  be  pre- 
served, 251  ;  on  the  phrase 
"Adherence  to  Type,"  259; 
on  Inheritance,  what  it  is,  264. 

Decaying  fallen  leaves,  imitation, 
of,  in  the  Woodcock's  plu- 
mage, 182. 

Design  and  Mental  Purpose, 
exhibited  in  the  Correlation  of 
the  Retina  with  certain  vibra- 
tions, 257. 

Detected  Method  in  Nature,  the 
Ultimate  Question,  above  and 
behind  every,  272. 


Development,  Hypotheses  of, 
the,  in  the  form  which  they 
have  as  yet  assumed,  are  de- 
prived of  all  scientific  basis, 
29  ;  theories  of,  what  they  have 
simply  been,  31  ;  theories, 
idea  common  to  all,  that  a 
new  species  is  simply  an  un- 
usual birth,  214 ;  Mr.  Dar- 
win's theory  of,  difference  be- 
tween it  and  other  theories  of 
development,  218;  of  Man's 
Nature,  boundless  discoveries 
open  to  those  who  would  in- 
vestigate the  laws  governing 
the,  325  ;  and  growth  of 
Modern  Civilization,  388. 

Diatomacea:,  190. 

Digestive  Organs,  the,  Mechan- 
ism of  the,  extends  through  a 
long  range  of  Creation,  269. 

Discovery,  outbreak  of  old  De- 
lusions on  every  fresh,  113; 
the  most  striking  thing  in  the 
history  of,  383. 

Disease  brings  out  correlations 
not  perceived  in  health,  247. 

Divine  Government,  Divine 
Thoughts,  Divine  Purposes, 
and  Divine  Affections,  rules 
and  principles  of,  53. 

Divine  Will,  the  ONE  FORCK, 
perhaps,  in  itself  a  mode  of 
action  of  the,  127. 

Diving  Birds,  Correlation  in,  253. 


Economic    Error   of    the    Old 

Commercial  Systems,  362. 
Economic  Science,  Combination 

involves  ho  Rebellion  against 

the  Laws  of,  373. 
Economists,  Political,  hostile  to 

Restriction,  362. 
Electric   Ray,  or    Torpedo,    an 

instance  of  an   extraordinary 


442 


INDEX. 


result  produced  by  a  common 
law  yoked  to  extraordinary 
conditions,  101  ;  Fish  and 
Electric  Telegraph,  absolute 
necessity  of  conforming  to  de- 
finite conditions  in  making 
each,  1 02 ;  Telegraph,  the, 
Babbage's  Calculating  Ma- 
chine, the  Steam  Engine,  and 
the  Solar  System,  all  work  by 
Natural  Consequence,  107. 

Everlasting  Will,  the,  some  pur- 
pose of  it  to  be  seen  working 
everywhere,  123. 

Experience,  Association,  or  In- 
tuition, origin  of  our  ideas 
how  far  due  respectively  to, 
289  ;  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  on,  290. 

Explanation,  the  mere  ticketing 
and  orderly  assortment  of  exter- 
nal facts,  not,  3  ;  what  it  is,  79. 

External  Correlations  provided 
beforehand  by  Utility,  256 ; 
Elements  of  Nature,  our  com- 
mand over  the,  in  advance  of 
our  command  over  the  re- 
sources of  Human  Character, 
384. 

"Eyes"  in  the  wing  of  the 
Argus  Pheasant,  compared  to 
the  "ball  and  socket"  orna- 
ment in  Art,  193. 

F. 

Fact,  Purpose  not  an  Inference 
merely,  but  a,  82  ;  Purpose  as 
a  general  Inference,  and  as  a 
particular,  distinction  between 
them  not  sufficiently  observed, 

83- 

Facts,  the,  of  Function,  consti- 
tute not  Final,  but  Immediate 
Purpose,  8 1  ;  Man  controls, 
only  because  he  interferes  with 
Laws,  318  ;  Men  always  try- 
ing to  evolve  out  of  their  own 


minds  knowledge  only  to  be 
acquired  by  patient  inquiry 
into,  326. 

Factories,  effects  of  "free"  la- 
bour in,  351  ;  Labour  of 
children  in,  in  what  sense 
"free,"  353;  in  what  sense 
not  "  free,"  353  ;  Owners 
of,  powerful  motives  in  opera- 
tion on  the,  353  ;  Inspectors 
of,  in  1864,  359. 

Factory  System,  the,  how  it 
arose,  344;  Act  of  1802,  in 
what  sense  invaluable,  350 ; 
Acts,  false  intellectual  con- 
ceptions at  the  bottom  of  op- 
position to,  352  ;  Acts,  the, 
the  first  Legislative  recognition 
of,  a  great  Natural  Law  quite 
as  important  as  Freedom  of 
Trade,  360  ;  Legislation,  Pro- 
gress of  Political  Science  in 
nothing  happier  than  in,  364  ; 
Combination  effects  a  higher 
good  than  that  resulting  from, 
372. 

Fallacies,  Verbal,  of  Mr.  Man- 
sel  exposed  by  Mr.  Mill,  310. 

False  Theory  and  mistaken  Con- 
duct found  out  by  the  working 
of  Natural  Consequence,  362. 

Feather,  Wing,  a  production 
wholly  unlike  any  other  ani- 
mal growth,  1 68. 

Feathers,  of  a  bird's  wing,  three- 
fold division  of  the,  155  ;  one 
fundamental  plan  in,  253. 

Final  ends  not  to  be  seen,  80. 

Fish,  power  of  many,  to  change 
colour  rapidly,  177. 

Flight,  the  true  Theory  of,  may 
be  tested  by  the  eye,  139. 

Fly  Shuttle  in  Weaving,  inven- 
tion of  the,  the  impulse  it 
gave,  346. 

Flying  Animal,  no,  lighter  tlian 
the  air  it  moves  in,  146. 


INDEX. 


443 


Foraminifcra,  119. 

Force,  or  Forces,  an  Observed 
Order  of  Facts  is  the  Index 
and  the  Result  of  the  work- 
ing of  some,  68  ;  the  Law  of 
Gravitation  is  that,  the  exact 
measure  of  whose  operation 
was  numerically  ascertained 
by  Newton,  69  ;  each,  if  left 
to  itself,  would  be  destructive 
of  the  Universe,  91  ;  what  is 
it?  119;  the  idea  of,  traced 
to  its  Fountain  Head,  I2O; 
ONE,  all  Natural  Forces  re- 
solvable perhaps  into,  127  ; 
this,  perhaps,  in  itself  a  mode 
of  action  of  the  Divine  Will, 
127  ;  of  Gravitatvpn,  the  most 
familiar  of  all  Forces  in  all 
Ages,  129  ;  this  Force, 
chiefly  that  concerned  in  flight, 
130;  or  Forces,  to  which  the 
phenomena  of  Life  can  be 
traced,  no  knowledge  of  the, 
212  ;  a,  emanating  from  Exter- 
nal things,  and  moulding  the 
structure  of  an  organism  in 
harmony  with  themselves,  no 
conception  of,  251  ;  Furnisher 
of,  no  substance  comparable 
as  a,  to  Coal,  260 ;  One,  the 
source  and  centre  of  the  rest, 
275  ;  ultimate  seat  of,  the,  we 
know  nothing  directly  of,  275  ; 
nearest  conception  of  this  de- 
rived from  our  own  conscious- 
ness, 275;  or  Power,  developed 
through  an  organ,  not  identi- 
cal with  that  organ,  279 ; 
or  Forces,  implied  in  an 
"Observed  Order  of  Facts," 
283  ;  Expenditure  of,  in  severe 
Thinking,  284. 

Forces,  Correlation  of,  modern 
doctrine  of  the,  6  ;  Law  as 
applied  to  individual,  the 
measure  of  whose  operation 


has  been  more  or  less  de- 
nned, or  ascertained,  65  ; 
Law  in  its  most  habitual 
sense,  as  Natur?1,  related  to 
Purpose,  and  subvervient  to 
the  discharge  of  Function,  79  > 
irresistible  tendency  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Science  to  personify, 
89 ;  no  phenomena  visible  to 
man  governed  by  /^variable, 
but  by  variable  combinations  of 
invariable  forces,  98  ;  Con- 
vertibility of,  modern  doctrine 
of  the,  122 ;  Natural,  Law 
in  what  sense  the  co-operation 
of,  working  together  for  ful- 
filment of  obvious  Intention, 
216;  Vital,  how  made  to 
evolve  a  new  Form  of  Life, 
261  ;  all,  in  their  mutual  re- 
lations, governed  by  principles 
of  arrangement  purely  Mental, 
275  ;  Material,  manifestations 
of  mental  Energy  and  Will, 
275  ;  apparent  barrier  against 
our  conceiving  how  any  com- 
bination of,  can  resuli  in  mind, 
284 ;  Material,  misconception 
of,  285  ;  Immaterial,  working 
in  matter,  285  ;  Bystanders 
often  see  the,  telling  on  our 
Wills,  more  clearly  than  we 
do  ourselves,  288  ;  Action  of, 
on  our  minds,  how  to  be 
traced,  289  ;  aggregate  of 
what,  may  be  called  the  Laws 
which  determine  hum  an  action 
and  opinions,  303  ;  or  Laws 
which  operate  on  the  Mind, 
exceedingly  difficult  to  reduce 
them  in  their  boundless  variety 
to  system,  303 ;  our  Volitions 
how  far  subject  to  adjusted, 
322  ;  the  fixedness  of  all,  in 
one  sense,  coi  otitutes  their  in- 
finite pliability  in  another, 
323;  of  Nature,  one  of  the 


INDEX. 


most  tremendous  of  the,  re- 
duced to  obedience  by  Watt, 
340  ;  Separate  and  Individual, 
in  Man  and  Nature,  alone  in- 
variable, 368  ;  Combinations 
of  these,  of  endless  variety 
and  endless  capability  of 
change,  368. 

Foreknowledge,  Perfect  know- 
ledge must  be  perfect,  312. 

Form,  of  Life,  new,  correlation 
required  in  the  establishment 
of  a,  250;  such  correlation,  as 
far  as  we  can  see,  without  any 
Physical  cause,  251  ;  and 
Spirit,  the  connexion  between, 
sanctioned  by  the  doctrine  of 
the  Resurrection,  286. 

Forms,  Typical,  work  of  Nature 
carried  on  under  rules  of  ad- 
herence to,  76  ;  of  Life,  suc- 
cessive introduction  of,  higher 
«ind  higher,  210;  allied,  spe- 
cific and  generic,  bond  of 
connexion  between  them,  218. 

Forward  Motion,  the  power  of, 
how  given  to  birds,  138. 

Fossil  Remains,  what  Forms  to 
be  traced  in,  211  ;  Animals, 
approximating  to  the  Forms 
of  the  Horse  and  the  Ox,  Pro- 
fessor Owen  on,  211. 

Fossils  designated  "the  Sports 
of  Nature,"  267. 

Free  Agency  of  Man,  faith  re- 
quired in  the,  to  secure  the 
working  for  good  of  great 
Natural  Laws,  376. 

Free  Labour,  those  who  opposed 
restrictions  on,  met  with  no 
adequate  reply,  355  ;  advo- 
cates of  Restriction  un,  igno- 
rant of  the  principles  at  issue, 

355- 

Free  Will,  erroneously  called 
the  peculiar  Prerogative  of 
Man,  304  ;  and  Necessity,  pro- 


gress at  last  on  the  vexed 
question  of,  308. 

Freedom,  a  relative  term,  not  an 
absolute,  302. 

Freedom  of  Exchange,  in  the 
products  of  Labour,  results 
of,  compared  with  the  re- 
sults of  perfect  freedom  of 
competition  in  Labour  itself, 
358- 

Freedom  of  Man's  Will  not  more 
mysterious  in  directing  the 
Mind  to  one  motive,  and  di- 
verting it  from  another,  than 
in  the  turning  of  the  Body 
to  the  right  hand  rather  than 
the  left,  314. 

Fulmars,  mechanism  of  flight  in, 

ISO- 
Function*  definition  of,  279 ;  ot 

Coal  in  the  world,  260. 
Function  of  an  Organ,  the,   its 

Purpose,  82. 

G. 

Galileo,  period  of,  343. 

Gallinaceous  Birds,  sort  of  wings 
in,  155;  comparatively  no  in- 
fancy in,  297 ;  fact  of  immense 
significance  connected  with, 
299. 

Gannet,  the,  diving  for  fish,  144. 

Genesis  of  Organic  Life,  modern 
idea  of  the,  30. 

Geographical  distribution  of 
Humming  Birds,  224. 

Gipsies,  case  of  the,  not  pa- 
rallel with  that  of  the  Jews,  20. 

Gladstone's,  Mr.  description  of 
the  old  Commercial  Policy, 

337- 

God's  Will,  extraordinary  mani- 
festations of,  how  they  may  be 
wrought,  1 6. 

God,  operations  of,  and  of  Men's 
Minds,  light  thrown  on  the 


INDEX. 


445 


analogy  between  them  by 
every  known  instance  of  Con- 
trivance, 128. 

Gold,  laws  relating  to,  in  An- 
cient Sparta  and  in  Modern 
Spain.  336. 

Gould,  Mr.  on  the  action  of  the 
wing  in  Humming  Birds,  167; 
on  the  reason  for  the  gorgeous 
colouring  of  those  birds,  231  ; 
his  description  of  ditto,  233  ; 
on  the  absence  of  Hybridism 
between  any  two  Species  of 
Humming  Birds,  237;  on  cer- 
tain local  varieties  near  Bo- 
gota, whose  ornament  is 
changing  colour,  239  ;  his 
"Birds  of  Australia,"  299. 

Government,  Divine  ;  see  Divine 
Government. 

Government,  principle  of,  only 
recognised  in  modern  times, 
326  ;  the  Science  of,  two 
great  discoveries  made  in, 
during  the  present  century, 
334- 

Gravitation,  Law  of,  the  dis- 
covery of  it  the  highest  exer- 
cise of  pure  intellect  through 
which  the  Human  Mind  has 
found  its  way,  72;  the  most 
familiar  of  all  Forces  in  all 
Ages,  129  ;  the  chief  Force 
in  flight,  130. 

G  rote's  "  Plato,"  327. 

Grouse,  feathers  of  the,  close 
imitation  in,  to  the  tinting 

•  and  mottling  of  the  ground  on 
which  they  lie,  181. 

Growth,  Correlations  of;  see 
Correlations  of  Growth. 

Growth,  Progress  and  Decay, 
whether  any  Law  of,  in  Na- 
tions as  in  Individual  Organ- 
isms, 387. 

Guizot,  M.  on  the  Supernatural, 
I,  2,  22,  27,  29,  51;  on  the 


only  serious  adversaries  of  the 
doctrine  of  Creation,  262  ;  on 
the  introduction  of  the  human, 
pair  into  the  world,  269  ;  on 
misconceptions  of  the  Past, 
and  false  anticipations  of  the 
Future,  386. 


H. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  exami- 
nation of  the  Philosophy  of, 
by  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill,  308,  et  scq. 

Hargraves,  344,  347. 

Hawks,  classified  as  "noble," 
or  "ignoble,"  158. 

Hebrides,  remarkable  chase  of  a 
Merlin  after  a  Snipe,  in  the, 
158- 

Hereditary  Transmission  of 
Mental  Qualities,  289 ;  of 
Innate  Ideas,  300. 

Heron's  Wing,  curious  experi- 
ment with  an  outstretched, 
140. 

Herschel,  Sir  John,  quoted,  73, 

122. 

Homology,  of  Orchids,  43  ;  in 
Structure,  and  Analogy  in 
Use,.  199. 

Homologies,  doctrine  of,  doc- 
trine of  Contrivance  and  Ad- 
justment not  so  metaphysical 
as  the,  83  ;  Science  of,  as  de- 
veloped by  Cuvier,  Hunter, 
Owen,  and  Huxley,  an  intri- 
cate, almost  a  transcendental, 
Science,  197. 

Horse,  the,  "silent  members" 
in,  195. 

Hudibras  quoted,  184. 

Human  Action  and  Opinions, 
aggregate  of  Forces  which  may 
be  called  Laws  which  deter- 
mine, 303. 

Human    Character,    elementary 


INDEX. 


Forces  having  a  constant 
operation  on,  325. 

Human  Law,  function  of,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  Natural  Law, 
325  ;  Law,  idea  of  founding 
it  on  the  Laws  of  Nature  never 
systematically  entertained  in 
the  Ancient  World,  326. 

Human  Society,  odious  concep- 
tions of,  in  Plato's  Republic, 
327. 

Human  Instincts,  and  faculties 
of  Contrivance,  impeded  by 
clumsy  machinery,  340. 

Human  Labour,  Factory  System 
as  affecting,  344. 

Human  Spirit,  Natural  Laws  in 
harmonious  relation  with  the, 

391. 

Humming  Birds,  the  most  re- 
markable examples  of  the 
machinery  of  flight,  1 66;  pe- 
culiarities of,  221  ;  their  dis- 
tinctiveness  from  all  other 
families  of  birds,  222  ;  geo- 
graphical distribution  of,  224 ; 
divisible  only  into  two  Sub- 
families, 225  ;  generic  and 
specific  differences  between 

.  these,  226 ;  species  of,  pecu- 
liar to  Cotopaxi,  to  Chimbo- 
razo,  Juan  Ferdandez,  &c. 
228  ;  a  curious  example  of 
Ornament  for  Ornament  s  sake, 
233  ;  the  Creation  of  sepa- 
rate species  of,  suggests  the 
idea  of  some  Creative  Law, 
of  the  nature  and  conditions 
of  which  we  know  nothing, 
236. 

Hunting  Grounds  of  Eagles, 
Falcons,  and  Hawks,  1 80. 

Hut  ton,  Captain,  on  the  flight 
of  the  Albatross,  165. 

Huxley,  Professor,  false  charge 
of  Atheism  against,  89  ;  his 
assertion  that  Life  precedes 


Organization,  118;  rhetorical 
designation  of  "Life"  in  his 
"Elements  of  Comparative 
Anatomy,"  213;  frontispiece 
to  his  "Man's  Place  in 
Nature,"  265. 

Hybridism  unknown  between 
two  species  of  Humming 
Birds,  237. 

Hyrax,  or  "Coney,"  the,  teeth 
and  hoofs  of,  resemble  those 
of  the  Rhinoceros,  248. 


Ideas,  in  what  sense  born  with 
us,  296  ;  formation  of,  all  that 
comes  from  the  Mind  itself  in 
the,  297. 

Identic  Shapes,  Forces  which 
aggregate  particles  of  matter 
in,  268. 

Idols,  Men's,  nowadays  their 
own  abstract  Conceptions, 

112. 

Immediate  Purpose,  Facts  of 
Adjustment  and  of  Function 
constitute  not  Final,  but,  81. 

Imponderable,  the  Great,  151. 

Incubator,  Artificial,  prepared 
by  the  Megapode,  298. 

Individual  Force,  Law  immu- 
table only  as  an,  97  ;  \Vill, 
Laws  against  which,  cannot 
contend,  359;  Will,  the, 
helplessness  and  thoughtless- 
ness of,  to  a  great  extent  to 
be  overcome,  374. 

Inductive  Sciences,  Whewell's 
History  of  the,  no. 

Inequality  of  Men,  in  the  sense 
of  gifts  of  Mind  and  Body,  377. 

Inheritance,  bond  of,  according 
to  Mr.  Darwin,  218;  Theory 
of,  when  it  startles  us,  263. 

Inorganic  Compounds,  relations 


INDEX. 


447 


of  certain  to  the  Chemistry  of 
Life,  94. 

Inspectors  of  Factories,  Reports 
of,  360. 

Instinct,  or  Intuition,  not  Expe- 
rience, teaches  us  uncon- 
sciously how  to  use  the  ma- 
chinery causing  Muscular  Con- 
tractions, 292. 

Instincts  of  the  nature  of  Ideas, 
297 ;  Natural,  when  to  be 
trusted,  358  ;  when  the  Higher 
Faculties  must  impose  their 
Will  on  the,  358. 

Institution,  Positive,  Authorita- 
tive Interference  of,  with  the 
freedom  of  the  Individual 
Will,  still  required  in  Fac- 
tories, 364. 

Institutions,  Positive,  stand  con- 
trasted with  Natural  Law  in 
one  sense  only,  333. 

Intellect,  Laws  of,  Philosophers 
who  fancy  they  are  reduced  to 
scientific  expression  when  de- 
scribed as  the  working  of  the 
"  cerebral  ganglia,"  282. 

Intention,  exhibited  in  the  me- 
chanism of  Orchids,  the  ques- 
tion Mr.  Darwin  sets  himself 
to  answer,  38  ;  Obvious,  Law 
in  what  sense  meant  as  the  co- 
operation of  Natural  Forces, 
working  together  for  the  ful- 
filment of,  216  ;  and  Purpose, 
the  Law  of  Structure  entirely 
subordinate  to  the  Law  of, 
265. 

Intuition,  Origin  of  our  Ideas 
how  far  due  to,  289  ;  a  word 
not  liked  by  supporters  ot  the 
doctrine  of  Experience,  291. 

Intuitions,  Copernicus,  Kepler, 
and  Galileo  guided  in  tfieir 
profound  conceptions  of  visible 
phenomena  by,  HO;  the 
most  extravagant  errors  in 


Philosophy  often  associated 
with  the  happies*"  386. 

Invariability,  double  meaning  of, 
in  the  Necessitarian  Philo- 
sophy, 309  ;  of  Sequence,  an 
ambiguous  phrase,  310. 

Invariable  Law,  Phenomena  not 
governed  by,  318;  Vision  of, 
on  the  Throne  of  Nature, 

390- 

Invention,  Mechanical,  .Scientific 
Men  forced  to  borrow  the  lan- 
guage of,  256 ;  triumphs  of, 
regarded  often  with  fear  and 
jealousy  by  the  Working 
Classes,  375  ;  a  Law  of  Na- 
ture in  the  strictest  sense, 
376. 

Invisible,  the,  all  the  Realities 
of  Nature  are  in  the  region 
of,  118. 


J. 

Jelly,  blobs  of,  without  parts,  or 
organs,  or  visible  structure, 
Vital  Force  in,  119. 

Jevons,  Mr.  W.  S.  on  the  Coal 
Question,  260. 

Jews,  preservation  of  the,  a 
striking  illustration  of  depar- 
ture from  the  ordinary  course  of 
Nature  effected  through  Na- 
tural means,  20. 

Job  on  the  Stars,  1 14. 

Juan  Fernandez,  three  species  of 
Humming  Birds  peculiar  to, 
228. 


K. 

Kepler,  three  Laws  of,  66. 
Kestrel  hovering,  161. 
"Knowing    how  to  do  it,"  in 

Nature  as   in   Art,    all  done 

seems  done  by,  127. 


443 


INDEX. 


Labellum  in  Orchids,  its  use, 
40. 

Labour,  Restrictions  on,  de- 
nounced by  Adam  Smith, 
338  ;  Children's,  in  Factories, 
in  what  sense  "free,"  in 
what  not  "free,"  353  ;  in- 
stincts of,  when  blind  to  all 
results  save  money-making, 
358 ;  resort  to  Combination 
for  the  protection  of,  recom- 
mended by  Reason  and  Ex- 
perience, 373 ;  Rewards  of, 
Limits  within  which  Combi- 
nations can,  and  beyond  which 
they  cannot,  affect  the,  378. 

Languages  grow  and  change 
by  rules  of  which  the  men 
speaking  them  are  uncon- 
scious, 76. 

Law,  Idea  of,  made  the  basis  of 
the  Christian  miracles,  24 ; 
highest,  known  to  Man,  61  ; 
the  word,  in  its  primary  sig- 
nification, 64  ;  FIVE  different 
senses  in  which  the  word  is 
habitually  used—firsf,  as  ap- 
plied to  an  Observed  Order  of 
Facts  ;  secondly,  to  that  Order 
as  involving  the  action  of 
some  Force,  or  Forces,  of 
which  nothing  more  may  be 
known  ;  thirdly,  as  applied  to 
individual  Forces,  the  mea- 
sure of  whose  operations  has 
been  more  or  less  defined 
and  ascertained  ;  fourthly,  as 
applied  to  Combinations  of 
Force  .having  reference  to 
the  fulfilment  of  Purpose  or 
the  discharge  of  Function ; 
fifthly,  as  applied  to  abstract 
conceptions  of  the  Mind — 
these  five  great  leading  sig- 
nifications of,  '  *  questions 


they  circle  round,  65  ;  neatest 
illustrations  of,  used  in  the 
first  sense,  to  be  found  in 
Kepler's  Three  Laws,  66  ;  in 
the  second  sense,  the  index 
and  result  of  the  working  of 
some  Force,  or  Forces,  68  ;  of 
Gravitation  defined,  69  :  in  its 
highest  sense,  as  Natural  Forces 
related  to  Purpose,  and  sub- 
servient to  the  discharge  of 
Function,  79  >  a,  only  immu- 
table as  an  Individual  Force, 
97  ;  the  term,  as  used  to  de- 
signate an  Abstract  Idea, 
108 ;  illustration  of  this  in 
the  "First  Law  of  Motion," 
108;  hvwhat  sense  meant  as 
the  co-operation  of  Natural 
Forces  working  together  for 
the  fulfilment  of  Obvious  In- 
tention, 216 ;  difference  be- 
tween that  to  which  the  Lower 
Animals  are  subject  and  that 
to  which  Man  is  subject,  304. 

Laws — of  Nature,  Man's  Mind 
strangely  excluded  by  Profes- 
sor Tyndall  from  the,  6  ;  if 
not  unchangeable,  could  not 
be  used  as  instruments  of  Will, 
97  ;  Natural,  unchangeable- 
ness  and  universality  of.  essen- 

.  tial  to  their  use  as  instruments 
of  Will,  146  ;  or  Forces,  the, 

f  which  operate  on  the  Mind, 
exceedingly  difficult  to  re- 
duce them  to  system,  303  ; 
interference  with,  the  only 
way  in  which  Man  can  con- 
trol Facts,  318  ;  against  which 
Individ  al  Will  cannot  con- 
tend, 359  ;  Economic,  invaria- 
bility of,  rightly  understood, 

379- 

Lecky,  Mr.  on  the  Rise  and 
Influence  of  Rationalism  hi 
Europe,  16. 


INDEX. 


449 


Legislation,  Wise  and  Successful, 
on  the  recognition  of  what 
causes  it  depends,  302  ;  double 
movement  in,  ever  since  the 
First  Factory  Act,  361. 

Leverage,  Law  of,  as  applied  to 
Wings,  150. 

Lewes,  Mr.  G.  H.,  70,  117,  124, 
204. 

Lewis,  Sir  G.  C.,  on  Astronomy, 

12. 

Life,  the  Cause  of  Organization, 
118  ;  Leading  Types  of,  in 
Geological  ages,  an  orderly 
gradation  in,  216  ;  Origin  of, 
nothing  known  or  guessed  at 
in,  corresponding  with  Law 
in  its  strictest  sense,  212  ; 
New  Forms  of,  if  developed 
from  the  Old,  the  working  of 
Creative  Power,  216. 

Living  Effort,  our  conceptions 
of  Force  formed  from  our  own 
consciousness  of,  120. 

Lizards,  Flying,  in  other  Ages 
of  the  World,  169. 

Locke,  quoted,  24. 

Longfellow,  Professor,  129. 


M. 

Machine,  Idea  and  Essence  of 
a,  90. 

McCosh,  Dr.,  on  the  Super- 
natural in  relation  to  the  Natu- 
ral, 17. 

Malformation,       Correlations 
brought  out  by,  247 . 

Man,  Is  he  Supernatural  ?  7. 

Man's  agency,  relation  of,  to  the 
Physical  Laws  of  Nature,  II. 

Man  and  the  Lower  Animals, 
common  Relationship  of,  by 
descent,  at  least  conceivable, 
29. 

'Mau  and  NiUuir,  works  of  both 


done  through  the  means  of 
Law,  107  ;  and  the  Lower 
Animals,  amount  and  kind  of 
difference  between,  spite  of 
close  affinities  of  bodily  struc- 
ture, 264  ;  and  the  highest 
Animals  below  him,  secret 
of  the  boundless  difference 
between,  306  ;  in  what  sense 
subject  to  the  Law  of  Causa- 
tion, 313 ;  Reason,  Conscience, 
Imagination,  Belief,  as  much 
a  part  of,  as  his  desires  and 
instincts,  332  ;  Combination 
natural  to,  376. 

Mankind,  Combination,  among 
many  Motives,  a  means  of  in- 
fluencing, to  an  extent  as  yet 
unknown,  the  conduct  and 
condition  of,  368  ;  progress  of, 
to  higher  and  better  things, 
3SS. 

Mansel's,  Mr.,  "Essay  on  Mira- 
cles," 1 8  ;  his  Limits  to  Re- 
ligious Thought,  its  Verbal 
fallacies,  exposed  by  Mr.  J. 
S.  Mill,  310. 

Mantis,  strange  imitation  of 
Vegetable  growths  in  the  body 
of  the.  184. 

Marine  Mollusca,  beautiful  shells 
of,  189. 

Material,  World,  increasing 
power  exercised  over  the,  by 
Man's  Will,  97  ;  World,  the, 
and  the  World  of  Mind,  Law 
in  the  same  sense  prevails  in 
the  phenomena  of  both,  275  ; 
Frame,  in  which  we  live,  some 
of  the  most  distant  objects  of 
the  Universe  more  accessible 
to  our  observation  and  intel- 
ligible to  us  than,  276  ;  Struc- 
ture, our  Affections  dependent 
on,  278. 

Materialism,  Suggestions  or,  lie 
thickest  on  the  surface  oi 

G  o 


45° 


INDEX. 


things,  113  ;  two  great  ene- 
mies to,  in  the  heait  and  the 
intellect,  115. 

Matter,  Immaterial  Forces  work- 
ing in,  285. 

Means,  God  governing  the  world 
by  the  choice  and  use  of, 
16  ;  and  Ends,  our  ignorance 
of  God:s  notions  of,  80. 

"Measure,"  inaccurately  termed 
the  "  verifiable  element "  in 
our  knowledge,  70. 

Mechanism  of  Orchids,  Inten- 
tion exhibited  in  the,  39 ;  of 
Flight  in  the  Albatross  and  in 
Seagulls,  150. 

Megapodes,  Innate  Ideas  in  the, 
298. 

Memory  often  paralysed  by  the 
stroke  which  paralyses  a  Limb, 
278.  _ 

Men,  in  what  sense  "fellow- 
workers  with  God,"  and  made 
"partakers  of  the  Divine  Na- 
ture," 9. 

Mental  Purpose  and  Physical 
Cause,  ideas  of,  not  antago- 
nistic, 32  ;  and  Resolve,  the 
one  thing  our  Intelligence 
perceives  with  direct  and  in- 
tuitive recognition,  34  ;  Pur- 
poses, Correlation  having  re- 
ference to  certain,  245. 

Merlin,  a,  swooping  on  its  prey, 
144  ;  chase  of  a,  after  a  vSnipe 
in  the  Hebrides,  158. 

Metaphors,  the,  employed  in 
Language,  generally  founded 
on  Analogies  instinctively  and 
often  unconsciously  perceived, 
64. 

Method  of  Nature,  proper  object 
of  Science  to  detect,  if  she  can, 
the,  271. 

M  ethods,  some,  of  operating  on 
Men's  Minds  known  to  us 
instinctively,  325. 


Mill,  Mr.  J.  S.,  his  admission 
that  our  muscular  contractions 
are  not  the  result  of  "  Expe- 
rience," 290  ;  Comments  on 
this  admission,  1 6,  291,  et  seq.; 
on  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"  Necessity,"  308,  309  ;  his 
use  of  the  vague  word  "  An- 
tecedent," 313  ;  his  definition 
in  "Auguste  Comte  and  Posi- 
tivism," of  the  Positive  as 
distinguished  from  the  Theo- 
logical Mode  of  Thought, 
315;  dissection  of  these 
phrases,  316,  317;  on 
"Changeable  Wills,"  319. 

Mind  and  Will  of  Man  in  one 
sense  "separate"  from  "Na- 
ture "  and  belonging  to  the 
"Supernatural,"  8. 

Mind,  Character  of,  expressed  in 
lines  and  shapes  of  matter, 
265 ;  Phenomena  of,  an  ob- 
served Order  of  Facts  in  the, 
274;  the,  unconscious  of  its 
dependence  on  the  Body, 
277  ;  first  to  be  mapped,  and 
then  its  Organ,  280  ;  and  Or- 
ganization, parallel  Pheno- 
mena of,  282  ;  and  Brain, 
connexion  between  them  re- 
cognised as  a  Law  by  us  only 
in  the  sense  of  an  "  Observed 
Order  of  Facts,"  283;  the,  to 
be  regarded  as  having,  like 
the  Body,  Automatic  Facul- 
ties, 293 ;  Phenomena  of, 
words  used  to  describe  the, 
suggestive  of  analogies  be- 
tween Mental  and  Material 
things,  302  ;  influences  which 
attract  the  Polar  Force  com- 
pared to,  303  ;  and  Character 
of  Man,  knowledge  of,  how- 
it  may  be  governed,  to  be  ob- 
tained only  by  slow  degrees, 
325;  Human, "Love  of  Gain 


INDEX. 


451 


an  instinct  implanted  in  the, 
376  ;  openness  and  simplicity 
of,  great  characteristics  of 
Men  who  have  exercised  an 
influence  for  good  on  Society, 

384- 
Mineral  Salt,  crystallising  under 

a  Voltaic  current,  Correlation 

of    Growth    in    its    simplest 

form,  245. 
Miracle,  a,  commonly  understood 

as  a  suspension  or  violation  of 

the  Laws  of  Nature,  17. 
Miracles,  when   they  lose  every 

element    of    inconceivability, 

23  ;  Christian,   idea    of   Law 
made    the  very  basis   of  the, 

24  ;  the  idea  of,  performed  by 
the  use  of  means,  regarded  by 
many  with  jealousy  and  sus- 
picion, 26. 

Modern  Policy  and  Ancient, 
striking  difference  between  the 
spirit  of,  335 ;  Politicians, 
great  aim  of,  to  open  new 
sources  of  national  opulence, 
336  ;  Political  Societies,  stag- 
nation and  decline  the  actual 
condition  of  many,  387. 

Mollusca,  the,  Vital  Forces  in, 
made  to  work  to  order,  215. 

Monkeys,  "  Silent  members " 
in,  195. 

Muscles,  the  seat  of  two  oppos- 
ing Forces,  77. 

Muscular  Power,  great  con- 
centration of,  in  the  Organism 
of  Birds,  133. 

N. 

Narwhal,  the,  Aborted  Germ 
in,  195. 

Nasmyth,  Mr.  James,  on  the 
shadows  and  "high  light"  in. 


the 


"  in  the  winn-  of  the 


Argus  Pheasant,  193. 


Nations,  calamities  of,  their 
origin  in  the  insensible  de- 
velopment of  New  Conditions, 
386. 

Natural  Consequence,  way  of, 
Steam  Engine  and  Sdar  Sys- 
tem both  worked  by,  108. 

Natural  Forces,  Idea  of,  quite 
separate  from  the  ascertained 
measure  of  their  energy,  70  ; 
found  to  operate  under  ruics 
having  strict  reference  to 
Space  and  Time,  74  ;  must 
be  conformed  to  and  obeyed, 
126. 

Natural  Law,  Common  Idea  of 
the  Supernatural  as  at  variance 
with,  above,  or  in  violation  of, 
4;  True  conception  of,  on  what 
founded,  326  ;  the  idea  of,  as 
affecting  mankind,  on  what 
founded,  331  ;  in  what  sense 
contrasted  with  Positive  In- 
stitution, 333  ;  Law,  Signal 
illustration  in  England  this 
century  of  circumstances  in 
which,  may  be  trusted,  and 
of  those  in  which  it  required 
to  be  controlled,  334 ;  and 
Positive  Institution,  antagon- 
ism between,  356  ;  ever  work- 
ing to  convict  error  and  con- 
firm truth,  357  ;  working  on 
the  Human  Will  while  exposed 
to  overpowering  motives  and 
under  debased  conditions  of 
the  understanding  and  the 
heart,  362. 

Natural  Laws,  founded  on  the 
right  exercise  of  Reason  in 
the  highest  and  best  sense, 
333  ;  best  fulfilled  when 
made  the  instruments  of  in- 
telligent Will,  and  the  servants 
of  enlightened  Conscience,  39 1 . 

"Natural     Selection  "    can    do 
nothing  except  with  the  mate* 
G  G  2 


452 


INDEX. 


rials  presented  to  it,  219  ; 
what  it  accounts  for  and  what 
it  does  not  account  for,  220  ; 
the  only  point,  with  reference 
to  the  Sub-Families  of  Hum- 
ming Birds,  on  which  it  has 
any  bearing,  though  it  does 
not  touch  the  facts  of  the 
case,  226  ;  does  not  account 
for  the  origin  or  spread  of 
Humming  Birds,  236 ;  real 
bearing  of,  240  ;  seizes  on  Ex- 
ternal Correlations,  but  can- 
not enter  the  womb  and  shape 
the  New  Form  in  harmony 
with  the  modified  conditions 
of  External  Life,  256  ;  ope- 
rates only  through  the  agency 
of  use  and  disuse  on  organs 
already  existing,  and  capable 
of  discharging  function,  267 ; 
Selection,  idea  of,  excluded 
by  the  theory  of  Creation  by 
Birth,  267. 

Nature,  Power  and  Works  of, 
all  Superhuman,  2  ;  glorious 
result  of  a  right  method  in  the 
study  of,  4;  what,  in  the 
largest  sense,  to  be  understood 
as  including,  5  ;  in  the  nar- 
row sense  of  Physical  Nature, 
7  ;  and  the  Supernatural,  Dr. 
Bushnell  on,  8  ;  Man's,  Phe- 
nomena of,  included  in  the 
term  ''Natural,"  II  ;  ordi- 
nary course  of,  13  ;  the  Su- 
perhuman and  the  Superma- 
terial,  familiar  facts  in,  23  ; 
the  Great  Parable,  54  ;  Uni- 
versal Presence  of  combina- 
tions of  Force  in,  /6  ;  Rela- 
tion of  an  Organic  Structure 
to  its  Purpose  in,  99  ;  com- 
parison illustrative  of  this  be 
tween  the  Menai  Bridge  and 
the  Shells  of  Barnacles,  99 ; 
one  vast  system  of  Contri- 


vance, 127  ;  Mechanics  of, 
highest  problem  in,  133  ;  Pur- 
pose of  particular  structures 
in,  often  misconceived,  176  ; 
Laboratory  of,  process  in  the, 
by  which  natural  tints  can  be 
transferred  to  substances  pre- 
pared to  receive  them,  177  ; 
Facts  of,  High  and  Complex 
Correlation  the  most  constant 
and  obvious  of  all  the,  251 ; 
no  fictions  or  bad  jokes  in, 
268  ;  no  short  cuts  in,  331  ;  a 
great  Armoury  for  the  use  of 
Will,  382  ;  Man's  command 
over  the  external  elements  of, 
in  advance  of  his  command 
over  the  resources  of  Human 
Character,  384;  Man's,  most 
certain  of  all  the  Laws  of, 
388. 

"  Necessity,"  Progress  at  last 
on  the  vexed  question  of, 
308 ;  Rebellion  against  the 
Doctrines  of,  founded  on  false 
conceptions  of  Invariable  Law, 

377- 

New  Forms,  Mr.  Darwin's 
Theory,  how  far  it  suggests 
anything  of  the  nature  of  Crea- 
tive Law  to  explain  the  intro- 
duction of,  221. 

New  Species,  a,  according  to 
Mr.  Darwin,  simply  an  un- 
usual birth,  218  ;  Creation  of, 
has  followed  some  plan  in 
which  variety  is  in  itself  an 
aim,  228 ;  a,  must  be  born 
male  and  female,  237 ;  of 
Humming  Birds,  if  born  from 
the  Old,  how  they  must  be 
born,  238. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  his  agitation 
on  discovering  the  Law  of 
Gravitation,  74. 

Numerical  Computation,  Intui- 
tive Powers  of,  293;  Rela- 


INDEX. 


453 


tions,  Ideas  of  Order  based 
on,  meet  us  in  Nature  at 
every  turn,  49. 


O. 

Orchis,  the  Madagascar,  its 
long  and  deep  nectary,  how 
developed,  44. 

Orchids,  Fertilization  of,  37 ; 
Intention  in  the  mechanism 
of,  the  question  Mr.  Dar- 
win sets  himself  to  answer, 
38 ;  Labellum  in,  its  use, 
40  ;  large  Family  of,  in  the 
forests  of  Central  America, 
227. 

Observed  Order  of  Facts,  an, 
implies  a  Force,  or  arrange- 
ment of  Forces,  out  of  which 
the  Order  comes,  283. 

Order,  a  subtle  and  pervading, 
binding  together  all  Living 
things,  209  ;  of  Nature,  the, 
very  complicated,  the  Mind 
perplexed  by  the  vast  variety 
of  subordinate  Facts,  173 ; 
of  Thought,  the  basis  of 
all  other  Order  in  the  works 
of  Man  and  of  Nature,  82. 

Organic  Forms,  Mr.  Darwin's 
denial  that  Beauty  for  its  own 
sake  can  be  an  end  in,  188 ; 
Growth,  symmetry  to  be  de- 
tected in  all  variations  of, 
242  ;  Growths,  general  im- 
pression left  by  the  obser- 
vance of  Correlation  between, 
249  ;  Life,  never  any  altera- 
tion in  the  whole  scale  of,  in 
those  principles  of  Chemical 
and  Mechanical  adjustment  on 
which  Respiration,  Circulation, 
and  Reproduction  have  been 
provided  for,  269. 

Organism,   Parts  of  an,  bound 


together  as  one  whole  by  a 
pervading  system  of  Correla- 
tions, 247. 

Organisms,  Inheritance  the  only 
cause  which  can  produce, 
quite  like  or  nearly  like  each 
other,  264  ;  Bilateral  Arrange- 
ment common  to  all,  down  to 
the  Radiata,  268 ;  New,  no 
knowledge  of  the  Laws  con- 
nected with  the  Creation  or 
development  of,  213. 

Origin  of  New  Forms,  Darwin's 
Theory  does  not  profess  to 
trace  to  a  definite  Law  the, 
217;  of  our  Ideas,  how  far  due 
respectively  to  Experience, 
Association,  or  Intuition, 
289  ;  clear  definition  of  terms 
greatly  required  in  the  discus- 
sion of  such  questions  as  the, 

295. 

Origin  of  Species,  the  true,  in 
what  it  consists,  240 ;  only 
sense  in  which  we  can  get 
from  the  Theory  of  the,  a 
glimpse  of  Creation  by  Law, 
261  ;  New  Species,  rule  which 
seems  to  have  governed  Crea- 
tive Power  in  the,  229. 

Ornament  in  Nature  in  itself  a 
Purpose,  1 88  ;  was  so  before 
Man  was  born,  189  ;  for  Or- 
nament's sake,  the  rule  in 
reference  to  which  Creative 
Power  seems  to  have  worked 
in  Humming  Birds,  232. 

Ornament  and  Use  j  see  Use  and 
Ornament. 

Ornithoryncus  Paradoxus,  253. 

Owen,  Professor,  on  the  Mental 
conception  of  the  Plan  of  all 
Vertebrate  Skeletons,  32}  on 
the  Battery  of  the  Electric 
Ray,  101  ;  on  Fossil  Approx- 
imations to  the  forms  of  the 
Horse  and  the  Ox,  211. 


454 


INDEX. 


P. 


Parable,  why  so  much  can  be 
conveyed  in  the  Form  of,  53. 

Parliament,  refusing  to  regulate 
"  Free  Labour," 349  ;  Combi- 
nation indicated  as  the  right 
course  by,  373. 

Pauperism,  in  how  far  to  be  at- 
tacked through  Combination, 

•     381- 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  the  Elder,  the 
first  to  interfere  by  law  with 
unrestricted  competition  in 
Human  Labour,  349 ;  his  Bill 
limited  to  the  regulation  of 
the  labour  of  Apprentices, 
349 ;  presses  a  new  measure 
of  Restriction,  351. 

Penguins,  148. 

Peregrine  Falcon,  sharp-pointed 
structure  of  wing  in  the, 

157. 

Perfect  Knowledge,  the  little 
way  we  can  ever  travel  towards, 
311. 

Personal  Agency  of  God,  the 
Creation  of  Man  "  out  of  the 
dust  of  the  ground  "  an  indi- 
cation of  the,  27. 

Personal  Will,  the  Idea  of,  sepa- 
rable from  the  Forces  which 
work  in  Nature,  in  a  sense  the 
projection  of  our  own  Per- 
sonality, 123. 

Personality  and  Will,  impossi- 
bility of  describing  any  facts 
in  Science  without  investing 
the  Laws  of  Nature  with, 
91. 

Petrels,  Mechanism  of  flight  in, 
150. 

Pfiasma  in  the  British  Museum, 
Specimen  of,  with  wings  spot- 
ted like  a  larva-eaten  leaf, 
187. 

Phenomena  of  Life,  no  know- 


ledge of  the  Force  or  Forces 
to  which  the,  can  be  traced, 
212 ;  of  Mind,  the,  an 
Observed  Order  of  Facts, 

274  ;      Law    in     one     sense 
prevails  in  the,    both   of  the 
Material   and  Mental   world, 

275  ;  never  the  result    of  in- 
dividual  Forces,  but    always 
of    the     variable    conditions 
under  which    several    indivi- 
dual   Forces    are    combined, 

3i8. 

Philosophy  of  History,  on  the 
recognition  of  what  causes  it 
depends,  302. 

Phrenological  School,  funda- 
mental error  of  the,  281. 

Phrenology,  a  name  which  is 
itself  a  fallacy,  280. 

Physical  Cause  and  Mental  Pur- 
pose, Ideas  of,  not  antagonis- 
tic, 32. 

Physical  Cause,  Correlation  in 
the  establishment  of  a  New 
Form*  of  Life,  so  far  as  we  can 
see,  without  any,  250. 

Physical  Forces  all  working  to 
Order,  260. 

Physical  Laws  of  Nature,  rela- 
tion of  Man's  agency  to  the, 
1 1  ;  advancing  knowledge  of, 
accompanied  with  advancing 
power  over  the  Physical 
World,  13. 

Physical  Science,  advances  in, 
can  only  widen  intelligent 
Spiritual  Beliefs,  114. 

Physics,  World  of,  Certainties 
in  the  world  of  Mind  as  abso- 
lute as  any  in  the,  312. 

Physiological  Discovery,  the 
Dependence  of  Mind  on 
Bodily  Organization,  a  fact 
containing  within  itself  the 
lesser  facts  of,  283. 

Physiology,     recent    Investiga« 


INDEX. 


455 


tions  in,  as  to  the  Muscles,  77  ; 
every  fact  in,  its  intimate 
bearing  on  some  question  of 
the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  290. 

Planets,  the,  much  discovered 
by  man  concerning  the  circu- 
lation of,  before  he  discovered 
the  circulation  of  the  blood, 
276. 

Plants,  basis  of  many  Correla- 
tions of  Growth  in,  243. 

Plato's  Republic,  327. 

Polar  Force  of  Magnetism,  303. 

Polarity,  in  Magnetic  Force,  ul- 
timate nature  and  source  of, 
245. 

Polarity,  Principle  of,  developed 
in  a  circle  in  the  Radiata, 
268. 

Policy,  Modern  Commercial, 
Central  idea  of,  337. 

Political  Society,  Ancient  Law- 
givers always  aiming  at  stand- 
ards of,  326 ;  Events,  me- 
morable Examples  in  the  last 
£\)d  present  generations  of  the 
Reign  of  Law  over  the  course 
of,  387. 

Positive  Institution,  and  Natural 
Law,,  antagonism  between, 
356  ;  Combination  coming  in 
the  place  of,  372. 

Positive  Philosophy,  the  word 
Will,  how  used  in,  320. 

Positivism,  a  sentence  the  con- 
centration of  all  that  is  erro- 
neous in,  316. 

Posterity's  wonder  respecting 
ourselves,  383. 

Potential  Use  in  Nature,  202. 

Power,  Law  in  its  primary  sig- 
nification, the  authoritative 
expression  of  Human  Will 
enforced  by,  64 ;  of  God,  Pro- 
fessor Owen's  Instances  of  the, 
as  manifested  in  his  Animal 
Creation,  263. 


Prayer,  real  Essence  of,  61. 

Primeval  Traditions  of  Belief, 
immense  satisfaction  to  know 
that  Logical  Analysis  confirms 
the  testimony  of  Consciousness 
and  runs  parallel  with  the, 
390. 

Problem,  the  most  difficult  of 
all,  in  the  Science  of  Govern- 
ment, 334. 

Progress  of  Mankind,  order  of 
facts  observable  in  the,  that 
long  ages  of  silence  and  in- 
action are  broken  up  and 
brought  to  an  end  by  shorter 
periods  of  almost  preternatu- 
ral activity,  343. 

Protection,  a  hindrance  to  the 
\Vealth  of  Nations,  the  skill 
of  Crafts,  and  the  success  of 
Trade,  341. 

Psychology  and  Physiology, 
neither  independent  of  the 
other,  290. 

Ptarmigan,  close  imitation  in 
the  Plumage  of  the,  to  the 
mottling  of  ground,  181. 

Purpose,  the  only  thing  we  can 
surely  know  in  the  relation 
of  Created  Forms  to  our  own 
Minds,  33  ;  Principle  of  Ad- 
justment no  meaning  except 
as  the  result  of,  78  ;  Function 
of  an  Organ,  its,  82  ;  as  a 
general  inference,  and  as  a 
particular  fact,  distinction  be- 
tween them  not  sufficiently 
observed,  83  ;  in  Nature  at- 
tained only  by  the  enlist- 
ment of  Laws  as  Means,  100  ; 
instance  of  this  in  the  Electric 
Ray,  where  an  extraordinary 
result  is  produced  by  a  com- 
mon Law  yoked  to  extraor- 
dinary conditions,  101 ;  Con- 
trivance necessary  for  the  ac- 
complishment of,  126;  Con* 


456 


INDEX. 


trivance  in  Nature  never  re- 
duced to  a  single,  186; 
of  the  One  Plan  of  Organic 
Life,  196 ;  how  Material 
Laws  follow  the  steps  of, 
208;  Mental,  Correlation  of 
Growth  having  reference  to 
a  certain,  245  ;  Correlation  of 
Growth  in  the  only  sense  we 
can  connect  it  with  the  Origin 
of  Species  not  a  Physical  cause 
but  a  Mental,  259  ;  and  In- 
tention, the  Law  of  Structure 
entirely  subordinate  to,  265  ; 
only,  to  be  detected  in  the 
adaptibility  of  the  Vertebrate 
Type  to  the  Infinite  varieties 
of  Life,  271. 

R. 

Radcliffe's,  Dr.  Theory  of  Mus- 
cular and  Nervous  Action, 

77- 

Radiata,  the,  268. 

Reason,  Doctrine  that  things 
contrary  to,  were  not  beyond 
his  faith,  held  by  a  late  eminent 
clergyman  of  the  English 
Church,  60;  and  Imagination, 
falling  impotently  on  analogy 
and  conjecture  in  endeavour- 
ing to  get  at  Nature's  method, 
272 ;  paralysed  by  the  same 
stroke  which  paralyses  a  limb, 
278 ;  and  Feelings,  direct 
appeals  to  the,  entirely  useless 
when  these  faculties  have  not 
been  placed  under  favourable 
conditions,  324  ;  on  what  path 
Instinct  a  surer  guide  than, 
386- 

Regions  where  means  of  investi- 
gation cease,  and  processes  of 
Verification  are  of  no  avail, 
271. 

Reign  of  Law,  the,  in  Nature, 


so  far  as  we  can  see  it,  Uni- 
versal, 4 ;  Universal,  perfectly 
consistent  with  a  power  of 
making  those  laws  subservient 
to  design,  22  ;  the,  the  reign 
of  Creative  Force,  directed  by 
Creative  Knowledge,  worked 
under  the  control  of  Creative 
Power,  and  in  fulfilment  of 
Creative  Purpose,  273. 

Religion,  Nothing  in,  incom- 
patible with  the  belief  that  all 
exercises  of  God's  Power  are 
effected  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  Means,  22,  50  ; 
or  Nature,  the  Will  of  the 
Supreme  either  in,  one  in 
which  ' '  there  is  no  variable- 
ness," 51;  and  Science,  Doc- 
trine that  they  should  be 
thought  separate  open  to 
one  fatal  objection,  57;  dis- 
astrous effect  of  the  belief  in 
their  separation,  58. 

Research,  Physical,  Transcen- 
dental character  of  the  results 
of,  1 1 6. 

Restrictions  on  Labour,  great 
discovery  of  the  absolute  ne- 
cessity of  imposing,  335  ;  from 
Trade,  immense  adva'ntage  of 
removing,  335. 

Restriction  on  Free  Labour, 
those  who  opposed,  met  with 
no  adequate  reply,  355  ;  Ad- 
vocates of,  ignorant  of  the 
fundamental  principles  '  at 
issue,  355. 

Resurrection,  Connexion  be- 
tween Spirit  and  Form  sanc- 
tioned by  the  doctrine  of  the, 
286. 

Retina,  external  Correlations  of, 

257- 

Rhizopods  of  enormous  size 
found  near  the  bottom  of 
"Azoic"  Rocks,  210. 


INDEX. 


457 


Rudimentary  Organs,  said  to  be 
intended  merely  to  suggest  a 
History  which  was  never  true, 
and  a  Method  which  was  never 
followed,  268. 


Sand-Grouse  of  Asiatic  Deserts 
and  their  colouring,  182. 

Sand  Partridges  of  ditto,  182. 

Science,  the  great  Quest  of, 
71  :  Classification  the  basis 
of,  84 ;  Astronomical,  ulti- 
mate fact  of,  92  ;  included  in 
Philosophy,  113  ;  the  "under- 
standing by  Faith  "  mentioned 
by  the  writer  of  the  Epistle 
to  the  Hebrews,  now  an  as- 
sured doctrine  of,  117;  Proper 
object  of,  to  detect  the  method 
of  Nature,  if  she  can,  271  ; 
True,  bondage  under  which  it 
lies,  331  :  of  Government, 
two  great  discoveries  made  in 
the,  during  the  present  cen- 
tury, 334 ;  of  Politics,  the, 
still  in  its  infancy,  383. 

Sciences,  Physical,  remarkable 
product  of  the  immense  deve- 
lopment of  the,  3. 

Scientific  Truth,  a  sharp  eye  to 
be  cast  on  every  form  of 
words  professing  to  represent, 
56 ;  Men  who,  though  trust- 
worthy on  the  facts  of  their 
own  science,  are  not  to  be 
trusted  on  the  place  of  those 
facts  in  the  general  system  of 
truth,  112. 

Scripture,  Language  of,  nowhere 
conscious  of  a  distinction  be- 
tween the  Natural  and  the 
Supernatural,  30. 

Seagulls,  Mechanism  of  flight 
in  the  soaring  of,  143,  150. 


Seasons,  Revolutions  of  the,  de- 
pendent on  a  multitude  of 
Laws,  each  of  which  would 
"produce  utter  confusion  if  not 
balanced  against  others  in  the 
right  proportion,  93. 

Seers,  great,  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, correspondence  of  their 
language  with  a  great  modern 
Scientific  Idea,  127. 

Self-consciousness  the  Truth  in 
the  light  of  which  all  other 
truths  are  known,  7. 

Self-evident  Truths,  and  Truths 
not  self-evident,  breakdown 
of  the  distinction  between.  294. 

Sensation,  no  new  light  thrown 
on,  because  Sensation  can  be 
traced  to  certain  nerves,  282. 

"Sensory  Ganglia,"  Philoso- 
phers who  think  they  cast 
new  light  on  Sensation  by 
calling  it  an  affection  of  the, 
282. 

"Silent  members"  in  Animal 
Frames,  views  on  the  subject 
by  Mr.  Darwin,  32  ;  deeper 
and  wider  views  of  Professor 
Owen  on,  32. 

Silurian  Sea,  Old,  richly  carved 
shells  and  corals  of  the, 
189. 

"  Slowworm,"  the  Common, 
"Blade  bone"  and  "Collar 
bone  "  of, — "  aborted  limbs  " 
in,  195. 

Smiles'  Life  of  Watt,  342. 

Smith,  Adam.  337  et  stq.  ;  work 
of,  inseparably  connected  with 
the  work  of  James  Watt,  339  ; 
not  dissimilar  to  Watt's  work 
in  its  relation  to  the  Reign  of 
Law,  340 ;  opinions  influenced 
by  personal  observation  of  the 
ill-treatment  of  Watt  by  the 
"  Burgesses  and  Craftsmen  of 
Glasgow,"  342;  doctrines  of, 


458 


INDEX. 


where  a  hindrance,  not  a  help, 
362. 
Snakes,  rudiments  of  Legs  in, 

195- 

Snipe  chased  by  a  Merlin  in  the 
Hebrides,  158. 

Snipes,  Feathers  of,  imitating 
the  colour  of  bleached  vege- 
table stalks,  184. 

Society,  Sanction  of,  given,  or 
withheld,  its  influence  for 
evil,  or  good,  366 ;  desire 
and  need  for  Combination 
grows  with  the  growth  of 
knowledge  and  with  the  in- 
creasing complications  of, 
376;  openness  and  simplicity 
of  mind  great  characteristics 
of  those  men  who  have  ex- 
erted an  influence  for  good  on, 
384 ;  disorders  of,  the  fruit 
of  ignorance  or  rebellion, 

385. 

Solar  System,  the,  like  the 
Steam  Engine,  works  by  way 
of  Natural  Consequence, 
1 08. 

Space  and  Time,  can  we  say 
more  of  their  wonders  than 
was  said  by  David  and  Job? 
114. 

Spain,  Modern,  prohibition  of 
gold  from  leaving  the  State, 
336. 

Sparrow  Hawk  chased  and 
" chaffed"  by  little  birds, 
158. 

Sparta,  Ancient,  Law  of,  pro- 
hibiting gold  from  ever  coming 
into  the  State,  336. 

Species,  the  Preservation  and 
Distribution  of,  when  they 
have  arisen,  the  real  bearing 
of  the  doctrine  of  Natural 
Selection,  240. 

Spindle,  the,  on  Egyptian 
monuments!  a  similar  instru- 


ment familiar  in  the  High- 
lands until  a  few  years  ago, 
345- 

Spinning  Jenny,  the,  coming 
to  economise  the  work  of 
human  hands,  347. 

Spinning  Wheel  in  Yorkshire 
in  1760,  345. 

Spontaneousness  of  Nature,  no 
such  thing  as,  according  to 
Professor  Tyndall,  6;  illus- 
tration of  "spontaneous"  de- 
sign in  the  Professor's  own 
mind,  13. 

Statute  of  Apprenticeship  in 
Watt's  time,  344. 

Steam  Engine,  Discovery  of  the, 
a  new  stimulus  to  the  mind's 
motives,  341. 

Stewart's,  Dugald,  account  of 
the  Life  and  Writings  of 
Adam  Smith,  337. 

"  Strong  Arm  of  the  Law," 
what  it  really  is  as  proposed 
by  Mr.  Baker,  the  P'actory 
Inspector,  360. 

Structure,  Bodily,  Affinities  be- 
tween the,  of  Man  and  that  of 
the  Lower  Animals,  amongst 
the  profound  est  mysteries  of 
Nature,  265. 

"  Struggle  for  Existence,"  the, 
of  Organisms,  220. 

Stunted  and  distorted  growth  in 
large  portions  of  mankind,  in 
how  far  these  conditions  are 
subject  to  the  control  of  Will 
through  the  Use  of  Means, 

325- 

Superhuman,  much  that  was 
once  thought,  not  thought  so 
now,  13. 

Superhuman  and  the  Super- 
material,  the,  familiar  facts  in 
nature,  23. 

Supernatural,  Belief  in  the,  es- 
sential to  all  Religion,  an 


INDEX. 


459 


assertion  true  only  in  a  special 
sense,  51. 

Supreme  Will  and  Supreme  In- 
telligence in  the  Laws  of 
Nature,  our  own  Wills  and 
Intelligence  enable  us  to  con- 
ceive of  a,  23. 

Swallow.Common,  sharp-pointed 
structure  of  Wing  in  the,  157. 

Swift,  the,  dropping,  not  flying 
backwards,  141  ;  its  wonder- 
ful and  Unceasing  evolutions, 
147. 

Sylph  Humming  Bird,  the,  233. 

Symmetry  a  relation  we  de- 
tect in  all  variations  of  Organic 
Growth,  242. 

T. 

Tails  in  Birds,  162. 

Taylor,  Jeremy,  on  Resem- 
blances, 53. 

Teachers  in  Politics,  Time  and 
Natural  Consequence  the 
great,  357. 

Tennyson's  Idylls  of  the  King, 
61  ;  Maud, '  100  ;  In  Memo- 
riam,  53,  116,  286. 

ferns,  Mechanism  of  Flight  in, 
150. 

"Theine,"  and  "Strychnine," 
identical  in  elements,  differ 
only  in  the  proportions  in 
which  they  are  combined,  95. 

Theology,  Systematic,  an  idea 
which  it  regards  with  sus- 
picion, 52. 

"  THINGS  HOPED  FOR,"  the 
Power  of,  a  Power  which 
never  dies,  115. 

Thought  and  Emotion,  exciting 
Causes  of,  must  come  from  the 
external  world,  297. 

Threes  within  Threes,  Arche- 
typal Arrangement  of,  in  Or- 
chids, 44. 


Time,  said  to  be  a  powerful 
Factor,  263. 

Torpedo,  number  of  Hexagonal 
columns  in  the  battery  of  the, 
101. 

Trade,  immense  advantage  of 
abolishing  Restrictions  on,  335 , 
success  in,  hindered  by  Protec- 
tion, 341. 

Triumphs,  for  which  man  has 
been  gifted  with  knowledge, 
a  sense  of  right,  and  faculties 
of  Contrivance,  383* 

Truth,  every  one,  connected  with 
every  other  Truth  in  the 
Universe,  56  ;  Ultimate,  be- 
yond the  reach  of  Science, 
272. 

Tulloch,  Principal,  quoted,  23. 

Tycho  Brahe,  343. 

Tyndall,  Professor,  quoted,  6, 
257. 

Type,  or  Pattern,  a  definite,  for 
each  class  of  Animal  adhered 
to,  211. 

Typical  Forms,  work  of  Crea- 
tion carried  on  under  rules  of 
adherence  to,  76. 

TJ. 

Ultimate  Question,  the,  What  is 
it  by  which  this  is  done  ?  lies 
above  and  behind  every  de- 
tected Method  in  Nature,  272 ; 
Force,  seat  of,  we  know  no- 
thing directly  of,  275. 

Unconscious  Metaphysics  of 
Human  Speech,  303. 

Unity  of  Design  amid  Variety 
of  Form,  a  universal  feature 
in  Nature,  198. 

Unknown  and  Unknowable,  the, 
result  to  Professor  Huxley  of 
using  this  vague  phrase,  89. 

Universe,  question  lying  at  the 
root  of  our  conceptions  of  the, 


460 


INDEX. 


63  ;  constitution  of  the,  Man's 
faculty  of  Contrivance  the 

,  nearest  analogy  by  which  to 
understand  the,  390. 

Unusual  Birth,  an,  Idea  common 
to  all  Development  Theories 
that  a  New  Species  is  simply, 
214. 

Use  and  Ornament  in  Nature 
may  often  arise  out  of  the 
same  conditions,  193. 

Useless  Organs,  how  explained 
by  the  Theory  of  Creation  by 
Birth,  266. 

Utility,  acting  through  Motive 
as  a  Mental  Purpose,  the  pro- 
vider beforehand  of  external 
Correlations,  256  ;  Correlated 
Growth  in  Flowers,  the 
Forces  of,  according  to  Mr. 
Darwin,  modify  structures  in- 
dependent of  Utility,  and 
therefore  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion, 267. 

V. 

-Variability  of  Adjustment  in  the 
facts  of  Nature,  389. 

Variable  Combinations  of  In- 
variable  Forces,  Phenomena 
governed  by,  98. 

Variation,  Laws  of,  Mr.  Darwin 
confesses  "  our  ignorance  of 
the  Laws  of  Variation  is  pro- 
found," 218  ;  so-called  Laws 
of,  for  the  most  part  simply 
observed  Facts  in  respect  to 
Variation.  241. 

Variety  in  itself  an  object  in 
the  creation  oi  New  Species, 
228. 

Velocity  of  Flight,  the  heavier  a 
bird  the  greater  its  possible, 
144. 

Vertebrate  Type,  Purpose  in  the 
adaptibility  of  the,  to  the  in« 


finite  varieties  of  Life,  206, 
271. 

Verities  of  the  World,  a  pre-ad- 
justed  relation  to  the,  295. 

Virgil,  quoted,  142. 

Vital  Force,  the  Great  Impon- 
derable, 151. 

Vital  Power,  the  nearest  concep- 
tion we  can  ever  have  of  Force 
derived  from  our  consciousness 
of,  275. 

Volitions,  our,  how  .far  subject 
to  Adjusted  Forces,  322. 

Voltaic  Battery,  Mr.  Darwin 
cannot  conceive  how  a,  can  be 
made  out  of  the  tissues  of  a 
fish,  104. 

Voltaic  Current,  Mineral  Salt 
crystallizing  under  a,  corre- 
lation of  growth  in  its 
simplest  form,  245. 

Voluntary  Society,  the  mere 
founding  of  a,  the  powerful 

;    latent  force  it  evolves,  369. 


W 


Wages,  Economic  Advantages 
gained  when  hours  of  labour 
are  reduced  without  corre- 
sponding reduction  in,  378. 

Wallace,  Mr.  his  description  of 
Humming  Birds  balancing 
themselves  in  the  air,  167. 

"Watch  Force,"  and  "Vital 
Force,"  analogy  between  them 
precise  and  accurate,  124. 

Water,  the  Old  Motive  Power, 
Factory  System  begun  under, 
347- 

Watt,  James,  339,  et  seq. 

Wealth,  views  of  the  accumu- 
lation of,  in  Ancient  Political 
•  Philosophy,  335  ;  of  Nations 
hindered  by  Protection,  341. 

Wenham,  Mr.  F.  H.  on  the 
Mechanical  Principle  involved 


INDEX. 


46l 


in  the  sufficiency  of  very  nar- 
row Wings,  154. 

Whales,  Teeth  in  young,  which 
never  cut  the  gum,  195. 

What  men  naturally  do,  no  sure 
test  of  what  they  ought,  or 
ought  to  be  allowed,  to  do, 

334- 

\Vhewell,  Dr.  on  the  leading 
characters  in  the  minds  of 
great  Scientific  Discoverers, 

HO. 

Will,  Man's,  instruments  of,  12  ; 
real  difficulty  in  the  idea 
of,  -exercised  without  the  use 
of  means,  14;  God's,  extraor- 
dinary manifestations  of,  how 
they  may  be  wrought  by  the 
use  of  Laws  of  which  Man 
knows  nothing,  1 6 ;  God's, 
seeking  and  effecting  the  ful- 
filment of  designs  as  our  living 
Wills  in  their  little  sphere 
effect  their  little  objects,  21  ; 
Human,  Law  in  its  pri- 
mary signification,  the  autho- 
ritative expression  of,  enforced 
by  Power,  64  ;  Man's,  increas- 
ing power  exercised  by,  over 
the  Material  World,  97  ;  the 
Everlasting,  some  Purpose  of 
it  to  be  seen  working  every- 
where, 123  ;  relation  of,  to 
Law,  and  Law  to  Will,  in 
Mun's  works  and  in  God's, 
126  ;  Unchan^eableness  and 
Universality  of  the  Natural 
Laws  essential  to  their  use  as 
instruments  of,  146;  cases  in 
which  Law  does  not  seem 
subservient  to,  172;  mani- 
fested in  Material  Forces, 
275  >  circuitous  communica- 
tion between  direct  acts  of 
the,  and  movements  of  the 
Body,  277  ;  the,  often  para- 
lysed by  the  stroke  which 


paralyses  a  limb,  278  ;  the, 
its  instinctive  knowledge,  how 
to  use  the  Organism  born  with 
it,  293  ;  in  the  Lower  Ani- 
mals, acted  on  by  fewer  and 
simpler  motives  than  Will  in 
Man,  304  ;  Men's,  "  free "  in 
one  sense,  and  in  one  on;y, 
305  ;  a  Variable,  indispensaole 
to  stability  of  Character,  320  ; 
the  Human,  if  unchange- 
able, then  no  such  thing 
as  changeability  conceivable, 
321  ;  of  Society,  collective, 
two  ways  in  which  it  operates 
on  the  conduct,  326 ;  conscious 
energies  of  the,  ever  tempted 
to  march  directly  on  objects 
only  to  be  reached  circuitously, 
341  ;  Individual,  Laws  against 
which  it  cannot  contend,  359  ; 
Natural  Law  working  on 
Human,  362  ;  Individual, 
Authoritative  Interference  of 
Positive  Institution  with  the 
freedom  of,  still  required  as 
regards  Factories,  364  ;  Indi- 
vidual, external  condit.ons 
which  tell  on,  often  nothing 
but  conditions  depending  on 
the  aggregate  Will  of  those 
around  us,  367  ;  Lnergies  of, 
Constancy  of  Nature  not  in- 
compatible with  the,  389 ; 
Change  of,  the  efficient  cause 
of  numberless  other  changes, 

390- 

Wills,  conclusions  regarding  our, 
against  which  we  are  apt  to 
rebel,  287  ;  our,  not  free  from 
motives,  302  ;  free  from  com- 
pulsion, and  from  nothing  else, 
307- 

Wilson's,  Professor,  Sonnet,  "A 
Cloud,"  154. 

Wing,  Bird's,  pulsations  in  a, 
usually  impossible  to  count; 


462 


INDEX. 


instances  in  the  Partridge, 
Pheasant,  Blackcock,  Pigeon, 
and  Diver,  133  ;  Bird's,  down- 
ward blow  of  a,  indispensable 
to  flight,  135  ;  convex  and  con- 
cave surfaces  of  a,  indispen- 
sable to  flight,  136  ;  sort  of, 
required  by  Birds  which  seek 
their  food  in  the  air,  147; 
peculiarity  of,  in  Divers,  148; 
peculiarity  of,  in  Birds  which 
feed  on  the  surface  of  the 
sea,  149 ;  peculiarity  of,  in 
Birds  of  great  and  long- 
sustained  powers  of  flight, 
150;  a  long,  the  implement 
used  by  the  Bird's  Vital  Force 
against  the  force  of  Gravity, 
151  ;  threefold  division  of  the 
feathers  of  a  Bird's,  155  ; 
sharpness  of  a,  on  what  it 
depends,  156  ;  a  Rook's,  an 
example  of  what,  157  ;  Bones 
of  a  Bird's,  the  bones  of  the 
Mammalian  arm  and  hand, 
169. 

"Windhover,"  machinery  of 
flight  in  the,  159. 

Wings,  Bird's,  Law  of  Leverage 
appealed  to  in,  150;  sort  of, 
in  Gallinaceous  Birds,  155 ; 
Birds  with  short,  155  ;  Birds 
with  short  and  blunt,  how 
they  catch  their  prey,  158  ; 
Humming  Bird's,  amazingly 
rapid  motion  of,  1 66. 

Wolf,  Mr.  J.  his  drawing  of  the 


wing  of  the  Golden  Plover, 
156  ;  his  illustration  of  a  Kes- 
trel hovering,  161. 

Woodcock's  Plumage,  the,  co- 
loured like  decaying  fallen 
leaves,  182  ;  Tail  Feathers  ca- 
pable of  forming  a  beautifully 
tinted  fan,  183  ;  lustrous  black 
eye  betrayed  it  to  the  fowler, 
184. 

Woodpeckers,  Law  of  Assimila- 
tive Colouring  not  extended 
to,  179. 

Words,  which  should  be  the  ser- 
vants of  Thought,  too  often  its 
masters,  63. 

Wordsworth  on  Nature,  as  in- 
cluding all  "in  the  Mind  of 
Man,"  5  ;  his  Ode  to  Immor- 
tality, 59. 

Working  Classes,  always  regard 
with  fear  and  jealousy  those 
triumphs  of  mechanical  inven- 
tion which  tend  to  the  econo 
mising  of  labour,  375  ;  Com- 
bination amongst  the,  an  Edu- 
cation in  itself,  380 ;  Men, 
Combination  the  only  means 
by  which  adult  working,  can 
defend  themselves,  372. 

Z. 

"Zambesi  and  its  Tributaries," 
Dr.  Livingstone's  work, 
quoted,  198.  .  . 


16mo,  cloth,  price  $1  50. 

PEIMEVAL  IAN: 

AN  EXAMINATION  OP  SOME  KEOENT  SPECULATIONS 

BY  THE  DUKE  OF  ARGYLL. 


CONTENTS. 

PART      I.  INTRODUCTORY. 
PART    II.  THE  ORIGIN  OP  MAN. 
PART  III.  THE  ANTIQUITY  OP  MAN. 
PART  IV.  MAN'S  PRIMITIVE  CONDITION 


Opinions  of  the 


"In  the  delicate  function  of  medi- 
ating between  the  antagonistic  ten- 
dencies of  scientific  and  religious 
thought,  the  Duke  of  Argyll  stands 
without  a  rival.  Keenly  alive  to  the 
results  of  modern  research,  and  not 
less  heartily  persuaded  of  the  truths 
of  reveaied  religion,  he  grasps  the 
mutual  relations  of  these  tvyo  depart 
mijnts  with  an  evenness  of  judgment 
that  makes  him  something  more  than 
a  mere  theologian  or  man  of  science. 
No  writer  of  the  present  day  com- 
bines such  accurate  and  varied  scien- 
tific culture  with  religious  convic- 
tions so  unaffected  and  intelligent. 
.  .  .  We  have  given  a  meagre  out- 
lii  e  of  a  book  which  deserves  to  be 
carefully  read  by  all  who  would  keep 
abreast  of  the  leading  tendencies  of 
the  time.  It  does  much  to  set  a  dif- 


ficult question  in  a  more  satisfactory 

light,  out  it 

this  in  furnishing  a  most  admirable 


does  even  better  than 


example  of  the  temper  in  which  such 
discussions  should  be  conducted.  If 
ihe  cause  of  revealed  truth  had  more 
defenders  like  the  Duke  of  Argyll, 
we  should  hear  less  of  the  growing 
scepticism  of  men  of  science.  He  is, 
himself,  a  striking  illustration  of  the 
en  tire  compatibility  of  Christian  faith 
with  scientific  culture."  —  The  Living 
Church. 

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command  the  respect  of  the  best 
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